

Christian Brothers Risk Management Services

ACTIVE SHOOTER *Resource Packet*

These resources were downloaded from a variety of governmental websites and assembled for your convenience. Additional resources and training material can also be found on their websites.

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
Resources

New York City Police
Department

U.S. Department of
Education



CHRISTIAN
BROTHERS
SERVICES



Christian Brothers Risk Management Services

Active Shooter Resource Packet

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ACTIVE SHOOTER

HOW TO RESPOND



National Retail Federation®
The Voice of Retail Worldwide



RETAIL INDUSTRY LEADERS ASSOCIATION
Retail's Future...Educate, Innovate, Advocate

October 2008

Emergency Numbers

EMERGENCY SERVICES: 9 -1 -1

LOCAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION LINE: _____

LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT: _____

LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT: _____

LOCAL HOSPITAL: _____

LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE: _____

FACILITY SECURITY: _____

FACILITY ADDRESS: _____

FLOOR: _____ SUITE/ROOM: _____

OFFICE #: _____ EXT. _____

PROFILE OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

An Active Shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.

Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims.

Because active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

Good practices for coping with an active shooter situation

- Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers
- Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit
- If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door
- If you are in a hallway, get into a room and secure the door
- As a last resort, attempt to take the active shooter down. When the shooter is at close range and you cannot flee, your chance of survival is much greater if you try to incapacitate him/her.

**CALL 911
WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO!**

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

Quickly determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life. Remember that customers and clients are likely to follow the lead of employees and managers during an active shooter situation.

1. Evacuate

If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises. Be sure to:

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow
- Leave your belongings behind
- Help others escape, if possible
- Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter may be
- Keep your hands visible
- Follow the instructions of any police officers
- Do not attempt to move wounded people
- Call 911 when you are safe

2. Hide out

If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active shooter is less likely to find you.

Your hiding place should:

- Be out of the active shooter's view
- Provide protection if shots are fired in your direction (i.e., an office with a closed and locked door)
- Not trap you or restrict your options for movement

To prevent an active shooter from entering your hiding place:

- Lock the door
- Blockade the door with heavy furniture

If the active shooter is nearby:

- Lock the door
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager
- Turn off any source of noise (i.e., radios, televisions)
- Hide behind large items (i.e., cabinets, desks)
- Remain quiet


If evacuation and hiding out are not possible:

- Remain calm
- Dial 911, if possible, to alert police to the active shooter's location
- If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen

3. Take action against the active shooter

As a last resort, and only when your life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by:

- Acting as aggressively as possible against him/her
- Throwing items and improvising weapons
- Yelling
- Committing to your actions



HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

Law enforcement's purpose is to stop the active shooter as soon as possible. Officers will proceed directly to the area in which the last shots were heard.

- Officers usually arrive in teams of four (4)
- Officers may wear regular patrol uniforms or external bulletproof vests, Kevlar helmets, and other tactical equipment
- Officers may be armed with rifles, shotguns, handguns
- Officers may use pepper spray or tear gas to control the situation
- Officers may shout commands, and may push individuals to the ground for their safety

How to react when law enforcement arrives:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises

Information to provide to law enforcement or 911 operator:

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- Physical description of shooter/s
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter/s
- Number of potential victims at the location

The first officers to arrive to the scene will not stop to help injured persons. Expect rescue teams comprised of additional officers and emergency medical personnel to follow the initial officers. These rescue teams will treat and remove any injured persons. They may also call upon able-bodied individuals to assist in removing the wounded from the premises.

Once you have reached a safe location or an assembly point, you will likely be held in that area by law enforcement until the situation is under control, and all witnesses have been identified and questioned. Do not leave until law enforcement authorities have instructed you to do so.

TRAINING YOUR STAFF FOR AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

To best prepare your staff for an active shooter situation, create an Emergency Action Plan (EAP), and conduct training exercises. Together, the EAP and training exercises will prepare your staff to effectively respond and help minimize loss of life.

Components of an Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

Create the EAP with input from several stakeholders including your human resources department, your training department (if one exists), facility owners / operators, your property manager, and local law enforcement and/or emergency responders. An effective EAP includes:

- A preferred method for reporting fires and other emergencies
- An evacuation policy and procedure
- Emergency escape procedures and route assignments (i.e., floor plans, safe areas)
- Contact information for, and responsibilities of individuals to be contacted under the EAP
- Information concerning local area hospitals (i.e., name, telephone number, and distance from your location)
- An emergency notification system to alert various parties of an emergency including:
 - Individuals at remote locations within premises
 - Local law enforcement
 - Local area hospitals

Components of Training Exercises

The most effective way to train your staff to respond to an active shooter situation is to conduct mock active shooter training exercises. Local law enforcement is an excellent resource in designing training exercises.

- Recognizing the sound of gunshots
- Reacting quickly when gunshots are heard and/or when a shooting is witnessed:
 - Evacuating the area
 - Hiding out
 - Acting against the shooter as a last resort
- Calling 911
- Reacting when law enforcement arrives
- Adopting the survival mind set during times of crisis

Additional Ways to Prepare For and Prevent an Active Shooter Situation

- Preparedness
 - Ensure that your facility has at least two evacuation routes
 - Post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout your facility
 - Include local law enforcement and first responders during training exercises
 - Encourage law enforcement, emergency responders, SWAT teams, K-9 teams, and bomb squads to train for an active shooter scenario at your location
- Prevention
 - Foster a respectful workplace
 - Be aware of indications of workplace violence and take remedial actions accordingly

For more information on creating an EAP contact the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, www.osha.gov.



PREPARING FOR AND MANAGING AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

Your human resources department and facility managers should engage in planning for emergency situations, including an active shooter scenario. Planning for emergency situations will help to mitigate the likelihood of an incident by establishing the mechanisms described below.

Human Resources' Responsibilities

- Conduct effective employee screening and background checks
- Create a system for reporting signs of potentially violent behavior
- Make counseling services available to employees
- Develop an EAP which includes policies and procedures for dealing with an active shooter situation, as well as after action planning

Facility Manager Responsibilities

- Institute access controls (i.e., keys, security system pass codes)
- Distribute critical items to appropriate managers / employees, including:
 - Floor plans
 - Keys
 - Facility personnel lists and telephone numbers
- Coordinate with the facility's security department to ensure the physical security of the location
- Assemble crisis kits containing:
 - radios
 - floor plans
 - staff roster, and staff emergency contact numbers
 - first aid kits
 - flashlights
- Place removable floor plans near entrances and exits for emergency responders
- Activate the emergency notification system when an emergency situation occurs

Reactions of Managers During an Active Shooter Situation

Employees and customers are likely to follow the lead of managers during an emergency situation. During an emergency, managers should be familiar with their EAP, and be prepared to:

- Take immediate action
- Remain calm
- Lock and barricade doors
- Evacuate staff and customers via a preplanned evacuation route to a safe area

Assisting Individuals with Special Needs and/or Disabilities

- Ensure that EAPs, evacuation instructions and any other relevant information address to individuals with special needs and/or disabilities
- Your building should be handicap-accessible, in compliance with ADA requirements.



RECOGNIZING POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

An active shooter in your workplace may be a current or former employee, or an acquaintance of a current or former employee. Intuitive managers and coworkers may notice characteristics of potentially violent behavior in an employee. Alert your Human Resources Department if you believe an employee or coworker exhibits potentially violent behavior.

Indicators of Potential Violence by an Employee

Employees typically do not just “snap,” but display indicators of potentially violent behavior over time. If these behaviors are recognized, they can often be managed and treated. Potentially violent behaviors by an employee may include one or more of the following (this list of behaviors is not comprehensive, nor is it intended as a mechanism for diagnosing violent tendencies):

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints
- Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene
- Depression / withdrawal
- Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures
- Repeated violations of company policies
- Increased severe mood swings
- Noticeably unstable, emotional responses
- Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation
- Suicidal; comments about “putting things in order”
- Behavior which is suspect of paranoia, (“everybody is against me”)
- Increasingly talks of problems at home
- Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems
- Talk of previous incidents of violence
- Empathy with individuals committing violence
- Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crimes

MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

After the active shooter has been incapacitated and is no longer a threat, human resources and/or management should engage in post-event assessments and activities, including:

- An accounting of all individuals at a designated assembly point to determine who, if anyone, is missing and potentially injured
- Determining a method for notifying families of individuals affected by the active shooter, including notification of any casualties
- Assessing the psychological state of individuals at the scene, and referring them to health care specialists accordingly
- Identifying and filling any critical personnel or operational gaps left in the organization as a result of the active shooter

LESSONS LEARNED

To facilitate effective planning for future emergencies, it is important to analyze the recent active shooter situation and create an after action report. The analysis and reporting contained in this report is useful for:

- Serving as documentation for response activities
- Identifying successes and failures that occurred during the event
- Providing an analysis of the effectiveness of the existing EAP
- Describing and defining a plan for making improvements to the EAP

References

Safety Guidelines for Armed Subjects, Active Shooter Situations, Indiana University Police Department, April 2007.

Safety Tips & Guidelines Regarding Potential “Active Shooter” Incidents Occurring on Campus, University of California Police.

Shots Fired, When Lightning Strikes (DVD), Center for Personal Protection and Safety, 2007.

Workplace Violence Desk Reference, Security Management Group International, www.SMGICorp.com

How to Plan for Workplace Emergencies and Evacuations, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, OSHA 3088, 2001.



U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

cfsteam@hq.dhs.gov

www.dhs.gov



COPING

WITH AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

- Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers
- Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit
- If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door
- Attempt to take the active shooter down as a last resort

Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.

PROFILE

OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area, typically through the use of firearms.

CHARACTERISTICS

OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

- Victims are selected at random
- The event is unpredictable and evolves quickly
- Law enforcement is usually required to end an active shooter situation



**CALL 911 WHEN IT
IS SAFE TO DO SO**

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

1. EVACUATE

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Keep your hands visible

2. HIDE OUT

- Hide in an area out of the shooter's view
- Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager

3. TAKE ACTION

- As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger
- Attempt to incapacitate the shooter
- Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

**CALL 911 WHEN IT
IS SAFE TO DO SO**

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

- Remain calm and follow instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating

INFORMATION

YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters
- Physical description of shooters
- Number and type of weapons held by shooters
- Number of potential victims at the location

COMO MANEJAR

UNA SITUACIÓN CON UNA PERSONA ARMADA

- Esté pendiente de sus alrededores y de cualquier peligro potencial
- Tome nota de las dos salidas más cercanas en cualquier instalación que visite
- Si se encuentra en una oficina, quédese allí y mantenga la puerta cerrada
- Como último recurso, trate de derribar el tirador

Comuníquese con los gerentes del edificio o con el departamento de recursos humanos para mayor información y para capacitar a todo el personal sobre como responder ante una persona armada en su lugar de trabajo.



INFORMACIÓN

QUE DEBE PROVEER A LA POLICÍA O AL OPERADOR DEL 911

- Ubicación de la persona armada
- Cantidad de tiradores
- Una descripción física del tirador o los tiradores
- Cantidad y tipo de armas que lleva el tirador o los tiradores
- Cantidad de víctimas potenciales en el local

CARACTERÍSTICAS

DE UNA SITUACIÓN CON PERSONAS ARMADAS

- Las víctimas son seleccionadas al azar
- El evento es imprevisible y se desarrolla rápidamente
- Normalmente se requiere la intervención de la policía para terminar una situación con una persona armada

**LLAME AL 911
CUANDO SEA SEGURO**

COMO RESPONDER

CUANDO UNA PERSONA ARMADA SE
ENCUENTRA EN SU VECINDARIO

1. CORRER

- Tenga en mente un plan y ruta de escape
- Deje sus pertenencias
- Mantenga sus manos visibles

2. ESCONDERSE

- Escóndase en un área fuera de la vista del tirador
- Bloquee la entrada a su escondite y cierre las puertas con llave
- Ponga en silencio su teléfono celular y/o beeper

3. LUCHAR

- Como último recurso y sólo cuando su vida este en peligro inminente
- Trate de incapacitar al tirador
- Demuestre agresión física y tírele cosas al tirador

**LLAME AL 911
CUANDO SEA SEGURO**

COMO RESPONDER

COMO RESPONDER CUANDO LLEGUE
LA POLICÍA

- Mantenga la calma y siga las instrucciones de los oficiales
- Suelte cualquier artículo que tenga en la mano (como por ejemplo bolsas, chaquetas)
- Levante las manos inmediatamente y abra los dedos
- Mantenga las manos visibles en todo momento
- Evite hacer movimientos rápidos hacia los oficiales como el tratar de tocarlos para sentirse seguro
- Evite señalar y/o gritar
- No pare para pedirles ayuda o direcciones a los oficiales durante la evacuación

PERFIL

DE UN TIROTEO EN PROCESO

Un tiroteo en proceso es una situación en la cual una persona está activamente involucrada en matar o tratar de matar a personas en un área cerrada o concurrida, normalmente a través del uso de armas de fuego.

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

QUICKLY DETERMINE THE MOST REASONABLE WAY TO PROTECT YOUR OWN LIFE. CUSTOMERS AND CLIENTS ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS DURING AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION.

1. Run

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Keep your hands visible

2. Hide

- Hide in an area out of the active shooter's view.
- Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors

3. Fight

- As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger.
- Attempt to incapacitate the active shooter
- Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

**CALL 911 WHEN IT IS
SAFE TO DO SO**

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES ON THE SCENE

1. HOW YOU SHOULD REACT WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as attempting to hold on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises

2. INFORMATION YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR:

- Location of the victims and the active shooter
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- Physical description of shooter/s
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter/s
- Number of potential victims at the location

RECOGNIZING SIGNS OF POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

AN ACTIVE SHOOTER MAY BE A CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEE. ALERT YOUR HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT IF YOU BELIEVE AN EMPLOYEE EXHIBITS POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR. INDICATORS OF POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR MAY INCLUDE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism, and/or vague physical complaints
- Depression/Withdrawal
- Increased severe mood swings, and noticeably unstable or emotional responses
- Increasingly talks of problems at home
- Increase in unsolicited comments about violence, firearms, and other dangerous weapons and violent crimes



Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.

COMO RESPONDER

CUANDO UNA PERSONA ARMADA SE ENCUENTRA EN SU VECINDARIO

RÁPIDAMENTE DETERMINE LA MANERA MÁS RAZONABLE DE PROTEGER SU PROPIA VIDA. LOS CLIENTES TIENDEN A SEGUIR EL EJEMPLO DE LOS EMPLEADOS Y LOS GERENTES DURANTE UNA SITUACIÓN CON UNA PERSONA ARMADA.

1. CORRER

- Tenga en mente un plan y una ruta de escape.
- Deje sus pertenencias.
- Mantenga sus manos visibles.

2. ESCONDERSE

- Escóndase en un área fuera de la vista del tirador.
- Bloquee la entrada del lugar de su escondite y cierre las puertas con llave.

3. LUCHAR

- Como último recurso y sólo cuando su vida este en peligro inminente.
- Trate de incapacitar al tirador.
- Demuestre agresión física y tírele cosas al tirador.

LLAME AL 911 CUANDO SEA SEGURO

COMO RESPONDER CUANDO LLEGUE LA POLICÍA A LA ESCENA

1. COMO DEBE REACCIONAR CUANDO LLEGUE LA POLICÍA A LA ESCENA:

- Mantenga la calma y siga las instrucciones de los oficiales.
- Levante las manos inmediatamente y abra los dedos.
- Mantenga las manos visibles en todo momento.
- Evite señalar y/o gritar.
- Evite hacer movimientos rápidos hacia los oficiales como el tratar de agarrarlos para sentirse seguro.
- No pare para pedirles ayuda o direcciones a los oficiales durante la evacuación, solo proceda en la dirección por donde están entrando los oficiales al local.

2. INFORMACIÓN QUE DEBE PROVEER A LA POLICÍA O AL OPERADOR DE 911:

- Ubicación de la persona armada.
- Cantidad de tiradores, si hay más de uno.
- Una descripción física del tirador o tiradores.
- Cantidad y tipo de armas que lleva el tirador o los tiradores.
- Cantidad de víctimas potenciales en el local.

RECONOCIENDO LAS SEÑALES POTENCIALES DE VIOLENCIA EN EL LUGAR DE TRABAJO

UN TIROTEO PUEDE SER INICIADO POR UN EMPLEADO ACTUAL O ANTERIOR. ALERTE A SU DEPARTAMENTO DE RECURSOS HUMANOS SI CREE QUE UN EMPLEADO ESTÁ DEMOSTRANDO UN COMPORTAMIENTO POTENCIALMENTE VIOLENTO. EL COMPORTAMIENTO POTENCIALMENTE VIOLENTO PUEDE INCLUIR UNO O MÁS DE LOS SIGUIENTES INDICADORES:

- Incremento en el uso del alcohol y/o drogas ilegales.
- Un aumento inexplicable del absentismo laboral y/o quejas físicas vagas.
- Depresión/Síndrome de aislamiento.
- Un aumento en los cambios del estado de ánimo así como un aumento notable en las respuestas emocionales o inestables.
- Un aumento en las pláticas sobre los problemas en casa.
- Un aumento de comentarios no solicitados sobre la violencia, las armas de fuego y otras armas peligrosas y crímenes violentos.



Comuníquese con los gerentes del edificio o con el departamento de recursos humanos para mayor información y para capacitar a todo el personal sobre como responder ante una persona armada en su lugar de trabajo.



Planning and Response to an Active Shooter:

An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide

November 2015



Interagency
Security
Committee

Change History and Document Control

Rev. #	Date	Changes	Approver
1.0	7/21/2015	Initial Issue	ISC
2.0	11/12/2015	FOUO Information Removed for Public Release	ISC



Message from the Interagency Security Committee Chair

One of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) national priorities is the protection of Federal employees and private citizens who work within and visit U.S. government-owned or leased facilities. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), chaired by DHS and consisting of 54 Federal departments and agencies, has as its mission the development of security standards and best practices for nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States.

As Chair of the ISC, I am pleased to introduce the new document titled *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide (non-FOUO)*. The For Official Use Only (FOUO) version of this document was initially released to the Federal community only in July 2015. It streamlined existing ISC policy on active shooter incidents into one cohesive policy and guidance document to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident at Federal facilities. The non-FOUO version is being made publicly available as a reference document for the private sector so that a wider audience may benefit from the information presented herein.

In many cases, active shooter incidents can be unpredictable in nature and can evolve quickly. As such, a number of guidance documents exist on how to prepare for and respond to an active shooter incident. Although previous ISC documents discussed active shooter incidents, such as the *Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response* and *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, this single cohesive document with greater concentration on active shooter incidents serves as a resource for Federal agencies and departments, and enhances preparedness for an active shooter incident in a Federal facility.

This policy and guidance, approved with full concurrence of the ISC primary members, is a significant milestone and represents exemplary collaboration across the ISC and among the ISC Active Shooter Working Group in developing the first ISC document combining policy and planning guidance. This Policy and Best Practices Guide was approved November 12, 2015 and will be reviewed and updated as needed.

Caitlin Durkovich
Assistant Secretary
Infrastructure Protection

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ISC Policy

INTENT:

The policy outlined herein is meant to establish baseline agency/department protocols across the Federal government for active shooter situations. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), under the authority of Presidential Executive Orders 12977 and 13286, mandates that the following policy be enacted at all nonmilitary Federal facilities.¹ Additionally, wherever possible, it is recommended that Agencies commit to the implementation of the best practices outlined in the subsequent sections of this document: *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide*.

POLICY:

- 1) Each facility shall have an active shooter² preparedness plan, which is to be updated every two years, as needed. At a minimum, a plan should comprise the following elements:
 - a. Security Assessments
 - b. Preparedness
 - c. Communication
 - d. Incident Plan (i.e., actions to take during an incident)
 - e. Training and Exercises
 - f. Post Incident Recovery
 - i. Employees
 - ii. Operations
- 2) As plans are drafted, reviewed, and updated, each facility Designated Official or designee shall collaborate with the facility security provider (e.g. Federal Protective Service [FPS], U.S. Marshals Service [USMS], etc.), on-site law enforcement agencies (if applicable), and first responder agencies likely to address an active shooter situation.
- 3) Agency representatives shall collaborate with other tenants/agencies in development of the plan.

¹ The policy outlined herein is a requirement of all agencies within the Executive Branch of the Federal government. Although this is not a requirement for agencies of the Legislative and Judiciary Branches, the ISC strongly recommends that agencies within those branches of government also implement this policy.

² An active shooter is defined as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area. While the majority of incidents involve the use of firearms, for the purposes of this policy, the term “active shooter” may also apply to an individual armed with any other type of weapon (e.g., firearm, knife, explosives, etc.). Throughout this policy and the subsequent best practices guidance, the ISC will use the term “active shooter” to describe any incident with a perpetrator who poses an active threat.

- 4) Agency representatives shall provide training, materials, and/or awareness discussions to inform employees of active shooter preparedness plans as they are updated.
 - a. Employees should be aware of the Federally-endorsed **run, hide, fight**³ concept.
 - b. Employees should be informed of the importance of having a personal plan.
 - c. New employees should be given active shooter preparedness training during the initial onboarding period.
- 5) The active shooter plan need not be a stand-alone document. The agency/facility security officials and/or Designated Official will determine the best way to incorporate the active shooter plan into existing protocols.
- 6) As previously noted, the six points above are policy requirements for all agencies within the Executive Branch of the Federal government. What follows throughout the rest of this document is a set of best practices and recommendations which are not policy requirements—these are meant to assist with the implementation of an active shooter plan as mandated by this policy.

³ Run, Hide, Fight video with closed captioning option: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video>. The video is also available in multiple languages.

Executive Summary

The primary mission of the ISC Active Shooter Working Group is to streamline existing ISC documents on active shooter into one cohesive policy and guidance document that agencies housed in Federal facilities can use as a reference to enhance prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts related to an active shooter incident.⁴ The goal of the ISC's Active Shooter Working Group is to promote the highest chance of victim and responder survivability through awareness, prevention, education, and training.

This guidance is designed to be applicable to all buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees. These include existing buildings, new construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, or being purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities; Federal campuses; where appropriate, individual facilities on Federal campuses; and special-use facilities.

Due to the nature of an active shooter event, this document contains guidance for all who might be involved, including law enforcement agencies, facility tenants, and the public. Certain responsibilities outlined within this document are specific to designated law enforcement officers or personnel possessing the authority and training to take immediate action to contain, apprehend, or neutralize an active threat. Other sections of this document are meant to educate facility tenants regarding actions they can take to save themselves or others.

⁴ The FOUO version of this document was initially released to the Federal community in July 2015. It streamlined existing ISC policy on active shooter incidents into one cohesive policy and guidance document to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident at Federal facilities. The non-FOUO version is being made publicly available as a reference document for the private sector. It is generally outside the scope of the ISC to promulgate policies and/or best practices for the private sector. However, the ISC has released this document so that a wider audience may benefit from the information presented herein. References to Federal facilities have not been removed. The private sector and other non-government entities may interpret this document as appropriate to their specific facility security plans.

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1 Introduction to Planning Guidance

Our Nation's Federal agencies are entrusted with providing a safe and secure environment for our government's most essential functions and assets, including the personnel that may occupy their facilities and the public that may pass through conducting business with the Federal government on any given day. Federal facilities are faced with planning for emergencies of all kinds, ranging from active shooters, hostage situations, and other similar security challenges, as well as natural threats to include fires, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and pandemics of infectious diseases. Many of these emergencies occur with little to no warning; therefore, it is critical for all facilities to plan in advance to help ensure the safety, security, and general welfare of all facility occupants.

The primary mission of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Active Shooter Working Group is to streamline existing ISC policy on active shooter incident planning and response into one cohesive policy and guidance document that agencies housed in Federal facilities can use as a reference to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident.

The ISC defines Federal facilities as buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees for nonmilitary activities. These include existing buildings, new construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, to be purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities, Federal campuses, and where appropriate, individual facilities on Federal campuses; and special-use facilities.

This document provides emergency planners, disaster committees, executive leadership, and others involved in emergency operations planning with detailed discussions of unique issues faced in Federal facilities before, during, and after an active shooter event. Occupant Emergency Plans should be living documents that are routinely reviewed and updated to consider all types of hazards, including the possibility of workplace violence, an active shooter, or terrorist incident. As our Nation continues to draw on lessons learned from actual emergencies, Federal facilities should incorporate those lessons learned into existing, or newly created, plans and procedures.

2 Background

The frequency of active shooter incidents has increased in recent years, and these incidents have affected numerous places where citizens congregate, such as schools, workplaces, places of worship, shopping malls, public meetings, and movie theaters. Unfortunately, these events highlight the need to reduce the risk of active shooter incidents while improving preparedness and strengthening ongoing efforts intended to prevent future occurrences.

The ISC defines an active shooter as an individual or individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area. In most cases, firearms are the weapon of choice during active shooter incidents, but any weapon (such as a knife, etc.) can be used to harm innocent individuals. Typically, there is no pattern or method to the selection of victims. Active shooter situations are dynamic and quickly evolve. Often, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the aggressive action of a shooter to mitigate harm to potential victims. However, because active shooter situations are also frequently over prior to the arrival

of law enforcement, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation prior to law enforcement arrival.

Agencies continue to evaluate active shooter events in an attempt to generate a profile of an active shooter. There are no hard links to provide an accurate profile of an active shooter. Though there is no profile, there are several possible indicators that can give clues to the possibility of a potential active shooter; see [Section 5: Preparedness](#). Continuous evaluation of these events is necessary and should be aimed at the detection, management, and resolution of an impending crisis in order to effectively exercise early prevention mechanisms. A good basic document is the 2014 Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013*⁵ (see key research findings on page 4).

The ISC Active Shooter Working Group's primary mission was to develop one cohesive active shooter document that agencies housed in Federal facilities can use as a reference to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident(s). This document may also be useful to other local jurisdictions across the United States.

National preparedness efforts, including planning, are based on Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8: National Preparedness, which was signed by President Obama in March 2011. This directive represents an evolution in our collective understanding of national preparedness based on lessons learned from natural disasters, terrorist acts, active shooter events, and other violent incidents.

PPD-8 characterizes preparedness using five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Emergency management officials and emergency responders engaging with Federal facilities are familiar with this terminology. These mission areas generally align with the three temporal frameworks (time frames) associated with an incident: pre-incident, incident, and post-incident environments. Most of the prevention, protection, and mitigation activities generally occur before or are modified after an incident, although these three mission areas are frequently applicable during an incident. For example, injury prevention can and should occur before, during, and after an incident. Response activities occur during an incident, while recovery activities can begin during and after an incident.

Planning teams at Federal facilities responsible for developing and revising occupant emergency plans and procedures should use the concepts and principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to incorporate planning efforts into existing emergency programs and plans that are related to active shooter incidents and other hostile threats. One component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), which provides a standardized approach for incident management, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity of the event. By using the ICS during an incident, Federal facilities will be able to work more effectively with the first responders in their communities.⁶

⁵ The study can be found at: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177.

⁶ For more information on the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System, please see <http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system>.

Examples of recommended practices and matters to consider have been included in this document for planning and implementation purposes; however, Federal facility emergency managers—with the support of their leadership and in conjunction with local emergency managers and responders—must consider what is most appropriate for that facility and its occupants. Additionally, planning teams should consider Federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

There are various documents, studies, and websites devoted to the awareness of active shooter incidents; reference [Section 9: Resources/Templates](#) for a list of resources and links that may be useful in developing or reviewing active shooter plans. These websites are constantly evolving and being updated as lessons are learned. The resources vary in content, ranging from providing an overview of past shooting incidents, findings, a background analysis of the shooter, weaponry used, resolution of events, training, equipment, and best practices. The inclusion of certain references does not imply endorsement of any documents, products, or approaches. Other resources may be equally helpful and should be considered in creating or revising existing plans and procedures.

Figure 1: Key Research Findings^{7, 8}

- 160 Active Shooter incidents occurred between 2000 and 2013.
- An average of 11.4 incidents occurred annually: an average of 6.4 annually in the first seven years of the study and an average of 16.4 annually in the last seven years.
- Shootings occurred in 40 of 50 states and the District of Columbia.
- The 160 incidents resulted in 1,043 casualties: 486 killed and 557 wounded, not including the shooter.
- In incidents, the median number of people killed was two, the median wounded was two.
- Approximately 60 percent of the incidents ended before police arrived.
- 64 (40 percent) of the incidents ended with the shooter committing suicide.
- In 21 incidents (13.1 percent), the incident ended after unarmed citizens safely and successfully restrained the shooter. Of note, 11 of the incidents involved unarmed principals, teachers, other school staff, and students who confronted shooters to end the threat.
- In 45 of the 160 (28.1 percent) incidents, law enforcement had to engage the shooter to end the threat. In 21 of those 45 (46.7 percent) instances, law enforcement suffered casualties with nine killed and 28 wounded.
- In 64 cases where the duration could be ascertained, 44 (69 percent) ended in less than five minutes with 23 ending in two minutes or less.
- In five incidents (3.8 percent) the shooting ended after armed individuals who were not law enforcement personnel exchanged gunfire with the shooters.
- Active shooter incidents occurred most frequently in areas of commerce (46 percent), followed by educational environments (24 percent), and government properties (ten percent).

⁷ Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014., http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177

⁸ Note: this study examines all active shooter incidents occurring in the United States, not just those at Federal facilities. The FBI identifies the criteria for an active shooter event as “individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in populated areas (excluding shootings related to gang or drug violence).” The study contains a full list of the 160 incidents used, including those that occurred at Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook Elementary School, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Fort Hood, the Aurora (Colorado) Cinemark Century 16 movie theater, the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin, and the Washington Navy Yard.

3 Applicability and Scope

Pursuant to the authority granted to the ISC in Section 5 of Executive Order (EO) 12977, as amended by EO 13286, this ISC guidance is intended to be a reference document to provide agencies with enhanced preparedness for an active shooter incident. The goal of the ISC's Active Shooter Working Group was to promote the highest chance of victim and responder survivability through awareness, prevention, education, and training.

This guidance was designed to be applicable to all buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees. These include existing buildings, new construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, being purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities; Federal campuses; where appropriate, individual facilities on Federal campuses; and special-use facilities.

Due to the nature of an active shooter event, this document contains guidance for all who might be involved in an active shooter event, including law enforcement agencies, facility tenants, and the public. Certain responsibilities outlined within this document are specific to designated law enforcement officers or personnel possessing the authority and training to take immediate action to contain, apprehend, or neutralize an active threat, while other sections of this document are meant to educate facility tenants.

4 Incorporating Active Shooter Considerations into the Occupant Emergency Program

A mutually supportive relationship exists between the risk management process, facility security assessments, and the Occupant Emergency Program (OEP). The OEP establishes basic procedures for safeguarding lives and property in and around the facility during emergencies.⁹ 41 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) requires Federal agencies to have an OEP.¹⁰ The OEP should contain the Facility Security Plan (FSP) and the Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP). As mandated by 41 CFR, facility Designated Officials are responsible for establishing, staffing, and training an Occupant Emergency Organization (OEO) which will develop, implement, and maintain the OEP.

Once risks to a facility are accurately assessed, including those posed by an active shooter event, facility security managers and Designated Officials can determine whether countermeasures in place are adequate to mitigate those risks or whether additional countermeasures are required. Procedural, programmatic, and physical security countermeasures resulting from the facility security assessment regarding active shooter events and other emergency situations should be included in the Occupant Emergency Program, Occupant Emergency Plan,¹¹ and Facility

⁹ For more information, see *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, March 2013. The guide can be accessed at: <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/isc-occupant-emergency-programs-guide>.

¹⁰ 41 CFR 102-74.230 through 102-74.260

¹¹ As differentiated from the occupant emergency program, an occupant emergency plan is a document describing the actions occupants should take to ensure their safety in a particular emergency situation.

Security Plan. These plans are intended to minimize the risk to personnel, property, and other assets within the facility if an incident occurs inside or immediately surrounding the facility by providing facility-specific response procedures for occupants to follow.¹²

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, various Presidential Directives and Executive Orders have been issued requiring Federal agencies to develop and implement plans, policies, and procedures for dealing with and responding to emergency situations. Agencies can use existing guidance such as OEPs, disaster response plans, and Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans when developing an active shooter or workplace violence prevention program and plan. As with any threat or hazard that is included in an OEP, goals, objectives, and courses of action should be established for an active shooter response plan. These plans should be included in the OEP as an addendum or a functional annex. For example, evacuation will be different during an active shooter incident than it would be for a fire.

Incorporating the concept of facility protection into the site's OEP can help reduce the likelihood of workplace violence incidents (including active shooter scenarios), increase the effectiveness of response, and limit casualties. Most acts of workplace violence occur as some form of verbal or non-verbal threat, bullying, harassment, or non-fatal physical assault. However, it is important to remember acts of physical workplace violence might start as some form of non-physical assault, so agencies must take all threats seriously and respond appropriately. It is also important to note a threat will not lead to a violent act in the great majority of cases. The threat itself, however, damages workplace safety and must be addressed.

While active shooter events are rare, the random and unpredictable nature of the threat and operating area present a complex challenge to Federal security and law enforcement personnel. Ideally, Federal security and law enforcement will deter and prevent active shooter attacks altogether. Should deterrence and prevention fail, however, occupant knowledge and application of emergency procedures and protective actions will save lives. Therefore, an OEP that delineates procedures to protect life and property in federally occupied space during emergency conditions is an essential tool, both before and during an active shooter incident.

Plans should be created with input from internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders may include leadership, security, facility owners and operators, property managers, the human resources department, risk managers, and the training department. External stakeholders should include local police, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, and fire personnel.

An effective active shooter plan will include the following:

- Proactive steps that can be taken by facility tenants to identify individuals who may be on a trajectory to commit a violent act.
- A preferred method for reporting active shooter incidents, including informing all those at the facility or who may be entering the facility.
- How to neutralize the threat and achieve life safety objectives.

¹² For more information, see *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, March 2013. The guide can be accessed at: <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/isc-occupant-emergency-programs-guide>.

- Evacuation, shelter-in-place, hide, and lockdown policies and procedures for individual offices and buildings.
 - Emergency escape procedures and route assignments (e.g., floor plans, safe areas), including where to evacuate and how to evacuate when the primary evacuation routes are unusable.
 - Plans should clearly explain shelter-in-place and lockdown procedures, including the differences between the two.
 - How to select effective “hide” locations.
 - Optimal locations have ballistic protection known as “cover” which include thick walls made of steel, cinder block, or brick and mortar; solid doors with locks; and areas with minimal glass and interior windows. These areas can be stocked with accessible first aid and emergency kits designed for hemorrhage control, communication devices, and telephones and/or duress alarms.
 - Designated “shelter-in-place” locations are often designed for natural hazards (earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) and may not be ideal for active shooter incidents. Facilities and/or agencies should consider the development of safe rooms when selecting or renewing a leased facility or new construction. See below for a discussion of safe rooms.
 - Personnel involved in such planning should ensure all sheltering sites and evacuation routes are accessible for persons with disabilities.
- Integration with the facility incident commander and the external incident commander.
- Information concerning local area emergency response agencies and hospitals (i.e., name, telephone number, and distance from the location), including internal phone numbers and contacts.
- How operations will be restored.

After the procedures are approved, occupant personnel should become intimately familiar with the OEP and active shooter plan through training and exercises before an emergency strikes. Drills and exercises should occur at least annually but preferably more frequently. For building-specific risk assessments, reference the *Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Standard*.¹³

4.1 Challenges

Preparing for and responding to an active shooter incident at Federal facilities poses unique challenges. Prior to finalizing or updating incident plans, the agency/facility officials should expect to confront many potential difficulties. These challenges include but are not limited to:

¹³ The standard can be found at: http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ISC_Risk-Management-Process_Aug_2013.pdf.

facility size, facility population, existing security practices, agency mission, child care centers, protection of sensitive and classified information, interaction with the public (e.g., visitor centers, courts, multi-tenant facilities), campus environments, areas of ingress and egress, and mixed-use spaces (e.g., retail shops). It is important to note that each site will pose a unique set of challenges. For this reason, it is important that each facility's active shooter preparedness plan is tailored to address the particularities posed by the site.

Addressing these challenges requires coordination between facility managers, security personnel, emergency management personnel, employees and Federal, state, and local law enforcement. Agencies housed in Federal facilities can use this ISC guidance document to mitigate and prepare for an active shooter incident and to promote the highest chance of victim and responder survivability through awareness, prevention, and education.

5 Preparedness

A major component of any active shooter program or plan is preparedness. This section focuses on measures that can be taken to reduce the risk of violent behavior; as well as mitigate the impacts of violent behavior should it occur. All workplace violence prevention, including active shooter programs, should meet minimum requirements set forth in Section 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970, EO 12196, and the basic program elements under 29 CFR Part 1960.

The 2013 *Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings*¹⁴ identified five non-linear components of mass casualty violence prevention:

- Identifying a person posing a potential threat of violence;
- Notifying the appropriate authorities with this information;
- Evaluating the threat credibility;
- Intervening to prevent the threat; and
- Documenting the intervention and disseminating the information within applicable laws and regulations.

Internal and external partners, programs, and processes can assist with these steps.

No profile exists for an active shooter; however, research indicates there may be signs or indicators. Facility employees should learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation that could develop into an active shooter incident. Each employee should be empowered to proactively seek ways to prevent an incident with internal resources or additional external assistance.

¹⁴ Paparazzo, John, Christine Eith, and Jennifer Tocco. 2013. *Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/publications/summits-on-preventing-multiple-causality-violence/e021311546_MultiCasualty-Violence_v508_05APR13.pdf.

By highlighting pre-attack behaviors displayed by past offenders, researchers have sought to enhance the detection and prevention of tragic events, including active shooter situations. Several agencies within the Federal government continue to explore incidents of targeted violence in an effort to identify these potential “warning signs.” Lessons learned from incidents during the last decade have aided first responders in better understanding how these incidents occur and how to prevent them.

While current studies are underway, past research has proven a valuable resource. For example, in 2002, the FBI published a monograph on workplace violence, including problematic behaviors of concern that may telegraph violent ideations and plans.¹⁵ In 2010, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Department of Education, and the FBI collaborated to produce the report *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*, which examined lethal or attempted lethal attacks at U.S. universities and colleges from 1900 to 2008.¹⁶ The report featured several key observations related to pre-attack behaviors, including the following:

- Concerning behaviors were observed by friends, family, associates, professors, or law enforcement in 31 percent of the cases. These behaviors included, but were not limited to, paranoid ideas, delusional statements, changes in personality or performance, disciplinary problems on site, depressed mood, suicidal ideation, non-specific threats of violence, increased isolation, “odd” or “bizarre” behavior, and interest in or acquisition of weapons.
- In only 13 percent of the cases did subjects make verbal and/or written threats to cause harm to the target. These threats were both veiled and explicit and were conveyed directly to the target or to a third party about the target.
- In 19 percent of the cases, stalking or harassing behavior was reported prior to the attack. These behaviors occurred within the context of a current or former romantic relationship and in academic and other non-romantic settings. They took on various forms, including written communications (conventional and electronic), telephone contact, and harassment of the target and/or the target’s friends and/or family. Subjects also followed or visited the target(s) or their families or damaged property belonging to the target(s) or their families prior to the attack.
- In only 10 percent of the cases did the subject engage in physically aggressive acts toward the targets. These behaviors took the form of physical assault, menacing actions with weapons, or repeated physical violence to intimate partners.

Specialized units in the Federal government, such as the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), continue to support behaviorally-based operational assessments of persons of concern in a

¹⁵ *Workplace Violence: Issues in Response*. U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Academy. 2002.
<http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence>.

¹⁶ *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*. Joint publication of U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2010.
http://rems.ed.gov/docs/CampusAttacks_201004.pdf.

Vossekuil, Bryan, et al. *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004.

variety of settings (e.g., schools, workplaces, places of worship, etc.) who appear to be on a trajectory towards violence. A review of current research, threat assessment literature, and active shooting incidents, combined with the extensive case experience of the BAU, suggests that there are observable pre-attack behaviors that, if recognized, could lead to the disruption of a planned attack.¹⁷ While checklists of various warning signs are often of limited use in isolation, the FBI has identified some behavioral indicators that should prompt further exploration and attention from law enforcement and/or facility security. These behaviors often include:

- development of a personal grievance;
- contextually inappropriate and recent acquisitions of multiple weapons;
- contextually inappropriate and recent escalation in target practice and weapons training;
- contextually inappropriate and recent interest in explosives;
- contextually inappropriate and intense interest or fascination with previous shootings or mass attacks; and
- experience of a significant personal loss (whether real or perceived) in the weeks and/or months leading up to the attack, such as a death, breakup, divorce, or loss of a job.

Few offenders had previous arrests for violent crimes.

The profile of an applicant for a security clearance could contain indicators of possible future psychological or behavioral abnormalities. For this reason, investigators and screeners should be aware of such behavioral patterns revealed during an applicant's examination. If not of sufficient magnitude for immediate rejection of the clearance, additional examination should focus on the questionable elements that suggest a potential problem. These findings should be recorded and reported to the proper officials.

5.1 Reporting Indicators, Warnings, and Incidents of Workplace Violence

Procedures for reporting violent incidents vary according to the type and intensity of violence involved; most Federal workplaces have a variety of reporting options. Depending on the nature of the situation, available resources, and the need for security/law enforcement involvement, the report may be made by or be provided to:

¹⁷ Calhoun, Frederick and Stephen Weston. *Contemporary Threat Management: A Practical Guide for Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent*. San Diego, CA: Specialized Training Services. 2003.

Deisinger, Gene, et al. *The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and Management Teams*. Stoneham, MA: Applied Risk Management. 2008.

Fein, Robert, et al. *Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. 1995.

Monahan, John, et al. *Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 2001.

- the employee's manager;
- the employee's colleagues and co-workers;
- in-house security;
- Human Resources or organizations such as Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), Sexual Assault Response Coordinator, or other Federal equivalent, etc.;
- threat assessment team;
- appropriate agency security (e.g., personnel security, adjudicators, etc.);
- Federal Protective Service (FPS);
- local mental health agencies or crisis intervention organizations; or
- local police departments.

In addition to established reporting procedures, agencies should allow employees who have safety or reprisal concerns to submit anonymous (to the extent possible) reports. Regardless of the specific reporting procedures, maintaining a successful violence prevention and response program requires agencies to investigate all reports and follow up with the appropriate actions where necessary. However, agencies should keep in mind that if there is no complainant, a law enforcement entity may feel there is no crime to investigate.

Accurate and early reporting that allows for a well-timed intervention can be instrumental in resolving issues of workplace incivility and bullying before they have the opportunity to escalate into physical violence. Developing and implementing reporting procedures for workplace interpersonal issues are just as important as establishing procedures for reporting physical violence. Employees who feel they are victims of bullying, verbal or electronic harassment/cyber bullying (e.g., emails, text messages, web pages), psychological violence, emotional abuse, or any type of domestic violence need to report the problem, as these behaviors can have negative impacts on the victim, work environment, and employee productivity. Employees should be encouraged to document the incidents in order to assist with remembering details, dates, and frequency of the incidents.

Early reporting of perceived abuse allows management to quickly address and correct a problem before it becomes more severe. The level of the management chain where an employee reports this type of violence will depend on who is committing the violence. If a direct supervisor is the perpetrator, then the employee needs to move up one or more levels on the management chain to report the violence. Additionally, employees need to be encouraged to report these incidents and be ensured of non-reprisal. It is recommended that a system be created, if not already in place, so that employees have the opportunity to speak to someone (non-affiliated in the reporting chain) who can determine the appropriate measures (e.g., counseling, reporting etc.) and to whom the incident is to be reported.

5.2 Threat Assessment Teams

Research shows that perpetrators of targeted acts of violence engage in both covert and overt behaviors prior to the attacks. Another resource most agencies can use to identify, evaluate, and

address these troubling signs is a multidisciplinary Threat Assessment Team (TAT). The Threat Assessment Team's objective is to use internal agency specialists (which could include personnel from the internal security office, Office of the Inspector General, Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of General Counsel, etc.) to prevent violence from occurring. Members are responsible for addressing threats, confronting violent behavior, and assisting in assessing potential for violence. TAT members consider, plan, prepare, share, and, in some cases, move on to action. The TAT serves as a central convening body that ensures that warning signs observed by multiple people are not considered isolated incidents and do not slip through the cracks, as they actually may represent escalating behavior that is a serious concern.

Federal entities should keep in mind, however, the importance of relying on factual information (including observed behavior) and avoid unfair labeling or stereotyping to remain in compliance with civil rights, privacy, and other applicable Federal and state laws. TATs are already an established protocol in most educational settings and have proven quite valuable. TATs were pushed to the forefront of concern following the 2007 shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia, where 32 individuals were killed. For smaller facilities who do not have this capability and would like to utilize a TAT, look to the parent agency for support, or the possibility of partnering with other federal agencies who utilize a TAT.

For the purposes of consistency and efficiency, a TAT should be developed and implemented in coordination with applicable Federal policies and practices. A TAT with diverse representation will often operate more efficiently and effectively. Team members may consist of human relations/labor relations personnel, security specialists, supervisors or managers, medical and mental health professionals, general counsel, and employee assistance specialists.¹⁸ In addition, any other individuals or groups within the Federal organization already working to identify staff needs can be a critical source of information on troubling behavior for a TAT.

The TAT reviews disconcerting or threatening behavior of employees, visitors, staff, or other persons brought to their attention. The TAT utilizes a holistic assessment and management strategy that considers the many aspects of the potentially threatening person's life—familial, work, social, academic, and residential. More than focusing on warning signs or threats alone, the TAT assessment involves a unique overall analysis of changing and relevant behaviors. The TAT takes into consideration, as appropriate, information about behaviors, various kinds of communications, information that has not been substantiated, any threats made, security concerns, family issues, or relationship problems that might involve a troubled individual. The TAT also may identify any potential victims with whom the individual may interact. Once the TAT identifies an individual who may pose a threat, the team will identify a course of action for addressing the situation. The appropriate course of action—whether law enforcement intervention, counseling, or other actions—will depend on the specifics of the situation.

Law enforcement can help assess reported threats or troubling behavior quickly and privately and reach out to available Federal resources as part of the TAT process or separately. The FBI's behavioral experts in its National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) at Quantico, Virginia, are available on a 24/7 basis to join in any threat assessment analysis and

¹⁸ Team members should be cognizant of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rules. Reference [Section 9: Resources/Templates](#) for a link to HIPAA information and privacy pocket cards.

develop threat mitigation strategies for persons of concern. The law enforcement member(s) of the TAT should contact the local FBI office for this behavioral analysis assistance.

Each FBI field office has an NCAVC representative available to work with TATs and coordinate access to the FBI's BAU, home to the NCAVC. For non-Federal entities, the FBI supports requests that are made through local police departments. The analysis focuses not on how to respond tactically to an active shooter incident but rather on how to prevent one. Early intervention can prevent a situation from escalating by identifying, assessing, and managing the threat. The TAT should consult with its agency's/organization's administration and develop a process to seek these additional resources.

TATs or Federal representatives should also work with local law enforcement to gain an understanding of the threats from outside their agency/organization that may affect the facility so that, in partnership, appropriate security measures can be established.

5.3 Employee Assistance Program

It is important to properly implement and promote an Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The effectiveness of any workplace violence program that includes active shooter preparedness is greatly enhanced in an organization with an active, well-known EAP presence. Agencies with active programs promote the EAP by issuing periodic statements from top management endorsing the program and reminding employees of the services offered by the EAP; having counselors attend staff meetings to familiarize agency employees with the counselors; having counselors give special briefings and seminars for managers, employees, and union stewards; and reminding employees that by law, all services provided by the EAP are confidential.

Active and frequent information dissemination is required to adequately support EAPs. EAPs often provide booklets, pamphlets, and lend libraries of books and videos about such topics as domestic violence, stress reduction, and dealing with angry customers. Another helpful resource is *Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response*.¹⁹ Early involvement in organizational change is essential. For an agency facing reorganization, restructuring, or other organizational change that may have a negative effect on employees, for example, the EAP can help provide individual or group sessions to maintain information flow, keep feelings under control, prevent potential outbursts, provide constructive outlets for feelings, and help employees plan for the future.

Much of the employee training described in this section is conducted by EAP staff. For example, counselors can train employees on topics such as dealing with angry coworkers and customers, conflict resolution, and communications skills. Since EAP staff understands how important it is that supervisors (and coworkers) not diagnose an employee's problem, they are in an excellent position to explain the delicate balance between identifying problem behavior early on and labeling an individual as potentially violent. EAP counselors can train supervisors to deal with problems as soon as they surface.

¹⁹ The guide can be accessed at:
<http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ISC%20Violence%20in%20the%20Federal%20Workplace%20Guide%20April%202013.pdf>

5.4 Law Enforcement and First Responder Coordination

Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement personnel can be an invaluable resource in developing a prevention and preparedness component of an active shooter program. As such, it may be in the best interest of the facility and/or agency to establish a written memorandum of agreement with local law enforcement entities who may respond to an active shooter situation or other emergency. Building strong partnerships with law enforcement, fire personnel, and EMS includes ensuring they also know the location of available public announcement systems, two-way communications systems, security cameras, and alarm controls. Equally important is information on access to utility controls, medical supplies, and law enforcement equipment. Providing this detailed information to first responders allows them to move through a facility rapidly during an emergency, to ensure areas are safe, and to tend to people in need.

6 Training and Exercises

Training and exercises are the best activities to help prepare personnel to react quickly and effectively in emergency situations. When considering training options for establishing awareness and providing appropriate responses to the threat of an active shooter, the Federal agency should conduct a thorough review to identify the best training approach for their facility occupants. This review should assess the specific features of the facility itself along with the needs and capabilities of the personnel occupying the facility.

Following the examination of the target population, a needs assessment should be conducted under the assumption that the risk of an active shooter event is high. Therefore, the assessment should formulate the most favorable actions for all persons likely to be involved, including community resources. Not unlike periodic fire drills, continual awareness campaigns of the active shooter threat can ensure a much higher chance of reacting quickly and surviving an actual situation. The target population should include individuals occupying or visiting the facility on a day-to-day basis, including security personnel, law enforcement officers, and members of the public frequenting the facility. Training participation opportunities should be extended to the external emergency responders likely to support the facility in an active shooter situation.

Each target group has different training needs. For example, members of the general public are less likely to attend formal training and could be exposed to essential information through posters, brochures, or radio and television spot announcements. Employees would benefit from briefings and participation in active shooter drills. On-site law enforcement/armed security, as well as external responders, would benefit from hands-on scenario-based training; knowledge of the facilities' physical features such as entrances, exits, and construction features; and knowledge of and familiarity with the capabilities of the internal security force.

An active shooter preparedness plan should be the source document used in the development of a training program. If no plan exists, the information gained through the needs analysis would be beneficial in developing a plan.

Once the needs are identified, a survey of existing training programs should be conducted to determine if a suitable training solution already exists. More often than not, training needs can be satisfied by an existing program from a sister agency such as FEMA or through the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). Other courses are available through private sector and non-governmental entities.

In some situations, the uniqueness of the target population may require the design and development of an entirely new training instrument or the modification of an existing one. This could involve the use of professional or experienced instructional designers if sufficient in-house talent is unavailable.

6.1 Training and Awareness Material

The method of instruction delivery depends on several factors. Instructor-led training is more formal and requires a time commitment from participants for the duration of the course. In some cases, online or web-based instruction is a suitable alternative that can reduce or alleviate scheduling conflicts or travel requirements.

Posters and other visual aids illustrate key learning points and should be situated in prime locations at the facility. These resources remind facility occupants of the objectives of the training program, strengthen their retention of essential information, and ensure occupants are aware of the possibility of an active shooter event.

An active shooter training video, entitled "**Run, Hide, Fight**" was developed and produced by the Houston Mayor's Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security and funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (see [Section 7: Response](#) for further detail). This six-minute video,²⁰ endorsed by multiple Federal agencies, dramatizes an active shooter incident in the workplace exemplifying the unpredictability and quick evolution of active shooter situations. Its purpose is to educate the public by demonstrating response actions during such an incident so that they can prepare for an active shooter situation. Active shooter events often appear spontaneous and evolve quickly, therefore preparation is essential. This preparation should include training and planning that maximizes the possibility of survival.

In order for information to be actionable, it must be accessible. For example, visual and/or auditory aids and cues (such as posters, sirens, etc.) are only useful if the audience can see and/or hear them. For those with a hearing or visual disability, the information conveyed through these means may not be accessible. Partnering with local disability entities such as Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Centers, governor's disability councils, mayoral task forces, independent living centers, etc., for assistance with tools, methods, resources and protocols can make life saving differences for employees and visitors with a variety of access and functional needs or disabilities.

²⁰ Run, Hide, Fight video with closed captioning option: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video>. The video is also available in multiple languages.

6.2 Occupant Self-Help and First Aid

Facility staff may be trained in the basics of hemorrhage control so that care can be initiated as quickly as possible. This training can include basic information on how to improvise a bandage and apply direct wound pressure. Tourniquets have been shown to be lifesaving, but it is unlikely that commercial tourniquets will be immediately available in most circumstances. Training for staff could therefore include when to use a tourniquet, how to improvise a tourniquet, and the correct application.

6.3 Considerations for Medical First Responders (Fire and EMS)

As previously noted, it is highly recommended that facilities coordinate plans with any responding officials, including fire departments and emergency medical services. Medical first responders may already have training in the care of injuries associated with active shooter events. Facilities will need to collaborate with fire personnel and EMS during an active shooter incident. Therefore, in order to ensure facility plans do not conflict with Fire or EMS training and response, it is important that site officials familiarize themselves and their employees with the training and resources available to fire personnel and EMS organizations.

Fire personnel and EMS entities that could respond to an active shooter event should ensure that they have adequate training to provide treatment or accept patients that have received treatment. First responders will likely need additional training on safely moving to waiting ambulances, ensuring a means of ambulance egress, and making transport destination decisions in case of multiple casualties. Whenever possible, these training programs should be developed and practiced in partnership with responding law enforcement agencies.

6.4 Exercises

Most Federal facilities practice evacuation drills for fires and take protective measures for tornadoes, but conduct far fewer preparedness exercises for active shooter incidents. To be prepared for an active shooter incident, facilities should train facility occupants and on-site security staff in what to expect and how to react. After conducting training sessions, it is absolutely essential to reinforce the classroom or on-line instruction with realistic exercises. Exercises should be designed for the needs of the individual agency and conducted in a manner that includes all people normally involved in the mitigation of an active shooter incident. People with disabilities and others with access and functional needs should be included in helping develop all phases of exercises, because they are the subject matter experts regarding their disabilities and needs whose life experiences will add reality to any exercise scenario. Phases of exercises include: concept design/development, testing/designing objectives, execution/conduct, evaluation, alteration and ongoing conduct, and evaluation and alteration of exercise design.

Good planning includes conducting exercises with first responders and facility security teams, including any security or law enforcement officers who are employed in the facility. Valuable partners are one of the most effective and efficient ways to ensure that everyone knows not only

his or her role but also the role of others at the scene. These exercises should include a walkthrough of the facility to allow law enforcement officials to provide input on shelter sites and be familiar with hazardous areas within the facility (e.g., magnetic resonance imaging [MRI] devices and radioactive areas). This will also familiarize first responders with the site, including shelter locations, evacuation routes, and locations where they may find occupants who may be unable to evacuate, such as persons with access or functional needs. The facility should also consider and plan for how to care for the critically injured from the event.

There are many types of exercises, starting with discussion-based exercises such as seminars and tabletop exercises. Activities can graduate to operations-based exercises utilizing personnel and equipment from multiple jurisdictions culminating in a full-scale exercise. Exercises can be designed to involve the entire facility population, to include local responders, or be narrower in scope to address a smaller portion of the facility or population. All drills and exercises should be announced prior to conducting them. Some recommendations for exercise programs include:

- pre-designated assembly points for people who need assistance evacuating;
- verified points of accessible egress;
- internal exercise training program for all employees including volunteers to respond to specific assembly areas;
- established alert and notification procedures;
- pre-determined communications capabilities; and
- identify employees who have current and valid credentials in EMS, law enforcement, or fire services that could assist safety or security officers, if needed.

Several active shooter scenarios should be considered due to the fact that an actual event is unpredictable. Feedback from these exercise sessions will be valuable in determining weaknesses in the plan and improving both plans and training. Exercises should be conducted on a recurring basis to keep the active shooter threat fresh in the minds of the participants, and should include the latest mitigation techniques and any recent changes in the overall plan. Information for the design and conduct of exercises is available from FEMA's Independent Study (IS) program.²¹

FEMA Independent Study courses that would be beneficial in exercise planning and conduct:

- IS-120.A: An Introduction to Exercises
- IS-130: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Planning
- IS-139: Exercise Design

Planning for an OEP exercise may include the following phases: initial planning conference, venue selection, midterm planning conference, advanced ICS workshop, crime scene preservation seminar, final planning conference, controller and evaluator briefing, emergency exercise, controller and evaluator debriefing, recovery and restoration tabletop exercise, and after-action conference and lessons learned follow-up.

²¹ The FEMA IS program can be accessed online via: <http://www.training.fema.gov/IS>.

7 Response

The facility OEP should include courses of action that will describe how occupants can most effectively respond to an active shooter situation to minimize the loss of life and teach/train on these practices. When an incident occurs, it is important to follow the OEP and any instructions given during an incident; however, often individuals will have to rely on their own judgment to decide which option will best protect lives, including their own. No single response fits all active shooter situations; however, making sure each individual knows his or her response options and empowering them to react decisively will save valuable time. Depicting scenarios and considering response options in advance will assist individuals and groups in quickly selecting their best course of action.

Understandably, this is a sensitive topic. There is no definitive best response during these scenarios, but maintaining a **run, hide, fight** mindset can increase the odds of surviving. It may be valuable to schedule a time for an open conversation regarding the topic at the facility. Though some individuals may find the conversation uncomfortable, they may also find it reassuring to know that as a whole their organization is thinking about how best to deal with this situation.

Regardless of training or directions given, each employee, visitor, and facility occupant will react and respond based on his or her own instincts. Some people may not be able to leave; others may refuse to leave. Some will find comfort in a group; others will face the challenges alone. It would be difficult or impossible for a facility to inform its occupants of every eventuality. Facilities should help occupants understand there is no perfect response.

Unless otherwise directed by law enforcement or other emergency personnel, the decision to stay or leave is something best determined by the individual. However, Federal facilities can help occupants better prepare, respond, and recover by discussing active shooter considerations and inviting employees to trust that they will make the best decision they can at the time, relying on their individual circumstances. During an active shooter incident, those present will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully-informed decision about applying the **run, hide, fight** options.

It is not uncommon for people confronted with a threat to first deny the possible danger rather than respond. A 2005 investigation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) into the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001 found that people close to the floors impacted waited longer to start evacuating than those on unaffected floors. Similarly, during the Virginia Tech shooting, individuals on campus responded to the shooting with varying degrees of urgency. These incidents highlight this delayed response or denial.

When an active shooter event occurs, facility occupants will look for authority figures to provide guidance on what to do. They may not make a distinction between law enforcement officers and other uniformed personnel. In the Federal environment, uniformed personnel may be Federal agents or other security staff or law enforcement officers. These individuals may not be present when a shooting begins. Announcements of the incident may be made via building notification system, facility occupants, or upon hearing weapons fire. Therefore, all employees should receive training in techniques on responding to an active shooter event using the **run, hide, fight** model. Individuals should remain calm and try to remember the procedures they learned in

training. Agency training should explain/distinguish the procedural differences between “sheltering” for a natural disaster event versus “lockdown” for an active shooter incident.

As the situation develops, occupants need to be trained to know how to use more than one option in the **run, hide, fight** continuum. Individuals need to decide what action is appropriate based on their locations. The goal in all cases is to survive and protect others, but options will depend on how close individuals are to the shooter. Those present can run away from the shooter, seek a secure place where they can hide and deny the shooter access, or incapacitate the shooter in order to survive and protect others from harm. In many instances, an individual might first need to hide and then run to safety when able. While they should follow the plan and any instructions given by appropriate facility representatives during an incident, they will often have to rely on their own judgment. The mental rehearsal of scenarios and considering response options in advance will assist individuals and groups in quickly selecting their best course of action.

Staff should have an understanding of the response plan and how to lead or direct facility occupants to the nearest evacuation routes (run) and identified secure areas (hide). Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately. For example, train staff to recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and necessary action (e.g., “Gun! Get out!”). In addition, those closest to the public address or other communications system, or who are otherwise able to alert others, should communicate the danger and necessary action. Internal communications with those in the immediate situation is critical. Security officials are encouraged to use any means necessary, including information technology platforms, software, or devices (e.g., computer messaging, mobile phone applications, etc.) to disseminate information to the workforce in a dynamic environment. Repetition in training and preparedness shortens the time it takes to orient, observe, and act. Upon recognizing the danger, staff or others must alert responders as soon as it is safe to do so by contacting 911 with information that is as clear and accurate as possible.

While personal safety is the primary consideration in any emergency, helping others to safety increases the survivability for all potential victims. Rendering aid can be as simple as rallying victims to “Follow me!” or aiding non-ambulatory persons and performing immediate first aid in safer areas.

Response to an incident will involve the facility tenants (including visitors), building security officers (if applicable), and responding law enforcement (internal and/or outside agencies). The site security manager (SSM) or designated official is responsible for ensuring an active shooter response and communication plan is in place. If the SSM agency has armed security or law enforcement, they are also responsible for deploying on-site assets. The SSM should also coordinate with responding outside agencies (both law enforcement and EMS) to maximize effectiveness of any response and minimize confusion and delay.

Remember, during an active shooter incident the natural human reaction is to be startled, feel fear and anxiety, and even experience initial disbelief and denial. Those present can hear noise from alarms, gunfire, explosions, and people shouting and screaming. Training (e.g., table top exercises and drills) provides the means to regain composure, recall at least some of what has been learned, and commit to action. Training to remember the **run, hide, fight** mantra improves the likelihood of action.

7.1 Run

If it is safe to do so, the first course of action that should be taken is to run. When possible, individuals should exit the building through the safest route and proceed to a designated assembly location(s) or an alternate vetted site. However, given the dynamic nature of an active shooter event, exiting the building and going to an evacuation site via practiced fire drill routes may put individuals at risk or may not be possible. If doing so is not possible or puts individuals at risk, employees may need to run out of the facility or away from the area under attack and move as far away as possible until they are in a safe location. These options should be clearly conveyed to employees during facility active shooter training and/or exercises.

Despite the complexity of this situation, facility occupants and visitors at risk who can evacuate safely should do so. Recent research shows the best method to reduce loss of life in an active shooter incident is for people to immediately evacuate or be evacuated from the area where an active shooter may be located or attempting to enter.²²

Staff should be trained to:

- leave personal belongings behind;
- put their hands in the air to signal that they are unarmed to law enforcement responders;
- visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible routes for occupants, visitors, or staff with disabilities and others with access and functional needs;
- avoid escalators and elevators; and
- take others with them but not stay behind because others refuse to leave.

Call 911 when safe to do so:

Information to provide to law enforcement or dispatchers:

- Location of active shooter(s)
- Location of caller
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- If there is law enforcement on-site (if known)
- Physical description of shooter(s)
- Type and number of weapons used by shooter(s)
- Use or threat of explosives/IEDs
- If shooting is still occurring
- Number of potential victims at the scene

²² Blair, J. Pete, et al. *Active Shooter Events and Response*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 2013.

Because facility occupants may scatter, they should be given directions on who they should contact in order to account for all personnel.

Planners should consider creating a threat annex for the **run, hide, fight** scenario. While developing this annex, at a minimum, consideration should be given to the following questions:

- Have primary and alternative accessible escape routes been identified?
- Have employees rehearsed the use of escape routes?
- Will escape routes provide enough distance, cover, and concealment to provide safety?
- Has a system been developed to account for all personnel when it is safe to do so?

7.2 Hide

If running is not a safe option, staff should be trained to hide in as safe a place as possible where the walls might be thicker and have fewer windows. Likewise, for occupants that cannot run, hiding may be the only option.

In addition, occupants should do the following:

- Lock the doors and/or barricade them with heavy furniture, if possible.
- Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows.
- Turn off lights.
- Silence all electronic devices.
- Remain silent.
- Look for other avenues of escape.
- Identify ad-hoc weapons.
- When safe to do so, use strategies to silently communicate with first responders, if possible (e.g., in rooms with exterior windows, make signs to silently signal law enforcement and emergency responders to indicate the status of the room's occupants).
- Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of view from the hallway (which would allow the best option for ambushing the shooter and for possible escape if the shooter enters or passes by the room).
- Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law enforcement.

Consider these additional actions:

- Identify a safe location on each floor before an incident occurs where occupants and visitors may safely barricade themselves during an event.
- Train people in how to lock down an area and secure the unit, including providing a checklist of instructions on the back of doors and by phones.
- Ensure emergency numbers are available at all phone locations.

Consider the following questions if developing a threat annex for the **run, hide, fight** scenario:

- Have shelter-in-place locations been identified?
- Is there a method to secure the access to these locations?
- Have employees rehearsed the movement to and positioning within these locations?
- How will communications be established with these locations?

7.3 Fight

If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, when confronted by the shooter individuals in immediate danger should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, chairs, etc. Research shows there is strength in numbers, as indicated in the earlier mentioned study. The potential victims themselves have disrupted 17 of 51 separate active shooter incidents before law enforcement arrived.²³

Speaking with staff about confronting a shooter may be daunting and upsetting for some individuals, but great comfort can come from the knowledge that their actions could save lives. To be clear, confronting an active shooter should never be a requirement of any non-law enforcement personnel's job; how each individual chooses to respond if directly confronted by an active shooter is up to him or her.

Consider the following questions if developing a threat annex for the **run, hide, fight** scenario:

- Have discussions about when it might be appropriate to defend been addressed?
- Have discussions about available equipment to be used to assist in their defense been addressed?
- Have discussions related to the concepts of superiority of numbers, surprise, speed, and violence of action been addressed?

7.4 Run, Hide, Fight for Occupants with Disabilities

Any actions taken during activation of the plan must be as effective for individuals with disabilities as those actions provided for the other occupants of the facility. When developing or making changes to an occupant emergency plan, it is imperative the needs of individuals with disabilities be addressed throughout the process. Applicable laws and regulations include but are not limited to:

- The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990;

²³ Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) "A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 – 2013": http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177.

- The Rehabilitation Act of 1973;
- EO 12196 “Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees” 1980; and
- EO 13347 “Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness” 2004.

As discussed earlier in this section, no one should be forced to stay or leave the premises during an active shooter situation (unless otherwise directed by law enforcement or other emergency personnel). Supervisors are ultimately responsible to ensure that members of their staff or visitors with a disability are properly taken care of during all emergency incidents. Federal managers and supervisors should be trained to:

- ensure those occupants identified as requiring assistance during an evacuation or shelter-in-place (SIP) have a customized plan that includes the assistance required, the name of the person(s) volunteering to assist, accountability protocol, type of equipment required (if any), and the evacuation route from the assigned work space;
- identify any volunteer(s) willing to assist person(s) with disabilities or needing assistance; and
- ensure those occupants under their supervision with self-identified assistance needs can be accounted for during an incident.²⁴

Additionally, notifications should be made in a variety of formats so that they are accessible to those with special needs. Proper planning and execution should consider:

- vibrating alerts for employees who are deaf or hard of hearing;
- employees who are blind;
- alternative notification measures;
- employees whose disabilities go beyond deafness or hard of hearing;
- including people with temporary disabilities;
- visitors;
- people with limited English proficiency;
- sign cards with text and picture based emergency messages/symbols; and
- involving people with disabilities in all planning.

7.5 Interacting with First Responders

Facility occupants should be aware that the first priority for responding law enforcement is to respond to the threat, engage, and neutralize the active shooter as soon as possible; all other actions are secondary. One comprehensive study found that in more than half (57 percent) of

²⁴ For more information, see *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, March 2013.

active shooter incidents where a solo officer arrived on the scene, shooting was still underway when the officer arrived. In 75 percent of those instances, that solo officer had to confront the perpetrator to end the threat. In those cases, the officer was shot one-third of the time.²⁵

Facility standard operating procedures (SOP) should address when transportation resources should be brought to the scene and address maintaining a transportation corridor to assist law enforcement and first responders. There should be guidance on prioritization of patients, use of treatment areas versus CCPs, and what destination hospitals may be used.

Law enforcement, firefighters, and EMS personnel (first responders) coming to a Federal facility because of a 911 call involving gunfire face a daunting task. Though the objectives remain the same—protect and save lives—the threat of an active shooter incident differs from responding to a natural disaster or many other emergencies. Emergency calls can involve actual or future threats of physical violence. Information coming in may be inaccurate and conflicting. This violence might be directed not only in or at the facility and its occupants, but also at nearby buildings off-site.

Active shooter incidents are one of the most dangerous situations facing law enforcement today. If there is active shooting, officers will assemble as a contact team, enter the facility, and proceed directly to the sounds of violence (gunshots, pleas for life, etc.). If no shouts or sounds of violence are heard, a quick and methodical search of the facility will be conducted. Should the gun shots start up, or sounds of violence be heard, the contact team will stop searching and proceed directly to this source. Facility occupants should not be alarmed if officers shout commands and push individuals to the ground for their safety. The first officers to arrive on the scene will not stop to assist with injured personnel. Rescue teams consisting of additional officers and, if authorized by facility/local law enforcement agency SOP, medical personnel will follow the first wave and will enter the facility as soon as possible.

Occupants should be trained to cooperate and not to interfere with the response of FPS or other first responders. The sooner law enforcement is able to discern the threat and react, the more lives can be saved. This is particularly true in an active shooter incident where law enforcement responds to a 911 call of shots fired. Many innocent lives are at risk in concentrated areas. This is why it is critical that facilities work with their local partners (e.g., first responders, emergency managers) to identify, prepare, prevent, and effectively respond to an active shooter incident in a coordinated fashion.

In actual emergencies, timely intelligence is critical. Staff should be trained to contact the police and share with them essential information. Law enforcement encourages all calls, and no one should assume that someone else has called. Video surveillance that is accessible to smart phones and other electronic devices must be shared with responding units as soon as practical.

²⁵ Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014., http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177

7.6 Roles and Responsibilities

First and subsequent arriving resources should have clearly defined tasks and roles. This should include basic activation of the active shooter event response and what initial information should be conveyed. Roles and responsibilities should be developed by a multiagency team to ensure interoperability. It should include who is responsible for and when incident command should be established.

7.7 Access and Staging

When and how law enforcement officers (LEO) establish an initial contact team should be clearly defined in any multiagency SOP. In addition, the LEOs should have a basic understanding of the desirable elements of a CCP to include security, proximity to occupants, and routes of egress. The management of active shooter events requires early insertion of medical responders into a potentially hostile environment, a philosophy contrary to that traditionally used. When, how, and under what conditions medical responders should enter the scene should be clearly defined by a multidisciplinary team, integrated into the SOP, and communicated to all. If any ongoing threat exists, law enforcement is responsible for maintaining medical responder safety. LEOs should also be responsible for determining when it is safe to evacuate occupants or if occupants should be managed in the CCP and for placing emphasis on maintaining a safe evacuation route for facility personnel.

Early identification of an active shooter event is critical to establishing an effective response. Federal facility staff engaged in security roles should receive training in agreed upon methods of notification and common terminology.

7.8 Tenant Cooperation with Law Enforcement

Tenants in a facility where an active shooting is taking place should keep the following in mind (as reinforced through training):

- (a) Quickly determine what actions to take to protect life: options include **run, hide, and fight**. Use best judgment based on the specific circumstances of the incident.
- (b) When encountering responding LEOs, remain calm and follow any and all instructions from the officers. Officers may shout commands and push individuals to the ground for his/her safety as well as their own.

When law enforcement personnel arrive at the scene, tenants should be aware of the following:

- Follow all official instructions from police;
- Remain calm, think, and resist the urge to panic;
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers;
- Keep hands visible at all times;
- Put down any items;

- Avoid making sudden or quick movements toward officers;
- Do not point, scream, or yell;
- Do not ask for help from the officers when evacuating;
- Proceed in the direction as advised by the officers; and
- Provide all relevant information to police.

7.9 Communications/Media Messaging

The public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for developing and releasing information about the incident to the news media, incident personnel, and other agencies and organizations, as appropriate. The public affairs officer at the affected facility should coordinate all external communications with the incident command through the joint information center (JIC). Once a JIC is established, a primary public affairs officer will be designated to coordinate all public information including that from the facility PAO.

Planning for successful crisis communications includes the following:

- Establish working relationships with local media and local law enforcement beforehand;
- Frontload agency websites with mission, key leaders, etc.;
- Have a public affairs plan (funding, backups, resources, etc.);
- To the extent possible, develop standard talking points for senior and crisis leadership to use when engaging the media;
- Get accurate information out early to avoid misinformation due to social media;
- FBI and other local law enforcement will send public affairs specialists, as requested, in an assist role;
- Include PAO in training;
- Establish main news contacts in advance ; and
- Have a checklist of necessary and appropriate information to provide.

7.10 The Importance of Effective Communication in a Crisis Environment

Communication during an incident is critical. Once an active shooter event has been identified, the response should be activated using uniform and agreed upon language by responding agencies. Whenever possible, communication should be in plain language. There should be a standardized communications plan to ensure all responding agencies are able to communicate. This should include establishing a common radio frequency where practical and use of common terms to describe actions, locations, roles, etc. Planning for active shooter events should include a predetermined communication plan that should be available to all agencies that may respond to

an active shooter event. The presence of a communication plan is of particular importance in the airport environment given the number of local, state, and Federal agencies involved in the daily operations of that setting. Communication plans should also include early notification of the health care system and facilities that may be called upon to receive casualties.

Lessons learned from past incidents include the following:

- Always have multiple communications options;
- Use any communication option available;
- Do not rely on others to relay critical information;
- Do not make assumptions of who knows what;
- Do not assume others know what you know;
- Do not assume you know everything you need to know;
- Ensure all standard emergency notification is accessible in alternative formats so that all people have situational awareness;
- Establish a knowledgeable liaison with the first responder command post; and
- Communication can be a challenge despite best efforts of trained professionals.

Training to Communicate Effectively

Teaching managers and emergency personnel how to communicate effectively is as critical as training staff and management in evacuation procedures. Accessible and Section 508 compliant scenario-based training addressing a wide range of variables is strongly encouraged and should include communication with facility staff/security and first responders.²⁶

8 Recovery

Once the active shooter has been incapacitated or apprehended and is no longer a threat, and law enforcement have evacuated the wounded, human resources and/or management should engage in post-event assessments and activities in coordination with local law enforcement and emergency personnel, including:

- accounting for all individuals at one or more designated assembly points to determine who, if anyone, is missing or potentially injured;
- coordinating with first responders to account for any occupants who were not evacuated;
- determining the best methods for notifying families of individuals affected by the active shooter, including notification of any casualties in coordination with law enforcement;

²⁶ For more information on accessibility and Section 508 compliance, please visit the FEMA Office of Disability Integration and Coordination website at: <https://www.fema.gov/office-disability-integration-and-coordination>. Additionally, the Federal website for Section 508 compliance can be accessed at: <https://www.section508.gov/>.

- assessing the psychological state of individuals at the scene and referring them to health care specialists accordingly;
- employing continuity of operations plans to ensure mission essential functions are carried out; and
- determining a transition plan that includes when to resume normal operations.

It is important to note that once the active shooter is apprehended or incapacitated, the situation and the location will be an active crime scene. Nothing should be touched unless it involves tending to the wounded. Discuss the implications of the facility as a crime scene with local law enforcement officials in advance.

Facility administrators and key personnel should plan for an extended, evolving situation and the mass casualty or internal disaster plan may be activated to manage the continuing situation. This may include altering daily activities in order for law enforcement and first responders to adequately investigate and clear the scene and to rehabilitate the facility to an acceptable level for work activity.

The OEP should identify trained personnel who will provide assistance to victims and their families. This should include establishing an incident response team (including first responders) that is trained to appropriately assess victims. They will provide emergency intervention services and victim assistance beginning immediately after the incident and throughout the recovery efforts. This team will integrate with state and Federal resources when an emergency occurs.

Federal and state laws mandate the care of victims of crimes in certain circumstances. Therefore, substantial resources and processes are already in place to aid victims and their families, most notably through state agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the FBI's Office for Victim Assistance. Prior familiarity with these resources—such as existing, dedicated toll-free numbers for victims and their families—will permit officials to immediately provide valuable information to victims, victim families, staff, and others affected by the tragedy.

8.1 Reunification

Where the immediate reunification of loved ones is not possible, providing family members with timely, accurate, and relevant information is paramount. The local or regional mass fatality plan may call for the establishment of a family assistance center (FAC) to help family members locate their loved ones and determine whether or not they are among the casualties. This center should be placed away from media view or exposure and it is recommended the families of the victims be separated from the family of the active shooter. Although the FAC should be away from the incident command, care should be taken to ensure that it is not so far away from the incident site that family members feel excluded.

Having family members wait for long periods of time for information about their loved ones not only adds to their stress and frustration, but can also escalate the emotions of the entire group. [Section 8.2: Psychological First Aid](#) describes in more detail how to prepare for and handle victims' emotional and psychological needs. When families are reunited, it is critical that there are child release processes in place where minors might be involved (e.g., childcare or

discharged patients) to ensure that no child is released to an unauthorized person, even if that person is well-meaning.²⁷

Essential steps to help establish trust and provide family members with a sense of control can be accomplished by identifying a safe location separate from distractions and/or media and the general public, but close enough to allow family members to feel connected in proximity to their children/loved ones; scheduling periodic updates even if no additional information is available; being prepared to speak with family members about what to expect when reunited with their loved ones; and ensuring effective communication with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as sign language interpreters for deaf or hard of hearing family members.

When reunification is not possible because an individual is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their loved one is missing or has been injured or killed, keeping in mind that law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications related to criminal activity. This will ensure that families and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate way.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. In cases where an individual has been killed, describe the importance of processing the scene for forensic, investigative purposes and to ensure accurate identification of victims. It is best to avoid making promises that cannot be kept with regard to timing of identification and release of victims' remains. Training personnel immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Crisis responders should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The OEP should include pre-identified points of contact to work with and support family members (e.g., Federal victim assistance personnel counselors, police officers). These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while an individual is still missing but before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long term.

The OEP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help with regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. It is critical that families and loved ones are supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving family members.

The OEP also should explicitly address how impacted families will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from

²⁷ A useful resource regarding this topic is the *Post-Disaster Reunification of Children: A Nationwide Approach*, published by FEMA, the American Red Cross, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. It can be accessed at: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1384376663394-eef4a1b4269de14faff40390e4e2f2d3/Post+Disaster+Reunification+of+Children+-+A+Nationwide+Approach.pdf>.

families and staff while the emergency is ongoing and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.

8.2 Psychological First Aid

An important aspect of recovery is to treat the emotional side effects of violence and stress. Psychological first aid (PFA) is an evidence-informed, modular approach used by mental health and disaster response workers to help individuals of all ages in the immediate aftermath of disaster and terrorism. PFA is designed to reduce the initial distress caused by traumatic events and to foster short- and long-term adaptive functioning and coping.

PFA does not assume that all survivors will develop mental health problems or long-term difficulties in recovery. Instead, it is based on an understanding that disaster survivors and others affected by such events will experience a broad range of early reactions (e.g., physical, psychological, behavioral, spiritual). Some of these reactions may cause enough distress to interfere with adaptive coping, and recovery may be helped by support from compassionate and caring disaster responders.

PFA is designed for delivery by mental health and other disaster response workers who provide early assistance to affected children, families, and adults as part of an organized disaster response effort. These providers may be embedded in a variety of response units, including first responder teams, the incident command structure, primary and emergency health care, incident crisis response teams, faith-based organizations, community emergency response teams, Medical Reserve Corps, the Citizen Corps, the Department of Defense Disaster Mental Health Response teams, and other disaster relief organizations.

Basic objectives of PFA:

- Establish a human connection in a non-intrusive, compassionate manner.
- Enhance immediate and ongoing safety and provide physical and emotional comfort.
- Calm and orient emotionally overwhelmed or distraught survivors.
- Help survivors specifically discuss what their immediate needs and concerns are and gather additional information as appropriate; offer practical assistance and information to help survivors address their immediate needs and concerns.
- Connect survivors as soon as possible to social support networks, including family members, friends, and neighbors.
- Support adaptive coping, acknowledge coping efforts and strengths, and empower survivors; encourage adults, children, and families to take an active role in their recovery.
- Provide information that may help survivors cope effectively with the psychological impact of disasters.
- When appropriate, link the survivor to another member of a disaster response team or to local recovery systems, mental health services, public sector services, and organizations.
 - PFA is designed for delivery in diverse settings. Mental health and other disaster response workers may be called upon to provide PFA in the following:

- General population shelters;
- Shelters for those with disabilities and others with access/functional needs;
- Field hospitals and medical triage areas;
- Acute care facilities (e.g., emergency departments);
- Staging areas or respite centers for first responders or relief workers;
- Emergency operations centers;
- Crisis hotlines or phone banks;
- Mobile dining facilities;
- Disaster assistance service centers;
- Family reception and assistance centers;
- Homes;
- Businesses; and
- Other community settings.²⁸

8.3 Training on Psychological First Aid

PFA training can be provided in person or online. The online version²⁹ is broadly used and is a six-hour interactive course that puts the participant in the role of a provider in a post-disaster scene. This professionally narrated course is for individuals new to disaster responses who want to learn the core goals of PFA, as well as for seasoned practitioners who want a review. It features innovative activities, video demonstrations, and mentor tips from the Nation's trauma experts and survivors. PFA online also offers a learning community where participants can share experiences using PFA in the field, receive guidance during times of disaster, and obtain additional resources and training.

The *Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide*³⁰ provides information for adults, families, first responders, disaster relief workers, crisis counselors, and volunteers to help survivors immediately in the aftermath of a traumatic event. The guide describes key steps for providing PFA, including how to approach someone in need, how to talk to them, how to help stabilize someone, and how to gather information. Appendices include resources about service delivery sites and settings, provider care, and worksheets and handouts.

²⁸ The content for this section was taken from *Psychological First Aid Field Operations Guide*, which is available at http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/pfa/english/1-psyfirstaid_final_complete_manual.pdf.

²⁹ For more information, visit <http://learn.nctsn.org/>.

³⁰ For more information, visit <http://www.nctsn.org/content/psychological-first-aid>.

Following disasters or emergencies, the PFA Mobile application can assist responders who provide PFA to adults, families, and children. Materials in PFA Mobile are adapted from the *Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide* (2nd Edition).³¹

The application allows responders to:

- read summaries of the eight core PFA actions;
- match PFA interventions to specific stress reactions of survivors;
- get mentor tips for applying PFA in the field;
- self-assess to determine their own readiness to conduct PFA; and
- assess and track survivors' needs to simplify data collection and referrals.

8.4 Managing the Responses to Victims and Families

Victim and family support is a critical component to ensuring a successful overall response to a critical incident. It is important to ensure the response is coordinated through each phase including the immediate response, transition process, and post-crisis support in a way that integrates into the investigative and operational response. There are predictable challenges and practical solutions in mass casualty events. Coordination with local resources is critical to ensure a smooth provision of services throughout the longevity of the case. The quality of the overall operational response to a mass casualty will, in large part, be judged by the response to victims and families, and should be based upon trust, cooperation, and respect shown to victims, families, and eye witnesses. Response planning should always track and adjust to meet the needs of the victim/family and the dynamics of the situation. Some considerations include (but are not limited to):

- information sharing;
- victim identification;
- family response management teams;
- communications plans; and
- resource coordination.

For more information, please see [Appendix A: Victim and Family Support Considerations](#).

9 Resources/Templates

The list below contains links to useful active shooter websites, with a brief description for each:

1. FBI Active Shooter Statistics 2000-2013:
<http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter->

³¹ For more information, visit <http://www.nctsn.org/content/pfa-mobile>.

[incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177](https://www.fbi.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/05/20150511-fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177)

2. FBI Active Shooter public site:
<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents>
3. FEMA Active Shooter Training (IS-907: Active Shooter: What You Can Do):
<http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/courseOverview.aspx?code=IS-907>
4. FEMA Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33007?id=7649>
5. FEMA Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plan:
<http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33599?id=7849>
6. FEMA Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33597?id=7848>

9.1 ISC Documents Referencing Active Shooter

1. ISC Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response and Appendix, 1st Edition (April 2013): <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/interagency-security-committee-violence-federal-workplace-guide-april-2013>
2. ISC Occupant Emergency Programs Guide, 1st Edition (March 2013):
<http://www.dhs.gov/publication/isc-occupant-emergency-programs-guide>

9.2 Other Government Resources

1. Air Force Be Ready Active Shooter:
<http://www.beready.af.mil/disasters&emergencies/activeshooter.asp>
2. DHS Active Shooter Video: <http://www.dhs.gov/video/options-consideration-active-shooter-training-video>
3. DHS Active Shooter Preparedness website: <http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>
4. DHS Office for Bombing Prevention counter-IED training courses and information:
<http://www.dhs.gov/bombing-prevention-training-courses>
5. DOJ/FBI/NTSB – Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies:
<http://www.nts.gov/tda/doclib/Mass%20Fatality%20Incident%20Family%20Assistance%20Operations.pdf>
6. DOJ Traumatic Incident Management: <http://www.justice.gov/jmd/hr/hrorder/chpt7-2.htm>

7. DOJ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings:
https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/publications/summits-on-preventing-multiple-causality-violence/e021311546_MultiCasualty-Violence_v508_05APR13.pdf
8. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin “Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2012” written by J. Pete Blair, M. Hunter Martaindale, and Terry Nichols. The article can be found on FBI.gov at <http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-from-2000-to-2012>.
9. FBI Active Shooter Events from 2000-2012: <http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-from-2000-to-2012>
10. FEMA – Mass Casualty Training (IS-360: Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship):
<http://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-360>
11. FEMA – Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools (IS-362A):
www.training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-362.a
12. FLETC – Active Shooter How to Respond, Supervisor Edition:
http://www.co.lincoln.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/sheriff039s_office/page/3780/activeshooterhowtorespondonesupervisor.pdf
13. Navy Active Shooter:
http://www.ready.navy.mil/be_informed/terrorism/active_shooter.html
14. Texas State University compiled statistics (published by the FBI) on active shooter events from 2000-2012: <http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-from-2000-to-2012>

9.3 HIPAA and FERPA Resource Cards for Printing

HIPAA and FERPA reference cards with Privacy Rule information can be found at: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents> or readers of this document may use the images pasted below to print them directly without the link (see next page).

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide for Law Enforcement

What is the HIPAA Privacy Rule?

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule provides Federal privacy protections for individually identifiable health information, called protected health information or PHI, held by most health care providers and health plans and their business associates. The HIPAA Privacy Rule sets out how and with whom PHI may be shared. The Privacy Rule also gives individuals certain rights regarding their health information, such as the rights to access or request corrections to their information.

Who must comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule?

HIPAA applies to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain health care transactions electronically (e.g., billing a health plan). These are known as covered entities. Hospitals, and most clinics, physicians and other health care practitioners are HIPAA covered entities. In addition, HIPAA protects PHI held by business associates, such as billing services and

others, hired by covered entities to perform services or functions that involve access to PHI.

Who is not required to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule?

Many entities that may have health information are not subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, including:

- employers,
- most state and local police or other law enforcement agencies,
- many state agencies like child protective services, and
- most schools and school districts.

While schools and school districts maintain student health records, these records are in most cases protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and not HIPAA. HIPAA may apply however to patient records at a university hospital or to the health records of non-students at a university health clinic.



Under what circumstances may a HIPAA covered entity disclose PHI to law enforcement?

A HIPAA covered entity may disclose PHI to law enforcement with the individual's signed HIPAA authorization.

A HIPAA covered entity also may disclose PHI to law enforcement without the individual's signed HIPAA authorization in certain incidents, including:

- To report PHI to a law enforcement official reasonably able to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an individual or the public.
- To report PHI that the covered entity in good faith believes to be evidence of a crime that occurred on the premises of the covered entity.
- To alert law enforcement to the death of the individual, when there is a suspicion that death resulted from criminal conduct.
- When responding to an off-site medical emergency, as necessary to alert law enforcement to criminal activity.
- To report PHI to law enforcement when required by law to do so (such as reporting gunshots or stab wounds).

- To comply with a court order or court-ordered warrant, a subpoena or summons issued by a judicial officer, or an administrative request from a law enforcement official (the administrative request must include a written statement that the information requested is relevant and material, specific and limited in scope, and de-identified information cannot be used).

- To respond to a request for PHI for purposes of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness or missing person, but the information must be limited to basic demographic and health information about the person.
- To respond to a request for PHI about an adult victim of a crime when the victim agrees (or in limited circumstances if the individual is unable to agree). Child abuse or neglect may be reported, without a parent's agreement, to any law enforcement official authorized by law to receive such reports.

For More Information

This is a summary of the relevant provisions and does not include all requirements that are found in the HIPAA Privacy Rule. For complete information, please visit the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service's Office for Civil Rights HIPAA web site at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy>.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act A Guide for First Responders and Law Enforcement

What is FERPA?

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (*FERPA*) is a Federal law that protects the privacy of student education records. The law applies to all educational institutions and agencies (termed “schools” below) that receive funds under any U.S. Department of Education program. *FERPA* gives parents certain rights with respect to their children’s education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she reaches the age of 18 or attends a postsecondary institution. Students to whom the rights have transferred are “eligible students.”

FERPA protects the rights of parents or eligible students to:

- *inspect and review education records;*
- *seek to amend education records;*
- *consent to the disclosure of information from education records, except as specified by law.*



What information can schools provide to law enforcement?

Generally, schools may disclose personally identifiable information (PII) from students’ education records to outside parties, including local law enforcement, only if the parent or the eligible student has provided prior written consent. “Education records” are defined as those records that are directly related to a student and maintained by a school or a party acting for the school, and include student records such as transcripts, disciplinary records, immunization records, and other similar records.

However, there are exceptions to the definition of “education records.” One of these exceptions is for school “law enforcement unit (LEU) records.” These records are defined as records that are (1) created by a LEU; (2) created for a law enforcement purpose; and (3) maintained by the LEU. These records are not protected under *FERPA* and can be disclosed according to school policy or as required by law. Education records that are in the possession of the LEU do not lose their status as education records and must continue to be protected under *FERPA*.



FERPA permits the non-consensual disclosure of PII from “education records” for health and safety emergencies and judicial orders.

Discussed below are some relevant exceptions to *FERPA*’s general consent rule that permit the non-consensual disclosure of PII from education records to law enforcement agencies:

Schools may non-consensually disclose designated “directory information” to law enforcement agencies.

This is permitted if the school has provided notice to parents and eligible students of PII from student education records that the school has designated as directory information and if the parents and eligible students have not opted out of directory information disclosures. Directory information is information from an education record that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed and may include items such as name, address, telephone listing, and participation in sports.



Schools may non-consensually disclose PII from education records in connection with a health or safety emergency.

When an articulable and significant threat exists – anything from an active shooter to a hazardous weather event to a chemical spill – school officials are permitted to disclose PII from education records to appropriate parties, such as law enforcement, in order to protect the health and safety of students or other individuals. Schools are allowed to share this information only during the period of the emergency, and they have to meet certain recordkeeping requirements.

Schools may non-consensually disclose PII from education records in order to comply with a judicial order or a lawfully issued subpoena. Prior notification to parents and students is generally required, though there are some exceptions for law enforcement subpoenas where the court or issuing agency has ordered that the existence or contents of the subpoena or the information furnished in response to the subpoena not be disclosed.

Questions about FERPA?


Email the U.S. Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office with questions about *FERPA* at FERPA.Customer@ed.gov. You may also contact your legal counsel for advice.



9.4 DHS Active Shooter Pocket Cards for Printing

DHS Active Shooter Pocket Cards information can be found at:

<http://www.dhs.gov/publication/active-shooter-pocket-card> or readers of this document may use the images pasted below to print them directly without the link (see below).

COPING	PROFILE
WITH AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION	OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers• Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit• If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door• Attempt to take the active shooter down as a last resort	<p>An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area, typically through the use of firearms.</p>
	CHARACTERISTICS
	OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Victims are selected at random• The event is unpredictable and evolves quickly• Law enforcement is usually required to end an active shooter situation
<p>Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.</p>	
CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO	
HOW TO RESPOND	HOW TO RESPOND
WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY	WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES
1. RUN <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Have an escape route and plan in mind• Leave your belongings behind• Keep your hands visible	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Remain calm and follow instructions• Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)• Raise hands and spread fingers• Keep hands visible at all times• Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety• Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling• Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating
2. HIDE <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hide in an area out of the shooter's view• Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors• Silence your cell phone and/or pager	
3. FIGHT <ul style="list-style-type: none">• As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger• Attempt to incapacitate the shooter• Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter	
CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO	INFORMATION
	YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Location of the active shooter• Number of shooters• Physical description of shooters• Number and type of weapons held by shooters• Number of potential victims at the location

9.5 Non-Federal Government Resources

The Federal Government does not officially endorse the organizations below or their products. These materials have been provided here for educational purposes only.

1. Texas State University Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training: <http://www.alerrt.org>
2. National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC): https://www.justnet.org/About_NLECTC.html
3. Tactical Emergency Casualty Care website: <http://www.c-tecc.org/>
4. Counseling Team International: <http://www.thecounselingteam.com/>
5. International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF): <http://www.icisf.org/>
6. Active Response Training: <http://www.activeresponsetraining.net/>
7. Behavioral Threat Assessment: http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/Implementing_Behavioral_Threat_Assessment.pdf
8. Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Mar 2014 Report “The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents”: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.pdf
9. Stratfor Video Reacting to Active Shooter Situation: <http://www.stratfor.com/video/conversation-reacting-armed-assailants>
10. New York City Police Department's "Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation" 2012: <http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/Activeshooter.pdf>

9.6 Foreign Resources

1. Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee – Active Shooter Guidelines for Places of Mass Gathering: <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-shooter-guidelines-places-mass-gathering.pdf>

List of Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initializations

TERM	DEFINITION
ADA	Americans with Disabilities Act
ALERRT	Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training
ASO	Armed Security Officer
ASTITP	Active Shooter Threat Instructor Training Program
ASTTP	Active Shooter Threat Training Program
BAU	Behavioral Analysis Unit
CCP	Casualty Collection Point
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
COOP	Continuity of Operations
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
EAP	Employee Assistance Program
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EO	Executive Order
FAC	Family Assistance Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERPA	Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FPS	Federal Protective Service
FSP	Facility Security Plan
HIPAA	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IARD	Immediate Action Rapid Deployment
ICS	Incident Command System
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFAK	Individual First Aid Kit
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
IS	Independent Study
ISC	Interagency Security Committee
JIC	Joint Information Center
LEFRTTP	Law Enforcement First Responder Training Program

LEO	Law Enforcement Officer
MRI	Magnetic Resonance Imaging
NCAVC	National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OEO	Occupant Emergency Organization
OEP	Occupant Emergency Program or Plan
OSH	Occupational Health and Safety
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PFA	Psychological First Aid
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
SALT	Sort-Assess-Lifesaving Interventions-Treatment/Transport
SIP	Shelter-In-Place
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSM	Site Security Manager
START	Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment
TAT	Threat Assessment Team
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USMS	United States Marshals Service
USSS	United States Secret Service

Glossary of Terms

TERM	DEFINITION
Active Shooter/Active Threat	An individual or individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and/or populated area. In most cases, firearms are the weapon of choice during mass casualty incidents but any weapon (such as a knife, etc.) can be utilized to harm innocent individuals and typically there is no pattern or method to the selection of victims.
Contact Team	A group of law enforcement officers who assemble and proceed directly to the sounds of violence with the goal of making contact with the perpetrator(s).
Designated Officials	Those individuals responsible for a facility's OEO and OEP. This includes staffing, training, developing, maintaining, and implementation of the OEO and OEP.
Employee Assistance Program	Federally required program which provides short-term counseling and referral services to employees at no cost.
Family Assistance Center	An area where families may gather to ascertain information about loved ones after a mass casualty emergency.
Federal Facilities	Government leased and owned facilities in the United States (inclusive of its territories) occupied by Federal employees for nonmilitary activities.
Mitigation	The capabilities necessary to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage by lessening the impact of an event or emergency. Mitigation also means reducing the likelihood that threats and hazards will happen.
Occupant Emergency Plan	Preparedness documents which cover a spectrum of emergency situations ranging from essential services interruptions, communicated threats, incidents posing a risk of injury or significant property damage, hazardous conditions, and incidents posing an immediate threat to life or property, including active shooter attacks.
Preparedness	PPD-8 characterizes preparedness using five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.
Prevention	The capabilities necessary to avoid, deter, or stop an imminent threat. Prevention is the action agencies take to keep a threatened or actual incident from occurring.
Protection	The capabilities to secure facilities against acts of terrorism and man-made or natural disasters. Protection focuses on ongoing actions that protect employees, visitors, networks, and property from a threat or hazard.
Psychological First Aid	An evidence-informed, modular approach used by mental health and disaster response workers to help individuals of all ages in the immediate aftermath of disaster and terrorism.
Public Affairs Officer	Responsible for developing and releasing information about an incident to the news media, incident personnel, and other agencies and organizations, as appropriate.

Recovery	The capabilities necessary to assist facilities affected by an event or emergency in restoring the work environment as soon as possible.
Response	The capabilities necessary to stabilize an emergency once it has already happened, restore and establish a safe and secure environment, save lives and prevent the destruction of property, and facilitate the transition to recovery.
Threat Assessment Team	Responsible for addressing threats, confronting violent behavior, and assisting in assessing potential for violence.

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Interagency Security Committee Participants

Interagency Security Committee

Bernard Holt
Acting Executive Director

Interagency Security Committee Representative

Lindsey E. Blair
Acting Deputy Executive Director

Working Group Chair

Glen Legus
United States Marshals Service

Working Group Participants

Jeffrey Afman
Federal Emergency Management Agency

William (Chip) Ayers
Customs and Border Protection

Douglas Baker
General Services Administration

Katheryn (Denise) Ballew
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jerry Castleberry
Round Rock Police Department

Brice Cook
Department of Energy

Craig Cruz
Environmental Protection Agency

Keith Dressel
Customs and Border Protection

Megan Drohan
Interagency Security Committee

Jim Gallagher
Department of Interior

Timothy Gregg
Internal Revenue Service

Michael Griffin
General Services Administration

Dennis Jahnke
Hennepin County Sheriff's Office

Heather King
National Security Council

David Knoff
California Highway Patrol

David Leighton
United States Coast Guard

James P. Leonard
Customs and Border Protection

Scott Ley
United States Marshals Service

Charles Lombard
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Kenneth Marsalis
Federal Aviation Administration

William Morrison
Federal Aviation Administration

Peter Orchard
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jennifer Parkinson
Federal Bureau of Investigation

James Pelkofski
Pentagon Force Protection Agency

Bayne Rector
Smithsonian Institute

Katherine Schweit
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jerry Stanphill
Federal Aviation Administration

Keith Szakal
Department of Transportation

Darryl Ward
Department of Interior

Rob Marohn
Federal Protective Service

Sandra Mayhall
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mark Murray
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

Jim Palmer
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Roger Parrino
Department of Homeland Security

Charles Pipkins
Department of Energy

Terry Register
Pentagon Force Protection Agency

Bruce Skean
Federal Protective Service

John (JT) Stroud
United States Department of Agriculture

David Vaughan
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jesse Williamson
Interagency Security Committee

Appendix A: Victim and Family Support Considerations

There are several elements of a successful response. They include the right plan, the right people, and the right focus. The first element is ensuring the right people are involved. These responders will manage and coordinate as well as deliver services. Responders should have an understanding of the issues and needs, and the ability to access and apply resources. Appropriate support to victims and families should be provided by experienced front-line providers. Not all law enforcement agencies have internal victim assistance personnel and resources and knowing what community resources and partners are available to assist will help in the absence of a victim assistance program. Having the right plan is also part of a successful response. The victim assistance response should be integrated into incident planning/response, and informed by experience and best practices. It is crucial that the relevant players are integrated into this plan. Develop a plan that can be adapted and scalable based on the incident response. Exercises can serve as a way to modify and improve the response plan. The last element of a successful response is having the right focus. Prioritizing addressing victim needs in a timely, compassionate, and professional manner is key. Remembering why responders do this work is imperative. The focus starts from the top down. It is important to identify a point of contact or a manager to oversee the lead agency's response and to plan and to coordinate with other partners. A successful response plan has investigative and operational benefits. Victims and families tend to be more cooperative when an agency proactively provides them with support and resources. It also assists with identifying, locating, communicating with additional victim/witnesses. The plan also ensures a continuous flow of information to and from the victims.

While each incident will have unique factors, there are predictable response elements in all incidents. Victims need accurate and timely information and the availability of a support system. Preparation and planning can make the difference in meeting these challenges. The role of law enforcement will intersect with victims/families around certain issues including information collection and provision including briefings, interviews, and investigative updates. Victim identification is another intersection between victims/families and law enforcement. This includes ante mortem data collection and missing person reporting in addition to the development of a victim list. In addition, death notification is a major interaction between the family members and law enforcement, as well as the management of personal effects, both evidentiary and non-evidentiary.

Identifying victims is one of the predictable challenges. The legal definition of a victim tends to be more inclusive than exclusive. An incident can result in injured, missing/deceased, walking wounded, and eyewitnesses who may be identified as victims. Closed populations include a set group of impacted individuals such as an airline manifest. Victim identification and notification is less problematic when there is a closed population of victims. In a closed population, victims are known and can be accounted for. In an open population, there are unknown number of victims, missing persons lists, and identification of whole or fragmented human remains. If a death notification is to be delivered to the next of kin, using an effective model can assist with reducing the stress of the individual notifying the family as well as the next of kin. The victim identification process is likely to be drawn out with open populations and when victim remains are disfigured, severely damaged, or fragmented. Victim populations tend to be diverse, which

necessitates planning for multi-cultural issues, language barriers, foreign citizens, injured victims and other special populations with unique needs.

There are practical solutions for identifying victims. Law enforcement generally has the legal responsibility to identify victims. This process starts at the scene. It is imperative to manage expectations. Carefully describing the importance of processing the scene for forensic, and investigative purposes, and to ensure accurate identification of victims is critical. There may be a need to inform families if the loved ones' remains are significantly disfigured. Eventually, the number of victim remains will begin to align with the number of families who have not located their loved ones. This has to be addressed, sooner rather than later. "Provisional" notification can be made by telling these families what is known at that point in time about the number of deceased victims, what needs to be done to identify victims, and how long the process is estimated to take. It is best to avoid making promises that cannot be kept with regard to timing of identification and release of victims' remains. Working collaboratively with the medical examiner to determine the most accurate and efficient victim identification process can be of great value. Ante-mortem interviews with families to collect identifying information should be conducted with a professionally trained victim support person present. When possible, avoid showing photographs to families for identification purposes. Ensure the relevant jurisdictions are clear on who will be doing the death notifications (Medical Examiner vs. Law Enforcement). Death notification should be done in teams (Law Enforcement and victim services provider) using a model. How these issues and death notification are handled has a major impact on families, as well as their relationship to officials and their perception of responding agencies.

Management of victim/family response is another predictable challenge. The National Transportation Safety Board estimates that an average of eight to twelve family members for each missing victim will respond to the incident location or city. Family structures may be very complex and may include parents, step-parents, and estranged family members. There will be family members who are unable to travel to the site but who still deserve information and support. Different victim populations (missing/deceased/hospitalized) may require different resources and services. Victims and families will begin asking about personal belongings. For the families of the deceased these items assume special significance as they are among the last things their loved ones touched and help maintain a physical connection when it is needed most.

There are quite a few practical solutions to manage the victim/family response. A strong, cohesive management team can ensure that the victim response goes smoothly, coordinates and maximize resources, and keeps senior officials informed. The team should consist of a representative from each responsible agency that is identified prior to an active shooter incident. Victim/Family Assistance Centers have been established in response to many events. FAC models generally are intended to support families of the missing/deceased in the immediate aftermath until all the victims have been recovered and identified. FACs may need to remain open through the period of funerals/burials. Considerations should be made for victims who are unable to travel, such as using phone conference bridges and websites. FBI Victim Specialists are located around the country and may be called upon to personally assist with notifications and other support to out of town family members. The plan should include all types of victims and multiple delivery points. Some victim needs are the same – information, emergency assistance, support – but some needs will be distinctly different (families of deceased vs. families of hospitalized injured). The needs of victims and the responsibilities for addressing these needs evolve along a continuum to include:

- the immediate aftermath;
- identifying victims and providing initial information and support;
- transition to services that help stabilize victims and families; and
- long-term provision of information and support associated with protracted investigations and potential prosecutions.

Other considerations include various victim populations specifically, children, persons with disabilities, elderly, non-English speaking victims. If the shooter killed members of his/her own family, there needs to be a separate process for working with surviving family members. A compassionate and supportive approach may enhance their cooperation.

Communication is another predictable challenge. Communication is the key to an effective response. Communicating with victims, families, responders and service providers is paramount for a successful outcome. A massive number of inbound calls from family, friends, and the public may incapacitate the emergency operations center. Victims have a primary need for information from an official source, as soon as it becomes available, and before the media receives it. There are practical solutions to work through communication issues. First, determine, in advance, one hotline number that will be issued to receive calls from families, friends and the public. Second, identify how the hotline will be staffed. A DOJ-funded, professional crisis call center may be a potential asset for local agencies. Ensure that the command post is coordinating and communicating with the lead victim assistance agency to provide critical victim information to victims and families. Deliver accurate information to families. Avoid speculation. It is acceptable to explain why complete or specific information cannot be provided at a given point in time, especially if it means taking the time necessary to ensure a thorough and accurate identification, autopsy, and criminal investigation. Respect victims' need to know the truth, even painful facts, and ensure that information is provided in a sensitive and supportive manner. Share victim information as appropriate while protecting victim privacy. The Family Assistance Center is usually the best place to deliver briefings as it provides privacy and support. The FAC ensures families remain at a centralized location. When identifying a media staging area, consider a location some distance from the FAC to avoid unintended interactions between media and families. When transitioning after the incident, ensure a formal structure for ongoing communication with victims and families to relay ongoing investigative findings and other information, as appropriate. To assist with interagency collaboration, Law Enforcement Online is a helpful tool to use when discussing victim issues within your agency or with other law enforcement agencies and responders.

Resource coordination is yet another predictable challenge. Many “helpers” and donations will show up at scenes and places where victims/families gather. Most will not be needed or helpful, especially when families are in acute crisis and having difficulty absorbing information and making decisions. Victim needs are basic. They include information, support, practical assistance, and privacy from media and well-meaning but unhelpful people. During the immediate aftermath of the incident, victims and families are less interested in the criminal charges and prosecutions. Acute distress is a common and normal reaction to sudden, violent trauma and loss but it does not necessitate mental health counseling, especially in the immediate aftermath. Most people cope over time but some will benefit from counseling at a later point.

A successful overall response to a critical incident includes a plan to respond to victims and families of the event. A coordinated response is critical in order to respond to the predictable challenges and practical solutions. Local resources ensure a seamless transition in the aftermath. A community's response to an active shooter event is largely dependent on the support provided to victims and their family members.



National Retail Federation[®]

The Voice of Retail Worldwide

2008

NRF-ICSC Emergency Response Protocols to Active Shooters

Retail Supplement to DHS Active Shooter Materials

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NRF-ICSC Emergency Response Protocols to Active Shooters

Retail Supplement to DHS Active Shooter Materials

Section 1: Introduction

We live in a dangerous world and the stakes keep getting higher. Following the shootings, which occurred in retail stores, during the 2007 holiday season and continued into 2008, retailers, mall developers and law enforcement across the country recognized the need for additional planning and response protocols, similar to the efforts currently underway in schools and churches, to handle these critical incidents.

On March 31, 2008 over 30 retail loss prevention executives, law enforcement officers and mall/property management executives met to discuss emergency response protocols to active shooter situations. The nature of these events, various store scenarios (specialty stores versus department stores) and case studies from past incidents were used to create the information below.

The National Retail Federation (NRF) and International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) worked directly with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and retailers to expand the information made available to the private and public sectors. The purpose of this document is to supplement the information published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Commercial Facilities Sector Team as a retail-specific document. DHS published training materials to address response protocols to active shooters in any commercial facility. This document is a guide for the retail community and can be adapted for the development of your crisis response in the event of an active shooting incident at a retail store.

Section 2: Active Shooter Overview

What is an Active Shooter?

According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, an **Active Shooter** is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims. Because active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

Section 3: Timeline of Recent Shooting Incidents, 2004 – 2008

Table 1 provides an overview of shooting incidents in/near retail locations. These incidents and other violent crimes occurring in mall parking lots are receiving nationwide media attention and causing legislators to react via revised gun control laws, gun-carry laws (allowing employees to carry guns to work), as well as camera requirements on mall/store parking lots.

Table 1 – Overview of Recent Shooting Incidents, 2004-2008			
Date	Location	Shopping Center/Store	Wounded
Nov. 18, 2004	St. Petersburg, FL	Gateway Shopping Center	1 wounded, 3 killed (2 victims & shooter)
Feb. 13, 2005	Kingston, NY	Hudson Valley Mall	2 wounded
Nov. 1, 2005	Tacoma, WA	Tacoma Mall	6 wounded
May 27, 2006	Oklahoma City, OK	Crossroads Mall	1 injured, 1 killed (shooter)
Nov. 18, 2006	Annapolis, MD	Westfield Annapolis Mall	2 injured
Feb. 12, 2007	Salt Lake City, UT	Trolley Square Mall	4 wounded, 6 killed (5 victims & shooter)
Apr. 29, 2007	Kansas City, MO	Ward Parkway Center	2 wounded, 4 killed (3 victims & shoot
June 13, 2007	Columbia, SC	Columbiana Shopping Center	1 wounded (estranged wife), 1 killed (her father)
Nov. 27, 2007	Houston, TX	Greenspoint Mall	2 dead (shooter & his girlfriend)
Dec. 5, 2007	Omaha, NE	Westroads Mall, Von Maur Department Store	4 wounded, 9 killed (including shooter)
Jan. 26, 2008	Jacksonville, FL	Regency Square Mall	1 killed (shoplifter), 1 wounded (police officer)
Feb. 2, 2008	Tinley Park, IL	Lane Bryant Store	1 wounded, 5 killed (1 associate, 4 customers)
Mar. 3, 2008	West Palm Beach, FL	Wendy's Restaurant	4 wounded (customers), 2 killed (1 diner, 1 shooter)
Mar. 15, 2008	Tukwila, WA	Westfield Southcenter Mall	1 wounded, not life-threatening
Apr. 3, 2008	Miami, FL	Dolphin Mall	5.5 hour lock-down of mall to search for 4 suspects.
Jun. 17, 2008	Tampa, FL	Lakeland Mall	1 wounded (gang member involved in fight)
Jul. 2, 2008	Atlanta, GA	Popular Coffee Shop	2 wounded, not life-threatening

Profile of Shooter

- In 100% of the shootings above the suspect was male
- In over 71% of the incidents, the shooter was between the ages of 15-25, with 20% ages 50-60.
- In 24% of the shootings, the shooter committed suicide before police were able to respond.

The frequency and devastating effects of the 2007 Holiday Season shootings initiated reaction from the retail loss prevention community, mall developers and law enforcement to work together more closely on planning for these occurrences.

Section 4: Active Shooter Policy Reference

Whether you are a retailer, employee, customer, mall management associate or law enforcement officer, the basic rules apply for shootings that occur within:

- department stores
- specialty stores
- anchor stores/big box
- the common area of a mall
- strip center stores
- parking lot of a mall/strip center

Basic Guidelines for individuals present during an active shooting incident:

1. Assess the situation
2. React
 - a. Evacuate
 - b. Hide out/Shelter-in-Place
 - c. Take action
3. Call 911 when it is safe to do so

For retailers of all sizes and sectors needing assistance, refer to the Supplementary Document “Active Shooters: In-Store Response Protocol Sample”, which contains sample policy language being used by retailers. The sample protocols document is intended to be a reference to help you navigate establishing your own company’s active shooter policy.

Section 5: Crisis Response – Overall Considerations for a Retailer

Crisis Response

Before April 20, 1999, not many people knew about Columbine, Colorado. Now, people automatically associate “Columbine” with one of the deadliest school shootings in U.S. history. Based on the learning’s from Columbine, first responding officers to active shooting crises will now quickly assess the situation and immediately take action. Anyone perceived as a vital threat will be eliminated.

Pre-Columbine, law enforcement would contain the area, fully assess the situation and then attempt to negotiate with the offender(s) until resolution of the incident. If negotiation failed or the offender(s) escalated the incident, the local SWAT team/Quick Response Team (QRT) would then initiate a tactical response. The learning’s from Columbine and other massacres have proven that it is better for law enforcement to enter the situation immediately and try to stop the violence. Shooters who have the intent of harming as many victims as possible typically go into the situation not expecting to leave alive (suicide-by-cop), thus the shooter inevitably engages with police officers.

Shooting incidents begin and end in such a short period of time (usually under 10 to 15 minutes) that by the time first responders arrive on the scene, the shooting is usually over and either the shooter has fled or has killed himself. Since these incidents are so spontaneous and lethal, off-duty officers and concerned citizens respond instinctually and engage the shooter. The five components of a crisis response plan should address how a retailer will:

- Prepare
- Prevent
- Respond
- Stabilize
- Recover

Will your policy serve your employees and customers during an emergency?

Prepare: How can a retailer prepare for an active shooter situation?

- Align communication strategy for/with:
 - Internal store operations (employee-to-employee)
 - Communicating to customers and all employees (employee-to-customer)
 - Mall security
 - Retailers located in the mall/shopping center/strip center
 - Law enforcement
 - Team/leadership at corporate headquarters

- Coordinate with mall/shopping center management
 - Conduct regular meetings for retailers within the mall/shopping center, mall management and law enforcement
 - Establish points of contact between retailers/mall management
 - Outline roles of retailers/mall management
 - Coordinate when off-duty police officers are on the payroll of retailers/mall management
- Coordinate with local police
 - Provide access to the building (provide master keys)
 - Provide building plans for emergency responders
- Consider altering existing facilities set-up, if necessary
 - All store phones should have 911 access or clear emergency dialing instructions so employees or customers are not put at risk
 - Store phones without access to dial 911 or clear alternate dialing instructions could put employees/customers at risk
 - Keys for the drop gate in the back office or on a lanyard carried only by a few authorized personnel might not ensure that a gate is dropped/door is locked if shooting breaks out in a common area and your store is located within a mall
 - Refer to the Supplementary Document “Active Shooters/Random Threat Plan: Risk Assessment” as a reference when conducting an assessment of your stores/facilities
- Coordinate escape plans
 - Designate an evacuation meeting location and inform all employees
 - Coordinate how to meet and account for employees once evacuated (check-in procedure)
 - Outline how you will evacuate multi-floor stores
 - Outline how you will account for your associates
 - Train employees to encourage customers to follow them to the evacuation area
- Train associates on what to expect visually and verbally from first responders. **First responders will:**
 - Proceed to the area where shots were last heard
 - Stop the shooting as quickly as possible, including with lethal force (if necessary)
 - Typically respond in teams of four
 - May be dressed in regular patrol uniforms or may be wearing external bulletproof vests, Kevlar helmets and other tactical equipment
 - Arrive at the scene armed with rifles, shotguns or handguns, and might use pepper spray or tear gas to gain control of the situation
 - First responder teams will assume control and mandate the actions of all persons in the area

- Educate associates to assist law enforcement and:
 - **remain calm and quiet**
 - follow instructions of first responders (Note: Law enforcement officers in tactical gear may appear intimidating because of their protective gear.)
 - keep their hands empty & visible at all times (put down bags/packages)
 - point out the location of the shooter to law enforcement officers (if it's known)
- Inform associates that:
 - first-responding law enforcement will **NOT** help any of the wounded/injured until the shooter is no longer a threat; rescue teams will come in later to aid the wounded/injured
 - they may be treated as a suspect
 - they will need to remain on the premises for a while after the shooting; the entire area is a crime scene and law enforcement will usually keep everyone in the area until they have been processed
 - your store might be turned into a temporary processing center for law enforcement officials
 - dependent on proximity and amount of casualties, your store may turn into a temporary recovery unit/emergency room/morgue
- Outline store response and recovery protocol for key departments
- Run a table top exercise and/or simulate an active shooter situation
 - Get the key stake holders involved within the mall/shopping center
 - Customers
 - Law enforcement/first responders
 - Mall developers
 - Retailers (specialty and department stores)
 - Employees at store locations
 - Employees at corporate headquarters

Prevent: How do you prevent an active shooter?

- **Suspicious Individuals** – Store/Mall Security response to observing suspicious individuals
- **Associates** – An active shooter may be a current or former employee. Employees typically display indicators of potentially violent behavior over time. Create a method for associates to notify human resources/management of this behavior.
- **Associates with tenuous domestic situations** – An active shooter may be related to an associate and or a spouse/domestic partner. Create a method for associates to notify human resources/management of domestic troubles.
- **Local Trends** – Establish relationships with law enforcement to stay abreast of any local trends and understand first responder activities.

Respond: What is the right response for your store?

- Considerations For Your Response Program
 - Store Profile (specialty or department store)
 - Security/Loss Prevention Personnel/Store Management on-site
 - Assess the Situation
 - Contact the Police (911)
 - Decision to Evacuate or Hide Out/Shelter-in-Place
 - Public Address Announcement
 - Company Notification
- Training Considerations
 - Simple and instinctual response
 - Implemented by various management levels
 - Include drills or walkthroughs
 - Follow up on a periodic basis

Stabilize: How can you stabilize a situation during the midst of a critical/crisis situation?

- Plan ahead and have a contingency plan
- Inform employees of the plan and train on how to react/respond
- Have a public relations plan in place to mitigate the damages after the shooting

Recover: What will your recovery efforts entail?

- Immediate Response
 - Thoroughly document the series of events through interviews and forensics
 - Dependent on proximity to the shooting and the extent of casualties, your store may become:
 - a temporary processing center
 - a temporary recovery unit/emergency room/morgue
- Associates & Customers
 - Obtain available counseling for all involved
 - Create 'safe' feeling so associates and customers will return
- Business Interests
 - Media Strategies with mall management

Section 6: Conclusion

In conclusion, this type of training is outside the bounds of what most retailers, customers and employees should expect when reporting to work/enjoying a leisurely afternoon of shopping. However, history has told us that it is critical to think about these situations, prepare for the worst and hope/expect the best. People will respond instinctually to these panic situations, however by training and teaching employees some of the basics, they will have that to fall back on during these crisis situations.

Active shooting situations may not be preventable however the amount of damage and life lost can be minimized. Working with industry experts and law enforcement/first responders, the sample response protocols below have been outlined.

Active Shooters: In-Store Response Protocol Sample

**If an active shooter or other violent situation occurs in/near your Store,
TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION!**

1. **ASSESS THE SITUATION** – Determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life. Customers are most likely to follow the lead of in-store associates and management during an active shooter situation. **Do not endanger your safety or the safety of others.**
2. **REACT** – Determine the location of the shooter (inside or outside store). Based on your assessment, react to the situation at hand in the method safest possible for you and those around you. The shooter may be moving through the mall, store, back corridors, entrances, or out to the parking areas. There may be danger from the gunfire of the attacker, and responding police officers. You must choose which action to take:
 - a. **EVACUATE** – If the shooter is in the store, and it is safe to do so, evacuate the store. Have an escape route and plan in mind and leave your belongings behind. Keep hands visible so it is clear to first responders that you are not armed. Run away from the sound, putting as much distance between you and the shooter as possible. Go to pre-established company meeting spot.
 - b. **HIDE OUT/SHELTER-IN-PLACE** – **Stay hidden** if possible and away from windows and exterior doors.
 - i. **HIDE OUT/SHELTER-IN-PLACE** – Take staff and customers to the back area, away from exposure to glass and the mall common area or the outside area. Go to a secure stockroom, office, emergency stairwells, utility closet, mall corridors, etc. Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors.
 - ii. **KEEP SAFE** – Stay inside your Store, unless instructed to do otherwise by the police officials or other local authorities. **Do NOT open the door** for anyone that cannot provide you with appropriate first responder/security identification and/or show you a badge.
 - c. **TAKE ACTION** – As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger. Attempt to incapacitate the active shooter. Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter.
 - d. **LOCK UP** – If it is safe to do so, **lock all Store doors**. Determine key holders, as they may vary by company. For stores with multiple exits, lock Store doors closest to vicinity/direction of shooter, if it is safe to do so. Determine the automatic and manual ways to close the door.

3. **COMMUNICATE** – When it is safe to do so: Call out and describe the situation.
 - a. **Inform customers and associates** – State over the Public Announcement System and store radios that a person is in the building with a weapon. Sample announcement: ***"Attention we have a 911 situation occurring please move to a secure area immediately."*** Repeat 3 times.
 - b. **Call 911** – Be prepared to provide as much information about the shooter as possible, including physical description/location of shooter:
 - i. Location of the active shooter
 - ii. Number of shooters, if more than one
 - iii. Physical description of shooter/s
 - iv. Number and type of weapons held
 - v. by the shooter/s
 - vi. Number of potential victims at the location
 - c. **Contact appropriate internal and external partners** – When safe to do so contact and update loss prevention/store management, mall security, corporate office.
4. **GET OUT – Follow all instructions given to you by authorities.** You may be requested to exit your area with your hands above your head and be told to leave all bags and packages in the Store. Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions.
5. **How should you react when law enforcement arrives**
 - a. Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions.
 - b. Immediately raise hands and spread fingers.
 - c. Keep hands visible at all times.
 - d. Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as attempting to hold on to them for safety.
 - e. Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling.
 - f. Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises.
6. **After the Event**
 - a. As soon as possible, the appropriate individuals at store operations and corporate should be contacted.
 - b. Establish an area outside the store for all Associates and Executives to evacuate to after the situation is resolved.
 - c. Set up Store Command Center. This should be the store's central communication post. Ensure someone is always stationed at the Command Center phone to take and give information as needed.

Active Shooters/Random Threat Plan: Risk Assessment

The chart below may be used to assist you in identifying considerations for your plan.

	YES	NO
PHYSICAL		
1) Is your store in a mall?		
2) Is your location a stand-alone store?		
3) Is your store near a major highway?		
4) Is your store near a major train route?		
5) Is your parking lot adequately lit?		
6) Is your parking lot patrolled regularly by either mall security or the police?		
7) Do you have a full time Loss Prevention staff?		
8) Does your store have a closed circuit (CCTV) system?		
9) Does your store have an emergency generator?		
10) Does your store have a P.A. system? If not, do you have a megaphone?		
11) How close is your cash office to an exit?	ft.	
12) Are your stockrooms locked at all times?		
13) Does management know where risers and utility shut-offs are located?		
13) Does management know where risers and utility shut-offs are located?		
ENVIRONMENT		
14) Has there been prior criminal activity or civil complaints against your store?		
15) Do you have an active cooperative alliance with mall security and the local police?		
16) Is your store in a tornado-prone area?		
17) Is your store near a crime magnet, such as a late night entertainment venue or near property in disrepair or abandoned?		
18) Is there a history of crime in the area where your store is located?		
19) Are there AED (automatic defibrillator devices) in the mall?		
20) How far is the closest medical facility?	mi.	
21) What is the average response time from the local police, fire and paramedics?	min.	
PEOPLE		
22) Do you have adequate staffing levels for each shift?		
23) Do you have emergency contact information for all associates?		
24) Are any associates trained in first aid, CPR or AED's?		



About the National Retail Federation

The National Retail Federation is the world's largest retail trade association, with membership that comprises all retail formats and channels of distribution including department, specialty, discount, catalog, Internet, independent stores, chain restaurants, drug stores and grocery stores as well as the industry's key trading partners of retail goods and services. NRF represents an industry with more than 1.6 million U.S. retail establishments, more than 24 million employees - about one in five American workers - and 2006 sales of \$4.7 trillion. As the industry umbrella group, NRF also represents more than 100 state, national and international retail associations. www.nrf.com

NRF Contacts

Joseph LaRocca
VP, Loss Prevention
202-783-7971
laroccaj@nrf.com

Angélica Rodríguez
Sr. Director, Loss Prevention
202-626-8142
rodrigueza@nrf.com



**325 7th Street, NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20004
www.nrf.com**



New York City Police Department

Active Shooter

*Recommendations and Analysis
for Risk Mitigation*

Raymond W. Kelly
Police Commissioner



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Part I: Introduction

Active shooter attacks are dynamic incidents that vary greatly from one attack to another. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” In its definition, DHS notes that, “in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.” The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has limited this definition to include only those cases that spill beyond an intended victim to others.¹

The type of police response to an active shooter attack depends on the unique circumstances of the incident. In the event of such an attack, private security personnel should follow the instructions of the first-responders from the NYPD.

Because active shooter attacks are dynamic events, the NYPD cannot put forward a single set of best-practices for private security response to such incidents. However, the NYPD has compiled a list of recommendations for building security personnel to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The recommendations draw on previous studies of active shooter attacks and are presented in Part II.²

The NYPD developed these recommendations based on a close analysis of active shooter incidents from 1966 to 2010. This Compendium of cases, presented in the Appendix, includes 281 active shooter incidents. It is organized chronologically by type of facility targeted, including office buildings, open commercial areas, factories and warehouses, schools, and other settings.

The NYPD performed a statistical analysis on a subset of these cases to identify common characteristics among active shooter attacks. This analysis is presented in Part III and the underlying methodology is presented in Part IV. The analysis found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution.

¹ *E.g.*, a case of a grievance against an employer leads to an attack targeting not only the direct supervisor but also others in the workplace.

² U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond,” October 2008, http://www.lpinformation.com/Portals/0/DHS_ActiveShooter_FlipBook.pdf; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, “Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips,” 2008, www.ucpd.ucla.edu/2008/activeshootersafetytips.pdf; US Secret Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States,” May 2002, http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, “Workplace Violence; Issues in Response,” June 2002, <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/violence.pdf>; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, “Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery,” October 2001, http://hawaii.gov/ag/cpja/quicklinks/workplace_violence/WVfull.pdf; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, “Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees,” <http://www.doli.state.mn.us/WSC/PDF/WorkplaceViolencePreventionGuide.pdf>.

Part II: Recommendations

The NYPD compiled a list of recommendations to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The NYPD developed these recommendations based on analysis of past active shooter incidents and careful review of previous studies.³ Unlike other works on active shooter attacks, this guide provides recommendations tailored to building security personnel. The NYPD organized its recommendations into three categories: procedures, systems, and training.

Procedures:

- Conduct a realistic security assessment to determine the facility's vulnerability to an active shooter attack.
- Identify multiple evacuation routes and practice evacuations under varying conditions; post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout the facility; ensure that evacuation routes account for individuals with special needs and disabilities.
- Designate shelter locations with thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal interior windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices, and duress alarms.
- Designate a point-of-contact with knowledge of the facility's security procedures and floor plan to liaise with police and other emergency agencies in the event of an attack.
- Incorporate an active shooter drill into the organization's emergency preparedness procedures.
- Vary security guards' patrols and patterns of operation.
- Limit access to blueprints, floor plans, and other documents containing sensitive security information, but make sure these documents are available to law enforcement responding to an incident.
- Establish a central command station for building security.

Systems:

- Put in place credential-based access control systems that provide accurate attendance reporting, limit unauthorized entry, and do not impede emergency egress.
- Put in place closed-circuit television systems that provide domain awareness of the entire facility and its perimeter; ensure that video feeds are viewable from a central command station.

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Active Shooter: How to Respond"; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, "Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips"; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, "Workplace Violence: Issues in Response"; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, "Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery"; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, "Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees."

- Put in place communications infrastructure that allows for facility-wide, real-time messaging.
- Put in place elevator systems that may be controlled or locked down from a central command station.

Training:

- Train building occupants on response options outlined by the Department of Homeland Security in “Active Shooter: How to Respond” when an active shooter is in the vicinity:⁴
 - **Evacuate:** Building occupants should evacuate the facility if safe to do so; evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualize their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators or escalators.
 - **Hide:** If evacuating the facility is not possible, building occupants should hide in a secure area (preferably a designated shelter location), lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, cover all windows, turn off all lights, silence any electronic devices, lie on the floor, and remain silent.
 - **Take Action:** If neither evacuating the facility nor seeking shelter is possible, building occupants should attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by throwing objects, using aggressive force, and yelling.
- Train building occupants to call 911 as soon as it is safe to do so.
- Train building occupants on how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene: follow all official instructions, remain calm, keep hands empty and visible at all times, and avoid making sudden or alarming movements.

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond.”

Part III: Analysis

The NYPD identified a subset of the active shooter cases included in the Compendium and ran statistical analyses of the data set (see Part IV for an explanation of the analytic methodology). This subset, called the “active shooter data set,” includes all cases in the Compendium, except: 1) those that occurred outside of the United States; 2) those that did not result in casualties of either victims or attackers; and 3) those that were foiled before the attack occurred. In total, the active shooter data set includes 202 cases.

Although this analysis identified some common characteristics among active shooters, the NYPD found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution.


Sex of Attacker

The NYPD’s analysis demonstrates that active shooters are an overwhelmingly male group. Only 8 out of 202 cases (4%) in the active shooter data set involved female attackers. Taking into account reporting biases (*i.e.*, the possibility that the relative rarity of female attackers leads to increased attention paid to those attacks), the actual percentage of female attackers may be even lower.

Age of Attacker

The NYPD’s analysis demonstrates that the median age of active shooters in the active shooter data set is 35. This median, however, conceals a more complicated, yet unsurprising distribution, depicted in Figure 1. The distribution of ages is bimodal, with a first peak for shootings at schools by 15-19 year-olds, and a second peak in non-school facilities by 35-44 year-olds.

Figure 1: Attacker Ages by Number of Attackers



Number of Attackers

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that 98% of active shooter incidents in the active shooter data set were carried out by a single attacker.

Planning Tactics


The NYPD's analysis demonstrates a broad range of tactical sophistication in the planning stage of active shooter attacks. Some active shooters do little to no planning and attack impulsively, while others do extensive planning, including pre-operational surveillance. A few active shooters even set up pre-planned defenses intended to trap victims and prolong their attacks, such as chaining doors and blocking entrances. Some attackers appear to have learned from previous active shooter incidents.

Targets

The NYPD organized relationships between attackers and victims in the active shooter data set into five categories: professional, academic, familial, other, and none.⁵

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that active shooters are often members of the communities they target. Figure 2 shows that the majority of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set occurred when the perpetrator had either a professional or academic relationship with at least one of the victims.⁶ However, 22% of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set occurred when the active shooter had no prior relationship to the victims, demonstrating that active shooter attacks can occur even without any prior altercation or grievance.

Figure 2: Attacker's Relationship to Victims



Moreover, of the 82 attacks that involved professional relationships, fewer than one-third were perpetrated by individuals who were no longer employed by the organization at the time of the attack, implying that the threat from active shooter attacks is not limited to

⁵ The NYPD categorized attacks against significant others and former significant others as "Other."

⁶ In cases in which the attacker had multiple victims, the NYPD determined the relationship classification based on the attacker's relationship to the "closest" victim. *E.g.*, In an active shooter incident in which an attacker shoots his spouse and his spouse's coworker, the relationship classification is "familial."

downsized employees. In fact, in many cases, active shooter attacks resulted from disagreements among current employees of the organization.

Number of Casualties


Determining the typical number of casualties in an active shooter attack is complex because the distribution of the number of deaths and woundings in the active shooter data set has a long tail.⁷ In other words, the active shooter data set includes a small number of attacks with a large number of casualties; these cases inflate the average. For this reason, the median is a better measure of the typical number of casualties than the average.

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that the median number of deaths in cases included in the active shooter data set is 2, and the average is 3.0. The majority of attacks included in the active shooter data set resulted in 0 to 5 deaths. The median number of wounded is 2, and the average is 3.6.

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that the distribution of the number of wounded is similar to the distribution of the number of dead. The distributions differ slightly in that there are a few more attacks with large numbers of wounded than there are attacks with large numbers of dead.

Figure 3 shows the distributions of the number of attacks by casualty count for both dead and wounded. These distributions demonstrate that a typical active shooter attack results in 0-2 deaths and 0-2 wounded.

Figure 3: Casualty Counts by Number of Incidents



⁷ In this section, the NYPD only included deaths or woundings of victims (not attackers) in the casualty counts.

Location of Attack

The NYPD organized attack locations in the active shooter data set into five categories: office buildings, open commercial areas,⁸ schools, factories and warehouses, and other facilities.⁹

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that less than one-third of attacks included in the active shooter data set took place at schools; and roughly one-half occurred at commercial facilities, such as office buildings, factories and warehouses, and open commercial areas. Moreover, Table 1 shows that attacks at restricted commercial facilities, such as office buildings, factories, and warehouses, occurred more frequently than attacks at open commercial facilities, such as retail stores or restaurants.¹⁰

Table 1: Number of Incidents by Location

Location Type	Number of Incidents	Percentage
School	64	29%
Office Building	29	13%
Open Commercial	52	23%
Factory/Warehouse	30	13%
Other	49	22%
Total	224*	100%

* The 202 cases in the active shooter data set occurred at 224 locations because several attacks involved more than one location.

Weapons

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that 36% of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set involved more than one weapon. In some instances, one of the weapons was a close combat weapon, such as a knife. In one case, a single attacker carried seven weapons, including a rifle, two shotguns, and four handguns.

In several cases, the attackers used firearms that they had stolen from relatives or friends. This pattern was most apparent in school-related shootings where attackers stole weapons from parents.

Reporting on weapons involved in active shooter attacks is often inconsistent and inaccurate. For some attacks, news reports state the exact make and model of the firearm involved; for other attacks, reports do not include specific information on weapons. Moreover, reports often refer to semi-automatic rifles as "machine guns" or "assault weapons"; neither term is particularly descriptive, and often times both terms are inaccurate. Additionally, in some cases, the make and model of a weapon is not enough

⁸ The NYPD defines "Open Commercial" as commercial locations to which members of the public have open, unfettered access. *E.g.*, shopping malls, department stores, restaurants, etc.

⁹ Several of the cases included in the "Other" category occurred at: airports, medical centers, and religious facilities. The NYPD chose not to break these types of locations out into their own categories because the number of attacks at each type of location did not exceed a 5% threshold.

¹⁰ Classification of some events required analyst judgment.

information to fully decipher its capabilities, since aftermarket kits are available to convert certain firearms from semi-automatic to fully-automatic.

Attack Resolution

The NYPD organized attack resolutions in the active shooter data set into four categories: applied force, no applied force, suicide or attempted suicide, and attacker fled.

Table 2 shows that the vast majority of attacks in the active shooter data set ended violently, either by force applied by law enforcement, private security, bystanders, or the attackers themselves. Only 14% ended without applied force, such as by a negotiated surrender.

Table 2: Number of Incidents by Incident Resolution

Resolution	Number of Incidents	Percentage
Applied Force	93	46%
No Applied Force	28	14%
Suicide/Attempted Suicide	80	40%
Attacker Fled	1	<1%
Total	202	100%

Part IV: Analytic Methodology

The Compendium of active shooter incidents presented in the Appendix includes 281 cases: 244 attacks with at least one casualty, two attacks resulting in zero casualties, and 35 plots foiled in the planning stages. The incidents in the Compendium occurred between 1966 and December 31, 2010. The NYPD compiled these cases from internet news sources identified using online search. The NYPD did not use special-access government sources to compile the cases in the Compendium; all information is open-source and publicly available.

The NYPD included only those incidents carried out by attackers that met the DHS definition of an active shooter: an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. The NYPD further restricted this definition to exclude: gang-related shootings, shootings that solely occurred in domestic settings, robberies, drive-by shootings, attacks that did not involve a firearm, and attacks categorized primarily as hostage-taking incidents.

The search technique used by the NYPD to identify the cases included in the Compendium had some limitations that resulted in sampling biases. First, since the NYPD gathered the data through an internet search, the Compendium has a strong sample bias towards recent incidents. For attacks that occurred between 2000 and 2010, the Compendium is nearly comprehensive. For attacks that occurred prior to 2000, the Compendium may not be comprehensive because the attacks pre-date widespread internet news reporting. Second, for incidents that occurred before 2000, the Compendium is biased towards attacks with higher dead and wounded counts, which tended to attract greater media attention and were thus easier to find in news reports.

To facilitate the quantitative analysis, the NYPD organized the information about each case into categories. Some incidents were difficult to classify and required analyst judgment to resolve. For all cases, the Compendium includes a footnote to the original source material that allows readers to obtain further detail or clarification.

Occasionally, multiple sources related to a single attack presented conflicting information about that attack. Generally, when the NYPD identified discrepancies between sources, the NYPD included the information presented in the more recent source; this is particularly relevant for the counts of dead and wounded, where later sources tend to be more accurate. In cases where the NYPD identified discrepancies between a government source and a news outlet, the NYPD included the information presented in the government source.

The NYPD prepared a subset of the Compendium cases suitable for quantitative analysis. The active shooter data set includes all cases in the Compendium, except: 1) those that occurred outside of the United States; 2) those that did not result in casualties of either victims or attackers; and 3) those that were foiled before the attack occurred. In total, the active shooter data set includes 202 cases.

The NYPD chose to restrict quantitative analysis to cases that took place within the United States because the NYPD limited its internet searches to English-language sites, creating a strong sampling bias against international incidents. Table 3 presents the number of cases in the Compendium by country.

Table 3: Number of Incidents by Country

Country	Number of Incidents	Country	Number of Incidents
U.S.	237	Denmark	1
Canada	8	Egypt	1
Germany	6	France	1
Australia	5	Greece	1
Israel	3	Italy	1
United Kingdom	4	The Netherlands	1
Finland	2	Slovakia	1
India	2	Somalia	1
Argentina	1	Sweden	1
Austria	1	Thailand	1
Bosnia	1	Yemen	1

The NYPD chose to restrict quantitative analysis to cases with one or more documented casualties to compensate for a strong sampling bias. Although the NYPD identified in the Compendium 35 foiled attacks and two attacks resulting in zero casualties, this portion of the Compendium is not comprehensive, given the comparatively limited amount of news coverage these attacks received.¹¹

Although it would be useful to comment on trends in the frequency of active shooter incidents, the NYPD determined that it is not possible to do so given the limitations of the active shooter data set. The sampling bias caused by using internet news as the primary source skews any observed patterns.

As a general rule, the ability to make generalizations regarding a group of events improves as the number of events in the sample increases. Accordingly, it is difficult to make precise statistical judgments with limited data. For this reason, many research questions that would have been interesting to investigate, such as the average number of deaths in active shooter incidents in each state, cannot be answered with this data set.

¹¹ Incidents in which the attacker was the only casualty may also suffer from limited news reporting, making this portion of the data set incomplete.

APPENDIX

COMPENDIUM OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS (1966-2010)

OFFICE BUILDINGS

Case #1

August 17, 2010: Patrick Sharp opened fire outside the Department of Public Safety in McKinney, Texas. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Sharp began his attack by setting his truck on fire to lure people out of the building. He then retreated across the street and fired 100 rounds of ammunition on employees standing outside the building. Sharp was unsuccessful in attempting to ignite the trailer attached to his truck, which was filled with explosives. Prior to the attack, Sharp made references to his plot on a social networking site and expressed his desire to kill people in correspondence with a Facebook friend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Department of Public Safety in McKinney, Texas
Attacker Information:	Patrick Gray Sharp (29/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun (12-gauge); handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Matthew Haag, Dallas Morning News, “‘I Enjoy Watching People Beg for their Life,’ McKinney Shooter Patrick Sharp told Facebook Friend,” August 19, 2010, <http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/081810dnmetmckinneyshoot.66e01f0d.html>.
2. CNN, “Heavily Armed Man Orchestrates Attack on Texas Police Building,” August 17, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-17/justice/texas.shooting_1_kowalski-public-safety-building-assault-rifle?_s=PM:CRIME.

Case #2

July 12, 2010: Robert Reza opened fire at Emcore Corporation, where he was formerly employed, killing two people and wounding four others, including his ex-girlfriend. Reza began his attack outside the office building and then later forced his way inside the facility. Reports state that the attack occurred after Reza and his ex-girlfriend were involved in a domestic dispute.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
------------------------------------	---

Location Information:	Emcore Corp in Albuquerque, New Mexico
Attacker Information:	Robert Reza (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Edecio Martinez, CBS News, "Emcore Shooter Robert Reza Kills Two, Self, Say Police," July 12, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20010291-504083.html.
2. Trip Jennings, The New Mexico Independent, "Two Women Killed by Shooter Monday were Victims of Chance, APD Chief Says" July 13, 2010, <http://newmexicoindependent.com/59273/two-women-killed-by-shooter-monday-were-victims-of-chance-apd-chief-says>.

Case #3

March 4, 2010: John Bedell opened fire on Pentagon police officers after an officer asked him for his credentials at the security checkpoint of the Pentagon's main entrance. Three guards returned fire and fatally wounded the gunman.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia
Attacker Information:	John Patrick Bedell, (36/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handguns (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Christian Davenport, Washington Post, "Officers who Shot Pentagon Gunman Recall Moments of Mayhem," March 9, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/08/AR2010030803897.html>.

Case #4

November 10, 2009: Robert Beiser opened fire in a drug-testing clinic where his wife was employed, killing her and injuring two of her co-workers. The attack came one week after Beiser's wife filed for divorce.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Legacy Metro Lab in Tualatin, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Robert Beiser (39/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 injured
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun; handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, KPTV, "Gunman Had Multiple Weapons, Police Say," November 10, 2009, <http://www.kptv.com/news/21575706/detail.html>.
2. Bill Oram, Oregonian, "Gunman Kills Estranged Wife at Tualatin Lab, Injures Two, Kills Self," November 10, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/tualatin/index.ssf/2009/11/police_responding_to_tualatin_shooting.html.

Case #5

November 6, 2009: Jason Rodriguez opened fire at his former workplace, killing one employee and wounding five others. The assailant surrendered at his mother's apartment after a two hour manhunt.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Reynolds, Smith & Hills in Orlando, Florida
Attacker Information:	Jason Rodriguez (40/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, Shaila Dewan, "Lawyer Cites Mental Illness in Orlando Shooting," November 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/us/08orlando.html?_r=2.
2. Orlando Sentinel, "Jason Rodriguez: Shooting at Downtown Orlando Office Building Leaves 5 Hurt, 1 Dead," November 6, 2009,

<http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/crime/os-shooting-reported-downtown-orlando-20091106,0,2873337.story>.

Case #6

November 14, 2008: Jing Hua Wu opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people, including the CEO. Wu had been laid-off hours prior to the attack and returned to the office to request a meeting with company officials. Wu shot and killed all three victims during this meeting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	SiPort Company offices in Santa Clara, California
Attacker Information:	Jing Hua Wu (47/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Michael Harvey, Times Online, "Tech Engineer Kills Three Bosses at Silicon Valley Start-Up After Being Sacked," November 16, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5167198.ece.

Case #7

October 4, 2007: John Ashley, a Baptist deacon, opened fire in a downtown law office, killing two people and injuring three others. Police shot and killed him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Giordano & Giordano Law Office in Alexandria, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	John Ashley (63/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Abbey Brown and Warren Hayes, USA Today, "Standoff at Louisiana Law Firm Leaves 3 Dead," October 5, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-05-louisiana-shooting_N.htm.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Louisiana Police Kill Gunman Who Killed 2, Wounded 3 in Law Office," October 5, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,299507,00.html>.

Case #8

August 30, 2007: Paulino Valenzuela, a terminated janitor, opened fire at his former workplace, killing his ex-supervisor and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	RiverBay Corporation in Bronx, New York
Attacker Information:	Paulino Valenzuela (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Nicole Bode, Kerry Burke and Tina Moore, New York Daily News, "Bronx Slay Suspect Paulino Valenzuela Claiming Self-Defense," September 3, 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/09/03/2007-09-03_bronx_slay_suspect_paulino_valenzuela_cl-1.html.
2. WCBSTV.com, "Bronx Workplace Shooting Leaves 1 Dead, 2 Wounded," August 30, 2007, <http://wcbstv.com/topstories/shooting.the.bronx.2.246871.html>.

Case #9

April 9, 2007: Anthony LaCalamita opened fire at an accounting firm where he was formerly employed, killing one person and injuring two others. LaCalamita had been fired from the company prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Gordon Advisors in Troy, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Anthony LaCalamita (38/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Source:

1. Ellen Piligian and Libby Sandler, New York Times, "Shooting at Accounting Firm Leaves One Dead and 2 Hurt," April 10, 2007,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B06EEDD153FF933A25757C0A9619C8B63>.

Case #10

February 13, 2007: Vincent J. Dortch opened fire in a conference room at the Naval Business Center, killing three business executives and wounding a fourth.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Philadelphia Naval Business Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information: Vincent J. Dortch (44/M)
Casualties: 3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons: 2
Weapon Information: Rifle (AK-47); handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Richard G. Jones, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 3 Members of Investment Firm and Himself," February 14, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/us/14board.html>.
2. Adam Taylor, Terri Sanginiti and Andrew Tangel, Delaware Online, "Bear Man Kills 3, Himself Over Deal Gone Bad,"
<http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20070214/NEWS/702140361/Bear-man-kills-3-himself-over-deal-gone-bad>.

Case #11

December 9, 2006: Joe Jackson opened fire at a law firm, killing three people and wounding one other. Jackson forced a security guard, at gunpoint, to take him to the 38th floor of the legal offices. He chained the office doors behind him. SWAT snipers fatally shot Jackson after a 45-minute standoff, during which he took a bystander hostage. Reports state that Jackson believed he had been cheated over an invention of a toilet designed for tractor-trailers.

Number of attack locations: 1

Location Information:	Wood, Phillips, Katz, Clark & Mortimer in Chicago, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Joseph Jackson (59/M)
Casualties:	3 dead, 1 wounded
Number of weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Revolver; knife; other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Chicago Tribune, "Deadly Pursuit," December 11, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-12-11/news/0612110299_1_joe-jackson-attorney-george-jackson.
2. Amy S. Clark, CBS News, "Shooting May Be Over 'Truck Toilet' Patent," December 9, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/08/national/main2243640.shtml?source=RSSattr=HOME_2243640.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Ill. Gunman Felt Cheated Over Invention," December 9, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16114776/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.

Case #12

October 21, 2004: Pelayo Errasti opened fire at the Beltservice Corporation Headquarters, injuring one employee. Reports state that Errasti, who had been fired from the company a year prior to the attack, intended to shoot his former boss.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Beltservice Corporation Headquarters in Earth City, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Pelayo Errasti (48/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. St. Louis County Police, "Press Release: Warrants Issued on 48 Year Old Man Suspected of Office Shooting in Earth City," October 22, 2004, <http://www.co.st-louis.mo.us/scripts/PD/press/view.cfm?ViewMe=5255>.
2. Associated Press, Washington Post, "Nation in Brief," October 24, 2004, <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/721913001.html?FMT=ABS>

&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Oct+24%2C+2004&author=&desc=NATION+IN+BRIEF.

Case #13

April 2, 2004: William Case opened fire at his workplace, killing his manager and wounding a co-worker. Reports state that Case had an argument with his manager about unemployment benefits prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Employment Security Commission office in Hendersonville, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	William Case (30/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. WRAL.com, "Hendersonville ESC Office Set to Reopen," April 8, 2004, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1090411/>.

Case #14

February 2, 2004: Louis Darrell Kinyon opened fire at his workplace, killing his supervisor. He then attempted to commit suicide. The attack occurred one week after Kinyon was suspended for violating company policy.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Provo River Water Users Association in Pleasant Grove, Utah
Attacker Information:	Louis Darrell Kinyon (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted suicide

Sources:

1. Jesse Hyde Deseret, Deseret News, "'Gentle Giant' Loved Family," February 4, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20040204/ai_n11443709/.

2. Jesse Hyde Deseret, Deseret News, "Shooting Suspect is Offered a Plea Deal," April 12, 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20050412/ai_n13593327/.

Case #15

February 25, 2003: Emanuel Burl Patterson opened fire at a temporary employment agency, killing four people and injuring another. Reports state Patterson had argued with people who were waiting in line prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Labor Ready Inc. in Huntsville, Alabama
Attacker Information:	Emanuel Burl Patterson (23/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Gunman Kills Four at Alabama Job Agency," February 26, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/26/us/gunman-kills-four-at-alabama-job-agency.html>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "Four Dead in Shooting in Ala., Gunman Surrenders," February 25, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-02-25-ala-shooting_x.htm.

Case #16

December 26, 2000: Michael McDermott opened fire at the Edgewater Technology firm, killing seven co-workers. At the end of his rampage, McDermott sat in the reception area and waited for law enforcement to arrive.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Edgewater Technology in Wakefield, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Michael McDermott (42/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); shotgun; handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Carey Goldberg, New York Times, "A Deadly Turn to a Normal Work Day," December 28, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/28/us/a-deadly-turn-to-a-normal-work-day.html>.
2. New York Times, "Man Convicted of Killing 7 Co-Workers," April 25, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/25/us/man-convicted-of-killing-7-co-workers.html>.

Case #17

November 2, 1999: Bryan Koji Uyesugi opened fire at a Xerox facility, killing his supervisor and six co-workers. Uyesugi fled in a van and was arrested after a five-hour standoff with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Xerox Engineering Systems in Iwilei, Hawaii
Attacker Information:	Bryan Uyesugi (40/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Jaymes K. Song, Star Bulletin, "7 Dead in Nimitz Hwy. Xerox Shooting," November 2, 1999, <http://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/11/02/news/story1.html>.

Case #18

August 5, 1999: Alan Eugene Miller opened fire at a heating and air conditioning firm, killing two co-workers. Miller then shot and killed his former supervisor at another company.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Ferguson Enterprises and Post Airgas offices in Pelham, Alabama
Attacker Information:	Alan Eugene Miller (34/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "Alabama Man Faces Murder Charges for Office Shooting Spree," August 5, 1999, <http://www-cgi.cnn.com/US/9908/05/alabama.shooting.03/>.

Case #19

July 29, 1999: Mark Barton opened fire at two brokerage offices, including one where he was formerly employed, killing nine people and wounding 12 others. Prior to the attack, Barton killed his wife and two children at their home with a hammer. Reports state that he had lost more than \$400,000 on his investments shortly before the attacks.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Momentum Securities and the All-Tech Investment Group in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Mark O. Barton (44/M)
Casualties:	9 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter and one .45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Kevin Sack, New York Times, "Shootings in Atlanta: The Overview," July 30, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/30/us/shootings-in-atlanta-the-overview-gunman-in-atlanta-slays-9-then-himself.html?scp=2&sq=Barton Shooting atlanta 1999&st=cse>.

Case #20

June 11, 1999: Joseph Brooks opened fire at his former psychiatrist's clinic, killing two people and injuring four others. Brooks then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Office of Dr. Bar-Levav in Southfield, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Joseph Brooks, Jr. (27/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Ex-Patient Kills Psychiatrist, Self," June 12, 1999, <http://articles.latimes.com/keyword/murder-suicides-michigan>.
2. Associated Press, Lundington Daily News, "Family, Friends Remember Slain Psychiatrist as Mentor, Teacher," June 14, 1999, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&dat=19990614&id=AdILAAAAIBAJ&sjid=0FUDAAAIBAJ&pg=4308,8035071>.

Case #21

March 18, 1999: Walter Shell opened fire at his ex-wife's lawyer's law offices, killing the lawyer and one of the lawyer's clients. Reports state that Shell was upset that the lawyer excluded him from his ex-wife's will days before she died.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Goodin Law Office in Johnson City, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Walter K. Shell (71/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. Becky Campbell, TimesNews.net, "DA Vows to Fight 'Tooth and Nail' to Keep Man Who Shot Johnson City Attorney, Judge Behind Bars," March 6, 2009, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9012237>.

Case #22

January 13, 1999: Di-Kieu Duy opened fire in the lobby of the KSL television station, wounding the building manager. Duy then shot an AT&T employee before being tackled by the victim's co-worker. Reports state that Duy, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, believed she had been harassed by an employee of KSL-TV.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Triad Center Office building in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	De-Kieu Duy (24/F)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Leigh Dethman, Desert Morning News, "Woman in Triad Case Still Cannot be Tried," September 1, 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20050901/ai_n15336865/.
2. Wendy Ogata, Desert News, "Infamous Shooting Incidents in Salt Lake County," January 14, 1999, <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/660195182/Infamous-shooting-incidents-in-Salt-Lake-County.html>.

Case #23

March 6, 1998: Matthew Beck opened fire at the Connecticut Lottery, killing four of his supervisors. Reports state that Beck was unhappy about his salary and his failure to earn a promotion prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connecticut Lottery headquarters in Newington, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Matthew Beck (35/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Jonathan Rabinovitz, New York Times, "Connecticut Lottery Worker Kills 4 Bosses, Then Himself," March 7, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/07/nyregion/rampage-connecticut-overview-connecticut-lottery-worker-kills-4-bosses-then.html>.

Case #24

July 19, 1995: Willie Woods opened fire at the C. Erwin Piper Technical Center in Los Angeles, killing four supervisors in their cubicles.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	C. Erwin Piper Technical Center in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Willie Woods (42/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (Glock, semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "9 Fatally Shot in California in 2 incidents over 2 Days," July 20, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/20/us/9-fatally-shot-in-california-in-2-incidents-over-2-days.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #25

December 2, 1993: Alan Winterbourne, an unemployed computer engineer, opened fire at a state unemployment center in Oxnard, killing four people and injuring four others. Winterbourne was fatally shot after he led responding officers on a car chase towards Ventura's unemployment center. Winterbourne concealed his weapons in a brown bag.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	California Employment Development Department in Oxnard and Ventura, California
Attacker Information:	Alan Winterbourne (33/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Handgun; shotgun; 2 rifles
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Julie Fields, Los Angeles Times, "Gunman Kills 4, Is Slain By Police," December 3, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-12-03/news/mn-63376_1_police-officers.

2. Seth Mydans, New York Times, "5 Die in Gunman's Rampage in 2 California Cities," December 3, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/03/us/5-die-in-gunman-s-rampage-in-2-california-cities.html?scp=1&sq=december%203,%201993%20winterbourne%20&st=cse>.
3. Tom Kiskien, Ventura County Star, "Shattered Lives," November 30, 2003, <http://www.vcstar.com/news/2003/Nov/30/shattered-lives/>.

Case #26

July 1, 1993: John Luigi Ferri opened fire at the Pettit & Martin law office, killing eight people and wounding six others. Reports state that Ferri was dissatisfied with the legal services he received.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pettit & Martin Law Offices in San Francisco, California
Attacker Information:	John Luigi Ferri (55/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (two semi-automatic TEC-9s and one .45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Robert Reinhold, New York Times, "Seeking Motive in the Killing of 8: Insane Ramblings Are Little Help," July 4, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/04/us/seeking-motive-in-the-killing-of-8-insane-ramblings-are-little-help.html>.
2. SFGate, Susan Sward, "101 California -- Legacy of Horror / Highrise Massacre Left Behind Change, Challenges," June 30, 1998, http://articles.sfgate.com/1998-06-30/news/17724389_1_response-system-police-chief-earl-sanders-assault-weapons.

Case #27

June 18, 1990: James Edward Pough opened fire at a General Motors Acceptance Corporation Office, killing nine people and wounding four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	General Motors Acceptance Corporation office in Jacksonville, Florida
Attacker Information:	James E. Pough (42/M)

Casualties:	9 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	June 19, 1990
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ronald Smothers, New York Times, "Florida Gunman kills 8 and Wounds 6 in office," June 18, 1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/19/us/florida-gunman-kills-8-and-wounds-6-in-office.html?scp=1&sq=June%201990,%20General%20Motors%20shooting&st=cse>.
2. Ron Word, Associated Press, St. Petersburg Times, "10th GMAC Victim Dies," June 28, 1990, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=8-YNAAAAIAAJ&sjid=eXUDAAAAIAAJ&pg=7007,1942591&dq=james+edward+pough>.

Case #28

February 16, 1988: Richard Farley opened fire at his former workplace, killing seven people and injuring four others. Farley surrendered after a five-hour standoff with police officers. Reports state that prior to the attack, Farley was angry that a former co-worker rejected his advances. Farley was fired from the company in 1986 after threatening to kill that same co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Electromagnetic Systems Lab Corp. in Sunnyvale, California
Attacker Information:	Richard Farley (40/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	7
Weapon Information:	1 rifle; 2 shotguns; 4 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "California: Another Fatal Attraction," February 29, 1988, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,966785,00.html?promoid=googlep>.
2. National Institute for the Prevention of Workplace Violence, "An Obsession with Laura," <http://www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/20010406-19.htm>.

FOILED OFFICE BUILDING

Case #29

December 29, 2010: Five men were arrested for planning a shooting attack on the offices of Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper that published satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen, Denmark
Attacker Information:	unknown (44/M); unknown (29/M); unknown (30/M); unknown (26/M); unknown (37/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun; handgun
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when authorities learned of the assailants' plans, following months of investigation.

Sources:

1. Jan M. Olsen, Washington Post, "Iraqi Suspect Says Unaware of Danish Terror Plot," December 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123100657.html>.
2. J. David Goodman, New York Times, "Police Arrest 5 in Danish Terror Plot," December 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/world/europe/30denmark.html>.
3. Niclas Rolander and Paul Sonne, Wall Street Journal, "Alleged Terror Plot Foiled in Denmark," December 29, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203525404576049431521312142.html>.

OPEN COMMERCIAL

Case #30

August 30, 2010: Lubomir Harman opened fire in his neighbor's apartment, killing six people. Harman then left the apartment and indiscriminately opened fire on bystanders in the street, killing one person and wounding 15 others. Reports state that Harman may have been motivated by racism, as well as loud noise emanating from the neighbor's apartment.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Devinska Nova Ves District in Bratislava, Slovakia
Attacker Information:	Lubomir Harman (48/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 15 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns; submachine gun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, "Slovakia Stunned by Rampaging Gunman," August 30, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/31/world/europe/31slovak.html>.
2. Rafael Gurbisz, Washington Times, "Police: Slovak Shooter Angry Over Neighbors' Noise," August 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/31/police-slovak-shooter-angry-over-neighbors-noise/>.

Case #31

August 14, 2010: Riccardo McCray opened fire in a crowded restaurant, killing four people and injuring four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Grill in Buffalo, New York
Attacker Information:	Riccardo M. McCray (23/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Matt Gryta and Lou Michel, Buffalo News, "Grand Jury Indicts McCray in City Grill Killings; Bail Revoked," September 1, 2010, <http://www.buffalonews.com/city/article178208.ece>.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Suspect in Deadly Buffalo, NY, Street Shooting Pleads Not Guilty to 4 Counts of Murder," August 26, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/08/26/suspect-deadly-buffalo-ny-street-shooting-pleads-guilty-counts-murder/>.

Case #32

June 6, 2010: Gerardo Regalado opened fire outside the restaurant where his estranged wife was employed, killing four people and injuring three others. Regalado fled the scene and was found dead several blocks away.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Yoyito Restaurant in Hialeah, Florida
Attacker Information:	Gerardo Regalado (38/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Caroline Black, CBS News, "Florida Man Kills Four Women in Restaurant Shooting," June 7, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20006983-504083.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
2. Christian Red, New York Daily News, "Former Yankees, Mets Pitcher Orlando 'El Duque' Hernandez "in shock" Over Half-Brother's Shootings," June 9, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseball/yankees/2010/06/09/2010-06-09_shootings_put_duque_in_shock.html.
3. CBS4, "Hialeah Shooting Spree Survivor Recalls Crime," June 16, 2010, <http://cbs4.com/local/Hialeah.Restaurant.Masacre.2.1755823.html>.

Case #33

June 2, 2010: Derrick Bird opened fire during a three-hour shooting spree, killing 12 people and wounding 11 others. Bird began his attack by shooting his twin brother, family lawyer and three fellow taxi drivers. He then drove across Cumbria County, firing randomly at bystanders and occasionally pulling over to shoot more victims.

Number of Attack Locations:	6
Location Information:	Cumbria in England, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Derrick Bird (52/M)
Casualties:	12 dead; 11 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. John F. Burns, New York Times, "Cameron Rejects Rush to Tighten Gun Laws," June 3, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/world/europe/04britain.html>.
2. Alistair Macdonald and Paul Sonne, Wall Street Journal, "U.K. Mulls Tighter Gun-control Laws After Shootings," June 4, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704025304575284243009612802.html>.
3. James Tozer, Chris Brooke and Paul Sims, Daily Mail, "Timetable of Mass Murder: Derrick Bird's Slaughter in the Lake District Reconstructed," June 4, 2010, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1283579/CUMBRIA-SHOOTINGS-Derrick-Birds-killing-spree-moment-moment.html>.

Case #34

January 12, 2010: Jesse James Warren opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people and wounding two others. Warren was fired from the truck rental company several months prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Penske Truck Rental in Kennesaw, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Jesse James Warren (60/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Shane Blatt, Alexis Stevens and Ralph Ellis, Cobb County News, "Cobb Shooter Chose Victims at Random, Company Official Says," January 14, 2010, <http://www.ajc.com/news/cobb/cobb-shooter-chose-victims-273801.html>.
2. Jon Gillooly, Marietta Daily Journal, "Accused Penske Killer of 3 Enters Plea of Not Guilty," July 24, 2010,

- http://www.mdjonline.com/view/full_story/8869872/article-Accused-Penske-killer-of-3-enters-plea-of-not-guilty.
3. MyFoxAtlanta, "Man Pleads Not Guilty in Penske Shooting," July 23, 2010, http://www.myfoxatlanta.com/dpp/news/local_news/Penske-Shooting-Suspect-Due-in-Court-20100723-am-sd.

Case #35

November 29, 2009: Maurice Clemmons opened fire at a coffee shop, killing four uniformed Washington police officers who were working on their laptops. Clemmons was found and killed by a policeman following a two-day manhunt. Reports state that Clemmons had confided to a friend his plans to shoot police officers the night before his attack.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Forza Coffee Shop in Lakewood, Washington
Attacker Information:	Maurice Clemmons (37/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Seattle Times, "Lakewood Police Shooting Suspect Killed by Officer in South Seattle Early Today," December 1, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010393433_webarrest01m.html.
2. William Yardley, New York Times, "Tacoma Suspect Said to Threaten to Shoot Officers," November 30, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/us/01tacoma.html>.
3. Lewis Kamb, News Tribune, "Clemmons' Last Days: A Timeline of Tragedy," December 3, 2009, <http://www.thenewstribune.com/2009/12/02/v-printerfriendly/977113/clemmons-last-days-a-timeline.html>.

Case #36

November 20, 2009: Li Zhong Ren opened fire at a shooting range where he was employed, killing two adults and two children. Ren then drove to a park where he opened fire on a group of Korean tourists. Ren had left several suicide notes prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
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Location Information:	Kannat Tabla and Last Command Post Park in Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands
Attacker Information:	Li Zhong Ren (42/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 6-9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 Rifles (.223-caliber and .22-caliber Magnum); shotgun (.410-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Police Identify Gunman in Saipan Rampage," November 22, 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/22/world/main5735021.shtml>.
2. Ferdie de la Torre, Saipan Tribune, "Gunman Fired Guns More Than 40 Times," November 26, 2009, <http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=95381&cat=1>.
3. Ferdie de la Torre, Saipan Tribune, "Shooting Rampage Stuns CNMI," <http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=96206&cat=1>.

Case #37

November 8, 2009: Richard Moreau opened fire in a bar, killing one customer and injuring three others. Reports state that Moreau got into an argument inside the bar and was escorted out by employees prior to the attack.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Sandbar Sports Grill in West Vail, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Richard Moreau (63/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Washington Times, "Suspect in Vail Bar Shooting Faces Murder Charge," November 9, 2009, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/9/suspect-vail-bar-shooting-faces-murder-charge/print/>.
2. Beth Potter, Denver Post, "One dead in Vail Bar Shooting; Suspect Jailed," November 8, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_13743040.

3. Huffington Post, “Ricahrd Moreau Murder Charges: Vail Bar Killer May Have Had PTSD,” November 8, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/09/richard-moreau-murder-cha_n_350920.html.

Case #38

August 4, 2009: George Sodini opened fire on a L.A. Fitness dance class, killing three women and injured nine others. Reports state that Sodini was angry about being disrespected by women.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	L.A. Fitness in Collier Township, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	George Sodini (48/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (two 9-millimeter semi-automatic, one .45-caliber semi-automatic revolver, and one .32-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CTV.ca, “Gunman in Health Club Shooting a 48-Year-Old Loner,” August 5, 2009,
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090805/health_club_090805/20090805?hub=World.
2. Lee Ferran, Chris Cuomo, Sarah Netter, Lindsay Goldwert, ABC News, “Pa. Gunman ‘Hell-Bent’ on Killings, Had 4 Guns,” August 5, 2009,
<http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=8255530&page=1>.

Case #39

September 9, 2009: Todd Buchanan opened fire at a bar, wounding three people. Reports state that Buchanan was involved in a fight at the bar and was ejected prior to the attack. He was arrested in his home several hours after the shooting.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Independent Bar in Orlando, Florida
Attacker Information:	Todd Garland Buchanan (29/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Walter Pacheco, Orlando Sentinel, "Naked Man Arrested After Shooting at Bar," September 10, 2009, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-09-10/news/0909100010_1_downtown-orlando-buchanan-orlando-man.
2. WFTV, "Accused Orlando Bar Gunman Denied Bond," September 10, 2009, <http://www.wftv.com/news/20835174/detail.html>.
3. WFTV, "Suspect Arrested in Shooting at Downtown Orlando Club," September 9, 2009, <http://www.wftv.com/news/20807598/detail.html>.

Case #40

July 24, 2009: An unknown assailant opened fire at a nightclub, killing one employee and wounding two others. Reports state that the assailant had been ejected from the club following a disturbance prior to the attack. The gunman fled the scene.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Club LT Tranz in North Houston, Texas
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attacker fled

Sources:

1. ABC News, "Nightclub Employee Killed in Shooting," July 25, 2009, <http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/local&id=6932947>.
Alexander Supgul, MyFox, "Images from Night of Deadly Club Shooting," July 29, 2009, http://www.myfoxboston.com/dpp/news/local/090729_pasadena_shooting_convenience.

Case #41

June 10, 2009: James W. Von Brunn opened fire at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, killing a security guard. Reports state that von Brunn was a white supremacist.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.
Attacker Information:	James W. von Brunn, (88/M)
Casualties:	1 dead
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. David Stout, New York Times, "Museum Gunman a Longtime Foe of Government," June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/11shoot.html?_r=1.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Guard Dies After Holocaust Museum Shooting," June 10, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31208188/>.

Case #42

May 30, 2009: Marcus J. Blanton opened fire at a strip club, killing one person and injuring four others. Blanton stabbed a sixth person before he was arrested on scene.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Club 418 in Springfield, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Marcus J. Blanton (24/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 4 wounded
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun; knife
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. John M. Guilfoil, Boston Globe, "One Dead, Several Injured in Springfield Strip Club Rampage," May 30, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2009/05/one_death_sever.html.

Case #43

April 3, 2009: Jiverly Wong, a naturalized immigrant, opened fire at the American Civic Association Immigration Center in Binghamton, killing 13 people and injuring four others. Wong had been taking English classes at the Center prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	American Civic Association Immigration Center in Binghamton, New York
Attacker Information:	Jiverly Wong (41/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter and one .45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Richard Esposito et al., ABC News “Binghamton Rampage Leaves 14 Dead, Police Don’t Know Motive,” April 3, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=7249853&page=1>.
2. Ray Rivera and Nate Schweber, New York Times, “Before Killings, Hints of Plans and Grievance,” April 4, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/nyregion/05suspect.html>.

Case #44

March 24, 2009: Lonnie Glasco, a veteran Metropolitan Transit System employee, opened fire at a bus depot complex, killing one co-worker and injuring another.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Metropolitan Transit System in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Lonnie Glasco (47/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 magnum)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Tony Perry, Los Angeles Times, “Man Shoots 2 Co-workers; 1 dies,” March 25, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/25/local/me-briefs25.S2>.

2. R. Stickney and Monica Dean, NBC San Diego, "MTS Shooter, Victim Identified," March 24, 2009, www.nbcsandiego.com/.../2-Shot-in-MTS-Workplace-Shooting.html.
3. San Diego10News, "Motive Remains Mystery in Bus Depot Shooting," March 25, 2009, <http://www.10news.com/news/19015034/detail.html>.

Case #45

February 24, 2009: An unknown gunman indiscriminately opened fire at a Mardi Gras parade, wounding seven people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Charles Ave. in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/unknown)
Casualties:	0 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter semi-automatic and one .40-caliber); revolver
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Corey Dade, Wall Street Journal, "Mardi Gras Revives, but Shooting Scars Party," February 25, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123551171997163137.html>.
2. United States of America v. Mark Brooks. 10-212. U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana, http://www.justice.gov/usao/lae/press/2010/downloads/factual_basis_mark_brooks.pdf.
3. Gwen Filosa, Times-Picayune, "Jury Frees 19-year-old New Orleans Man of 2009 Mardi Gras Parade Shooting Charge," August 26, 2010, <http://nola.live.advance.net/news/t-p/neworleans/index.ssf?/base/news-15/1282890635287520.xml&coll=1>.
4. Gwen Filosa, Times-Picayune, "Prosecutors Work to Keep Cases Touched by Danziger Bridge Investigation on Track," April 08, 2010, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/04/prosecutors_work_to_keep_cases.html

Case #46

January 24, 2009: Erik Salvador Ayala opened fire outside a nightclub, killing two people and injuring 7 others.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	The Zone in Portland, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Erik Salvador Ayala (24/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 injured
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Steve Miletich, Seattle Times, "Washington Exchange Student From Peru Among Portland Shooter's Victims," January 26, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/localnews/2008670663_whitesalmon26m.html.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Gunman in Portland, Oregon Shooting Spree Dies," January 27, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28882699/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.

Case #47

November 26, 2008: 10 militants launched a series of coordinated shooting and bombing attacks throughout Mumbai, killing 188 people and wounding 372 others. The attackers were trained in Pakistan by the Islamic terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba. Nine of the assailants were killed during the standoff with law enforcement.

Number of Attack Locations:	10
Location Information:	Cama Hospital; Rail Terminus; Leopold Café; Mumbai Chabad House; Oberoi Trident Hotel; Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai
Attacker Information:	Ajmal Kasab (21/M); Ismail Khan (25/M); Hafiz Arshad (23/M); Javed (22/M); Shoaib (21/M); Nazir (28/M); Nasr (23/M); Babr Imran (25/M); Abdul Rahman (21/M); Fahad Ullah (23/M)
Casualties:	188 dead; 372 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter); 2 rifles (one AK-47 and one AK-56)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	November 29, 2008
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Jeremy Kahn and Robert F. Worth, New York Times, "Mumbai Attackers Called Part of Larger Band of Recruits," December 9, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/world/asia/10mumbai.html>.
2. China Daily, "India Charges Mumbai Gunman with Murder," February 25, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-02/25/content_7513194.htm.

Case #48

March 12, 2008: Robert Lanham opened fire at the bank where his ex-wife worked, killing her, a customer and a bank manager. Reports state that Lanham was distraught over his recent divorce.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Regions Bank in McComb, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Robert Lanham (35/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun/ (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. McComb-Enterprise Journal, "Four, Including Gunman, Killed in Bank Shooting," March 12, 2008, <http://www.enterprise-journal.com/articles/2008/03/12/news/01.txt>.

Case #49

March 3, 2008: Alburn Edward Blake opened fire in a Wendy's restaurant, killing a paramedic and wounding five other people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Wendy's in West Palm Beach, Florida
Attacker Information:	Alburn Blake (60/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Times Online, "Police Baffled by Mystery of Gunman Who Shot Dead Firefighter at Wendy's," March 4, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article3482368.ece.

Case #50

December 5, 2007: Robert Hawkins opened fire at an Omaha mall, killing eight people and wounding 5 others. Reports state that Hawkins was angry about losing his job and breaking up with his girlfriend prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Westroads Mall in Omaha, Nebraska
Attacker Information:	Robert Hawkins (19/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Teen's Downward Spiral Ends in Gunfire, Death," December 6, 2007,
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22116784//;http://www.kptm.com/Global/story.asp?S=7457887>.
2. CNN, "Police: Nine Killed in Shooting at Omaha Mall, Including Gunman," December 6, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/12/05/mall.shooting/>.
3. Associated Press, CBS News, "Omaha Mall, Scene of Mass Killing, Reopens," December 8, 2007,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/08/national/main3594414.shtml>.

Case #51

April 30, 2007: David Logsdon opened fire at a crowded Target parking lot, killing two people and wounding seven others. Logsdon was fatally shot by police following the attack. Reports state that Logsdon was unhappy over his termination from the Target store prior to the attack. Police believe the gunman was also responsible for the death of his neighbor earlier that day.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ward Parkway Shopping Center in Kansas City, Missouri

Attacker Information:	David W. Logsdon (51/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns; rifle (.30-caliber carbine)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Kansas City Mall Shooter Disgruntled Over Denied Security Job License," April 30, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,269215,00.html>.
2. KMBC, "Police: Gunman Wanted to Cause Havoc at Mall," April 30, 2007, <http://www.kmbc.com/r/13220624/detail.html>.
3. The Estate of Luke A. Nilges, Joann Nilges, and Wayna Nilges v. Shawnee Gun Shop, Kansas State Court of Appeals, 103, 175. <http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/CtApp/2010/20101105/103175.pdf>.

Case #52

February 12, 2007: Sulejman Talovic opened fire at Trolley Square Mall, killing five bystanders and wounding four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	Sulejman Talovic (18/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Sean Alfano, CBS News, "Police: Off-Duty Cop Saved Lives in Mall," February 13, 2007, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/13/national/main2466711.shtml>.
2. Martin Stolz, New York Times, "After a Rampage, Trying to Grasp What Led a Son to Kill," February 20, 2007, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E2DE123EF933A15751C0A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.

Case #53

April 18, 2006: Herbert Chalmers Jr. opened fire at his workplace, killing two people and wounding another. Chalmers launched his attack shortly after raping an ex-girlfriend and killing the mother of his child at separate locations.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Finneger's Catering in St. Louis, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Herbert Chambers Jr. (55/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Man Kills Woman, 2 Others," April 18, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12375826/from/RSS/>.
2. New York Times, "National Briefing, Midwest: Missouri: Another Victim in Shooting Rampage," April 22, 2008, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2D9153FF931A15757C0A9609C8B63>.
3. Jeremy Kohler, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "I Could Have Stopped Them," April 20, 2006, <http://www.newnation.vg/forums/showthread.php?t=40370>

Case #54

April 4, 2006: Grant Gallaher opened fire in the Baker City Post Office parking lot, killing his supervisor after initially striking him with his vehicle. Gallaher also intended to kill his postmaster. Reports state that Gallaher was upset about his supervisor's decision to add extra work to his delivery route.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Baker City Post Office in Baker City, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Grant Gallaher (41/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. Chris Collins, Baker City Herald, "Shooting Car Was Allegedly Suspect's Last Act," April 7, 2006, <http://www.bakercityherald.com/Local-News/Shooting-car-was-allegedly-suspect-s-last-act>.

Case #55

February 13, 2005: Robert Bonelli opened fire at the Hudson Valley Mall, wounding two people. He was tackled by mall employees when he ran out of ammunition.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hudson Valley Mall, Kingston, New York
Attacker Information:	Robert Bonelli (26/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Mid-Hudson News, "Bonelli to Appear in Court," March 15, 2006, http://www.midhudsonnews.com/News/Archive/Bonelli_ct-15Mar06.htm.
2. CNN, "Shooter Wounds Two at New York Mall," February 13, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/13/mall.shooting/>.

Case #56

December 8, 2004: Nathan Gale, a former marine, opened fire at a nightclub, killing four people and wounding two others. Gale was shot by responding police officers after taking a hostage behind the stage.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alrosa Villa in Columbus, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Nathan Gale (25/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter Beretta)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rick Lyman and Albert Salvato, New York Times, "After a Concert Shooting, a Who but Not a Why," December 10, 2004,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400EEDE1131F933A25751C1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1>.
2. John Esterbrook, CBS News, "Inside the Mind of a Killer," December 10, 2004,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/14/national/main661127.shtml>.

Case #57

November 18, 2004: Justin Cudar opened fire in a Radioshack store, killing two people and wounding another. Cudar was being investigated for a road-rage incident and managed to evade police prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Radioshack in St. Petersburg, Florida
Attacker Information:	Justin Cudar (25/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Jamie Thompson and Carrie Johnson, St. Petersburg Times, "Gunman Kills Two, Self at Gateway Mall," November 19, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/19/Tampabay/Gunman_kills_two__sel.shtml.
2. Jamie Thompson and Carrie Johnson, St. Petersburg Times, "Shooting is Last Act of a Traumatic, Violent Life," November 20, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/20/Southpinellas/Shooting_is_last_act_.shtml.

Case #58

August 29, 2003: Thomas Edgar Harrison opened fire at his ex-girlfriend's workplace, killing one employee. Harrison was initially denied access to the workplace but returned shortly thereafter and began his attack. He engaged in an hour-long standoff with a SWAT team before committing suicide. Prior to the attack, Harrison raped and kidnapped his ex-girlfriend, who was then issued an order of protection against him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Electric Picture Co. in Nashville, Tennessee

Attacker Information:	Thomas Edgar Harrison (43/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	August 30, 2003
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Two Dead in Tennessee Store Shooting," August 30, 2003, <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/30/nation/na-shooting30>.
2. Seattle Times, "Man Kills Shop Owner, Self in Pursuit of Ex-Girlfriend," August 31, 2003, <http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=20030831&slug=ndig31>.

Case #59

July 28, 2003: Andres Casarrubias opened fire at the nursery where his estranged wife worked, killing two employees, including his wife, and injuring another. Reports state that Casarrubias believed his wife was having an affair with a co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Gold Leaf Nursery in Boynton Beach, Florida
Attacker Information:	Andres Casarrubias (44/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. WPBF.com, "Man Shoots Estranged Wife, Co-Worker at Garden Center," July 29, 2003, <http://www.wpbfl.com/news/2363718/detail.html>.

Case #60

July 23, 2003: Ron Thomas opened fire at the Century 21 real estate office where he was employed, killing two people and wounding another. Thomas committed suicide after engaging the police in a car chase.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Century 21 office in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Ron Thomas (unknown/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Two Women Dead, One Hurt in San Antonio Office Shooting," July 24, 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,92766,00.html>.
2. Jim Ventura, Laredo Morning Times, "Police: Shooter Was 'Control Freak,'" July 25, 2003, <http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archive/072503/pagea8.pdf>.

Case #61

March 20, 2000: Robert Wayne Harris opened fire at his former workplace, killing five employees and injuring another. Harris was fired three days prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mi-T-Fine Car Wash in Irving, Texas
Attacker Information:	Robert Wayne Harris (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Matt Curry, ABC News, "Guilty Verdict in Car Wash Killings," September 26, 2000, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95626&page=1>.

Case #62

December 20, 1997: Anthony Deculit opened fire at his workplace, killing one employee and wounding two others, including his supervisor. Reports state that Deculit had been reprimanded by a supervisor for sleeping at work and rejected for a promotion prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Milwaukee Post Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Anthony Deculit (37/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Postal Worker Kills Self After Fatal Rampage," December 20, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-521>.

Case #63

November 17, 1997: Six gunmen opened fire at the ancient Temple of Queen Hatshepsut, killing 62 people, including 58 foreigners, and wounding 26 others. Following the attack, the assailants' bodies were discovered in a cave in an apparent suicide. The Islamic Group and Jihad Talaat al-Fath claimed credit for the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Temple of Hatshepsut in Deir el-Bahri, Egypt
Attacker Information:	Karam Mohammad Ismail (18/M); Essmat Erian (24/M); Mahmoud Ahmed Karim (23/M); Saeed Mohammed Shawaki (23/M); Medhat Abdel Rahman (32/M); unknown (unknown/unknown)
Casualties:	62 dead; 26 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle; handgun; knife; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Daniel J. Wakin, New York Times, "Egypt Shores Up Security, but Tourism is Shaky," November 3, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/03/world/egypt-shores-up-security-but-tourism-is-shaky.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. BBC News, "Egypt Tourist Massacre," November 17, 1997, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/31958.stm>.
3. BBC News, "Swiss Abandon Luxor Massacre Inquiry," March 10, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/673013.stm.

4. BBC News, "Massacre at Luxor," December 6, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/2546737.stm>.
5. Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower* (New York, NY: Random House, 2006). p. 292.

Case #64

October 7, 1997: Charles Lee White opened fire at the ProtoCall store where his ex-girlfriend worked, killing two people. White then fatally shot himself.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ProtoCall retail store in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Charles Lee White (42/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Victoria Advocate, "Gunman Kills 2, Takes Own Life," October 8, 1997, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=861&dat=19971008&id=ljUKAAAAIBAJ&sjid=PEsDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6951,1352262>.
2. Chip Brown, Associated Press, "Three Dead, One Wounded in Shooting at San Antonio Business," http://www.sosinc.org/victim_stories.php.

Case #65

September 2, 1997: Jesus Antonio Tamayo open fired at a post office, wounding two women, including his ex-wife.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Miami Beach Post Office, Florida
Attacker Information:	Jesus Antonio Tamayo (64/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. New York Times, "Postal Worker Shoots 2 and Then Kills Himself," September 3, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/03/us/postal-worker-shoots-2-and-then-kills-himself.html?scp=1&sq=September%203rd,%201997%20Jesus%20Antonio%20Tamayo&st=cse>.

Case #66

February 23, 1997: Ali Abu Kamal opened fire at the Empire State Building's observation deck, killing one person and wounding six others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Empire State Building in New York, New York
Attacker Information:	Ali Abu Kamal (69/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber Beretta)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "Gunman Shoots 7, Kills Self at Empire State Building," February 24, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/24/empire.shooting/>.

Case #67

April 28, 1996: Martin Bryant opened fire during an extended shooting spree, killing 35 people and wounding 21 others. Bryant began the attack by stabbing the owner of a Seascope guest accommodation site. He then entered the Broad Arrow café and shot 20 people dead in a span of 15 seconds. The gunman continued to open fire on the crowd outside of the café as well as under a tour bus where tourists were hiding for cover. Bryant then escaped in a car, shooting pedestrians and vehicle passengers along the way. Following the shooting spree, Bryant took a man hostage and entered a Seascope guest house, where authorities negotiated with Bryant for six hours until his phone battery died. Bryant was captured the next morning.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Broad Arrow Café and Port Arthur in Tasmania, Australia
Attacker Information:	Martin Bryant (28/M)
Casualties:	35 dead; 21 wounded

Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one AR 15 and one FN)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	April 29, 1996
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Australia Gunman Called a Loner with a Mental History," April 30, 1996,
[http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/30/world/australia-gunman-called-a-loner-with-a-mental-history.html?scp=3&sq="Martin+Bryant"&st=nyt](http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/30/world/australia-gunman-called-a-loner-with-a-mental-history.html?scp=3&sq=).
2. Patrick Bellamy, TruTV.com, "Suddenly One Sunday,"
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/bryant/index_1.html.

Case #68

May 6, 1993: Larry Jasion opened fire at a post office, killing one person and wounding two others. Reports state that Jasion, a postal worker, was angry over losing a promotion to a woman prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Dearborn, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Larry Jasion (unknown/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "Post Office Murders," May 17, 1993,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978524,00.html>.

Case #69

May 6, 1993: Mark Hilbun opened fire at a post office, killing a co-worker and wounding three others. Reports state that Hilbun was fired prior to the attack for stalking a co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dana Point Post Office in Dana Point, California
Attacker Information:	Mark R. Hilbun (38/M)

Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Ex-Postal Employee is Arrested in Deaths of Two in California," May 9, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/09/us/ex-postal-employee-is-arrested-in-deaths-of-two-in-california.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Marle Cone and Jodi Wilgoren, Los Angeles Times, "Fired Mail Carrier Said to be Manic-Depressive," May 7, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-07/news/mn-32377_1_mail-carrier.

Case #70

November 14, 1991: Thomas McIlvane opened fire at a post office, killing three people and injuring six others. McIlvane had been fired from the post office prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Royal Oak Post Office in Royal Oak, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Thomas McIlvane (31/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Doron P. Levin, New York Times, "Ex-Postal Worker Kills 3 and Wounds 6 in Michigan," November 15, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/15/us/ex-postal-worker-kills-3-and-wounds-6-in-michigan.html?scp=1&sq=November%2015,%201991%20Royal%20Oak&st=ce>.

Case #71

October 16, 1991: George Jo Hennard opened fire in a restaurant during lunchtime, killing 22 people and wounding 20 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Luby's Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas
Attacker Information:	George Jo Hennard (35/M)
Casualties:	22 dead; 20 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Thomas C. Hayes, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 22 and Himself in Texas Cafeteria," October 17, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/17/us/gunman-kills-22-and-himself-in-texas-cafeteria.html?sec=travel>.

Case #72

October 10, 1991: Joseph Harris opened fire at a post office, killing two former co-workers. The night before, Harris had killed his former supervisor with a three-foot samurai sword and fatally shot her fiancé in their home. During the post office attack, Harris was armed with several guns, hand grenades, and a samurai sword.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ridgewood Post Office in Ridgewood, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Joseph Harris (35/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Machine gun; other; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Services Conducted in New Jersey for Slain Postal Service Workers," October 15, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/15/nyregion/services-conducted-in-new-jersey-for-slain-postal-service-workers.html>.

Case #73

August 17, 1991: Wade Frankum opened fire in a shopping mall, killing six people and wounding eight others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Strathfield Shopping Plaza in Strathfield, Australia
Attacker Information:	Wade Frankum (33/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 8 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "A Masked Gunman Kills 6 at a Mall in Australia," August 18, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/18/world/a-masked-gunman-kills-6-at-a-mall-in-australia.html>.

Case #74

August 10, 1989: John Merlin Taylor opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing two co-workers and injuring another. Prior to the attack, Taylor fatally shot his wife in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Orange Glen, California
Attacker Information:	John Merlin Taylor (52/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Tom Gorman and Richard Serrano, Los Angeles Times, "Postal Employee Kills Wife, 2 Co-Workers," August 11, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-11/news/mn-207_1_postal-employee.

Case #75

December 14, 1988: Warren Murphy opened fire at the post office where he was employed, wounding two co-workers and his supervisor. Murphy surrendered after holding a female hostage for 13 hours.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	New Orleans Post Office in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Warren Murphy (39/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	December 15, 1988
Resolution:	No Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Mail Handler Shoots 3 at Post Office," December 15, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-12-15/news/mn-524_1_post-office.
2. Washington Post, "3 Shot in New Orleans as Suspect Holes Up," December 15, 1988, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1295435.html>.

Case #76

December 8, 1987: Frank Vitkovic opened fire on three floors at a post office, killing eight people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Melbourne, Australia
Attacker Information:	Frank Vitkovic (22/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. The Age, "Melbourne Remembers Queen Street Massacre," December 6, 2007, <http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Melbourne-remembers-Queen-St-massacre/2007/12/06/1196812912743.html>.
2. Kenneth Polk, *When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 137.

Case #77

August 19, 1987: Michael Ryan opened fire during a shooting spree, killing 16 people and wounding 15 others. Ryan's attack began in Wiltshire where he shot a woman in a forest and a cashier at a gas station. The assailant then killed his mother and fired

indiscriminately on bystanders as he drove to a busy shopping area. Ryan committed suicide shortly after the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Wiltshire and Hungerford in Berkshire, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Michael Ryan (27/M)
Casualties:	16 dead; 15 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Kalashnikov); rifle (automatic); handgun (Beretta); other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Douglas Hurd, Economicexpert.com, "Report of Mr. Colin Smith CVO QPM. Chief Constable Thames Valley Police to the RT Hon Douglas Hurd CBE, MP. Secretary of State for the Home Department," August 1987, <http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Hungerford:Report.html>.
2. Stewart Tendler, Andrew Morgan, David Sapsted and Michael McCarthy, Times Online, "Times Archive, 1987: 14 Die as Gunman Runs Amok," August 20, 1987, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/tol_archive/article7142452.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1.
3. Richard Ford, Times Online, "Factfile: British Shooting Massacres," August 1987, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article7142484.ece>.

Case #78

August 20, 1986: Patrick Sherrill opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing 14 people and injuring seven others. Reports state that prior to the attack, Sherrill believed he was going to be fired from his job.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Edmond Post Office in Edmond, Oklahoma
Attacker Information:	Patrick Henry Sherrill (44/M)
Casualties:	14 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (two .45-caliber semi-automatic and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rachael Bell, TruTV.com, "Workplace Homicide," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/work_homicide/4.html.

Case #79

March 6, 1985: Steven Brownlee opened fire at a post office, killing two co-workers and wounding a third.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlanta Post Office in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Steven W. Brownlee (30/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Felicity Barringer, New York Times, "Postal Officials Examine System After 2 Killings," May 8, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/08/us/postal-officials-examine-system-after-2-killings.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Clerk Kills Fellow Worker, Wounds Two in Shooting Spree at Atlanta Post Office," March 7, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-07/news/mn-34494_1.

Case #80

July 18, 1984: James Huberty opened fire in a McDonald's restaurant, killing 21 people and injuring 19 others. Huberty was dressed in camouflage during his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	McDonald's in San Ysidro, California
Attacker Information:	James Oliver Huberty (41/M)
Casualties:	21 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun (Uzi); shotgun; handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Jessica Gresko, Associated Press, "20 Years Later, San Ysidro McDonald's Massacre Remembered," July 18, 2004, http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/article_2ba4343e-7009-54ce-98df-79a23ff8d0d7.html.

Case #81

December 2, 1983: James Howard Brooks opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing one person and wounding another. He then surrendered to police. Reports state that Brooks was angry at having been criticized by his supervisor.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Anniston Post Office in Anniston, Alabama
Attacker Information:	James Howard Brooks (53/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, *The Copycat Effect: How the Media and Popular Culture Trigger the Mayhem in Tomorrow's Headlines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pg. 151.
2. Associated Press, Ocala Star-Banner, "Postal Worker Held in Death of Postmaster," December 3, 1983, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=qZoTAAAAIBAJ&sjid=YQYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6908,1058534&dq=anniston+alabama+shooting+1983>.

Case #82

August 19, 1983: Perry Smith opened fire at a post office, killing a co-worker and wounding two others. Reports state that Smith felt he was mistreated by co-workers after his son committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post office and convenience store in Johnston, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Perry Smith (unknown/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Felicity Barringer, New York Times, "Postal Officials Examine System After 2 Killings," May 8, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/08/us/postal-officials-examine-system-after-2-killings.html?pagewanted=all>
2. Mark Ames, AlterNet, "Excerpt: Breaking Down at the Post Office," October 3, 2005, http://www.alternet.org/media/24798/excerpt:_breaking_down_at_the_post_office/.

Case #83

August 20, 1982: Carl Brow opened fire in a welding shop, killing eight people and injuring three others. Reports state that Brown was upset that the welding shop charged him \$20 for repairs on a lawnmower engine.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Bob Moore's Weldong & Machine Services, Inc. in Miami, Florida
Attacker Information:	Carl Brown (51/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "Murderer's Row," August 30, 1982, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921255,00.html?iid=chix-sphere>.

Case #84

January 1, 1972: Mark Essex launched a series of attacks over the course of a week, killing nine people and wounding 13 others. In one attack Essex hid in a parking lot across the street from the New Orleans Police Department and randomly shot at officers. Essex then broke into various facilities shooting civilians and responding officers before being killed by police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Mark James Robert Essex (23/M)
Casualties:	9 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.44-caliber Magnum); handgun (.38-caliber Colt revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	January 7, 1972
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Anthony Walsh, *Race and Crime: A Biosocial Analysis* (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2004, pp. 38-39.
2. Chuck Hustmyre, TruTV.com, "Notorious Murders: Mark Essex," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/mark_essex/index.html.

FACTORIES & WAREHOUSES

Case #85

September 9, 2010: Yvonne Hiller opened fire at her workplace, killing two people and wounding another. Hiller was suspended from her job and escorted off the premises ten minutes prior to the attack. She drove through a security barrier before entering the facility on foot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kraft Food plant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Yvonne Hiller (43/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 Magnum)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Troy Graham, Mike Newall and Michael Brocker, Philadelphia Inquirer, "Before Kraft Shooting Rampage Growing Alarm Over Suspect's Behavior," September 11, 2010, http://www.philly.com/inquirer/front_page/20100911_Before_Kraft_shooting_rampage_growing_alarm_over_suspect_s_behavior.html.
2. Sean Alfano, NY Daily News, "Suspended Female Employee Guns Down Two in Shooting Spree at Kraft Factory in Philadelphia," September 10, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/09/10/2010-09-10_suspended_female_employee_opens_fire_at_kraft_foods_facility_in_philly_killing_t.html.

Case #86

August 3, 2010: Omar Thornton opened fire at his workplace, killing eight people and injuring two others. Thornton hid his weapons in a lunchbox. Reports state that he was angry after being asked to resign for stealing beer from the warehouse in which he worked.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hartford Distributors in Manchester, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Omar Thornton (34/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 2 wounded

Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ray Rivera and Christine Haughney, New York Times, "Amid Mourning, Eerie Details Emerge About Connecticut Shootings," August 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/nyregion/05shooting.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Conn. Warehouse Gunman Targeted Managers," August 4, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/08/03/dead-wounded-conn-workplace-shooting/>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "9 Dead in Shooting at Connecticut Beer Distributor," August 4, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38535909/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts.
4. Emily Friedman, ABC News, "911 Tapes from Connecticut Shooting Describe Gunman's Deadly Rampage," August 4, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/connecticut-shooter-omar-thornton-chased-victims-beer-distributor/story?id=11322281&page=1>

Case #87

January 7, 2010: Timothy Hendron opened fire at the electrical equipment plant where he worked, killing three people and injuring five others. Hendron was in the midst of a 2006 lawsuit against his employer regarding the company's retirement plan.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ABB Inc. in St. Louis, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Timothy Hendron (51/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 injured
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun; handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CNN, "Police Investigating Motive for Shooting in St. Louis That Left 4 Dead," January 8, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-08/justice/factory.shootings_1_abb-motive-dead?_s=PM:CRIME.
2. Liz Robbins, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 3 Co-Workers in St. Louis Factory and Then Himself," January 7, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/us/08gunman.html>.

Case #88

August 1, 2008: Robert Diamond opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, killing two former co-workers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Simon & Schuster book warehouse in Bristol, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Robert Diamond (32/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Smith & Wesson)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. CBS, "Former Employee Arrested in Deadly Pa. Shooting," August 2, 2008, <http://cbs3.com/topstories/shooting.simon.and.2.785808.html>.
2. ABC, "Former Employee Kills Two at Bristol Warehouse," August 2, 2008, <http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=6301504>.

Case #89

June 25, 2008: Wesley Neal Higdon opened fire at his workplace, killing five co-workers and wounding another. Reports state that Higdon had been reprimanded by a supervisor for having an argument with a co-worker prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlantis Plastics in Henderson, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Wesley Neal Higdon (25/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Bob Driehaus, New York Times, "Man in Kentucky Kills 5 Co-Workers," June 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/us/26kentuckycnd.html?_r=1.

Case #90

April 1, 2008: Howard Trang opened fire in a factory, injuring one co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alloy Fabricators in Randolph, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Howard Trang (48/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. TheBostonChannel.com, "1 Dead, 1 Wounded in Workplace Shooting," April 1, 2008, <http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/15760103/detail.html>.
2. EnterpriseNews.com, "Family of Randolph Shooting Victim Gropes for Answers," April 1, 2008, <http://www.enterprisenews.com/homepage/x325171363>.

Case #91

March 19, 2008: Lee Isaac Bedwell Leeds opened fire at the Black Road Auto office, killing his father, a customer and two co-workers. His father owned the office.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Black Road Auto wrecking yard in Santa Maria, California
Attacker Information:	Lee Isaac Bedwell Leeds (31/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Keyt.com, "Lee Leeds Makes Court Appearance," April 1, 2008, <http://www.keyt.com/news/local/17194121.html>.
2. Associated Press, North County Times, "Son of Owner Held in Santa Maria Wrecking Yard Slayings," March 20, 2008, http://www.nctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/article_e2ffbed6-d594-50f0-8150-d64fe67a60f7.html.

Case #92

April 27, 2007. Steven Harold Smith opened fire at the Lode Street Wastewater Facility where he was employed, killing his estranged wife and a supervisor.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lode Street Wastewater Facility in Santa Cruz, California
Attacker Information:	Steven Harold Smith (50/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "2 Die in Shootings at Water Plant," April 28, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/28/local/me-shooting28>.

Case #93

March 5, 2007: Jose Mendez opened fire at his workplace, wounding three co-workers. Reports state that Mendez was angry that his working hours had been reduced at the menu printing plant.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kenyon Press plant in Signal Hill, California
Attacker Information:	Jose Mendez (68/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Megan Garvey, Los Angeles Times, "Man Wounds 3 Co-Workers and Then Kills Himself in Signal Hill," March 6, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/06/local/me-shooting6>.

Case #94

January 11, 2007: Jason Burnam opened fire at Crossroads Industrial Services, where he was employed, wounding three people in the cafeteria and one in an office of the factory. Reports state that Burnam had been taking medication for bipolar disorder and claimed that he launched the attack to gain respect.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Crossroads Industrial Services in Indianapolis, Indiana
Attacker Information:	Jason Burnman (24/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "4 Hurt in Ind. Workplace Shooting," January 11, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-01-11-indiana-shooting_x.htm.

Case #95

June 26, 2006: Michael Julius Ford opened fire at a Safeway warehouse, killing one co-worker and wounding four other people, including a police officer.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Safeway Inc. in Denver, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Michael Julius Ford (22/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. The Denver Channel, "Suspect, Victims in Safeway Shooting Rampage Identified," June 27, 2006, <http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/9424239/detail.html>.
2. Associated Press, New York Times, "Gunman Killed After Fatal Denver Shooting," June 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/26/us/26gunman.html?_r=1.

Case #96

April 21, 2006: Julian English opened fire at a Tyson Foods Inc. poultry processing plant where he was employed, wounding a co-worker. English had been suspended from his job prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tyson Foods Inc. in Pine Bluff, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Julian English (24/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, "Suspended Worker Opens Fire at Plant," April 21, 2006, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=s7IaAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=JEUEAAAAIIBAJ&pg=5058,353778&dq=tyson+worker+shoots+co-worker&hl=en>.

Case #97

January 29, 2006: Jennifer San Marco opened fire at a postal facility, killing six people hours after killing her neighbor. San Marco then fatally shot herself. The assailant was a former postal worker at the facility she targeted and was on medical leave. Reports state that San Marco entered the facility gates by following closely behind another car and gained access through the front door by taking another employee's electronic identification badge at gunpoint.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Santa Barbara Processing and Distribution Center in Santa Barbara, California
Attacker Information:	Jennifer San Marco (44/F)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Profesional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC "Police Look for Motive in Deadly Postal Shooting," January 31, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11107022/>.

2. Randal C. Archibold, et. al., New York Times, "Death Toll Climbs to 8 in California Postal Plant Rampage," February 2, 2006,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04E7D91F3FF931A35751C0A9609C8B63>.

Case #98

November 23, 2005: Joe Cobb opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, wounding two supervisors. Cobb then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	H&M Wagner and Sons food distribution office in Glen Burnie, Maryland
Attacker Information:	Joseph Allen Cobb (54/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "Fired Man Shoots Supervisors, Himself," November 23, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-11-23-job-shooting_x.htm
2. Jeff Horseman and Penny Riordan, The Maryland Gazette, "Shooting Victims Out of Hospital," November 26, 2005,
<http://www.hometownglenburnie.com/news/mdgazette/2005/11/26-07>

Case #99

September 27, 2005: Victor M. Piazza opened fire at a nail polish factory where he was formerly employed, killing one supervisor and wounding two others. Piazza was fired from the company after child pornography charges were filed against him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Verla International factory in New Windsor, New York
Attacker Information:	Victor M. Piazza (55/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-Caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. John Holl, New York Times, "Shot on Job, Woman Dies 4 Days Later," October 1, 2005, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E1DF1030F932A35753C1A9639C8B63>.
2. John Doherty and Alexa James, Times Herald-Record, "Fired Sex Offender Shoots 3, Kills Self," September 27, 2005, <http://archive.recordonline.com/archive/2005/09/27/shoot27.htm>.
3. Michelle O'Donnell and John Holl, New York Times, "Ex-Employee Kills Himself After Shooting 3 in Factory," September 27, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/nyregion/27shoot.html>.

Case #100

February 21, 2005: Alexander L. Lett opened fire at his workplace, wounding two co-workers. The attack ended when Lett was detained by other employees.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Northrop Grumman Ships Systems in Pascagoula, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Alexander L. Lett (41/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Los Angeles Times, "Two Hurt in Shipyard Shooting; Worker Held," February 22, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/22/nation/na-briefs22.2>.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Suspect in Miss. Shipyard Shooting Held," February 21, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148258,00.html>.

Case #101

January 26, 2005: Myles Meyers opened fire at his workplace, killing one person and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jeep Liberty Plant in Toledo, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Myles Meyers (54/M)

Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (20-gauge, double-barrel shotgun)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Autoworker's Grudge Turns Deadly," January 27, 2005, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/26/national/main669662.shtml>.
2. George Windau, Labor Notes, "Pressure Led to Shootings at Jeep," March 1, 2005, <http://www.labornotes.org/node/843>.

Case #102

July 2, 2004: Elijah Brown opened fire at the food plant where he was employed, killing five people and injuring two others. Brown then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ConAgra Foods Inc. plant in Kansas City, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Elijah Brown (21/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Six Dead in Kansas Workplace Shooting," July 3, 2004, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5353964>.

Case #103

December 9, 2003: John Gardner opened fire at the PrintXcel plant, killing one employee. He then set multiple fires in the plant. Gardner had been fired from the company prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	PrintXcel in Visalia, California
Attacker Information:	John Gardner (45/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Azadeh Moaveni, Los Angeles Times, "Man Fatally Shoots Worker, Then Himself," December 10, 2003, <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/dec/10/local/me-workshoot10>.

Case #104

August 27, 2003: Alexander L. Lett opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, killing six former co-workers. Lett was fired shortly before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Windy City Core Supply in Chicago, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Salvador Tapia (36/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Joel Roberts, CBS News, "7 Dead in Chicago Rampage," August 27, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/national/main570552.shtml>.

Case #105

August 19, 2003: Ricky Shadle opened fire at his workplace, killing one co-worker and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Andover Industries in Andover, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Ricky Shadle (32/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (one 10-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. R. Kropko, Associated Press, "Man Threatened Suicide Before Factor Shooting, His Parents Say," August 21, 2003,
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/08/21/loc_oh-plantshooting21.html.

Case #106

July 9, 2003: Douglas Williams opened fire at the Lockheed Martin assembly plant where he was employed, killing five people and injuring nine others. Williams then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lockheed Martin assembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Doug Williams (48/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); rifle (.223-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Jarrett Murphy, CBS News, "Six Dead in Mississippi Massacre," July 9, 2003,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/09/national/main562301.shtml>.

Case #107

July 1, 2003: Jonathon Russell opened fire at his workplace, killing three people and wounding five others. Russell committed suicide following a shootout with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Modine Manufacturing Co. in Jefferson City, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Jonathon Russell (25/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Paul Sioca, Associated Press, "Three Killed, Several Injured in Shooting at Missouri Manufacturing," July 2, 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20030702/ai_n11402211/.

Case #108

December 6, 2001: Robert Wissman opened fire at the Nu-Wood Decorative Millwork plant, killing one person and wounding six others. Reports state that prior to the attack, Wissman was involved in a dispute with his employer over his possible termination.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Nu-Wood Decorative Millwork factory in Goshen, Indiana
Attacker Information:	Robert Wissman (36/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Jodi Wilgoren, New York Times, "Indiana Factory Shooting Leaves 2 Dead and 6 Hurt," December 7, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/us/indiana-factory-shooting-leaves-2-dead-and-6-hurt.html>.
2. John W. Fountain, New York Times, "Factory Feud Is Cited in Shooting in Indiana," December 8, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/08/us/factory-feud-is-cited-in-shooting-in-indiana.html>.
3. Katina Hull, Laredo Morning Times, "Factory Gunman in Indiana Rampage in 'Love Triangle,'" December 8, 2001, <http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archive/120801/page11.pdf>.

Case #109

February 5, 2001: William Baker opened fire at the Navistar International factory where he was employed, killing four co-workers and wounding four others. Baker concealed his weapons in a golf bag.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Navistar International plant in Melrose Park, Illinois
Attacker Information:	William D. Baker (66/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, "Five Workers Die in Shooting Rampage at Chicago Navistar Plant," February 6, 2001, http://www.lubbockonline.com/stories/020601/nat_020601041.shtml.

Case #110

September 15, 1997: Arthur Hastings Wise opened fire at his former workplace, killing four people and injuring three others, including a security guard. Wise had been recently fired from the company prior to the attack. Reports state that after Wise shot the security guard, he tore out the telephone lines in the guard station and then entered the building.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	R.E. Phelon Co. factory in Aikens County, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Arthur Hastings Wise (43/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted Suicide

Sources:

1. State v. Wise. 25819., South Carolina Judicial Department, May 11, 2004, <http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25819>.
2. Jeffrey Collins, The Times and Democrat, "Hastings Wise a 'Volunteer' for Execution; His is Scheduled for This Evening," http://www.thetandd.com/news/article_931d7ad1-28eb-53a8-aa06-cd5bf8d05595.html.
3. Joshua Quinn, NBC Augusta, "Arthur Hastings Wise Put to Death for Aiken Murders," August 16, 2007, <http://www.nbcaugusta.com/news/local/1835431.html>.

Case #111

June 5, 1997: Daniel S. Marsden opened fire at his workplace, killing two co-workers and wounding four others. He committed suicide two hours later. Reports state that

Marsden began his attack after retrieving a gun from his car following an argument with co-workers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Omni Plastic plant in Santa Fe Springs, California
Attacker Information:	Daniel S. Marsden (38/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Matea Gold and John Cox, Los Angeles Times, "Gunman Felt He Was Taunted, Police Say," June 7, 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/1997-06-07/local/me-919_1_santa-fe-springs.

Case #112

April 3, 1995: James Simpson opened fire at on oil refinery inspection plant where he was formerly employed, killing five workers. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Walter Rossler Company in Corpus Christi, Texas
Attacker Information:	James Simpson (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic); handgun (.32-caliber semi-automatic revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. New York Times, "6 Die in Texas Office Shooting," April 4, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/04/us/6-die-in-texas-office-shooting.html?scp=3&sq=April%20,201995%20Corpus%20Christi&st=cse>.
2. Kelly Shannon, Associated Press, "Employee Kills 5, Self at Texas Refinery," April 5, 1995, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19950404&id=fzUVAAAI BAJ&sjid=xgcEAAAIBAJ&pg=6965,2886531>.

Case #113

March 14, 1994: Tuan Nguyen opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people and wounding two others. Nguyen was fired from the company shortly before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Extron Electronics factory in Santa Fe Springs, California
Attacker Information:	Tuan Nguyen (29/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Seattle Times, "Some Recent Workplace Shootings," July 31, 1999,
<http://www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/WorkplaceViolenceIncidents.html>.
2. "Across the Nation," March 15, 1994,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19940315&slug=1900389>.

Case #114

September 14, 1989: Joseph T. Wesbecker opened fire in the printing plant where he was employed, killing eight people and wounding twelve others. Wesbecker was on disability leave for mental illness at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Standard Gravure Corporation plant in Louisville, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Joseph T. Wesbecker (47/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	6
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (two semi-automatic MAC-11s, one .38-caliber revolver, and one 9-millimeter); rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Worker on Disability Leave Kills 7, Then Himself, in Printing Plant," September 15, 1989,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/15/us/worker-on-disability-leave-kills-7-then-himself-in-printing-plant.html?scp=1&sq=September%2015,%201989%20Kentucky%20shooting&st=cse>.
2. Associated Press, The Victoria Advocate, "Records Show Killer Having Mental Illness," September 24, 1989,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=wb8LAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cVYDAAAIBAJ&pg=3936,4855278&dq=joseph+wesbecker>.

SCHOOLS

Case #115

December 14, 2010: Clay A. Duke opened fire at a Florida school board meeting. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Duke, who had an extensive criminal record, held the board members hostage at gunpoint and tried to shoot the superintendent. Duke committed suicide after a security guard shot him in the leg. Reports state that the assailant was unhappy about paying taxes and his wife being fired from her workplace.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Bay District School Board meeting in Panama City, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clay A. Duke (56/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Anahad O’Conner, New York Times, “Video Captures Man Confronting School Board Before Shooting,” December 14, 2010, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/video-captures-man-confronting-school-board-before-shooting/>.
2. Associated Press, Washington Post, “School Board Shooting: Clay Duke Kills Self After Pulling Gun at Meeting,” December 15, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/15/AR2010121500632.html>.
3. Nina Mandell, Meena Hartenstein and Michael Sheridan, NY Daily News, “School Board Shooting: Florida Man Clay Duke Opens Fire at Meeting, Kills Himself, Police Say,” http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/12/15/2010-12-15_school_board_shooting_florida_man_opens_fire_at_meeting_kills_self_video_capture.html.

Case #116

October 8, 2010: Brendan O’Rourke opened fire on the playground of Kelly Elementary School, wounding two girls. O’Rourke then walked to a second playground and shot and missed at three boys and a school aide. Three construction workers tackled O’Rourke while he was reloading his gun, and held him until police arrived.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Kelly Elementary School in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Brendan O'Rourke (41/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 Magnum revolver); other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Paul Krueger, Lindsay Hood, Eric S. Page and Michelle Wayland, NBC San Diego, "Details Emerge About School-Shooting Suspect," October 11, 2010, <http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local-beat/Kelly-Elementary-Gunman--104734879.html>.
2. Elliot Spagat, SFGate.com, "School Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty," October 14, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-10-14/bay-area/24134110_1_court-judge-marshall-hockett-school-shooting-school-aide.
3. Sarah Gordon, North County Times, "Accused School Shooter Pleads Not Guilty to Attempted Murder," October 13, 2010, http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/carlsbad/article_9edbfd8d-f9e4-557a-8122-adce57af7c83.html.

Case #117

September 27, 2010: Colton Joshua Tooley opened fire on the University of Texas in Austin campus. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Tooley, wearing a dark suit and ski mask, fired toward a campus church before entering the library where he committed suicide. The attack began near the University of Texas Tower, the site of Charles Whitman's deadly shooting rampage in 1966.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Texas in Austen, Texas
Attacker Information:	Colton Joshua Tooley (19/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Texas: Gunfire at a University," September 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/us/29brfs-guntexas.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS News, "Student Opens Fire at UT Austin, Kills Self," September 28, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/28/national/main6907650.shtml>.

Case #118

August 30, 2010: Thomas Cowan entered Sullivan Central High School, where his brother was employed as a custodian, and pointed a gun at the principal's head. A school officer intervened and urged Cowan to drop his weapon. Cowan lunged for the school officer's gun and a 13-minute standoff ensued until two deputies arrived and fatally shot him to death. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Reports state that Cowan repeatedly asked for the whereabouts of the school fire alarm, allegedly to lure students out of the building and into the line of fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Sullivan Central High School in Blountville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Thomas Richard Cowan (62/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .38-caliber semi-automatic and one .25-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rain Smith, Times News, "We Have a Man With a Gun at Central High School...He's Ready to Shoot...Listen to the 911 Calls," August 31, 2010, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9025927>.
2. Rain Smith, Times News, "Police Officers Kill Gunman at Sullivan Central," August 30, 2010, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9025899>.
3. Claire Galofaro and Daniel Gilbert, TriCities, "Gunman Killed at Sullivan Central," August 31, 2010, <http://www2.tricities.com/news/2010/aug/31/incident-sullivan-central-high-school-ar-479580/>.

Case #119

March 9, 2010: Nathaniel Brown opened fire in an Ohio State University facility, killing one co-worker and injuring another. He then committed suicide. Brown was an Ohio State University custodian who had recently been informed that he would be fired.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Maintenance building at Ohio State University
Attacker Information:	Nathaniel Brown (51/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ian Urbina, New York Times, "Ohio State Employee Kills Co-Worker, Then Self, Police Say," March 9, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/us/10ohio.html>.
2. Everdeen Mason, The Lantern, "Updated: OSU Janitor Kills a Supervisor, Wounds Another, Then Shoots and Kills Himself," March 9, 2010, <http://www.thelantern.com/campus/updated-osu-janitor-kills-a-supervisor-wounds-another-then-shoots-and-kills-himself-1.1260849>.

Case #120

February 26, 2010: Jed Waits open fired in the parking lot of Birney Elementary School, killing a special education teacher. Before he was killed by a deputy sheriff, Waits also shot at and missed a bystander who had witnessed the shooting. Reports states that the victim had obtained a civil anti-harassment order against Waits in 2008 after he had repeatedly stalked her beginning in 2003.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Birney Elementary School in Tacoma, Washington
Attacker Information:	Jed Waits (30/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	1 handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Nancy Bartley and Christine Clarridge, Seattle Times, "Slain Tacoma Teacher had Been Harassed by Gunman for Years," February 26, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/localnews/2011195554_teachershot26m.html.

Case #121

February 23, 2010: Bruce Strongeagle Eastwood opened fire in the parking lot of Deer Creek Middle School, injuring two students. Eastwood was tackled by a math teacher who held him until police arrived.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Deer Creek Middle School in Littleton, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Bruce Strongeagle Eastwood (32/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Carlin DeGuerin Miller, CBS News, "David Benke, Hero Teacher: Hailed for Tackling Gunman, Says He Hope He Would Be Ready," February 25, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-6239395-504083.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
2. Kirk Mitchell, Denver Post, "Suspect's Dad Laments Lack of Mental-Health Care," February 28, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_14485435?source=rss.

Case #122

February 12, 2010: Amy Bishop, an assistant professor of biological science at the University of Alabama, opened fire in a faculty meeting, killing three people and wounding three others. Five of the victims were members of the faculty and the sixth was an employee of the university. Reports state that Bishop was angry after being denied tenure.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	The University of Alabama in Huntsville, Alabama

Attacker Information:	Amy Bishop (42/F)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	1 handgun (9 millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. USA Today, "Alabama Campus Reels After Shooting," February 15, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-02-15-professor_N.htm.

Case #123

April 26, 2009: Odane Greg Maye opened fire at a Hampton University dormitory, wounding a pizza delivery man and the dormitory manager. Before the shooting began, Maye, a former student at Hampton University, parked his car off campus to avoid a vehicle checkpoint. He then attempted to commit suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hampton University in Hampton, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Odane Greg Maye (18/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted suicide

Sources:

1. Janet DiGiacomo, CNN, "Three Wounded in Hampton University Shooting," April 26, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/26/hampton.university.shooting/>.
2. Associated Press, WSAV.com, "Richmond Man Charged in Hampton University Shooting," April 30, 2009, http://www2.wsav.com/sav/news/national/article/richmond_man_charged_in_hampton_university_shooting/11833.

Case #124

March 11, 2009: Tim Kretschmer opened fire at his high school in Germany, killing 15 people and wounding nine others. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Albertville-Realschule Winnenden school in Winnenden, Germany
Attacker Information:	Tim Kretschmer (17/M)
Casualties:	15 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "German Rampage Victims Mostly Female," March 12, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/03/11/germany.school.shooting/>.

Case #125

October 16, 2008: Two teenage gunmen opened fire after exiting from a black sport utility vehicle, killing one person and wounding three others. The gunmen targeted students who were leaving school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Henry Ford High School in Detroit, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Devon Bell (18/M); William Morton (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. ClickonDetroit.com, "3 Arraigned on Murder Charges for Shooting," October 20, 2008, <http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/17735433/detail.html>.
2. Robert Brignall, Examiner, "Second Shooter Gets Prison Term for Role in 2008 High School Ambush," November 26, 2009, <http://www.examiner.com/crime-in-detroit/second-shooter-gets-prison-term-for-role-2008-high-school-ambush>.

Case #126

September 23, 2008: Matti Juhani Saari opened fire at his university in Finland, killing 10 people. He then committed suicide after setting a fire on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Kauhajoki School of Hospitality in Kauhajoki, Finland
Attacker Information:	Mattie Juhani Saari (22/M)
Casualties:	10 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. BBC News, "Finnish College Gunman Kills 10," September 23, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7630969.stm>.

Case #127

March 6, 2008: Alaa Abu Dhein opened fire in a crowded library at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, killing eight teenage students and wounding 11 others. The gunman was killed in a gunfight between the assailant and Israeli security forces.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, Israel
Attacker Information:	(26/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 11 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Terror Shooting at Mercaz Harav Kook Yeshiva in Jerusalem," March 6, 2008, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Terror+shooting+at+Mercaz+Harav+Yeshiva+in+Jerusalem+6-Mar-2008.htm>.

Case #128

February 14, 2008: Steven Phillip Kazmierczak, a former graduate student at Northern Illinois University, opened fire in a university lecture hall, killing five people. Kazmierczak carried his weapons onto the campus in a guitar case, stepped from behind a screen on the stage, and began firing at students.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Steven Phillip Kazmierczak (27/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	3 handguns; shotgun (pump-action)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. MSNBC, "College Shooter's Deadly Rampage Baffles Friends," February 16, 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23171567/%20http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/02/15/illinois-shooting.html>.

Case #129

February 8, 2008: Latina Williams opened fire in a classroom at Louisiana Technical College in Baton Rouge, killing two students.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Louisiana Technical College in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Latina Williams (23/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "List of Recently Deadly Campus Shootings," February 15, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-15-campus-shootings_N.htm.
2. Doug Simpson, Associated Press, "Student Kills 2, Self at La. College," February 8, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/02/08/woman_kills_2_then_self_at_la_college/.

Case #130

December 9, 2007: Matthew Murray opened fire in a missionary training center dormitory, killing two people and wounding four others. He then walked 70 miles to an evangelical church in Colorado Springs and fatally shot two more people. Murray had been expelled from the training center three years prior to the attack. Reports state that he sent hate mail to the center several weeks prior to the attack.

Number of attack locations:	2
Location Information:	Youth With a Mission Training Center in Arvada, Colorado; New Life Church in Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Matthew Murray (24/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	1 rifle; 2 handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Maria Newman and John Holusha, New York Times, "Man Committed Both Colo. Shootings, Police Say," December 10, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/us/10cnd-shoot.html>.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Colorado Church Gunman Sought Revenge After He Was Kicked Out of Missionary Training," December 11, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,316387,00.html>.
3. Eric Marropodi, CNN, "Colorado Gunman Killed Himself," December 11, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/12/11/colorado.shootings/>.

Case #131

November 7, 2007: Pekka-Eric Auvinen opened fire at his high school, killing seven students and a teacher and wounding 12 other people. Auvinen had previously posted a video on the internet stating he was going to "eliminate" everyone who he deemed "unfit."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jokela High School in Tuusula, Finland
Attacker Information:	Pekka-Eric Auvinen (18/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. BBC News, "Finland Mourns Shooting Victims," November 8, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7084349.stm>.
2. YLE.fi, "Nine Dead in School Shooting," November 7, 2007, http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/news/2007/11/nine_dead_in_school_shooting_256579.html.

Case #132

October 10, 2007: Asa Coon opened fire in his school, injuring two students and two teachers. Reports state that prior to the attack Coon was angry at being suspended for his involvement in a fight.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	SuccessTech in Cleveland, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Asa H. Coon (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .38-caliber and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Chris Maag and Ian Urbina, New York Times, "Student, 14, Shoots 4 and Kills Himself in Cleveland School," October 11, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/us/11cleveland.html>.

Case #133

September 21, 2007: Loyer D. Braden, a student at Delaware State University, opened fire in the campus dining hall, killing one student and injuring another.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Delaware State University in Dover, Delaware
Attacker Information:	Loyer Braden (18/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Victim in Delaware State University Shooting Dies of Injuries," October 23, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,304625,00.html>.
2. Susan Kinzie, Washington Post, "Freshman Charged in Shooting of Two at Delaware State," September 25, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401822.html>.

Case #134

April 16, 2007: Seung-Hui Cho, a Virginia Polytechnic Institute student, opened fire inside a university dormitory and in several classrooms, killing 32 people and wounding 20 others. He committed suicide after the attack. Reports state that Cho had a history of mental and behavioral problems.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia
Attacker Information: Seung-Hui Cho (23/M)
Casualties: 32 dead; 20 wounded
Number of Weapons: 2
Weapon Information: 2 handguns (one .22-caliber semi-automatic and one 9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Source:

1. Virginia Tech Review Panel, "Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel," <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport.cfm>.

Case #135

November 20, 2006: Sebastian Bosse opened fire at his former high school, injuring five people. The gunman was armed with guns, pipe bombs and smoke bombs. Reports state that Bosse had left a suicide note prior to the attack and indicated his plans on an internet site.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Geschwister Scholl in Erfurt, Germany
Attacker Information: Sebastian Bosse (18/M)

Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 rifles (one small-bore and two sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Gulf Times, "School Shooter in Germany Shot Himself, Autopsy Shows," November 22, 2006, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=118844&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21.

Case #136

October 2, 2006: Charles Carl Roberts IV opened fire in a one-room Amish schoolhouse, killing five female students. Roberts barricaded himself in the school before carrying out the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Amish schoolhouse in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Charles Carl Roberts, IV (32/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (semi-automatic); rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "Fifth Girl Dies After Amish School Shooting," 10/3/2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/02/amish.shooting/index.html>.

Case #137

September 29, 2006: Eric Hainstock aimed a shotgun at his high school teacher before the weapon was wrestled from him by a custodian. The gunman then took his second firearm and opened fire, killing a principal. Hainstock had previously complained to teachers and school administrators about being teased by his fellow students. Additionally, he had been issued a disciplinary warning for possessing tobacco the day before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Weston Schools in Cazenovia, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Eric Hainstock (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "Wisconsin Principal Dies after School Shooting," September 30, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-09-29-principal-shot_x.htm.

Case #138

September 13, 2006: Kimveer Singh Gill opened fire on students in a Canadian college, killing one person and wounding 19 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dawson College in Montreal, Canada
Attacker Information:	Kimveer Gill (25/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CBS News, "Montreal Gunman Called Himself 'Angel of Death,'" September 14, 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/09/14/gunman-shooting.html>.

Case #139

August 30, 2006: Alvaro Castillo opened fire and set off pipe bombs in the parking lot of his former high school, wounding two students. Prior to the attack, Castillo fatally shot his father in his home and sent an e-mail to the principal of Columbine High School warning of his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Orange High School in Hillsborough, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	Alvaro Castillo (19/M)

Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (sawed-off); rifle (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Teenager is Accused of Multiple Shootings," September 1, 2006,
[http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E3D81E3EF932A3575AC0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=.](http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E3D81E3EF932A3575AC0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=)
2. Beth Karas, CNN, "Man Obsessed with Columbine Convicted of Murder," August 21, 2009,
[http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/08/21/north.carolina.castillo.trial/.](http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/08/21/north.carolina.castillo.trial/)

Case #140

August 24, 2006: Christopher Williams opened fire at the school where his ex-girlfriend taught, killing one teacher and wounding another. Reports state that the gunman was angry over his breakup with his girlfriend and was searching for her at the school. Prior to the school attack, Williams fatally shot his ex-girlfriend's mother in her home. After the attack, the gunman drove to his friend's house and shot his friend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Essex Elementary School in Essex, Vermont
Attacker Information:	Christopher Williams (27/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Christian Avar, Vermont Guardian, "Beyond the Abuse: Putting the Essex Murders in Context," September 1, 2006,
[http://www.vermontguardian.com/local/092006/EssexMurders.shtml.](http://www.vermontguardian.com/local/092006/EssexMurders.shtml)
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Suspect in Vermont School Shooting Rampage Pleads Not Guilty," August 25, 2006,
[http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210531,00.html.](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210531,00.html)

Case #141

March 14, 2006: James Scott Newman opened fire outside his middle school cafeteria, injuring two classmates.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pine Middle School in Reno, Nevada
Attacker Information:	James S. Newman (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Two Hurt in Reno Middle School Shooting," March 14, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187860,00.html>.

Case #142

November 8, 2005: Kenneth Bartley Jr. opened fire in his high school principal's office, killing one assistant principal and wounding two others. Bartley began his attack when he was called into the principal's office because students had seen him with a gun on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Campbell County Comprehensive High School in Jacksboro, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Ken Bartley, Jr. (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Boy in School Shooting May be Tried as an Adult," November 9, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9970713/>.

Case #143

March 21, 2005: Jeff Weise opened fire at an Indian reservation high school, killing seven fellow students and wounding seven others. The shooting spree lasted 10 minutes. Prior to the attack Weise fatally shot his grandparents at their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Red Lake High School in Red Lake, Minnesota
Attacker Information:	Jeff Weise (16/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "High School Shooting Spree Leaves 10 Dead," March 22, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,151085,00.html>.
2. BBC News, "Town Reels from Teenage Killing," March 22, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4373661.stm>.

Case #144

September 28, 2004: A middle school student opened fire at his school, killing four students and wounding five others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Middle school in Carmen de Patagones, Argentina
Attacker Information:	Rafael (15/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "4 Die in Argentina School Shooting," September 28, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/28/world/main646126.shtml>.
2. China Daily, "Teen Opens Fire in Argentine School: 4 Dead," September 29, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/29/content_378671.htm.

3. Bill Cormier, Associated Press, "School Shooting in Argentina Kills Four," September 29, 2004,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20040929/ai_n14586339/.

Case #145

February 9, 2004: John Romano opened fire at his high school, injuring a teacher. An assistant principal tackled and disarmed Romano. Reports state that Romano loaded his gun in the bathroom prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Columbia High School in East Greenbush, New York
Attacker Information:	Jon W. Romano (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge pump-action)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Marc Santora, New York Times, "Student Opens Fire at a High School near Albany, Hitting a Teacher," February 10, 2004,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/nyregion/student-opens-fire-at-a-high-school-near-albany-hitting-a-teacher.html>.

Case #146

September 24, 2003: John McLaughlin opened fire at his high school, killing two students. He then aimed his gun at a gym coach, but ultimately put the gun down. The gym coach then took the suspect to the school office without a struggle.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Rocori High School in St. Cloud, Minnesota
Attacker Information:	John Jason McLaughlin (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Minnesota Public Radio, "Teen Convicted of Murder in Rocori High School Shootings," July 18, 2005,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/07/18_postt_rocoriverdict/.
2. Minnesota Public Radio, "Veteran Teacher Called Hero in Cold Spring School Shootings," September 25, 2003,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/09/25_baxtera_reax/.

Case #147

July 17, 2003: Richard Dean "Rusty" Bright opened fire at a Kanawha County Board of Education meeting, wounding a teacher. Bright, a maintenance worker for the Board of Education, began his attack by dousing his supervisor and a personnel official with gasoline. After his lighter failed, he shot the teacher. Police later discovered additional weapons in Bright's vehicle.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kanawha County Board of Education school board meeting in Charleston, West Virginia
Attacker Information:	Richard Dean "Rusty" Bright (58/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, Tuscaloosa News, "School Board Meeting Onlookers Thwart Attack by Maintenance Worker," July 19, 2003,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1817&dat=20030719&id=DEcuAAAI BAJ&sjid=f6YEAAAIBAJ&pg=6717,4505726>.

Case #148

June 6, 2003: Anatcha Boonkwan opened fire in a school field, killing two people and wounding four others. Boonkwan targeted students gathering to listen to a campaign speech from a student body presidential candidate. He used a pistol that he stole from his father.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pak Phanang in Nakorn Srithammarat, Thailand
Attacker Information:	Anatcha Boonkwan (17/M)

Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, "One Killed, Several Injured in Southern Thailand School Shooting," June 6, 2003, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-74476631.html>.
2. Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, "Second Student Dies of Gunshot Wound," June 9, 2003, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-23495780_ITM.

Case #149

May 9, 2003: Biswanath Halder opened fire at a Case Western Reserve University building, killing one person and wounding two others. The attack lasted seven hours. Reports state that Halder was upset because he believed a university student hacked into his web site.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Biswanath Halder (62/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Danny Hakim, New York Times, "Ex-Employee Held in Campus Attack," May 11, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/ex-employee-held-in-campus-attack.html?pagewanted=all>.

Case #150

October 29, 2002: Robert Flores opened fire in an instructor's office at the University of Arizona Nursing College, killing three of his instructors. Reports state that Flores was a failing student.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona

Attacker Information:	Robert S. Flores, Jr. (41/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic, one .40-caliber semi-automatic, one .357-caliber revolver, and one 9-millimeter revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. M. Broder, New York Times, "Arizona Gunman Chose Victims in Advance," October 30, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/30/us/arizona-gunman-chose-victims-in-advance.html>.

Case #151

October 21, 2002: Huan Yun Xiang opened fire in a Melbourne University classroom, killing two students and wounding five others. Reports state that before firing, Xiang, a fourth-year honors student, stood on his desk, pointed his gun at students and yelled, "you never understand me."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Monash University in Melbourne, Australia
Attacker Information:	Huan Yun "Allen" Xiang (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Padraic Murphy, Misha Ketchell, and Andrew Heasley, Sydney Morning Herald, "Two Die as Gunman Attacks His Own Class," October 22, 2002, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/21/1034561446759.html>.
2. Jamie Barry, The Age, "Student Believed Monash Killings Were 'His Destiny,'" September 12, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/11/1063268520181.html>.
3. David Rood, The Age, "Reluctant Heroes Draw Positives from Pain," October 21, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/10/20/1066631353598.html>.

Case #152

April 29, 2002: Dragoslav Petkovic opened fire at his high school, killing one teacher and wounding another.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Vlasenica High School in Vlasenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Attacker Information:	Dragoslav Petkovic (17/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (7.65-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. New York Times, "Bosnia Student Kills Teacher and Himself," April 30, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/30/world/bosnia-student-kills-teacher-and-himself.html>.

Case #153

April 26, 2002: Robert Steinhäuser opened fire at a German high school, killing 13 teachers, two students, and a policeman. The attack lasted for 20 minutes. Steinhäuser was expelled from the school prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Johann Gutenberg High School in Erfurt, Germany
Attacker Information:	Robert Steinhäuser (19/M)
Casualties:	16 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CNN, "Brave Teacher Stopped Gun Rampage," April 27, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/04/27/germany.shooting/>.
2. Edmund L. Andrews, New York Times, "Shooting Rampage at German School," April 27, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/27/world/shooting-rampage-at-german-school.html>.

Case #154

February 19, 2002: A gunman opened fire at a factory where he was formerly employed, killing two people. The gunman then opened fire at his former school, killing a headmaster and wounding a teacher. The assailant also detonated at least two homemade pipe bombs in the school. He had been expelled from the school prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Factory in Eching; high school in Freising, Germany
Attacker Information:	unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, *The Copycat Effect: How the Media and Popular Culture Trigger the Mayhem in Tomorrow's Headlines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pg. 177.
2. "A School Principal is Killed by Gunfire," <http://www.keystosaferschools.com/FREISINGGermany21902.htm>.

Case #155

January 16, 2002: Peter Odighizuwa opened fire on the campus of the Appalachian School of law, killing the dean, a student and a professor, and wounding three other people. Reports state that Odighizuwa, a graduate student, was angry over recently being dismissed from the school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Appalachian School of Law in Grundy, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Peter Odighizuwa (42/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Thomas J. Lueck, New York Times, "3 Slain at Law School; Student is Held," January 17, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/17/college/coll17SHOO.html>.

Case #156

May 17, 2001: Donald Cowan opened fire at a Pacific Lutheran University dormitory, killing a music professor. Cowan left a 16-page suicide note expressing anger at a colleague of the victim, whom Cowan briefly dated as a teenager.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma, Washington
Attacker Information:	Donald Cowan (55/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rebecca Cook, ABC News, "Professor Shot in Tacoma," <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93280&page=1>.

Case #157

March 22, 2001: Jason Hoffman opened fire at his high school, wounding five people. The attack began when a school dean questioned Hoffman as to why he was carrying a gun over his shoulder. After shooting and missing the dean, Hoffman ran toward the administration offices while randomly shooting into windows and a doorway.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Granite Hills High School in El Cajon, California
Attacker Information:	Jason Anthony Hoffman (18/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Greg Krikorian, Los Angeles Times, "Violence Marks Life of School Gunfire Suspect," April 23, 2001, <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/23/local/me-54634>.

Case #158

March 5, 2001: Charles Andrews Williams opened fire at his high school, killing two schoolmates and wounding 13 others. He began his shooting spree by firing randomly inside a bathroom and around the courtyard. Reports state that Williams had warned classmates he would bring a weapon to school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Santana High School in Santee, California
Attacker Information:	Charles Andrews Williams (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CNN, "Suspect Had Talked About Shooting at School," March 5, 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/03/05/school.shooting.07/index.html>.
2. Michigan Daily, "2 Dead, 13 Hurt in Rampage," March 6, 2001, <http://www.michigandaily.com/content/2-dead-13-hurt-rampage>.

Case #159

December 7, 1999: A gunman opened fire at his high school, injuring five people. The gunman began targeting students in a hallway and a computer room. Reports state that the attack was fueled by a feud between the assailant's family and one of the victims' family. Prior to the attack, one of the victim's family members had asked police for protection from the assailant, but their request was denied.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	De Leijgraaf High School in Veghel, Netherlands
Attacker Information:	Unknown (17/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Victoria Advance, "Family Feud Behind Dutch School Shooting, Police Say," December 9, 1999,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=861&dat=19991209&id=qiYPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=VIUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5645,1881212>.
2. Anthony Deutsch, Laredo Morning Times, "Student Wounds Four in Denmark," December 8, 1999,
<http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache%3AVNdHkrg4HI0J%3Aairwolf.lmtonline.com%2Fnews%2Farchive%2F1208%2Fpagea14.pdf+Dutch+school+shooting+%2B+17&hl=en&gl=us&sig=AFQjCNHSYl4rNhRBxN7jiWXc3Be6ykAvJA&pli=1>.
3. Emergency Disaster Management, Inc., "School Shootings,"
http://www.emergency-management.net/school_shoot.htm.

Case #160

December 6, 1999: Seth Trickey opened fire on a crowd of students at his middle school, wounding four people. He was then subdued by a teacher.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Gibson Middle School in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma
Attacker Information:	Seth Trickey (13/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Renee Ruble, Associated Press, "Four Wounded in Oklahoma School Shooting; Suspect in Custody," December 6, 1999,
<http://www.boston.com/news/daily/06/shooting.htm>.

Case #161

May 21, 1999: Thomas Solomon opened fire at his high school, wounding six students. Solomon was eventually disarmed by an assistant principal after attempting to commit suicide. Authorities later discovered printouts of bomb recipes and notes detailing his plot to plant explosives in the school building in Solomon's bedroom. Reports state that Solomon was distraught over a recent breakup with his girlfriend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Heritage High School in Conyers, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Thomas Solomon, Jr. (15/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. TIME, "Just a Routine School Shooting," May 31, 1999,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991076,00.html>.

Case #162

April 28, 1999: Todd Smith, a high school drop-out, opened fire at his former high school, killing one person and wounding one other. Reports state that Smith's mother claimed her son was obsessed with violent movies and video games, endured incessant bullying by his peers and displayed signs of depression before the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	W.R. Myers High School in Alberta, Canada
Attacker Information:	Todd Cameron Smith (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Calgary Herald, "Grim Record of School Killings," December 5, 2009,
<http://www2.canada.com/nanaimodailynews/news/story.html?id=2307283>.
2. CBS News Online, "Tragedy in Taber," April 27, 2004,
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/taber/>.

Case #163

April 20, 1999: Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold opened fire at Columbine High School, killing 12 fellow students and a teacher and wounding 24 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Eric Harris (18/M); Dylan Klebold (17/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 24 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 shotguns (sawed-off); handgun (TEC-9); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, Michael A. Lindenberg, "Ten Years After Columbine, It's Easier to Bear Arms," April 20, 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891416,00.html>.
2. Greg Toppo, USA Today, "10 Years Later, the Real Story Behind Columbine," April 14, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-04-13-columbine-myths_N.htm.

Case #164

April 16, 1999: Shawn Cooper opened fire at his high school. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Students barricaded themselves in classrooms when Cooper began firing his shotgun at students and faculty. Cooper surrendered after a 20-minute standoff with police. Reports state that Cooper had been taking Ritalin prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Notus Junior-Senior High School in Notus, Idaho
Attacker Information:	Shawn Cooper (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. University of Michigan, "School Violence," http://sitemaker.umich.edu/356.dolan/list_of_school_shooters.
2. Kelly Patricia O'Meara, Insight on the News, "Doping Kids," June 28, 1999, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_24_15/ai_54968252/.

Case #165

May 21, 1998: Kip Kinkel opened fire in the cafeteria of his high school, killing two students and wounding 22 other people. Prior to the attack, Kinkel fatally shot his parents at home. Although several students were aware that Kinkel had devised a “hit-list” prior to the attack, no one alerted authorities.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Kip Kinkel (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 22 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Unknown

Sources:

1. ABC News, “School Shooter: ‘I Didn’t Realize’ They Would Die,”
<http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?id=5040342&page=2>.
2. Sam Howe Verhovek, New York Times, “Teenager to Spend Life in Prison for Shootings,” November 11, 1999,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/11/us/teenager-to-spend-life-in-prison-for-shootings.html>.

Case #166

March 24, 1998: Mitchell Johnson and Andrew Golden opened fire outside their middle school, killing five people and wounding 10 others. Prior to the attack, Johnson and Golden pulled the fire alarm, luring the students and teachers outside the building and into the gunmen’s line of fire. The boys stole a cache of weapons from Golden’s grandfather’s house. Reports state that the boys had warned classmates of the impending attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Andrew Golden (11/M); Mitchell Johnson (13/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 10 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-06 Remington); rifle (.30 carbine Universal); handgun (semi-automatic); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Rick Bragg, et. al., New York Times, "From Wild Talk and Friendship to Five Deaths in a Schoolyard," March 29, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/29/us/from-wild-talk-and-friendship-to-five-deaths-in-a-schoolyard.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.
2. Kenneth Heard, Arkansas Democrat Gazette, "Public Defenders Agency to Pay for Jonesboro Shooters Civil Case," July 27, 1999, <http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/1999/jul/27/public-defenders-agency-pay-jonesboro-shooters-civ/>.
3. Rick Bragg, New York Times, "Judge Punishes Arkansas Boys Who Killed 5," August 12, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/us/judge-punishes-arkansas-boys-who-killed-5.html?ref=andrewgolden&pagewanted=1>.

Case #167

December 15, 1997: Joseph Colt Todd opened fire outside his high school, injuring two students. Todd hid in the woods next to his school and shot at students in the parking lot. Reports state that Todd was angry at being teased by classmates.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Stamps High School in Stamps, Arkansas
Attacker Information: Joseph "Colt" Todd (14/M)
Casualties: 0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons: Unknown
Weapon Information: Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Rick Bragg, New York Times, "5 Are Killed at School; Boys, 11 and 13 are Held," March 25, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/25/us/5-are-killed-at-school-boys-11-and-13-are-held.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Los Angeles Times, "Boy, 14, Charged in Shooting at School," December 20, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-660>.

Case #168

December 1, 1997: Michael Carneal opened fire on a prayer group at Heath High School, killing three girls and wounding five others. A classmate and friend of the

assailant persuaded Carneal to put the gun down. Carneal had warned several classmates of his plan.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Michael Carneal (17/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 shotguns; 2 rifles (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Julie Grace and West Paducah, Time Magazine, "When the Silence Fell," June 24, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,137027,00.html>.
2. CNN, "Third student dies in Kentucky school shooting," December 2, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9712/02/school.shooting.on/>.

Case #169

October 1, 1997: Luke Woodham opened fire at his high school, killing two people and wounding seven others. Prior to the attack, Woodham stabbed his mother to death in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Luke Woodham (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-.30)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Howard Chua-Eoan, Time Magazine, "Mississippi Gothic," June 24, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,136736,00.html>.
2. CNN, "Teen pleads innocent in high school shooting," October 2, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9710/02/miss.shooting.folo/>.

Case #170

March 30, 1997: Mohammad Ahman al-Naziri (also known as Hassan Ali al-Baadani) opened fire at two neighboring schools, killing eight people, including six children and wounding 14 others. The gunman claimed his daughter was raped by an administrator at one of the schools.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tala'l Private School and Musa Bin Nusayr School in Sanaa, Yemen
Attacker Information:	Mohammad Ahman al-Naziri (48/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Kalishnikov)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CNN, "Gunman kills eight at two schools in Yemen," March 30, 1997;
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/30/briefs/yemen.html>.
2. Seattle Times, "Around The World," April 2, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970402&slug=2531929>.

Case #171

February 19, 1997: Evan Ramsey opened fire at his high school, killing a student, a principal, and wounding two others. Reports state that Ramsey had been bullied by classmates and had openly discussed his plans with friends prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Bethel Regional High School in Bethel, Alaska
Attacker Information:	Evan Ramsey (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Jim Avila, Reynolds Holding, Terri Whitcraft and Beth Tribolet, ABC News, "School Shooter: 'I Didn't Realize' They Would Die," June 11, 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5040342&page=1>.
2. CBS News, "Rage: A look at a Teen Killer," March 7, 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/08/17/60II/main58625.shtml>.

Case #172

March 13, 1996: Thomas Hamilton opened fire at a primary school, killing 17 students and teachers. Hamilton was fired from his post as a Scout Master prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dunblane Primary School in Dunblane, Scotland
Attacker Information:	Thomas Hamilton (43/M)
Casualties:	17 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rachael Bell, TruTV.com, "The Dunblane Massacre," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/dunblane_massacre/index.html.

Case #173

February 8, 1996: Douglas Bradley opened fire on his high school's basketball court, injuring three students. Bradley drove his car onto the court and threw money out the window to draw people into his line of fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mid-Peninsula Education Center in Palo Alto, California
Attacker Information:	Douglas Bradley (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, Public Entity Risk Institute, "The Copycat Effect: School Shootings and Recommendations," 2004
https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/component/option,com_bookmarks/Itemid,44/camid,30/navstart,0/task,detail/mode,0/id,796/search.
2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 37.

Case #174

February 2, 1996: Barry Loukaitis opened fire on his middle school algebra class, killing a teacher and two students and wounding another. Loukaitis held hostages for 10 minutes and released some of the wounded before he was disarmed by a gym instructor. Loukaitis wore a duster jacket to hide his weapons.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Frontier Middle School in Moses Lake, Washington
Attacker Information:	Barry Loukaitis (14/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-.30); 2 handguns (one .22-caliber revolver and one .25-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Celin Childs, AssociatedContent.com, "Barry Loukaitis: Teenage Killer," November 28, 2007,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/458224/barry_loukaitis_teenage_killer.html?cat=17.
2. Alex Tizon, Seattle Times, "Scarred by Killings, Moses Lake asks: What has this Town Become?" February 23, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970223&slug=2525360>.
3. Ronald K. Fitten and Arthur Santana, Seattle Times, "Teen's Trial a No-Win Case – Loukaitis' Attorney Calls for New Kind of Verdict: Guilty but Mentally Ill," September 25, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970925&slug=2562274>.

Case #175

November 15, 1995: Jamie Rouse opened fire at his high school, killing a teacher and a student, and wounding another teacher. Reports state that Rouse was angry at being socially ostracized at school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Richland High School in Lynville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Jamie Rouse (17/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber rifle)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rebecca Leung, CBS News, "Student Serving Life Sentence for Killing Two Teachers, One Friend," April 14, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/12/48hours/main611470.shtml>.
2. Laurie Goodstein and William Glaberson, New York Times, "The Well-Marked Roads to Homicidal Rage," April 10, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/10/us/the-well-marked-roads-to-homicidal-rage.html?sec=health&spon=&pagewanted=1>.

Case #176

October 12, 1995: Toby Sincino opened fire at his high school, killing one teacher and wounding another. Sincino began his attack by shooting his math teacher in the face. He then walked to the guidance counselor's office, but after being unable to unlock the door, he shot another math teacher. Reports state that Sincino was angry over being bullied at school and warned classmates that he possessed a gun. He had been suspended the day before the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Blackville-Hilda High School in Blackville, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Toby Sincino (16/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.32-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Neil Ribner, The California School of Professional Psychology, *Handbook of Juvenile Forensic Psychology*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), p. 232.
2. James R. Langford, *Augusta Chronicle*, "Teen's Life Full of Contradictions – the 15-year-old who shot two teachers and then himself hinted that he would not be alive much longer," October 22, 1995, <http://www.ssristories.com/show.php?item=1568>.
3. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 339.

Case #177

November 7, 1994: Keith A. Ledeger opened fire at his former middle school, killing a custodian and wounding two staff members. He then shot a police officer near the main entrance. Ledeger had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Wickliffe Middle School in Wickliffe, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Keith A. Ledeger (37/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Man Fires Shotgun in School, Killing One and Injuring 3," November 8, 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/08/us/man-fires-shotgun-in-school-killing-one-and-injuring-3.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #178

October 20, 1994: Ta Phu Cuong opened fire at a high school, injuring two staff members. Reports state that Cuong was disappointed with his grades.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Brockton High School in Toronto, Canada
Attacker Information:	Ta Phu Cuong (27/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. TheStar.com, "Shooting violence in Canadian schools 1975-2007," May 23, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/news/article/217023>.
2. Alan Cairns, Toronto Sun, "Green is No Stranger to Justice Perception of Fairness is Crucial, Says New Judge," August 17, 2006, <http://www.caf.ca/Admin.aspx?AppModule=TxAppFramework.Web.Admin&Command=EMBEDDEDFILE&DataObjectID=701&ColumnID=3581&FieldName=CONTENT&Lang=EN&RecordID=726>.

Case #179

January 18, 1993: Gary Scott Pennington opened fired at a high school English class, killing a teacher and a custodian. Pennington then held 22 students hostage.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: East Carter High School in Grayson, Kentucky
Attacker Information: Gary Scott Pennington (17/M)
Casualties: 2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons: Unknown
Weapon Information: Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: No force

Sources:

1. Jerry Buckley, U.S. News, "The Tragedy in Room 108," October 31, 1993, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/931108/archive_016061_4.htm.
2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 337.
3. Susan Reed, People.com, "Reading, Writing and Murder," June 14, 1993, <http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20110610,00.html>.

Case #180

December 14, 1992: Wayne Lo opened fire on his school's campus, killing two people and wounding four others. Lo began his attack by shooting a security guard and a professor before targeting students in the library and dormitories. Prior to the attack, school administrators were notified that Lo had received a package from an ammunition company, but determined the school had no authority to interfere with the package. In

addition, the school resident director was warned that Lo threatened to kill her and her husband.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Simon's Rock College of Bard in Great Barrington, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Wayne Lo (18/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Anthony DePalma, New York Times, "Questions Outweigh Answers in Shooting Spree at College," December 28, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/28/us/questions-outweigh-answers-in-shooting-spree-at-college.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. FindLaw.com, *RLI INSURANCE COMPANY* vs. *SIMON'S ROCK EARLY COLLEGE & others*, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=ma&vol=appslip/appmarc h02i&invol=1>.

Case #181

September 11, 1992: Randy Matthews opened fire at his high school pep rally, wounding six fellow students. Another student was trampled by the fleeing mob of students. Reports state that although Matthews initially targeted a student with whom he had fought, he continued to spray bullets at other students in the hallway.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Palo Duro High School in Amarillo, Texas
Attacker Information:	Randy Earl Matthews (17/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Student Wounds 6 at High School," September 12, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/12/us/student-wounds-6-at-high-school.html>.

Case #182

August 24, 1992: Valery Fabrikant, a mechanical engineering professor, opened fired at Concordia University's Henry F. Hall Building, killing four colleagues and wounding another. Fabrikant barricaded himself in an office with two hostages who ultimately tackled and disarmed him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Concordia University in Quebec, Canada
Attacker Information:	Valery Fabrikant (52/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, one 6.35-millimeter semi-automatic, and one 7.65-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. John Scott Cowan, "Lessons from the Fabrikant File: A Report to the Board of Governors of Concordia University," May 1994, http://archives3.concordia.ca/timeline/histories/Cowan_report.pdf.
2. David R. Lyon, Stephen D. Hart, and Christopher D. Webster, "Violence and Risk Assessment," in *Introduction to Psychology and Law: Canadian Perspectives* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2001), chap. 11, pp. 314-315.
3. Wilfred Cude, "The Rogue Professor," in *The Ph.D Trap Revisited* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), chap. 5, pp. 114-130, http://books.google.com/books?id=9HlgQOHVcRMC&dq=The+Ph.D+Trap+%2B+Wilfred+Cude&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=TjahS8mJlcGblgfqzuGkDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CBIQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=&f=false.

Case #183

May 14, 1992: John McMahan opened fire on a middle school science class, wounding two fellow students. Reports state that McMahan was angry over being bullied in school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Silverado Middle School in Napa, California
Attacker Information:	John McMahan (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 83.
2. Lynn M. Stuter, "Weapons of Violence in Schools since 1990," March 2005, http://www.learn-usa.com/relevant_to_et/Youth_Violence.pdf.

Case #184

May 1, 1992: Eric Houston opened fire at his former high school, killing four people and wounding nine others. During the attack, Houston held dozens of students hostage on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lindhurst High School in Hoyt, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Eric Houston (20/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Mark Gladstone and Carl Ingram, Los Angeles Times, "Man Surrenders After Terrorizing School," May 02, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-02/news/mn-1318_1_high-school-diploma.
2. Kymm Mann, Appeal-Democrat.com, "School Shooting Turns Unwanted Attention to Lindhurst," April 16, 2007, <http://www.appeal-democrat.com/news/school-47104-shooting-eckardt.html>.
3. Meg Sommerfeld, Education Week, "Classes to Resume at California School where Gunman Killed 4 and Wounded 9," May 13, 1992, <http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1992/05/13/34olive.h11.html>.

Case #185

November 1, 1991: Gang Lu, a graduate student, opened fire on the University of Iowa campus, killing five people and wounding another. Lu's victims included two professors, a department chair, an associate professor, an associate vice president and a student

employee. Reports state that Lu was angry over the unenthusiastic reception his dissertation received. Investigators recovered letters in which Mr. Lu enumerated a list of targets and outlined his plans to exact revenge.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa
Attacker Information:	Gang Lu (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	handgun (.38-caliber revolver); handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Michel Marriott, New York Times, "Iowa Gunman was Torn by Academic Challenge," November 4, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/04/us/iowa-gunman-was-torn-by-academic-challenge.html>.
2. Steve Maravetz, *FYI Faculty & Staff News*, "Remembering November 1: A University Tragedy 10 Years Later," October 2001, http://www.uiowa.edu/~fyi/issues/issues2001_v39/10192001/november.html.

Case #186

December 6, 1989: Marc Lepine opened fire at a university, killing 14 people and wounding 14 others. Lepine began his attack by splitting up students in a classroom by gender and systematically shooting nine female students. He then targeted women in the corridors, cafeteria and classrooms.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ecole Polytechnique in Quebec, Canada
Attacker Information:	Marc Lepine (25/M)
Casualties:	14 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Sturm Ruger brand rifle, mini-14 model)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Teresa Z. Sourour, "Report of Coroner's Investigation," May 10, 1991 http://www.diarmani.com/Montreal_Coroners_Report.pdf.

Case #187

January 17, 1989: Patrick Purdy opened fire at an elementary school playground, killing five people and wounding 29 others. Purdy had attended the school 16 years prior to his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Cleveland Elementary School in Stockade, California
Attacker Information:	Patrick Edward Purdy (24/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 29 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.56-caliber); handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Robert Reinhold, New York Times, "After Shooting, Horror but Few Answers," January 19, 1989, <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/19/us/after-shooting-horror-but-few-answers.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Time Magazine, "Slaughter in a School Yard," June 24 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,151105,00.html>.

Case #188

December 16, 1988: Nicholas Elliot opened fire at his high school, killing a teacher and wounding two others. Elliot hid his gun in his backpack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlantic Shores Christian School in Virginia Beach, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Nicholas Elliot (16/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Erik Larson, *The Atlantic*, "The Story of a Gun," January 1993, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/01/the-story-of-a-gun/3531/>.

2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 336.

Case #189

September 26, 1988: James Wilson opened fire at an elementary school, killing two young girls and wounding nine other people. Reports state that Wilson was angry about being teased for his weight and for taking psychiatric drugs.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Oakland Elementary School in Breenwood, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	James William Wilson (19/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Man Held in School Shooting is Depicted as Jobless," September 28, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/28/us/man-held-in-school-shooting-is-depicted-as-jobless-recluse.html>.
2. Associated Press, New York Times, "Second Victim Dies after School Shooting Incident," September 30, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/30/us/second-victim-dies-after-school-shooting-incident.html>.

Case #190

May 20, 1988: Laurie Dann opened fire at an elementary school, killing a second-grader and wounding five other students. Dann then shot a man in a nearby house. Prior to the attacks, Dunn, who had a history of mental illness, lit a house on fire, attempted to firebomb a school, and delivered poisoned snacks to people she knew.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hubbard Woods School in Winnetka, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Laurie Dann (30/F)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .22-caliber semi-automatic and one .32-caliber)

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. ABC News, "School Shooting Remembered 20 Years Later," May 20, 2008, <http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=6154968>.
2. Mark Walsh, Education Week, "Winnetka School's Staff is Praised for Courage Amid Shooting Spree," June 1, 1988, <http://www.edweek.org/login.html?source=http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1988/06/01/x36nut.h07.html&destination=http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1988/06/01/x36nut.h07.html&levelId=2100>.
3. Jennifer Halperin, Northern Illinois University Libraries, "The Education of a Crusader," December 14, 1993, <http://www.lib.niu.edu/1993/ii931211.html>.

Case #191

December 4, 1986: Kristofer Hans opened fire at his high school, killing one person and wounding three others. Hans initially tried to kill his teacher, but shot and killed her substitute instead. Hans then fired several shots as he fled the school building, wounding two students and a vice principal. Reports state that Hans was angry about failing a French class.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fergus High School in Lewiston, Montana
Attacker Information:	Kristofer Hans (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, "Failing Grade is Linked to Shooting of Teacher," December 6, 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/06/us/failing-grade-is-linked-to-shooting-of-teacher.html>.
2. Len Iwanski, The Free Lance-Star, "Student on Rampage Kills Teacher, Hurts 3," December 5, 1986, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=19861205&id=LXEQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=UosDAAAIBAJ&pg=6835,761096>.
3. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 336.

Case #192

December 10, 1985: Floyd Warmasley opened fire at his junior high school, killing a custodian and injuring the principal and secretary. After shooting the three victims, Warmasley roamed the school and took a student hostage for more than a half-hour.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Portland Junior High School in Portland, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Floyd Warmasley (13/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Connecticut Student Held in Shooting Death of Custodian," December 11, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-11/news/mn-898_1.
2. Associated Press, Reading Eagle, "13-year old Fatally Guns Down School Custodian, Injures Two," December 11, 1985, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19851211&id=BBoiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=gqYFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3025,244519>.
3. Associated Press, Lewiston Daily Sun, "Concord Superintendent Offers to Help Conn. School," December 13, 1985, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1928&dat=19851213&id=sIIpAAAAIBAJ&sjid=FGgFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3413,2700214>.

Case #193

January 21, 1985: James Alan Kearbey opened fire at his high school, killing the principal and wounding two teachers and a student. Kearbey's classmates claimed he was fascinated with military weapons and war.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Goddard Junior High School in Goddard, Kansas
Attacker Information:	James Alan Kearbey (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (M1-A); handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Free Lance-Star "14-year-old charged in Shooting Spree," January 22, 1985,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=19850122&id=V1MQAAA AIBAJ&sjid=V4sDAAAAIIBAJ&pg=5241,2995151>.
2. Indianapolis Star, "School Violence Around the World," October 2, 2006,
http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/crime/school_violence/school_shootin gs.html.

Case #194

January 21, 1983: David F. Lawler opened fire in his junior high school study hall, killing one student and wounding another. After Lawler committed suicide, investigators discovered a three-page suicide note in his bag.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:Parkway South Junior High School in
Manchester, Missouri**Attacker Information:**

David F. Lawler (14/M)

Casualties:

1 dead; 1 wounded

Number of Weapons:

3

Weapon Information:

2 handguns (.22-caliber); knife

Closest Relationship to the Victim:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. United Press International, New York Times "Around the Nation: 8th Grader Kills Youth, then Himself at School," January 21, 1983,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/21/us/around-the-nation-8th-grader-kills-youth-then-himself-at-school.html>.
2. Mark Ribbing, Baltimore Sun, "Fatal Junior High Shooting Still Haunts 16 Years Later," May 02, 1999, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-05-02/topic/9905040373_1_senti-firecracker-beneath.

Case #195

January 29, 1979: Brenda Spencer opened fire at an elementary school, killing the principal and a custodian and wounding eight children and a police officer. Spencer fired the shots from her house across the street from the school.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:	Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Brenda Spencer (16/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Peter Rowe, San Diego Union-Tribune "1979 School Shooting Inspired Boy to Teach," October 6, 2007, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071006/news_1n6teacher.html.
2. Katherine Ramsland, TruTV.com, "School Killers," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial_killers/weird/kids1/index_1.html.
3. Associated Press, USA Today.com, "Parole Denied in School Shooting," June 19, 2001, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001-04-18-spencer.htm>.

Case #196

July 12, 1976: Edward Charles Allaway opened fire in the basement of a library where he was employed as a custodian, killing seven people and wounding two others. Allaway then called the police and surrendered.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	California State University in Fullerton, California
Attacker Information:	Edward Charles Allaway (37/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Rene Lynch, Los Angeles Times, "Slayer of Seven is Sent Back to Atascadero," December 17, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-17/local/me-3115_1_napa-state-hospital.
2. Associated Press, Anchorage Daily News, "Library Shooting Kills 7," July 19, 1976, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1828&dat=19760710&id=XjUeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fb4EAAAAIBAJ&pg=1447,1114782>.

Case #197

October 27, 1975: Robert Poulin opened fire in a classroom at St. Pius X High School, killing one person and injuring five others. Prior to the attack, Poulin raped and fatally burned a female teenager at his home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Pius X High School in Ottawa, Canada
Attacker Information:	Robert Poulin (18/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 334.
2. Associated Press, The Miami News, "Student Opens Fire on Class, Kills Self," October 27, 1975,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19751027&id=k5YzAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DuwFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3696,2884442>.

Case #198

May 28, 1975: Michael Slobodian opened fire at a secondary school, killing a teacher and a student and injuring 13 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Centennial Secondary School in Ontario, Canada
Attacker Information:	Michael Slobodian (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one .44-Magnum lever action and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Andrew Hanon, Edmonton Sun, "Canada's First School Shooting Recalled," March 12, 2009, <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2009/03/12/8718126-sun.html>.
2. Associated Press, Bulletin, "Teenager Takes Own Life After Killing 2, Wounding 13," May 29, 1975, <http://news.google.de/newspapers?id=eTYVAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=8vcDAAAAIIBAJ&pg=1363,432029&dq=>.
3. Associated Press, Ocala Star-Banner, "School Killer 'Sought Revenge,'" May 28, 1975, http://news.google.de/newspapers?id=_BcVAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=8QUEAAAAIIBAJ&pg=3004,6164509&dq=slobodian&hl=en.

Case #199

December 30, 1974: Anthony Barbaro opened fire at his high school, killing three people and wounding nine others. Equipped with guns and homemade bombs, Barbaro began his attack by setting several fires in the school. He then shot a janitor and fired from a third-floor window at responding firemen and bystanders. A search Barbaro's home revealed handmade bombs and a diary detailing five months of planning.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Olean High School in Olean, New York
Attacker Information:	Anthony Barbaro (18/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Caitlin Lovinger, New York Times, "The Nation: After the Madness, Violence, Even Before the Internet," April 25, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/weekinreview/the-nation-after-the-madness-violence-even-before-the-internet.html>.
2. St. Petersburg Times, "Sniper Suspect Found Hanged in New York Jail Cell," November 2, 1975, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=XLgMAAAAIBAJ&sjid=K2ADAAAAIBAJ&pg=6000,541166&dq=olean>.
3. New York Times, Ford Fessenden, "They Threaten, Seethe and Unhinge, Then Kill in Quantity," April 9, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/09/us/they-threaten-seethe-and-unhinge-then-kill-in-quantity.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1>.

Case #200

May 15, 1974: Terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine opened fire at an elementary school in a series of attacks that killed 26 people and wounded 70 others. The assailants then took students hostage and demanded that Israel release political prisoners. Prior to attacking the school, the gunmen attacked a van, killed a family in an apartment and shot a bystander. They were ultimately killed by Israeli fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Netiv Meir School in Ma'a lot, Israel
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	26 dead; 70 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "Middle East: Bullets, Bombs and a Sign of Hope," May 27, 1974, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911276-1,00.html>.
2. Jack Khoury, Haaretz, "U.S. Filmmakers Plan Documentary on Ma'alot Massacre," March 7, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/833554.html>.
3. BBC, "1974: Teenagers Die in Israeli School Attack," http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/15/newsid_4307000/4307545.stm.

Case #201

August 1, 1966: Charles Joseph Whitman, an architectural engineering student, opened fire from an observation desk on the University of Texas campus, killing 13 people and wounding 31 others. Whitman's attack ended after he was shot by a police officer.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Texas in Austin, Texas
Attacker Information:	Charles Joseph Whitman (25/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 31 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (high-power .30-06); shotgun (sawed-off); and handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "The Madman in the Tower," August 12, 1966,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842584,00.html>.

FOILED SCHOOL

Case #202

August 26, 2010: Austin Cook was arrested when authorities uncovered his plan to "break the record" of the Columbine and Virginia Tech school shootings at his high school. Police seized a rifle, bow and arrow, several gun-related books and a Columbine video game from the suspect's home. Prior to his arrest, Cook attempted to recruit someone to help him conduct the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Leto High School in Tampa, Florida
Attacker Information:	Austin James Cook (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22 caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when law enforcement investigated a tip that was reported to Campus Crime Stoppers.

Sources:

1. Jessica Vander Velde, St. Petersburg Times, "Tip About Planned Shooting at Leto High School Leads to Arrest of 17-Year-Old," August 26, 2010,
<http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1117431.ece>.
2. Bill Logan, ABC News, "Leto High Moves on After Mass Murder Threat," August 26, 2010,
http://www.abcactionnews.com/dpp/news/region_tampa/leto-high-moves-on-after-mass-murder-threat.
3. Theresa Collington, WTSP News, "Deputies: Mass Shooting Thwarted at Leto High School," August 26, 2010,
<http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=142887>.

Case #203

May 7, 2010: Christopher Franko and his girlfriend, Dana Saltzman, were arrested for planning an attack on their high school. Reports state that the suspects sought to purchase

shotguns and randomly shoot students, faculty and staff at Franko's former school. Prior to this plot, Franko had been accused of similar shooting attempts at his school.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connetquot High School in Long Island, New York
Attacker Information:	Christopher Franko (17/M); Dana Saltzman (16/F)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Shotguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when Franko's social worker alerted police as to her suspicions that the two suspects might be planning an attack.

Sources:

1. Frank Eltmann, Huffington Post, "Christopher Franko Charged: Connetquot High School Student charged with Second Columbine-Style Plot in three Years," June 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/christopher-franko-charge_n_604717.html.
2. Carlin DeGuerin Miller, CBS News, "Columbine-Style Attack on Long Island High School Foiled, Two Teens Arrested, Say Police," May 10, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20004559-504083.html.
3. Associated Press, Huffington Post, "Dana Saltzman, Christopher Franko Arrested in Plot to Attack Long Island High School: Columbine-Style Shooting Planned for Connetquot High School," May 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/08/dana-saltzman-christopher_n_568930.html.

Case #204

March 4, 2010: Charles Mustoe was arrested for planning an attack at Chelan High School. Mustoe planned to carry out the attack on April 20, 2011, the anniversary of the Columbine High school shooting. Reports state that Mustoe was angry about being bullied at school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Chelan High School in Chelan, Washington
Attacker Information:	Charles T. Mustoe (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	10
Weapon Information:	3 shotguns; 5 rifles; 2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the parents of a girl with whom Mustoe had discussed his plans alerted authorities.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Columbian, "Brewster Teen Charged in Alleged School Shooting Plot," March 4, 2010, <http://www.columbian.com/news/2010/mar/04/brewster-teen-charged-alleged-school-shooting-plot/>.
2. K.C. Mehaffey, Wenatchee World, "Charges Reduced for Teen Police Say Planned Columbine-Type Shooting," December 2, 2010, <http://www.wenatcheeworld.com/news/2010/dec/02/charges-for-brewster-teen-reduced/>.

Case #205

February 14, 2010: A student was arrested for planning a shooting spree at Marshall High School.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Marshall High School in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect revealed his plans to a man with whom he was playing an online video game; the man immediately notified law enforcement.

Sources:

1. Crystal Mazza, WOAI, "Student Arrested for Plotting Attack Against High School," February 15, 2010, http://www.woai.com/news/local/story/Student-arrested-for-plotting-attack-against-high/I6d_yPrPjUenlu5DnyGrGg.csp.
2. ABC News – KSAT, "Alleged School Shooting Plot Foiled," February 15, 2010, <http://www.ksat.com/news/22570319/detail.html#>.

Case #206

May 4, 2009: Two high school students were arrested for plotting to randomly shoot classmates at Covina High School during a school assembly. Authorities discovered two loaded handguns as well as violent drawings at the home of one of the teenagers. The boys admitted to having brought their weapons to the school three times in the past.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Covina High School in West Covina, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one Glock .40-caliber and one Smith & Wesson .357-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a man reported the theft of two handguns from his home, enabling police to trace the theft to the victim's stepson.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: 2 Teens were Plotting School Shooting," May 1, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30526342/>.
2. KTLA.com, "Local Teens Plead Not Guilty in School Shootings," May 4, 2009, <http://www.ktla.com/news/local/ktla-covina-guns-school,0,5371888.story>.

Case #207

April 9, 2009: During an investigation of two teenagers who were arrested in New Mexico on suspicion of burglary, authorities uncovered the teenagers' plans for a shooting attack at Dove Creek High School. The teenagers planned to shoot students, the school principal, the superintendant, the County Sheriff, and the Undersheriff. A stash of weapons was discovered in one of the teenagers' home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dove Creek High School in Colorado
Attacker Information:	Cody Barr (19/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Over 9
Weapon Information:	7 rifles; handguns (.22-caliber); shotguns; rifle (M1 carbine); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when one of the suspects informed his family about the plot.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Sheriff: Teen Planned School Shooting," April 9, 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/09/national/main4933195.shtml>.
2. Associated Press, Denver Post, "2 Teens Arrested in Shooting Plot at Dove Creek School," April 09, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_12109381.

Case #208

April 8, 2009: Three high school students were arrested for plotting to bomb their high school after police discovered 28 pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, shotguns, violent videos, and a hit-list of students' names at one of the teenagers' home. Two years prior, one of the teenagers had served three months of supervised probation for possessing a hoax explosive device around the date of the Columbine High School attack anniversary.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Landstown High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia

Attacker Information:

Phillip Bay (17/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

Over 30

Weapon Information:

2 shotguns; other

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when the suspects' friend alerted authorities of their plan to bomb the school.

Sources:

1. Kathy Adams and Shawn Day, Virginia Pilot, "Beach Teen Charged with Making Explosives in Plot on School," April 8, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/04/beach-teen-charged-making-explosives-plot-school>.
2. Kathy Adams, Virginia Pilot, "More Arrests Made in Possible Bomb Plot at Va. Beach School," April 18, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/04/more-arrests-made-possible-bomb-plot-va-beach-school>.
3. Shawn Day, Virginia Pilot, "Sanity is at Issue in case of Landstown Bomb Plot Teen," August 27, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/08/sanity-issue-case-landstown-bomb-plot-teen>.

Case #209

December 8, 2008: Gregory Nason was arrested for plotting to shoot students at Blue Mountain High School. Police found multiple weapons, replica guns, a gas mask, a fake hand grenade, shooting gloves, replica explosive devices and paramilitary clothing at his home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Blue Mountain High School in North Manheim, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Gregory N. Nason (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	5
Weapon Information:	2 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when several students informed school officials that they suspected Nason might conduct a school shooting.

Sources:

1. Mike Urban, ReadingEagle.com, "Student Charged in Planned Assault at Blue Mountain High School after Arms Cache is Found," December 19, 2008, <http://readingeagle.com/article.aspx?id=118243>.
2. Chris A. Courogen, Patriot News, "Schuylkill County Student Charged with Planning School Shooting," December 19, 2008, http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2008/12/schuylkill_county_student_char.html.

Case #210

December 4, 2008: Richard Yanis was arrested after stealing three guns and hundreds of rounds of ammunition from his father. Reports state that Yanis's intention was to conduct a shooting spree at Pottstown High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pottstown High School in Montco, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Richard Yanis (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one Smith & Wesson .357 caliber revolver; one Smith & Wesson .22 caliber semi-automatic; one Colt .45 caliber semi-automatic)

Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect's father reported three handguns stolen from a secured gun locker in his basement. Simultaneously, a school friend of the suspect alerted a teacher about his friend's weapons. The teacher immediately contacted authorities.

Sources:

1. CNN, "Pennsylvania Teen Charged with Plotting to Kill School Enemies," December 9, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/09/school.plot/index.html>.
2. ABC Local, "Alleged Plot Foiled at Pottstown H.S.," January 7, 2009, <http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=6545748>.

Case #211

October 29, 2008: Five teenage boys were arrested for plotting to shoot students, teachers, and staff at Big Bear High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Big Bear High School in Big Bear, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when fellow students overheard the plans and alerted school authorities.

Source:

1. David Kelly, Los Angeles Times, "Teens Allegedly Plotted Shooting," October 31, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/31/local/me-briefs31.S4>.

Case #212

March 6, 2008: A high school student was arrested when his plot to murder classmates and teachers in New Jersey was foiled by fellow students. Reports state that the student had begun surveying school security and mapping escape routes. The student had also drafted a hit-list of intended victims.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Belvidere High School in Belvidere, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Unknown (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect warned classmates about a hit-list he had drafted. Worried students notified school administrators.

Sources:

1. Laura Batchelor, CNN, "Student's School Shooting Plot Foiled, Police Say," March 6, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/06/nj.school.plot/index.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS News, "Alleged 'Plot to Kill' Foiled at N.J. School," March 6, 2008, <http://cbs3.com/topstories/Plot.to.Kill.2.670663.html>.

Case #213

November 28, 2007: Three high school students were arrested for planning to attack their school on the 11th anniversary of the Columbine High School shooting attacks.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Arlington High School in Lagrangeville, New York
Attacker Information:	Patrick Quigley (16/M); Joseph Saia (16/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when a student saw a MySpace posting detailing the attack and reported it to the high school principal.

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Daily News, "Hudson Valley High Students Arrested, Charged with Plotting School Attack, November 28, 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/11/28/2007-11-28_hudson_valley_high_students_arrested_cha.html.

Case #214

November 18, 2007: Two teenagers were arrested for planning an attack on their high school on the anniversary of a 2006 school shooting in Germany. After being questioned by law enforcement, one of the youths committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a train. The other suspect confessed to the plot. Air guns, crossbows and a possible hit-list of intended victims were discovered in one of the suspects' home.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Georg-Buechner Gymnasium in Cologne, Germany

Attacker Information:

Unknown (17/M); unknown (18/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

Unknown

Weapon Information:

Other

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when classmates informed school authorities that the suspects were studying a website containing images of the Columbine massacre. One of the suspects had also warned several students of an imminent attack.

Sources:

1. BBC News, "Germany 'Fails School Massacre,'" November 19, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7101689.stm>.
2. CNN, "Attack on German High School Prevented, Police Say," November 18, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/18/germany.school.plot/index.html>.

Case #215

October 12, 2007: Dillon Cossey was arrested for stockpiling weapons and plotting a school attack. Police found more than 35 weapons, a bomb-making book and violent journals and videos of the 1999 Columbine High School shooting in Cossey's bedroom. Reports state that Cossey was angry about being bullied at his school and told a friend that he wanted to stage an attack similar to the assault on Columbine High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Plymouth Whitemarsh High School in Norristown, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Dillon Cossey (14/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Over 35
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber); 2 rifles (one .22-caliber and one 9-millimeter semi-automatic); 30 rifle (air-powered); rifle (9-millimeter semi-automatic with a laser scope)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a high school student informed police officers of the impending attack.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Mother Bought Guns for Pennsylvania Boy Charged with School Plot," October 12, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,301379,00.html>.
2. David Schoetz and Russell Goldman, ABC News, "Online, Teens 'Idolized Columbine Killers,'" November 13, 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3848474&page=1>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "14-year-old Admits to Illegally Stockpiling Guns," October 26, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21490224/wid/6448213/>.
4. Associated Press, CBS News, "Pa. Student Admits Stockpiling Weapons," October 26, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/26/national/main3414966.shtml?source=related_story.

Case #216

July 13, 2007: Two teenagers were arrested for planning an assault at the Connetquot High School in Long Island on the anniversary of the Columbine High School rampage. The teenagers detailed their plot in journals and a video in which they identified several

victims by name. The teenagers also considered throwing bombs in the McDonald's where they worked and made numerous unsuccessful attempts to purchase weapons.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connetquot High School in Long Island, New York
Attacker Information:	Michael McDonough (17/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one Uzi automatic one AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a journal belonging to one of the suspects was turned over to authorities after it was discovered by a customer in a McDonald's parking lot. The journal contained numerous threats and detailed plans to attack the school.

Sources:

1. Winnie Hu, New York Times, "Long Island Teenagers Are Accused in Attack Plot on a School," July 14, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/14/nyregion/14school.html>.
2. David Schoetz, ABC News, "Samaritan Helps Foil Columbine-Style Shooting," July 13, 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=3374965&page=1>.
3. Verena Dobnik, USA Today, "2 NY Teens Charged with School Plot," July 14, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-13-3180234222_x.htm.
4. Associated Press, USA Today, "Boy, 15 Pleads Guilty to School Plot," August 1, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-08-01-3180234222_x.htm.

Case #217

September 21, 2006: Three high school seniors were arrested for plotting an attack on their high school. Investigators discovered an arsenal of guns and bombs in the suspects' homes. Reports state that the teenagers spent two years planning the attack because they were angry over being disrespected by female students. Authorities also confiscated a black leather trench coat and a book titled "Bully: A True Story of High School Revenge."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	East High School in Green Bay, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	William Cornell (17/M); Shawn Sturtz, (17/M); Bradley Netwal (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; rifles; handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a friend of the suspects informed an associate principal of the plan.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "3 Wisconsin Teens Charged in Planned School-Shooting Plot," September 22, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,215145,00.html>.
2. Corinthia McCoy, Green Bay Press Gazette, "Cornell gets Six Years in Prison for East High Bomb Plot," October 2, 2007, <http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/article/20071002/GPG0101/710020536/Cornell-gets-six-years-in-prison-for-East-High-bomb-plot>.

Case #218

April 25, 2006: Brian Michael Evans was arrested for plotting a shooting attack on his high school. Investigators discovered weapons and a book containing directions to make explosives in Evans's home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Rogers High School in Puyallup, Washington
Attacker Information:	Brian Michael Evans (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	5
Weapon Information:	2 rifles; 2 handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student who had received an online message from Evans outlining his shooting plans alerted school authorities.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Student Plotting Washington School Shooting Charged," April 25, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193003,00.html>.

2. Christine Lagorio, CBS News, "School Plot Stopped in Washington," April 25, 2006, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/25/national/main1541731.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody>.

Case #219

April 24, 2006: A group of six seventh-graders were arrested for planning an attack on their middle school. The students intended to cut off power and telephone service to their school and kill classmates and faculty with guns and knives. Reports state that the students claimed to have been bullied by other students and sought to exact revenge.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	North Pole Middle School in Anchorage, Alaska
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student informed a parent about rumors that were circulating in school regarding the plot; the parent alerted police.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "North Pole Unnerved by Alleged Plot to Kill Students," April 25, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,192981,00.html>.
2. Associated Press, Sydney Morning Herald, "School Slaughter Plot Foiled in Alaska," April 23, 2006, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/school-slaughter-plot-foiled-in-alaska/2006/04/23/1145730804837.html>.

Case #220

April 20, 2006: Five students were arrested hours before they planned to carry out a shooting spree on their school campus. Police were notified about a hit-list as well as a message on MySpace that warned students to wear bullet proof vests and flak jackets to school on April 20 – the anniversary of the Columbine High School massacre. Weapons

and coded messages were discovered in the bedroom of one suspect and documents about firearms and references to Armageddon were found in two suspects' school lockers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Riverton High School in Riverton, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M);
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when school officials were notified about a threatening message on one of the suspects' MySpace page. A teenager who chatted with one of the suspects on MySpace received a list of a dozen potential victims from the suspect and immediately notified law enforcement.

Sources:

1. Christine Lagorio, CBS News, "Kansas School Shooting Plot Foiled," April 20, 2006, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/20/national/main1524759.shtml>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "5 Kan. Students Arrested in Alleged Plot," April 21, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-20-kansas_x.htm.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Charges Mulled in Alleged School Shooting Plot," April 23, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12409480/>.

Case #221

April 10, 2006: Four students were arrested for plotting to shoot fellow students, teachers and residents of their community. The students planned to start a food fight during school lunch to cause a distraction and then begin executing students and teachers from a hit-list before continuing their shooting rampage off-campus. The students surveyed school security and mapped escape routes but failed to obtain any weapons before school officials were alerted to the plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Winslow Township High School in Camden, New Jersey

Attacker Information:	Edwin DeLeon, (15/M); Peter Cunningham (16/M); David Cruz Jr. (16/M); James Whelan (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	N/A
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the principal at Winslow Township High School heard about the alleged plot and alerted police.

Sources:

1. Laura Batchelor, CNN, "Student's School Shooting Plot Foiled, Police Say," March 6, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/06/nj.school.plot/index.html>.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "New Jersey Teen Gets 6 Years in Prison for School Shooting Plot," October 6, 2006, <http://origin.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,218362,00.html>.
3. Associated Press, New York Times, "Camden: Teenagers Admit to Shooting Plan," August 11, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/nyregion/11mbrfs-008.html>.
4. Troy Graham, Philadelphia Inquirer "Boy, 15 to Get 5 Years in School Plot," July 12, 2006, <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-148112791/boy-16-get-5.html>.

Case #222

December 15, 2005: Two teenage friends were arrested for plotting an attack on their high school. The teenagers obtained ammunition and improvised explosive devices which they practiced detonating in the Antelope Valley Desert.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Quartz Hill High School in Quartz Hill, California
Attacker Information:	Johnny Alvarez Cases (17/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student who overheard the suspects discussing their plans

to cut her arms and legs off during the attack alerted the assistant principal.

Sources:

3. Jonathan Abrams, Los Angeles Times, "Columbine II? Behind the Alleged Plot," May 20, 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/20/local/me-quartz20>.
4. Associated Press, FOX News, "Officials: Students Plotted Attack on California High School," May 21, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196318,00.html>.

Case #223

September 21, 2005: Two boys were arrested for planning a shooting at their middle school. The students planned to shoot a school resource officer before randomly firing on students. One of the suspects had already caught the attention of authorities after firing a handgun in his bedroom.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pickens Middle School in Pickens, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Unknown (11/M); unknown (12/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic and one .25-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	A suspect's sister alerted her parents about her brother's plot.

Source:

1. Charmaine Smith, Anderson Independent-Mail, "No Motive Apparent in Foiled School Shooting," September 21, 2005, <http://www.independentmail.com/news/2005/sep/21/no-motive-apparent-in-foiled-school-shooting/>.

Case #224

March 16, 2005: Two students were arrested for plotting to open fire in their high school. Upon searching the boys' homes, authorities discovered a rifle as well as maps and notes detailing the plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	St. John Bosco High School in Bellflower, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when one of the suspects confided in a school counselor and admitted to the plot.

Source:

1. Nicholas Shields, Los Angeles Times, "2 Boys Charged in Plot," March 16, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/16/local/me-plot16>.

Case #225

February 10, 2004: Two high school students were arrested for plotting to shoot fellow students and detonate explosive devices on campus. The students had planned to burglarize a store, obtain weapons, and use those weapons to shoot fellow students. One of the teenagers obtained a map of the school and stole his parents' .22-caliber rifle from their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Laguna Creek High School in Elk Grove, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a parent overheard a conversation about the plot and alerted authorities.

Sources:

1. Cynthia Daniels, Los Angeles Times, "Teen Charged in Attack Plot at High School," February 12, 2004, <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/12/local/me-plot12>.
2. KCRA.com, "Students Arrested In Alleged Campus Plot," February 11, 2004, <http://www.kcra.com/news/2837756/detail.html>.

Case #226

November 2001: Three teenagers were arrested after they confessed to planning a school attack that would surpass the death toll at the Columbine High School massacre. The students called themselves the Trenchcoat Mafia, the name used by the Columbine High School attackers, and planned to blow up the school and then gun down fleeing teachers and students. They were caught with a stash of ammunition, knives, Nazi photographs, bomb-making recipes and drug paraphernalia at their homes. In addition, a school janitor found a letter outlining plans for an attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	New Bedford High School in New Bedford, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Eric McKeehan (17/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student alerted authorities to the plot after hearing a rumor on campus about an imminent shooting.

Sources:

1. Fox Butterfield and Robert D. McFadden, New York Times, "3 Teenagers Held in Plot at Massachusetts School," November 26, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/26/us/3-teenagers-held-in-plot-at-massachusetts-school.html>.
2. Jim Avila, Reynolds Holding, Teri Whitcraft and Beth Tribolet, ABC News, "School Shooter: 'I Didn't Realize' They Would Die," June 11, 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5040342>.
3. ABC News Online, "US Students Charged with School Massacre Plot," November 27, 2001, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200111/s426269.htm>.

Case #227

February 14, 2001: Jeremy Getman was arrested after carrying a cache of weapons into his school. His bag contained firearms, pipe bombs, a propane tank and a bag full of ammunition. Reports state that Getman planned to kill as many of his classmates and teachers as possible.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Southside High School in Elmira, New York

Attacker Information:	Jeremy Getman (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	20
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.22-caliber); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student received a threatening note from the suspect claiming that he had a gun. She then alerted authorities to the suspect's cache of weapons.

Source:

1. CBS News, "Arsenal in a Gym Bag," February 15, 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/02/15/national/main272129.shtml>.

Case #228

February 8, 2001: Alexander Vukodinovich, Scott William Parent and Chad Meininger were arrested for plotting an attack on their junior high school. One of the boys admitted to having shown drawings of the planned attack to several students. Reports state that the teenagers had discussed trying to replicate the Columbine High School attacks at their school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Preston Junior High School in Fort Collins, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Alexander Vukodinovich (14/M); Scott William Parent (14/M); Chad Meininger (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	6
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one TEC-9 semi-automatic and one .38-caliber); 2 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when four girls alerted police to a phone conversation they had with one of the suspects in which he threatened their lives and discussed the plot.

Source:

1. Kevin Vaughan and Deborah Frazier, Rocky Mountain News, "'Columbine' Talk Escaped Adults," February 9, 2001,

<http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2001/feb/09/columbine-talk-escaped-adults/>.

Case #229

February 6, 2001: Three students were arrested for planning an attack on their high school. Upon searching their homes, police discovered firearms, 400 rounds of ammunition, bomb making materials, a floor plan of their high school, Nazi drawings and black trench coats similar to those worn by the Columbine High School gunmen.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Royal Valley High in Hoyt, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (17/M); unknown (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (modified assault); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student notified school officials after hearing rumors about the students' alleged plan.

Source:

1. ABC News, "In Kansas Police Stop School Attack," February 6, 2001,
<http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94120&page=1>.

Case #230

January 29, 2001: Al DeGuzman was arrested for planning to attack his community college. Reports state that DeGuzman spent two years crafting his attack plan. Police discovered a 19-minute audiotape detailing DeGuzman's plot to kill as many people at the college as possible.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	De Anza Community College in Cupertino, California
Attacker Information:	Al DeGuzman (19/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	54
Weapon Information:	3 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when a drugstore photo clerk notified police that a customer had developed photos of himself surrounded by guns and bombs.

Sources:

1. Johanna McGeary, Time Magazine, "The Copycat?" February 4, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,97997,00.html>.
2. Bay City News, "Man who Planned Massacre at De Anza College Commits Suicide," August 9, 2004, http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-08-09/news/17437299_1_prison-officials-sentence-folsom.
3. Maria Alicia Gaura, Matthew B. Stannard and Stacy Fin, San Francisco Chronicle, "De Anza College Bloodbath Foiled," January 31, 2001, http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-01-31/news/17582292_1_miceli-al-deguzman-bombs.
4. May Wong, ABC News, "Police Thwart 'Columbine-Style' Campus Assault," January 30, 2001, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94253&page=1>.

Case #231

April 23, 1999: Four boys were arrested for plotting to attack their junior high school with guns and explosives. Authorities discovered gunpowder and bomb-making instructions in the suspects' homes. Reports state that the students drafted a list of teachers and students they wished to target.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Danforth Junior High School in Wimberley, Texas

Attacker Information:

Unknown (14/M); unknown (14/M);
unknown (14/M); unknown (14/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

N/A

Weapon Information:

N/A

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Students alerted authorities after overhearing the suspects bragging about their planned attack.

Sources:

1. Tammerlin Drummond, Hilary Hylton, Austin and Andrew Purvis, Time Magazine, "Battling the Columbine Copycats," May 10, 1999, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,990949,00.html>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "Five Texas Teens Charged in Assault Plot," April 24, 1999, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/colo/colo64.htm>.

Case #232

November 16, 1998: Five teenagers were arrested for plotting to kill staff members and students at their high school. Reports state that the teenagers planned on using guns stolen from one of the suspects' home and intended to target people who had bullied them in school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Burlington High School in Burlington, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	N/A
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the girlfriend of a suspect told her parents about the alleged plot. Rumors of the plot had been circulating among the student body after one of the suspects told certain individuals not to be in school on the day of the proposed attack.

Sources:

1. Pam Belluck, New York Times, "Students Accused of Plotting Mass Slayings," November 17, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/17/us/students-accused-of-plotting-mass-slaying.html>.
2. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Teens Accused in School Murder Plot," November 17, 1998, <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/nov/17/news/mn-43830>.

Case #233

October 7, 1997: Six teenagers were arrested in Mississippi for plotting to kill classmates at their high school. The arrest came nearly a week after their friend, Luke Woodham, killed two students and wounded seven in a shooting at the same school. The six students planned to terrorize the school by starting fires, cutting telephone lines and killing classmates. Reports state that they then planned to flee to Louisiana, Mexico and Cuba. Several suspects documented their plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Marshall Grant Boyette Jr. (18/M); Donald Brooks Jr. (17/M); Justin Sledge (16/M), Wesley Brownell (17/M); Daniel Thompson (16/M); Delbert Shaw (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when police were advised by students and parents to investigate Woodham's friends following his attack. One particular suspect came to the attention of authorities for publicly defending Woodham during a candlelight vigil for victims of Woodham's shooting rampage.

Sources:

1. Kevin Sack, New York Times, "Southern Town Stunned by Arrests in Murder Plot," October 9, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/09/us/southern-town-stunned-by-arrests-in-murder-plot.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Los Angeles Times, "6 Teenagers Charged with Murder Plot," October 8, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/08/news/mn-40448>.

OTHER

Case #234

October 4, 2010: Clifford Miller Jr. opened fire throughout his neighborhood during a 13-minute shooting spree, killing his father and wounding five others. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	5
Location Information:	Gainesville neighborhood, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clifford Miller Jr. (24/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Fla. Gunman Kills Father, Self, Wounds 5," October 5, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39509403/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.
2. Chad Smith, Cindy Swirko & Karen Voyles, Gainesville Sun, "Details Emerge About Gunman in Shooting," October 6, 2010, <http://www.gainesville.com/article/20101006/ARTICLES/101009671>.

Case #235

September 19, 2010: Sabine Radmacher opened fire in the gynecology unit of St. Elisabeth Hospital in Germany, killing a nurse and wounding three other people, including a police officer. Radmacher killed her estranged husband and son at their apartment across the street minutes before the attack at the hospital.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Elisabeth Hospital in Lorrach, Germany
Attacker Information:	Sabine Radmacher (41/F)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Allan Hall, News.Scotman.com, “Woman Who Opened Fire at Hospital Had Killed Family,” September 21, 2010, <http://news.scotsman.com/world/Woman-who-opened-fire-at.6541415.jp>.
2. BBC News, “Fatal Shooting at German Hospital,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11366024>.

Case #236

September 19, 2010: Two gunmen opened fire on tourists at a 17th century New Delhi mosque, wounding two people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jama Masjid Mosque in New Delhi, India
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attacker fled

Sources:

1. Jim Yardley and Hari Kumar, New York Times, “Taiwanese Tourists Shot in New Delhi,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/world/asia/20delhi.html>.
2. Associated Press, BBC News, “Tourists Shot Near Delhi Mosque,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11361549>.

Case #237

August 24, 2010: A group of three Al-Shabaab insurgents opened fire at the Muna Hotel in Somalia, killing roughly 30 people and injuring 16 others. The gunmen, who were disguised in government military uniforms, targeted bystanders, hotel staff and armed guards. The insurgents moved throughout different floors in the hotel during the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Muna Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia
Attacker Information:	2
Casualties:	30-33 dead; 16 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (assault)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Sarah Childress, Wall Street Journal, "Militants Kill at Least 31 in Somalia," August 25, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575448932323995708.html>.
2. Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post, "Al-Qaeda-Linked Somali Militants Storm Mogadishu Hotel, Kill at Least 33," August 24, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082403049.html>.
3. Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, "At Least 30 Killed in Somalia Hotel Attack," August 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/world/africa/25somalia.html?_r=4&hp.

Case #238

April 19, 2010: Abdo Ibssa opened fire in the Parkwest Medical Center parking lot, killing one hospital employee and wounding two others. Reports state that Ibssa, who had a history of mental illness, was convinced that a monitoring device had been implanted in him during an appendectomy in 2001.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Parkwest Medical Center in Knoxville, Tennessee
Attacker Information: Abdo Ibssa (38/M)
Casualties: 1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons: 1
Weapon Information: Handgun (.357-caliber magnum revolver)
Closest Relationship to Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Hospital Shooter Thought Doc Implanted Chip," April 20, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/20/national/main6414982.shtml>.
2. Chloe Morrison, Daily Times, "Parkwest Shooter was Mentally Ill, Left Note at Home," April 21, 2010, <http://www.thedailytimes.com/article/20100421/NEWS/304219984>.

Case #239

January 4, 2010: Johnny Wicks opened fire in the lobby of a federal courthouse, killing a security officer and wounding a deputy United States Marshal. Wicks was fatally shot by police. Reports state that the gunman was disgruntled over a reduction in his Social Security benefits.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Federal District Courthouse in Las Vegas, Nevada
Attacker Information:	Johnny Lee Wicks (66/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Steve Friess, New York Times, "Two Killed in Las Vegas Courthouse," January 4, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/us/05vegas.html>.
2. Ashley Powers, Los Angeles Times, "Shootout at Las Vegas courthouse Kills 2," January 4, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/04/nation/la-naw-vegas-shooting5-2010jan05>.

Case #240

November 5, 2009: Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, opened fire at the Fort Hood army base, killing 13 people and wounding 31 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Hood Solider Readiness Center in Killeen, Texas
Attacker Information:	Nidal Malik Hasan (39/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 31 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one FN Herstal 5.7 tactical semi-automatic and one .357-magnum Smith & Wesson revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. James C. McKinley Jr. and James Dao, New York Times, "Fort Hood Gunman Gave Signals Before his Rampage," November 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/us/09reconstruct.html?_r=2&hp.
2. CNN, "Investigators look for Missed Signals in Fort Hood Probe," November 10, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/09/fort.hood.shootings/>.

Case #241

July 2, 2009: Jamie Paredes opened fire at a dental office, killing his wife and wounding three other people. Reports state that Paredes was distraught about his wife seeking a divorce.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Family Dental Care Center in Simi Valley, California
Attacker Information:	Jaime Paredes (29/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS, "Victim ID'd in SoCal Dental Office Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://cbs2.com/local/dental.office.shooting.2.1069067.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS, "1 Dead, 3 Injured in Simi Valley Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://cbs2.com/local/1.Dead.3.2.1068016.html>.
3. Keyt.com, "A suspected Lover's Quarrel Spurred Simi Valley Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://www.keyt.com/news/local/49716897.html>.

Case #242

June 1, 2009: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad opened fire outside an Army recruiting booth, killing a soldier and wounding another. Reports state that Muhammad targeted soldiers because of U.S. policies toward the Muslim world.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	U.S. Army Recruiting Booth in Little Rock, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed (23/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2

Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber); handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Steve Barnes and James Dao, New York Times, "Gunman Kills Soldier Outside Recruiting Station," June 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/us/02recruit.html?_r=1.

Case #243

April 17, 2009: Mario Ramirez opened fire at the hospital where he worked, killing his boss and wounding another person. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Long Beach Memorial Medical Center in Long Beach, California
Attacker Information:	Mario Ramirez (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. James Wagner and Jessica Garrison, Los Angeles Times, "Long Beach Hospital Shootings Make 'no sense'," April 18, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/18/local/me-hospital-shooting18>.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "California Hospital Shooter Described as Family Man," April 17, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30255221/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts.

Case #244

March 29, 2009: Robert Stewart opened fire at a nursing home, killing seven elderly residents and a nurse, and wounding four other people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pinelake Health and Rehab Center in Carthage, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	Robert Stewart (45/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 4 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Shaila Dewan, New York Times, "Alleged Gunamn's Wife Worked at Nursing Home," March 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/us/31shooting.html?_r=2&scp=3&sq=carthage shooting&st=cse.

Case #245

March 21, 2009: Lovelle Mixon opened fire near a police substation, killing four police officers and wounding another. Mixon was on parole at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Police station in Oakland, California
Attacker Information:	Lovelle Mixon (26/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Demian Bulwa and Jaxon Van Derbeken, San Francisco Chronicle, "Killer of 4 Officers Wanted to Avoid Prison," March 23, 2009, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/23/MNH016L58R.DTL>.
2. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, San Francisco Chronicle, "Doomed SWAT Sergeants Didn't Expect an AK-47," March 23, 2009, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/22/BAV116KEU0.DTL>.

Case #246

February 14, 2009: Frank Garcia opened fire at his former workplace, killing a nurse and a bystander. Reports state that Garcia, who worked at the hospital as a nursing supervisor before being fired, was angry at co-workers who had accused him of sexual harassment. Earlier in the day, Garcia also killed another former co-worker and her husband in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Lakeside Memorial Hospital in Brockport, New York
Attacker Information:	Frank Garcia (35/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Ben Dobbin, Huffington Post, "Frank Garcia Guilty of Murder Rampage," December 16, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/16/frank-garcia-guilty-of-mu_n_394172.html.
2. Ben Dobbin, Huffington Post, "Frank Garcia Guilty: Valentine's Day Killer Convicted," November 30, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/01/frank-garcia-guilty-valen_n_375066.html.

Case #247

July 27, 2008: Jim D. Adkisson opened fire at a church during a children's performance of the musical "Annie," killing two people and wounding seven others. Adkisson, an anti-liberal activist, left a suicide note in his car explaining his motives for the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tennessee Valley Unitarian Church in Knoxville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Jim D. Adkisson (58/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Shaila Dewan, New York Times, "Hatred Said to Motivate Tenn. Shooter," July 28, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/us/28shooting.html>.
2. J.J. Stambaugh, Knoxville.com, "Takedown of Alleged Shooter Recounted," July 29, 2008, <http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/29/takedown-alleged-shooter-recounted/>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Killer Targeted Church for Liberal Views," July 28, 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25872864>.

Case #248

February 7, 2008: Charles Lee “Cookie” Thornton opened fire on Kirkwood’s City Council, killing five people and wounding two others. Thornton began his attack by fatally shooting a police sergeant outside City Hall. He then grabbed the sergeant’s gun, and continued his shooting spree inside the council chambers. Reports state that Thornton had a history of disputes with the city government and had been arrested twice at council meetings prior to the attack. The gunman left a suicide note.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Hall in Kirkwood, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Charles Lee Thornton (50/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Times Online, “Missouri Man, Charles Lee Thornton, Shoots Dead Five in Row Over Kirkwood Council Fines,” February 8, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article3333114.ece.
2. CBS News, “Six Dead in Missouri City Council Shooting,” February 8, 2008, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/07/national/main3805672.shtml>.
3. Monica Davey, New York Times, “Gunman Kills 5 People at City Council Meeting,” February 8, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/us/08missouri.html>.

Case #249

May 20, 2007: Jason Hamilton opened fired at a courthouse, killing a police officer and wounding a sheriff's deputy and a bystander. Hamilton then killed a caretaker in a nearby church.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Latah County Courthouse and First Presbyterian Church in Moscow, Idaho
Attacker Information:	Jason Hamilton (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one Springfield M-1A and one AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Bill Loftus and William Yardley, New York Times, "Idaho Gunman Also Killed Wife, Police Say," May 22, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/us/22sniper.html>.
2. John K. Wiley, Fox News, "Police Probe Idaho Shooter's Arsenal," May 23, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2007May23/0,4675,IdahoShootings,00.html.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Idaho Police Officer Injured in Shooting Dies," May 21, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18766089/>.

Case #250

May 9, 2005: Gregory Gray opened fire at his former workplace, killing a former co-worker. An employee tackled and subdued Gray as he reached for his second gun. Gray was fired from the mental health center a year prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Conard Community Service Center in San Francisco, California
Attacker Information: Gregory Gary (54/M)
Casualties: 1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons: 1
Weapon Information: Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Source:

1. Jaxon Van Derbeken and Wyatt Buchanan, San Francisco Chronicle, "Colleagues Recall Clashes with man Held in Slaying," May 18, 2005,
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/05/18/BAGSLCQQ1L1.DTL>.

Case #251

February 25, 2005: A gunman opened fire at his workplace, killing his boss and another employee. The maintenance worker began his attack after being reprimanded for arriving late to work.

Number of Attack Locations: 1

Location Information:	Bureau of Street Services maintenance yard in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Hector Becerra, Los Angeles Times, "L.A. River Marker System is Getting Back on Track," November 16, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/16/local/me-river16>.
2. Natasha Lee, Los Angeles Times, "2 Are Shot to Death at Maintenance Yard," February 25, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/25/local/me-double25>.

Case #252

May 7, 2004: Jean Delagrave opened fire at his workplace, killing one person and wounding two others. Delagrave surrendered to law enforcement shortly after the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Liquiterminals Ltd. Trucking facility in Mississauga, Canada
Attacker Information:	Jean Delagrave (49/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Canadian Press, CTV.ca, "Suspect in Workplace Shooting Has Bail Hearing," May 08, 2004, http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/an/plocal/CTVNews/20040508/workplace_shooting_040508/20040508/?hub=TorontoHome.
2. Bob Mitchell, The Star, "Family Wants Killer in Maximum Security," January 24, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/article/174228>.

Case #253

November 6, 2003: Tom West opened fire at his former workplace, killing two people and wounding three others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Watkins Motor Lines in West Chester, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Tom West (50/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. ABC News, "Two Dead, Three Wounded in Ohio Shooting," November 6, 2003, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=90171&page=1>.

Case #254

October 7, 2003: Michael Gardner opened fire at his workplace, targeting employees and responding police officers. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Gardner surrendered when law enforcement arrived on scene. Gardner had been taking medication for mental health issues at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alvin C. York Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Michael Gardner (50/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Rob Johnson, Tennessean, "VA Pharmacist Treated Troubled Man," March 7, 2005, <http://www.hwyllaw.com/CM/Articles/VA-pharmacist-treated-troubled-man.pdf>.
2. Ian Demsky, Tennessean, "Friends Support Suspect in Shooting at VA Hospital," October 25, 2003, <http://www.hwyllaw.com/CM/Articles/Friends-support-suspect-in-shooting-at-VA-hospital.pdf>.

Case #255

October 5, 2003: Sheila W. Chaney Wilson opened fire at an Atlanta church before Sunday morning services, killing her mother and the minister. She then committed suicide. Wilson had recently been taken out of a mental health facility.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Turner Monumental AME Church in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Sheila W. Chaney Wilson (43/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.44-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Lauren Johnston, CBS News, "Murder-Suicide in Atlanta Church," October 6, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/19/national/main574325.shtml>.
2. Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, "Pastor and 2 Others Are Killed in Shooting at Atlanta Church," October 6, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/06/us/pastor-and-2-others-are-killed-in-shooting-at-atlanta-church.html>.

Case #256

July 23, 2003: Othniel Askew opened fire at City Hall in New York City, killing a city councilman. Askew was a political rival of the victim. Authorities found extra cartridges in the Askew's socks.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Hall in New York, New York
Attacker Information:	Othniel Askew (31/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Smith & Wesson)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "NYC Councilman Killed by Political Rival," July 24, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/07/23/ny.shooting/>.

Case #257

October 2 2002: John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo opened fire on random targets during a three-week sniper rampage along Interstate 95 around the Virginia and Washington, D.C. Metro area.

Number of Attack Locations:	14
Location Information:	Various locations in the Washington, D.C. metro area
Attacker Information:	John Allen Muhammad (42/M); Lee Boyd Malvo (16/M)
Casualties:	10 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Bushmaster XM-15); handgun (.223-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	October 22, 2002
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. J.J. Stambaugh, Knoxnews.com, "Takedown of Alleged Shooter Recounted," July 29, 2008, <http://m.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/29/takedown-alleged-shooter-recounted/>.
2. Liza Porteus, Fox News, "Timeline: Tracking the Sniper's Trail," October 29, 2002, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,66630,00.html>.

Case #258

July 8, 2002: Patrick Gott opened fire in the Louis Armstrong International Airport, killing one person and wounding another. Reports state that Gott, a former Marine, was angry about bystanders ridiculing his turban.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Louis Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Patrick Gott (43/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, CBS News, "Cops: Airport Shooter Acted Alone," May 23, 2002,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/23/national/main509955.shtml>.
2. Free Republic, "Man Declared Insane in N.O. Airport Killing," July 11, 2005,
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1440602/posts>.

Case #259

July 4, 2002: Hesham Mohamed Hadayet opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport, killing two people and wounding four others. Hadayet began his attack while standing in line at the ticket counter of Israel's El-Al Airlines.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Los Angeles International Airport in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Hesham Mohamed Hadayet (41/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "Los Angeles Airport Shooting Kills 3," July 5, 2002,
<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/>.

Case #260

March 27, 2002: Richard Durn opened fire at a meeting of councilors in Nanterre Town Hall, killing eight counselors and wounding 19 other people. Durn died the following day after leaping from a police station window during questioning. Police officers discovered a 13-page suicide note at Mr. Durn's home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Nanterre Town Hall in Nanterre, France
Attacker Information:	Richard Durn (33/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one semi-automatic and one .357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Suzanne Daley, New York Times, "Man Who Fatally Shot 8 French Officials Jumps to His Death," March 29, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/29/world/man-who-fatally-shot-8-french-officials-jumps-to-his-death.html?pagewanted=2>.
2. CNN, "Paris Killer Leap: Police Cleared," April 6, 2002, http://articles.cnn.com/2002-04-06/world/police.shooting_1_apparent-suicide-richard-durn-licence?_s=PM:europa.
3. BBC News, "Eight Dead in Paris Shooting," March 27, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1895751.stm>.

Case #261

September 9, 2001: Joseph Ferguson opened fire at his workplace, killing five people, including his girlfriend, and wounding two others. The attack occurred a week after Ferguson had been suspended from his job as a security guard. During the 24-hour incident, Ferguson took hostages and left behind a suicide video explaining the motives behind his attack. The attack concluded when Ferguson committed suicide amidst a standoff with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	City equipment yard and City marina in Sacramento, California
Attacker Information:	Joseph Ferguson (20/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	1 rifle (AK-47); 1 handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	September 10, 2001
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Eric Baily and Robin Fields, Los Angeles Times, "Shootout Vowed in Chilling Video," September 11, 2001, <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/11/news/mn-44550>.
2. Andrew Gumbel, The Independent, "Gunamn's Suicide Ends Sacramento Rampage," September 11, 2001, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/gunmans-suicide-ends-sacramento-rampage-668920.html>.
3. New York Times, "Suspect Sought in Killings of 4 in Sacramento," September 9, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/10/us/suspect-sought-in-killings-of-4-in-sacramento.html>.

4. CNN, "Gunman was 'Hellbent on Killing More,'" September 11, 2001,
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/10/sacramento.shooting/index.html>.

Case #262

July 23, 2001: Keith Adams opened fire at a construction site where he was employed, killing a co-worker and wounding another. Police recovered more than 80 live rounds from Adam's truck.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Construction site in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida
Attacker Information:	Keith James Adams (28/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Bob Markey, Sun Sentinel, "Shooting Victim Battles Serious Injuries to Leg," August 1, 2001, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-08-01/news/0108010125_1_co-worker-assault-rifle-keith-adams.
2. BNET, "Construction Worker Opens Fire; 1 Dead," July 24, 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4179/is_20010724/ai_n11768176/.

Case #263

December 30, 1999: Silvio Izquierdo-Leyva opened fire at the Radisson Hotel where he was employed, killing four co-workers and wounding three others. Izquierdo-Leyva then killed a fifth person who would not give him her car.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Radisson Bay Harbor Hotel in Tampa, Florida
Attacker Information:	Silvio Izquierdo-Leyva (38/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter semi-automatic and one .38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Christopher Goffard, St. Petersburg Times, "He Killed ... For No Reason," April 18, 2002,
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/04/18/TampaBay/_He_killed_for_no_re.shtml.
2. Law Enforcement News, "Shooting Gallery," December 15/31, 1999,
<http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/1999/12.30/gallery.html>.

Case #264

November 4, 1999: Kevin Cruz opened fire at a shipyard, killing two people and wounding two others. Cruz fled the scene and was arrested months later.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Northlake Shipyard in Seattle, Washington
Attacker Information:	Kevin Cruz (29/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Elizabeth Murtaugh, Associated Press, "Cruz Gets Life in Prison for Shipyard Slayings," March 8, 2002,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=20020308&slug=webcruz08>.
2. Nancy Bartley, The Seattle Times, "Testimony Begins in Trial for '99 Shipyard Slayings; Victim Reported 'Threats,'" January 3, 2002,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=20020103&slug=cruz03m>.
3. Mike Carter, Steve Miletich, Nancy Bartley, and Dave Birkland, The Seattle Times, "Manhunt in Seattle – Shooting Not Random – Killer Had a Target, Police Say," November 4, 1999,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=19991104&slug=2993178>.

Case #265

September 14, 1999: Dung Trinh opened fire at a hospital, killing three employees. He was disarmed by an employee of the hospital. Reports state that Trinh was distraught over his mother's death and intended to kill his mother's nurse.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	West Anaheim Medical Center in Anaheim, California
Attacker Information:	Dung Trinh (43/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (revolver); handgun (revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CBS News, "3 Dead in Hospital Shooting," September 14, 1999, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/09/14/national/main11932.shtml>.
2. Jack Leonard and Scott Gold, Los Angeles Times, "Police Study Motives for Hospital Shooting," September 16, 1999, <http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/16/local/me-10747/2>.
3. City of Anaheim, "Anaheim Police Department History: 1990," <http://www.anaheim.net/article.asp?id=674>.

Case #266

August 12, 1999: Buford O'Neal Furrow Jr. opened fire at a day care center in the North Valley Jewish Community Center, injuring five people. Furrow then shot and killed a letter carrier after leaving the community center. Furrow had an extensive criminal record prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jewish Community Center in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Buford O'Neal Furrow, Jr. (38/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AR 15); submachine gun (Uzi); Handgun (Glock 9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Timothy Egan, New York Times, "Racist Shootings Test Limits of Health System, and Laws," August 14, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/14/us/racist-shootings-test-limits-of-health-system-and-laws.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.
2. Mike Carter and Keiko Morris, Seattle Times, "Furrow's Gun Originally a Police Weapon," August 13, 1999,

<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19990813&slug=2977109>.

3. Frank Gibney Jr., Pat Dawson, Julie Grace, David Jackson, Michael Krantz, Flora Tartakovsky and Dick Thompson, Time Magazine, "The Kids Got in the Way," <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991784-2,00.html>.

Case #267

April 15, 1999: Sergei Babarin opened fire at a Mormon library, killing two people and wounding five others. He was shot by police. Reports state that Barbarin, a diagnosed schizophrenic, had stopped taking his medication for several months leading up to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Temple Square Mormon Church in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	Sergei S. Barbarin (70/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. James Brooke, New York Times, "3 Are Killed and 5 Hurt in Shootout in Utah City," April 16, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/16/us/3-are-killed-and-5-hurt-in-shootout-in-utah-city.html?scp=4&sq=Sergei Babarin 1999 salt lake&st=cse>.

Case #268

July 24, 1998: Russell Eugene Weston Jr. opened fire at a security checkpoint at the United States Capitol, killing a police officer and wounding a tourist. Weston then fatally shot a plain-clothed detective stationed outside of Representative Tom Delay's office. Weston began his attack when a Capitol police officer confronted Weston about trying to avoid the metal detector.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	United States Capitol Building in Washington, D.C.
Attacker Information:	Russell E. Weston, Jr. (41/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Martin Weil, Washington Post, "Gunman Shoots His Way into Capitol; Two Officers Killed, Suspect Captured," July 25, 1998, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/main072598.htm>.
2. CNN, "Weston: A Man with a History of Mental Illness," July 26, 1998, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9807/26/cap.shooting.weston/>.

Case #269

December 18, 1997: Arturo Reyes Torres opened fire at a California maintenance yard where he was formerly employed, killing four employees and wounding two others. The attack concluded when Torres was killed by police. He had recently been fired from the company for stealing.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Caltrans Maintenance Yard in Orange County, California
Attacker Information:	Arturo Reyes Torres (unknown/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Dismissed Worker Kills 4 and Then is Slain," December 20, 1997, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9907E1DD163EF933A15751C1A961958260>.
2. Nick Anderson, David Reyes and Esther Schrader, Los Angeles Times, "4 Workers, Gunman Die in Caltrans Yard Attack," December 19, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/19/news/mn-172>.
3. Nick Anderson, Lee Romney and David Haldane, Los Angeles Times, "Aftermath of a Killer's Fury," December 29, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-431>.

Case #270

April 24, 1996: Kenneth Tornes opened fire at the firehouse where he worked, killing four supervisors. He then engaged police in a shootout at a shopping center after leading the officers on a chase. Prior to the attack, Tornes killed his estranged wife in her home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jackson Fire Department in Jackson, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Kenneth Tornes (32/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic and one TEC-9semi-automatic); rifle (Mac 11)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Firefighter Kills Wife and 4 Officials," April 25, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/25/us/firefighter-kills-wife-and-4-officials.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
2. Associated Press, Eugene Register Guard, "Firefighter Guns down Wife, Superiors," April 25, 1996, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1310&dat=19960425&id=EnYVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6-oDAAAIBAJ&pg=6888,5993878>.

Case #271

February 9, 1996: Clifton McCree opened fire in a trailer, killing five former colleagues and wounding another. Reports state that McCree, a former maintenance crew worker, was angry about being fired from his job for illegal drug use 14 months earlier.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Lauderdale Beach in Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clifton McCree (41/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one revolver and one semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Florida Killer Said Victims Were Racists, Police Say," February 11, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/us/florida-killer-said-victims-were-racists-police-say.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #272

June 11, 1994: Mattias Flink, a police lieutenant, opened fire at an army base and on public streets, killing seven people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Army base and public streets in Falun, Sweden
Attacker Information:	Mattias Flink (24/M)
Casualties:	7 dead
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-5)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Reuters, "TIMELINE – Shooting Incident in Finland," December 31, 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-45088320091231>.
2. The Local, "Mass Murderer Denied Request for Reduced Sentence," September 3, 2008, <http://www.thelocal.se/14112/20080903/>.
3. The Local, "Court Affirms Mass Murderer's Life Sentence," October 27, 2008, <http://www.thelocal.se/15240/20081027/>.

Case #273

December 7, 1993: Colin Ferguson opened fire in a crowded car on a Long Island Railroad train, killing six passengers and wounding 19 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Long Island Railroad car to Hicksville, Garden City, New York
Attacker Information:	Colin Ferguson (37/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter Ruger)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Francis X. Clines, New York Times, "DEATH ON THE L.I.R.R.: The Rampage; Gunman in a Train Aisle Passes Out Death," December 9, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/09/nyregion/death-on-the-lirr-the-rampage-gunman-in-a-train-aisle-passes-out-death.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Legal Information Institute, "The 'Insanity Defense' and Diminished Capacity: Colin Ferguson – the Long Island Railroad Gunman," Cornell Law School, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/insane/lirr.html>.
3. Pat Milton, Associated Press, "Ferguson Guilty in LIRR Massacre," February 18, 1995, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=OtrppQHxQ5wC&dat=19950218&printsec=frontpage>.

Case #274

April 30, 1989: Robert Sartin opened fire throughout the town of Monkseaton, killing one person and wounding 14 others. Sartin's 20-minute shooting spree concluded when he was cornered by police officers near a seafront. He stole his father's shotgun to carry out the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Monkseaton in North Tyneside, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Robert Sartin (22/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Adrian Pitches, BBC News, "Town Struggles to Recall Shooting," May 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/tyne/8029888.stm.
2. Rob Pattinson, Sunday Sun, "Monkseaton Mourns Victim of Gunman Robert Sartin," April 26, 2009, <http://www.sundaysun.co.uk/news/north-east-news/2009/04/26/monkseaton-mourns-victim-of-gunman-robert-sartin-79310-23473229/>.

Case #275

August 9, 1987: Julian Knight opened fire on pedestrians and cars from atop a billboard platform, killing seven people and wounding 19 others. Knight was a failed army cadet.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hoddle Street in Melbourne Australia
Attacker Information:	Julian Knight (19/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber Ruger); shotgun (12-gauge pump-action); rifle (M14)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No Force

Sources:

1. Reuters, Los Angeles Times, "Australia Killer Gets 460 Years in Prison," November 11, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-11/news/mn-863_1_years-prison-australia.
2. Elissa Hunt, Herald Sun, "Hoddle St. Killer Julian Knight has Legal Win in Parole Bid," August 11, 2010, <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/hoddle-st-killer-julian-knight-has-his-first-legal-win-parole-bid/story-e6frf7kx-1225903849955>.
3. Australian Government Attorney General's Department, *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, November 2004, [http://www.ag.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/\(3273BD3F76A7A5DEDAE36942A54D7D90\)~AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf/\\$file/AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf](http://www.ag.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(3273BD3F76A7A5DEDAE36942A54D7D90)~AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf/$file/AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf).
4. "Hoddle Street," Victoria Police Magazine, August 2007, pg. 6-11, www.police.vic.gov.au/retrievemedias.asp?Media_ID=20148.

Case #276

December 27, 1985: Four gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization opened fire at the El-Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport, killing 13 people and wounding 75 others. Italian police and Israeli security guards killed three of the gunmen and captured the fourth. The gunmen were armed with grenades and automatic rifles.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Rome, Italy
Attacker Information:	Ibrahim Mohammed Khaled (unknown/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 75 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle; other

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Roberto Suro, New York Times, "Palestinian Gets 30 Years for Rome Airport Attack," February 13, 1988,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/13/world/palestinian-gets-30-years-for-rome-airport-attack.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,"
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>.

Case #277

December 27, 1985: Three gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization opened fire at the El-Al ticket counter at Vienna's Schwechat Airport, killing three people and wounding 30 others. Austrian police killed one of the gunmen and captured the other two.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Schwechat Airport in Vienna, Austria
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	3 dead; 30 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Roberto Suro, New York Times, "Palestinian Gets 30 Years for Rome Airport Attack," February 13, 1988,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/13/world/palestinian-gets-30-years-for-rome-airport-attack.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,"
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html

Case #278

August 5, 1973: Sehud Muhammad and Talat Hussan opened fire and threw grenades in a crowded passenger lounge at Athens Airport, killing three people and wounding 55

others. The passengers in the lounge were about to board a flight for Israel. The Palestinian gunmen surrendered after taking 35 passengers hostage for two hours.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Athens Airport in Athens, Greece
Attacker Information:	Sehud Muhammad (unknown/M); Talat Hussan (unknown/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 55 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. BBC, "1973: Athens Attack Leaves Three Dead,"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/5/newsid_4533000/4533763.stm.

Case #279

May 29, 1972: Kozo Okamoto, Tsuyoshi Okudaira and Yasuyuki Yasuda opened fire on crowds at the Lod International Airport in Israel, killing 26 people and injuring 72 others. As the three Japanese gunmen arrived at the airport from Paris, they began randomly targeting victims using automatic guns and hand grenades. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine recruited the gunmen from the Japanese Red Army.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lod International Airport in Airport City, Israel
Attacker Information:	Kozo Okamoto (24/M); Tsuyoshi Okudaira (unknown/M); Yasuyuki Yasuda (unknown/M)
Casualties:	26 dead; 72 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force and suicide

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "Israel: Terrorist on Trial," July 24, 1972,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906148-1,00.html>.

2. BBC, "1972: Japanese Kill 26 at Tel Aviv Airport,"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/29/newsid_2542000/2542263.stm.

FOILED OTHER

Case #280

May 8, 2007: Mohamad Ibraim Shnewer, Dritan Duka, Eljvir Duka, Shain Duka, Serdar Tatar, and Agron Abdullahu were arrested for planning an attack on the Fort Dix Army Base. The six men from Eastern Europe and the Middle East were apprehended by authorities while trying to purchase automatic weapons from undercover FBI agents. They also spoke of attacking U.S. warships and conducted surveillance on Fort Monmouth in New Jersey, Dover Air Force Base in Delaware and other military installations.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Dix Army base in Burlington County, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Mohamad Ibraim Shnewer (22/M); Dritan Duka (28/M); Eljvir Duka (23/M); Shain Duka (26/M); Serdar Tatar (23/M); Agron Abdullahu (24/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	AK-47 assault weapons, M-16s, other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a shopkeeper at a video store alerted authorities to the men after he had been asked to copy a suspicious video onto a DVD. The video displayed 10 young men shooting weapons at a firing range while calling for jihad.

Sources:

1. Kareem Fahim, New York Times, "Six Ordinary Lives That Took a Detour to a World of Terror," May 9, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/nyregion/09suspects.html?pagewanted=print>.
2. David Kocieniewski, New York Times, "6 Men Arrested in a Terror Plot against Fort Dix," May 9, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09plot.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1.

3. Associated Press, FOX News, "Store Clerk Helps Feds Bust 6 in Alleged 'Jihad' Plot to Kill U.S. Soldiers at Fort Dix," May 8, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,270601,00.html>.
4. NPR, "Plot to Attack Fort Dix Foiled, Authorities Say," May 8, 2007, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10072697>.

Case #281

June 24, 2009: John Rosser was arrested for plotting to kill his former boss at the Duke Energy Convention Center. Rosser was fired from the Convention Center two years before the plot was uncovered.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Duke Energy Convention Center in Cincinnati, Ohio
Attacker Information:	John Rosser (28/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when Rosser told his landlord about the plot, who then alerted authorities. Officers captured Rosser, who was armed with a gun, about 100 yards from the Convention Center.

Source:

1. United Press International, "Cincy Police Foil Workplace Shooting," June 24, 2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/06/24/Cincy-police-foil-workplace-shooting/UPI-20451245863259/.

GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS



FEMA



GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS

U.S. Department of Education
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency

2013

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U.S. Department of Education

Arne Duncan
Secretary

Office of Elementary and Secondary Education

Deborah S. Delisle
Assistant Secretary

Office of Safe and Healthy Students

David Esquith
Director

June 2013

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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Each school day, our nation's schools are entrusted to provide a safe and healthy learning environment for approximately 55 million elementary and secondary school students¹ in public and nonpublic schools. Families and communities expect schools to keep their children and youths safe from threats (human-caused emergencies such as crime and violence) and hazards (natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents). In collaboration with their local government and community partners, schools can take steps to plan for these potential emergencies through the creation of a school Emergency Operations Plan (school EOP).

Lessons learned from school emergencies highlight the importance of preparing school officials and first responders to implement emergency operations plans. By having plans in place to keep students and staff safe, schools play a key role in taking preventative and protective measures to stop an emergency from occurring or reduce the impact of an incident. Although schools are not traditional response organizations, when a school-based emergency occurs, school personnel respond immediately. They provide first aid, notify response partners, and provide instructions before first responders arrive. They also work with their community partners, i.e., governmental organizations that have a responsibility in the school emergency operations plan to provide a cohesive, coordinated response. Community partners include first responders (law enforcement officers, fire officials, and emergency medical services personnel) as well as public and mental health entities.

We recommend that planning teams responsible for developing and revising school EOPs use this document to guide their efforts. It is recommended that districts and individual schools compare existing plans and processes against the content and processes outlined in this guide. To gain the most from it, users should read through the entire document prior to initiating their planning efforts and then refer back to it throughout the planning process.

The guide is organized in four sections:

1. The principles of school emergency management planning.
2. A process for developing, implementing, and continually refining a school EOP with community partners (e.g., first responders and emergency management personnel) at the school building level.
3. A discussion of the form, function, and content of school EOPs.
4. "A Closer Look," which considers key topics that support school emergency planning, including addressing an *active shooter*, school climate, psychological first aid, and information-sharing.

As the team that developed this guide began its work to respond to the president's call for model emergency management plans for schools, it became clear that there is a need to help ensure that

¹ U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics 2011*. Washington, DC: Author, 2012. Available at <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/index.asp>.

our schools' emergency planning efforts are aligned with the emergency planning practices at the national, state, and local levels. Recent developments have put a new emphasis on the process for developing EOPs.

National preparedness efforts, including planning, are now informed by *Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8*, which was signed by the president in March 2011 and describes the nation's approach to preparedness. This directive represents an evolution in our collective understanding of national preparedness, based on the lessons learned from terrorist attacks, hurricanes, school incidents, and other experiences.

PPD-8 defines preparedness around five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.

- ❖ **Prevention**,² for the purposes of this guide, means the capabilities necessary to avoid, deter, or stop an imminent crime or threatened or actual mass casualty incident. Prevention is the action schools take to prevent a threatened or actual incident from occurring.
- ❖ **Protection** means the capabilities to secure schools against acts of violence and manmade or natural disasters. Protection focuses on ongoing actions that protect students, teachers, staff, visitors, networks, and property from a threat or hazard.
- ❖ **Mitigation** means the capabilities necessary to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage by lessening the impact of an event or emergency. In this document, "mitigation" also means reducing the likelihood that threats and hazards will happen.
- ❖ **Response** means the capabilities necessary to stabilize an emergency once it has already happened or is certain to happen in an unpreventable way; establish a safe and secure environment; save lives and property; and facilitate the transition to recovery.
- ❖ **Recovery** means the capabilities necessary to assist schools affected by an event or emergency in restoring the learning environment.

Emergency management officials and emergency responders engaging with schools are familiar with this terminology. These mission areas generally align with the three timeframes associated with an incident: before, during, and after.

The majority of Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation activities generally occur before an incident, although these three mission areas do have ongoing activities that can occur throughout an incident. Response activities occur during an incident, and Recovery activities can begin during an incident and occur after an incident. To help avoid confusion over terms and allow for ease of reference, this guide uses "before," "during," and "after."

² In the broader *PPD-8* construct, the term "prevention" refers to those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. The term "prevention" also refers to preventing imminent threats.

As schools plan for and execute response and recovery activities through the emergency operations plan, they should use the concepts and principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). One component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), which provides a standardized approach for *incident management*, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. By using ICS during an incident, schools will be able to more effectively work with the responders in their communities. For more information on ICS and NIMS, please see the Resources section.

While some of the vocabulary, processes, and approaches discussed in this guide may be new to the education community, they are critical. The vocabulary, processes, and approaches are critical to the creation of emergency management practices and plans that are integrated with the efforts of first responders and other key stakeholders, and that incorporate everything possible to keep children safe. If a school system has an existing plan, revising and adapting that plan using the principles and process described in this guide will help ensure alignment with the terminology and approaches used across the nation.

The Departments issuing this guidance are providing examples of good practices and matters to consider for planning and implementation purposes. The guidance does not create any requirements beyond those included in applicable law and regulations, or create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization. The information presented in this document generally constitutes informal guidance and provides examples that may be helpful. The inclusion of certain references does not imply any endorsement of any documents, products, or approaches. There may be other resources that may be equally helpful.

This guide replaces “*Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities*” (January 2007), which is rescinded.

All websites listed in this guide were last accessed on May 30, 2013.

PLANNING PRINCIPLES

The following principles are key to developing a comprehensive school emergency operations plan (school EOP) that addresses a range of threats and hazards:

Planning must be supported by leadership. At the district and school levels, senior-level officials can help the planning process by demonstrating strong support for the planning team.

Planning uses assessment to customize plans to the building level. Effective planning is built around comprehensive, ongoing assessment of the school community. Information gathered through assessment is used to customize plans to the building level, taking into consideration the school's unique circumstances and resources.

Planning considers all threats and hazards. The planning process must take into account a wide range of possible threats and hazards that may impact the school. Comprehensive school emergency management planning considers all threats and hazards throughout the planning process, addressing safety needs before, during, and after an incident.

Planning provides for the access and functional needs of the whole school community. The “whole school community” includes children, individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, those from religiously, racially, and ethnically diverse backgrounds, and people with limited English proficiency.

Planning considers all settings and all times. School EOPs must account for incidents that may occur during and outside the school day as well as on and off campus (e.g., sporting events, field trips).

Creating and revising a model emergency operations plan is done by following a collaborative process. This guide provides a process, plan format, and content guidance that are flexible enough for use by all school emergency planning teams. If a planning team also uses templates, it must first evaluate their usefulness to ensure the tools do not undermine the collaborative initiative and collectively shared plan. There are some jurisdictions that provide templates to schools, and these will reflect state and local mandates, as applicable.

THE PLANNING PROCESS


There are many ways to develop a school EOP. The planning process discussed in this section is flexible and can be adapted to accommodate a school's unique characteristics and situation.

Effective school emergency management planning and development of a school EOP are not done in isolation. It is critical that schools work with their district staff and community partners—local emergency management staff, first responders, and public and mental health officials—during the planning process, as an effective school EOP is supported at the district level and integrated with district, community, regional, and state plans. This collaboration makes more resources available and helps to ensure the seamless integration of all responders.

Schools can use the process outlined below to develop a plan, do a comprehensive review of their entire plan, or conduct periodic and incremental reviews of the plan's components. While this guide is designed for schools, districts may use this planning process as well.

Figure 1 depicts the six steps in the planning process.³ At each step, schools should consider the impact of their decisions on ongoing activities such as training and exercises as well as on equipment and resources.

Figure 1: Steps in the Planning Process



Step 1: Form a Collaborative Planning Team

Lessons learned from experience indicate that operational planning is best performed by a team. Case studies reinforce this concept by pointing out that the common thread found in successful operations is that participating organizations have understood and accepted their roles. Close

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2.0*. Washington, DC: Author, November 2010. Available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.

collaboration between schools and community partners ensures the coordination of efforts and the integration of emergency management plans.

Identify Core Planning Team: The core planning team should include representatives from a wide range of school personnel, including, but not limited to, administrators, educators, school psychologists, nurses, facilities managers, transportation managers, food personnel, and family services representatives. It should also include student and parent representatives, and individuals and organizations that serve and represent the interests of students, staff, and parents with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs, as well as racial minorities and religious organizations, so that specific concerns are included in the early stages of planning. In addition, the core planning team should include community partners such as first responders, local emergency management staff, and others who have roles and responsibilities in school emergency management before, during, and after an incident. This includes local law enforcement officers, emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, school resource officers, fire officials, public and mental health practitioners, and local emergency managers. Their expertise will inform the development, implementation, and refinement of the school EOP.

The planning team should be small enough to permit close collaboration with first responders and other community partners, yet large enough to be representative of the school, its families, and its community. It should also be large enough as to not place an undue burden on any single person.

Connecting the Planning Team to District, Local or Regional, State, Tribal, and Federal Emergency Planning

Schools undertake emergency operations planning within the context of district, local or regional, state, tribal, and federal agency emergency planning. School districts serve as the liaison between the school and these broader agencies. In order to promote coordination between these entities, the planning team is strongly encouraged to include a district representative. The local school district's emergency planning policies, procedures, and training activities will inform and enhance the school's planning to a significant degree.

In addition, from the onset, the planning team should be aware of any local or state requirements that may apply to the school EOP.

Form a Common Framework: A shared approach facilitates mutual understanding, coordination, and execution of the emergency management strategies as well as works from a common command structure. All team members need to take time to learn each other's vocabulary, command structure, and culture in order to facilitate effective planning.

Define and Assign Roles and Responsibilities: Each person involved in the development and refinement of the plan should know her or his roles and responsibilities in the planning process.

Determine a Regular Schedule of Meetings: School emergency management planning is an ongoing effort that is reinforced through regularly scheduled planning meetings. Establishing a

flexible but regular schedule of meeting times will facilitate greater collaboration, coordination, and communication among team members and will help solidify crucial relationships.

Step 1 Outcome

After completing Step 1, the school has formed a planning team with representatives from all necessary stakeholders. The planning team has taken initial steps to form a common framework, define and assign roles and responsibilities in the planning process, and set a schedule of planning meetings.



Step 2: Understand the Situation

In Step 2, the planning team identifies possible threats and hazards, and assesses the risk and vulnerabilities posed by those threats and hazards.

Effective school planning depends on a consistent analysis and comparison of the threats and hazards a particular school faces. This is typically performed through a threat and hazard identification and risk assessment process that collects information about threats and hazards, and assigns values to risk for the purposes of deciding which threats or hazards the plan should prioritize and subsequently address.

Identify Threats and Hazards

The planning team first needs to understand the threats and hazards faced by the school and the surrounding community.

The planning team can draw upon a wealth of existing information to identify the range of threats and hazards that may be faced by the school. First, the planning team members should share their own knowledge of threats and hazards the school and surrounding community have faced in the past or may face in the future. The planning team should then reach out to local, state, and federal agencies for data about historical threats and hazards faced by the surrounding community. Local and county agencies that have a knowledge of threats and hazards include, but are not limited to, emergency management offices, fire and police departments, as well as local organizations and community groups (e.g., local chapter of the American Red Cross, Community Emergency Response Team), utilities, and other businesses that can provide helpful information.

Assess the Risk Posed by the Identified Threats and Hazards

Once an initial set of threats and hazards have been identified through the process described in the previous section, the planning team should select suitable assessment tools to evaluate the risk posed by the identified threats and hazards.⁴ Evaluating risk entails understanding the probability that the specific threat or hazard will occur; the effects it will likely have, including

⁴ For more information on the threat and hazard identification and risk assessment process, please see FEMA's *Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide (CPG 201)* at <http://www.fema.gov/plan>.

the severity of the impact; the time the school will have to warn students and staff about the threat or hazard; and how long it may last. The local and county emergency management staff should be able to provide information on some of the risks posed by threats and hazards common to the school and surrounding community. This enables the planning team to focus its assessment efforts on threats and hazards unique to the school community, as well as on the particular vulnerabilities of the building and its occupants.

“Vulnerabilities” refers to the characteristics of the school (e.g., structure, equipment, information technology (IT) or electrical systems, grounds, surrounding area) that could make it more susceptible to the identified threats and hazards. Assessing risk and vulnerability enables the planning team to focus its efforts on prioritized threats and hazards.

There are numerous assessments that the planning team may use, including site assessments, culture and climate assessments, school behavioral threat assessments, and capacity assessments. These assessments will help the planning team not only assess risk but also identify resources and issues that the plan may need to address. Through the assessment process, the planning team may also identify additional threats and hazards.

The most successful assessments are conducted by a broad array of individuals, including support staff and first responders. Students and parents, including students and parents with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs, should be included to the maximum extent appropriate. The assessment also has to be strategic: If the school is in an isolated region of a county and the response times for law enforcement officers or fire officials and EMS practitioners are lengthy, that may alter the calculus of the assessment. If response time is lengthy, other security measures may need to be enacted to compensate for lengthy response times.

Assessments will be used not only to develop the initial plan but also to inform updates and revisions to the plan on an ongoing basis. The following table provides more information about some of the most essential assessments the planning team should undertake.⁵

⁵ For more information on assessments and schools, see the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance (TA) Center’s *A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments* at http://rem.s.ed.gov/display.aspx?page=publications_General.

Table 1: Assessment

Type of Assessment	Description	Purpose and Results
Site Assessment	A site assessment examines the safety, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of the school's buildings and grounds. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, a review of building access and egress control measures, visibility around the exterior of the building, structural integrity of the building, compliance with applicable architectural standards for individuals with disabilities and others with functional and access needs, and emergency vehicle access.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased understanding of the potential impact of threats and hazards on the school buildings and grounds.• Increased understanding of risk and vulnerabilities of the school buildings and grounds when developing the plan.• Knowledge of which facilities are physically accessible to students, staff, parents, volunteer workers, and emergency response personnel with disabilities and can be used in compliance with the law.
Culture and Climate Assessment	In schools with positive climates, students are more likely to feel connected to adults and their peers. This fosters a nurturing environment where students are more likely to succeed, feel safe, and report threats. A school culture and climate assessment evaluates student and staff connectedness to the school and problem behaviors. For example, this assessment may reveal a high number of bullying incidents, indicating a need to implement an anti-bullying program. If a student survey is used to assess culture and climate, student privacy must be protected. A range of school personnel can assist in the assessment of culture and school climate, including school counselors and mental health staff.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Knowledge of students' and staff's perceptions of their safety.• Knowledge of problem behaviors that need to be addressed to improve school climate.

Type of Assessment	Description	Purpose and Results
School Threat Assessment	A school threat assessment analyzes communication and behaviors to determine whether or not a student, staff, or other person may pose a threat. These assessments must be based on fact, must comply with applicable privacy, civil rights, and other applicable laws, and are often conducted by multidisciplinary threat assessment teams. While a planning team may include the creation of a threat assessment team in its plan, the assessment team is a separate entity from the planning team and meets on its own regular schedule.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Students, staff, or other persons that may pose a threat are identified before a threat develops into an incident and are referred for services, if appropriate.
Capacity Assessment	The planning team needs to know what resources will be at their disposal. A capacity assessment examines the capabilities of students and staff as well as the services and material resources of community partners. This assessment is used to identify people in the building with applicable skills (e.g., first aid certification, search and rescue training, counseling and mental health expertise, ability to assist individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs). Equipment and supplies should also be inventoried. The inventory should include an evaluation of equipment and supplies uniquely for individuals with disabilities, such as evacuation chairs, the availability of sign language interpreters and technology used for effective communication, accessible transportation, and consumable medical supplies and durable medical equipment that may be necessary during a shelter-in-place or evacuation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An increased understanding of the resources available. Information about staff capabilities will help planners assign roles and responsibilities in the plan.

After conducting these assessments, the planning team should consolidate all of the information it has obtained into a format that is usable for comparing the risks posed by the identified threats and hazards. This information will then be used to assess and compare the threats and hazards and their likely consequences. This is referred to as a “risk and vulnerability assessment.” One effective method for organizing information is to create a table with a range of information about each possible threat and hazard, including any new threats or hazards identified through the assessment process. The table should include:

- ❖ Probability or frequency of occurrence (i.e., how often a threat or hazard may occur);
- ❖ Magnitude (i.e., the extent of expected damage);
- ❖ Time available to warn staff, students, and visitors;
- ❖ Duration (i.e., for how long the hazard or threat will be occurring); and
- ❖ Follow-on and cascading effects of threat or hazard.

While some of the information collected will directly feed into this table, other information, for example details on school climate challenges, will have to be organized differently. The most important outcome is that information is clearly presented so that it can be easily used to inform the plan’s development.

Prioritize Threats and Hazards

Next, the planning team should use the information it has organized to compare and prioritize risks posed by threats and hazards. This will allow the team to decide which threats or hazards it will directly address in the plan. The team must consider multiple factors when developing an indicator of risk to the institution. One option is a mathematical approach, which assigns index numbers (e.g., a 1-to-4, 1-to-5, or 1-to-10 scale) for different categories of information used in the ranking scheme. Using this approach, the planning team will categorize threats and hazards as posing a relatively high, medium, or low risk. The following table, “Table 2: Sample Risk Assessment Worksheet” (separate from Table 1, above) provides a sample risk assessment worksheet for comparing and prioritizing threats and hazards.

Table 2: Sample Risk Assessment Worksheet

Hazard	Probability	Magnitude	Warning	Duration	Risk Priority
Fire	4. Highly likely 3. Likely 2. Possible 1. Unlikely	4. Catastrophic 3. Critical 2. Limited 1. Negligible	4. Minimal 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 12–24 hrs. 1. 24+ hrs.	4. 12+ hrs. 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 3–6 hrs. 1. < 3 Hours	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> Low
Hazmat spill outside the school	4. Highly likely 3. Likely 2. Possible 1. Unlikely	4. Catastrophic 3. Critical 2. Limited 1. Negligible	4. Minimal 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 12–4 hrs. 1. 24+ hrs.	4. 12+ hrs. 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 3–6 hrs. 1. < 3 hrs.	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> Low

Step 2 Outcome

After completing Step 2, the planning team has a prioritized (high, medium, or low risk) list of threats and hazards based on the results of the risk assessment.



Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives

In Step 3, the planning team decides which of the threats and hazards identified in Step 2 will be addressed in the school EOP. The planning team may decide to address only those threats and hazards that rank “high” in risk priority, or they may decide to also address some of the threats and hazards that rank “medium.” This is a critical decision point in the planning process that is left up to the planning team. It is recommended that the team address more than just the “high” risk priority threats and hazards.

Once the planning team has decided which threats and hazards will be addressed in the school EOP, it develops *goals* and *objectives* for each.

Develop Goals and Objectives

Goals are broad, general statements that indicate the desired outcome in response to the threat or hazard identified by planners in the previous step. They are what personnel and other resources are supposed to achieve. They also help identify when major activities are complete and what defines a successful outcome.

The planning team should develop at least *three goals* for addressing each threat or hazard (though the planning team may want to identify more). Those three goals should indicate the

desired outcome for (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the threat or hazard. For a fire, for instance, three possible goals include

- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 1 (before): Prevent a fire from occurring on school grounds.
- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 2 (during): Protect all persons from injury and property from damage by the fire.
- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 3 (after): Provide necessary medical attention to those in need.

Objectives are specific, measurable actions that are necessary to achieve the goals. Often, planners will need to identify multiple objectives in support of a single goal.

Using the goal in Example 1 of preventing a fire on or near school grounds, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 1.1: Provide fire prevention training to all students and staff who use combustible materials or equipment.
- ❖ Objective 1.2: Store combustible materials in fireproof containers or rooms.

Using the goal in Example 2 of protecting all persons from injury by the fire, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 2.1: Evacuate all persons from the building immediately.
- ❖ Objective 2.2: Account for all persons.

Using the goal in Example 3 of providing necessary medical attention to those in need, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 3.1: Immediately notify fire department officials and EMS personnel of any fire on schools grounds via 911.
- ❖ Objective 3.2: Immediately begin to provide first aid.

After the team has finished compiling the objectives for the prioritized threats and hazards, it will find that certain critical “*functions*” or activities apply to more than one threat or hazard. Examples of these cross-cutting functions include evacuating, providing medical care, and accounting for all students, staff, and guests.

After identifying these functions, the planning team should develop three goals for each function. As with the goals already identified for threats and hazards, the three goals should indicate the desired outcome for (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the function has been executed. These commonly occurring functions will be contained in a “*Functional Annex*” within the school EOP. More details on these functions are included in the Plan Content section of this guide, including issues to consider as you develop goals and objectives for these functions.

For an evacuation function, three possible goals are

- ❖ Function Goal Example 1 (before): Ensure all students and staff know their evacuation route.
- ❖ Function Goal Example 2 (during): Evacuate the school immediately.
- ❖ Function Goal Example 3 (after): Confirm that all individuals have left the building.

Once the goals for a function are identified, possible supporting objectives are identified. For the evacuation goals above, objectives could include

- ❖ Objective 1.1 (before): Assess, identify, and communicate the location of rally points to be used during an evacuation.
- ❖ Objective 2.1 (during): Evacuate all students, staff, and guests from the school using assigned routes.
- ❖ Objective 3.1 (after): Safely sweep the building.

Step 3 Outcome

After completing Step 3, the planning team has at least three goals (i.e., before, during, and after) for each threat or hazard and function, as well as objectives for each goal.



Step 4: Plan Development (Identifying Courses of Action)

In Step 4, the planning team develops courses of action for accomplishing each of the objectives identified in Step 3 (for threats, hazards, and functions). Courses of action address the what, who, when, where, why, and how for each threat, hazard, and function. The planning team should examine each course of action to determine whether it is feasible and whether the stakeholders necessary to implement it find it acceptable. For additional issues to consider as you develop courses of action for functions, please see the Plan Content section.

Identify Courses of Action

Courses of action include criteria for determining how and when each response will be implemented under a variety of circumstances. Subsequently, the planning team develops response protocols and procedures to support these efforts.

Possible courses of action are typically developed using the following steps:

1. **Depict the scenario.** Create a potential scenario based on the threats and hazards identified and prioritized in Step 2.

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2. **Determine the amount of time available to respond.** This will vary based on the type of threat or hazard and the particular scenario. For example, in the case of a hurricane, the school might have days or hours to respond before the storm makes landfall, while the school may have to respond in minutes to an *active shooter*.
 3. **Identify decision points.** Decision points indicate the place in time, as threats or hazards unfold, when leaders anticipate making decisions about a course of action. Walking through each scenario in detail will help identify the relevant decision points for each one, such as whether or not to evacuate, shelter in place, or lockdown.
 4. **Develop courses of action.** Planners develop courses of action to achieve their goals and objectives by answering the following questions:
 - What is the action?
 - Who is responsible for the action?
 - When does the action take place?
 - How long does the action take and how much time is actually available?
 - What has to happen before?
 - What happens after?
 - What resources are needed to perform the action?
 - How will this action affect specific populations, such as individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs who may require medication, wayfinding, evacuation assistance, or personal assistance services, or who may experience severe anxiety during traumatic events?

PLANS MUST COMPLY WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Plans must comply with the *Americans with Disabilities Act*, among other prohibitions on disability discrimination, across the spectrum of emergency management services, programs, and activities, including preparation, testing, notification and alerts, evacuation, transportation, sheltering, emergency medical care and services, transitioning back, recovery, and repairing and rebuilding. Plans should include students, staff, and parents with disabilities. Among other things, school emergency plans must address the provision of appropriate auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities (e.g., interpreters, captioning, and accessible information technology); ensure individuals with disabilities are not separated from service animals and assistive devices, and can receive disability-related assistance throughout emergencies (e.g., assistance with activities of daily living, administration of medications); and comply with the law's architectural and other requirements. (Information and technical assistance about the *Americans with Disabilities Act* (ADA) is available at <http://www.ada.gov>.)

PLANS MUST ADDRESS LANGUAGE ACCESS

Effective communication with individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP), including students and parents, is an essential component of emergency planning and response. Plans must comply with applicable legal requirements on language access, including *Title VI* of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* (available at <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titlevi.php>) and the *Title VI* regulation of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* (available at <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/fedagencies.php>).

Select Courses of Action

After developing courses of action, planners compare the costs and benefits of each proposed course of action against the goals and objectives. Based on this comparison, planners select the preferred course or courses of action to move forward in the planning process. Plans often include multiple courses of action for a given scenario to reflect the different ways it could unfold.

After selecting courses of action, the planning team identifies resources necessary to accomplish each course of action without regard to resource availability. Once the planning team identifies all of the requirements, it begins matching available resources to requirements. This step provides planners an opportunity to identify resource gaps or shortfalls that must be taken into account.

Step 4 Outcome

After completing Step 4, the planning team will have identified goals, objectives, and courses of action for before, during, and after threats and hazards, as well as functions.

Goals, objectives, and courses of action for threats and hazards will go into the “Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes” section of the school EOP.

Goals, objectives, and courses of action for functions will be contained in the “Functional Annexes” section of the school EOP.



Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval

In Step 5, the planning team develops a draft of the school EOP using the courses of action developed in Step 4. In addition, the team reviews the plan, obtains official approval, and shares the plan with community partners such as first responders, local emergency management officials, staff, and stakeholders.

Format the Plan

An effective school EOP is presented in a way that makes it easy for users to find the information they need and that is compatible with local and state plans. This may include using

plain language and providing pictures and/or visual cues for key action steps. This guide presents a traditional format that can be tailored to meet individual school needs. This format has three major sections: the Basic Plan, Functional Annexes, and Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes.

The *Basic Plan* section of the school EOP provides an overview of the school's approach to emergency operations. Although the Basic Plan section guides the development of the more operationally oriented annexes, its primary audiences consist of the school, local emergency officials, and the community (as appropriate). The elements listed in this section should meet the needs of these audiences while providing a solid foundation for the development of supporting annexes.

The *Functional Annexes* section details the goals, objectives, and courses of action of functions (e.g., evacuation, communications, recovery) that apply across multiple threats or hazards. Functional annexes set forth how the school manages a function before, during, and after an emergency.

The *Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes* section specifies the goals, objectives, and courses of action that a school will follow to address a particular type of threat or hazard (e.g., hurricane, *active shooter*). Threat- and hazard-specific annexes, like functional annexes, set forth how the school manages a function before, during, and after an emergency.

The following functional format can be used for the Functional Annexes as well as for the Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes sections. Using the format below and the work the planning team did in Step 4, each function, threat, and hazard will have at least three goals, with one or more objectives for each goal and a course of action for each of the objectives.

- ❖ Title (the function, threat, or hazard)
- ❖ Goal(s)
- ❖ Objective(s)
- ❖ Courses of Action (Describe the courses of action you developed in Step 4 in the sequence in which they will occur.)

Figure 2 below outlines the different components of each of these three sections. This guide details the contents of these three sections under Plan Content.⁶

⁶ The term *annex* is used throughout this guide to refer to functional, hazard- or threat-specific, or other supplements to the basic plan. Some plans may use the term *appendix* in the same fashion (e.g., hazard-specific appendix).

Figure 2: Traditional EOP Format

School EOP Format

Basic Plan

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Introductory Material | 2.4. Planning Assumptions |
| 1.1. Promulgation Document and Signatures | 3. Concept of Operations |
| 1.2. Approval and Implementation | 4. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities |
| 1.3. Record and Changes | 5. Direction, Control, and Coordination |
| 1.4. Record of Distribution | 6. Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination |
| 1.5. Table of Contents | 7. Training and Exercises |
| 2. Purpose, Scope, Situation Overview, and Assumptions | 8. Administration, Finance, and Logistics |
| 2.1. Purpose | 9. Plan Development and Maintenance |
| 2.2. Scope | 10. Authorities and References |
| 2.3. Situation Overview | |

Functional Annexes

NOTE: This is not a complete list, but it is recommended that all EOPs include at least the following functional annexes:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Communications | 6. Reunification |
| 2. Evacuation | 7. Continuity of Operations (COOP) |
| 3. Shelter-in-Place | 8. Security |
| 4. Lockdown | 9. Recovery |
| 5. Accounting for All Persons | 10. Health and Medical |

Threat- or Hazard-Specific Annexes

NOTE: This is not a complete list. Each school's annexes will vary based on its hazard analysis.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Hurricane or Severe Storm | 5. Mass Casualty Incident |
| 2. Earthquake | 6. <i>Active Shooter</i> |
| 3. Tornado | 7. Pandemic or Disease Outbreak |
| 4. Hazardous Materials Incident | |

Write the Plan

As the planning team works through the draft, the members add necessary tables, charts, and other supporting graphics. The planning team circulates a draft to obtain the comments of stakeholders that have responsibilities for implementing the plan. Successful plans are written according to the following simple rules.

1. Summarize important information with checklists and visual aids, such as maps and flowcharts.
2. Write clearly, using plain language, avoiding jargon, minimizing the use of abbreviations, and using short sentences and the active voice. Qualifiers and vague wording only add to confusion.
3. Use a logical, consistent structure that makes it easy for readers to grasp the rationale for the sequence of the information and to scan for the information they need.

-
4. Provide enough detail to convey an easily understood plan that is actionable. For example, classroom teachers may have a one-page document that covers what they will need to know and do during an emergency, or create flip-charts, posters, or signs giving simple directions. Organize the contents in a way that helps users quickly identify solutions and options. Plans should provide guidance for carrying out common courses of action, through the functional and threat- and hazard-specific annexes, while also staying out of the weeds.
 5. Develop accessible tools and documents. Use appropriate auxiliary aids and services necessary for effective communication, such as accessible websites, digital text that can be converted to audio or Braille, text equivalents for images, and captioning of any audio and audio description of any video content.

Review the Plan

Planners should check the written plan for compliance with applicable laws and for its usefulness in practice. Commonly used criteria can help determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the plan. The following measures can help determine if a plan is of high quality:

- ❖ A plan is *adequate* if the plan identifies and addresses critical courses of action effectively; the plan can accomplish the assigned function; and the plan's assumptions are valid and reasonable.
- ❖ A plan is *feasible* if the school can accomplish the assigned function and critical tasks by using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan.
- ❖ A plan is *acceptable* if it meets the requirements driven by a threat or hazard, meets cost and time limitations, and is consistent with the law.
- ❖ A plan is *complete* if it
 - Incorporates all courses of action to be accomplished for all selected threats and hazards and identified functions;
 - Integrates the needs of the whole school community;
 - Provides a complete picture of what should happen, when, and at whose direction;
 - Estimates time for achieving objectives, with safety remaining as the utmost priority;
 - Identifies success criteria and a desired end state; and
 - Conforms with the planning principles outlined in this guide.
- ❖ The plan must *comply* with applicable state and local requirements because these provide a baseline that facilitates both planning and execution.

Additionally, when reviewing the plan, the planning team does not have to provide all of the resources needed to execute a course of action or meet a requirement established during the

planning effort. However, the plan should explain where or how the district and school will obtain the resources to support those requirements.

Approve and Share the Plan

After finalizing the plan, the planning team should present it to the appropriate leadership and obtain official approval of the plan. The team should then share the plan with its community partners who have a responsibility in the plan (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) and additional stakeholders that have a role in the plan, including relevant district, local, regional, and/or state agencies with which the plan will be coordinated. The plan should also be shared with other organizations that may use the school building(s).

Schools should be careful to protect the plan from those who are not authorized to have it and should consider how they will secure documents shared electronically. Law enforcement agencies and first responders have a secured, Web-accessible site available to house copies of plans, building schematics, phone contact sheets, and other important details that round out planning. Schools must comply with state and local open records laws in storing and protecting the plan.

The team should maintain a record of the people and organizations that receive a copy of the plan.

Step 5 Outcome

After completing Step 5, the planning team will have a final school EOP.



Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance

Train Stakeholders on the Plan and Their Roles

Everyone involved in the plan needs to know her or his roles and responsibilities before, during, and after an emergency. Key training components include:

Hold a meeting. At least once a year, hold a meeting to educate all parties on the plan. Go through the plan to familiarize these stakeholders with it.

Visit evacuation sites. Show involved parties not only where evacuation sites are located but also where specific areas, such as reunification areas, media areas, and triage areas will be located.

Give involved parties appropriate and relevant literature on the plan, policies, and procedures. It may also be helpful to provide all parties with quick reference guides that remind them of key courses of action.

Post key information throughout the building. It is important that students and staff are familiar with and have easy access to information such as evacuation routes and shelter-in-place procedures and locations. Ensure that information concerning evacuation routes and shelter-in-

place procedures and locations is effectively communicated to students, staff, and parents with disabilities as well as others with access and functional needs, such as by distributing the materials by e-mail in an accessible format.

Familiarize students and staff with the plan and community partners. Bringing community partners (e.g., law enforcement officers, fire officials, and EMS personnel) that have a role into the school to talk about the plan will make students and staff feel more comfortable working with these partners.

Train staff on the skills necessary to fulfill their roles. Staff will be assigned specific roles in the plan and positions supporting the Incident Command System (ICS) that will require special skills, such as first aid, threat assessment, and provision of personal assistance services for students with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs. Also, substitute teachers must be trained on the plan and their roles in the plan.

Exercise the Plan

The more a plan is practiced and stakeholders are trained on the plan, the more effectively they will be able to act before, during, and after an emergency to lessen the impact on life and property. Exercises provide opportunities to practice with community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management personnel), as well as to identify gaps and weaknesses in the plan. The exercises below require increasing amounts of planning, time, and resources. Ideally, schools will create an exercise program, building from a tabletop exercise up to a more advanced exercise, like a functional exercise:

- ❖ **Tabletop exercises:** Tabletop exercises are small-group discussions that walk through a scenario and the courses of action a school will need to take before, during, and after an emergency to lessen the impact on the school community. This activity helps assess the plan and resources, and facilitates an understanding of emergency management and planning concepts.
- ❖ **Drills:** During drills, school personnel and community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) use the actual school grounds and buildings to practice responding to a scenario.
- ❖ **Functional exercises:** Functional exercises are similar to drills but involve multiple partners; some may be conducted district-wide. Participants react to realistic simulated events (e.g., a bomb threat, or an intruder with a gun in a classroom), and implement the plan and procedures using the ICS.
- ❖ **Full-scale exercises:** These exercises are the most time-consuming activity in the exercise continuum and are multiagency, multijurisdictional efforts in which all resources are deployed. This type of exercise tests collaboration among the agencies and participants, public information systems, communications systems, and equipment. An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is established by either law enforcement or fire services, and the ICS is activated.

Before making a decision about how many and which types of exercises to implement, a school should consider the costs and benefits of each, as well as any state or local requirements. For

example, while a tabletop exercise may be less costly and less time-consuming to run, a full-scale exercise provides a more realistic context for the simulated response to an emergency situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to improve the plans. If students are involved, the school should also consider the age of the student population when selecting the appropriate exercise. Schools should also consider whether to include parents and should take into account the cultural diversity of their populations when designing exercises and training.

It is up to the planning team to decide how often exercises should be conducted. While frequent exercise is important, it is imperative that exercises are of high quality.

To effectively execute an exercise

- ❖ Include community partners such as first responders (law enforcement officers, EMS practitioners, and fire department personnel) and local emergency management staff;
- ❖ Communicate information in advance to avoid confusion and concern;
- ❖ Exercise under different and non-ideal conditions (e.g., times of day, weather conditions, points in the academic calendar, absence of key personnel, and various school events);
- ❖ Be consistent with common emergency management terminology;
- ❖ Debrief and develop an after-action report that evaluates results, identifies gaps or shortfalls, and documents lessons learned; and
- ❖ Discuss how the school EOP and procedures will be modified, if needed, and specify who has the responsibility for modifying the plan.

For additional information on conducting exercises, please see the *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Guide* at https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP10.aspx.

Review, Revise, and Maintain the Plan

This step closes the loop in the planning process. It focuses on adding the information gained from exercising the plan to the research collected in Step 2, starting the planning cycle over again. Remember, planning is a continuous process even after the plan is published. Plans should evolve as the school and planning team learn lessons, obtain new information and insights, and update priorities.

Reviews should be a recurring activity. Planning teams should establish a process for reviewing and revising the plan. Many schools review their plans on an annual basis. In no case should any part of a plan go for more than two years without being reviewed and revised.

Some schools have found it useful to review and revise portions instead of reviewing the entire plan at once. Schools may consider reviewing a portion each month or at natural breaks in the academic calendar. Certain events will also provide new information that will be used to inform the plan. Schools should consider reviewing and updating their plans or sections of their plans after

-
- ❖ Actual emergencies;
 - ❖ Changes have been made in policy, personnel, organizational structures, processes, facilities, or equipment;
 - ❖ Formal updates of planning guidance or standards have been finalized;
 - ❖ Formal exercises have taken place;
 - ❖ Changes in the school and surrounding community have occurred;
 - ❖ Threats or hazards change or new ones emerge; or
 - ❖ Ongoing assessments generate new information.

The planning team should ensure that all community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) have the most current version of the school EOP.

PLAN CONTENT

Step 5 of the planning process in this guide introduced a format with three sections for schools to follow in developing a school EOP. This section provides greater detail about what each of the three sections should include and some key considerations in developing the content.

The Basic Plan

The Basic Plan section of the school EOP provides an overview of the school's approach to operations before, during, and after an emergency. This section addresses the overarching activities the school undertakes regardless of the function, threat, or hazard. The content in this section provides a solid foundation for the school's operations. The information in this section should not duplicate information contained in other parts of the plan. Almost all of the information contained in the basic plan should be able to come from the planning team. If the planning team finds that it has to go outside its members for a significant amount of information, it may be an indication that the planning team membership needs to be expanded.

Introductory Material

Introductory material can enhance accountability with community partners, including first responders, local emergency managers, and public and mental health officials, and make a school EOP easier to use. Typical introductory material includes:

- ❖ **Cover Page.** The cover page includes the title of the plan, a date, and the school(s) covered by the plan.
- ❖ **Promulgation Documentor Signature Page.** This document or page contains a signed statement formally recognizing and adopting the school EOP. It gives both the authority and the responsibility to school officials to perform their tasks before, during, or after an incident, and therefore should be signed by the school administrator or another authorizing official.

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- ❖ **Approval and Implementation Page.** The approval and implementation page introduces the plan, outlines its applicability, and indicates that it supersedes all previous plans. It includes a delegation of authority for specific modifications that can be made to the plan and by whom they can be made without the school administrator's signature. It also includes a date and should be signed by the authorized school administrator.
 - ❖ **Record of Changes.** Each update or change to the plan should be tracked. The record of changes, usually in table format, contains, at a minimum, a change number, the date of the change, the name of the person who made the change, and a summary of the change.
 - ❖ **Record of Distribution.** The record of distribution, usually in table format, indicates the title and the name of the person receiving the plan, the agency to which the recipient belongs (either the school office or, if from outside the school, the name of the appropriate government agency or private-sector entity), the date of delivery, and the number of copies delivered. Other relevant information could be considered. The record of distribution can be used to prove that individuals and organizations with specified roles have acknowledged their receipt, review, and/or acceptance of the plan. Copies of the plan can be made available to the public and media without sensitive information, in accordance with public records laws.
 - ❖ **Table of Contents.** The table of contents is a logically ordered, clearly identified layout of the major sections and subsections of the plan that will make finding information within the plan easier.

Purpose and Situation Overview

The Purpose and Situation Overview section includes the following components:

- ❖ **Purpose.** The purpose sets the foundation for the rest of the school EOP. The basic plan's purpose is a general statement of what the school EOP is meant to do. The statement should be supported by a brief synopsis of the basic plan and annexes.
- ❖ **Situation Overview.** The situation section explains why a school EOP is necessary. The situation section covers a general discussion of
 - The threats and hazards that pose a risk to the school and would result in a need to use this plan; and
 - Dependencies on parties outside the school for critical resources.

Concept of Operations

The Concept of Operations section explains in broad terms the school administrator's intent with regard to an operation.

This section is designed to give an overall picture of how the school will protect the students, staff, and visitors, and should

- ❖ Identify those with authority to activate the plan (e.g., school administrators, department heads);
- ❖ Describe the process by which the school coordinates with all appropriate agencies, boards, or divisions within the jurisdiction;
- ❖ Describe how plans take into account the architectural, programmatic, and communication rights of individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs;
- ❖ Identify other response and support agency plans that directly support the implementation of this plan (e.g., city or county EOP, school EOPs from schools co-located on the campus);
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken before an emergency is to prevent, protect from, and mitigate the impact on life or property;
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken during an emergency is to respond to the emergency and minimize its impact on life or property; and
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken after an emergency is to recover from its impact on life or property.

Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

This section provides an overview of the broad roles and responsibilities of school staff, families, guardians, and community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency managers, public and mental health personnel), and of organizational functions *during* all emergencies. It

- ❖ Describes the broad roles and responsibilities of individuals that apply *during*⁷ all emergencies.
 - Individuals that the planning team may wish to include in this section of the plan are principals and other school administrative leaders, teachers, support personnel (e.g., instructional aides, counselors, social workers, psychologists, nurses, maintenance staff, school resource officers [SROs], cafeteria workers, bus drivers), and parents and guardians.
 - The planning team may also wish to include community-based organizations represented in the EOP.

⁷ If the planning team considers the information critical to the successful implementation of the plan, it may identify roles and responsibilities of one or more of these individuals before and after an emergency in addition to during an emergency.

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- The following is an example of the type of information that would be included in the plan to describe the broad roles and responsibilities of teachers during all emergencies.
 - Teachers will be responsible for the supervision of students and shall remain with students until directed otherwise. Teachers' responsibilities include:
 - ✓ directing students to inside or outside assembly areas according to instructions provided by the Incident Commander or designee;
 - ✓ accounting for students when class relocates to an outside or inside assembly area or evacuates to another location;
 - ✓ reporting missing students to the Incident Commander or designee;
 - ✓ obtaining first-aid services for injured students; and if trained and certified in first aid, rendering first aid, if necessary.
 - ❖ Describes informal and formal agreements in place for the quick activation and sharing of resources during an emergency (e.g., evacuation locations to a nearby business' parking lot). Agreements may be between the school and response groups (e.g., fire department, police department), neighboring schools, organizations, and businesses.

Direction, Control, and Coordination

This section describes the framework for all direction, control, and coordination activities. It should explain

- ❖ The ICS structure as used by the school;
- ❖ The relationship between the school EOP and the district, or the broader community's emergency management system; and
- ❖ Who has control of the equipment, resources, and supplies needed to support the school EOP.

Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination

This section addresses the role of information in the successful implementation of the activities that occur before, during, and after an emergency.

- ❖ Identify the type of information that will be helpful in the successful implementation of the activities that occur before, during, and after an emergency, such as
 - Before and during: weather reports, law enforcement alerts, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration radio alerts, crime reports.
 - After: mental health agencies' websites and hotlines, and emergency management and relief agencies websites and hotlines assisting in all aspects of recovery.

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- ❖ For each of the identified types of information, provide answers to the following questions:
 - What is the source of the information?
 - Who analyzes and uses the information?
 - How is the information collected and shared?
 - What is the format for providing the information to those who will use it?
 - When should the information be collected and shared?

Training and Exercises

This section describes the critical training and exercise activities the school will use in support of the plan. This includes the core training objectives and frequency to ensure that staff, students, faculty, parents, and community representatives understand roles, responsibilities, and expectations. This section also establishes the expected frequency of exercises to be conducted by the school. Content may be influenced based on similar requirements at the district and/or local jurisdiction level(s). Exercises may range from basic fire and shelter-in-place drills to full-scale communitywide drills that realistically portray a crisis and show the role the school plays in school district and municipal planning.

Administration, Finance, and Logistics

This section covers general support requirements and the availability of services and support for all types of emergencies, as well as general policies for managing resources. It should identify and reference policies and procedures that exist outside the plan. This section should

- ❖ Identify administrative controls (e.g., budget and acquisition policies and procedures) and requirements that will be used to provide resource and expenditure accountability;
- ❖ Briefly describe how the school will maintain accurate logs of key activities;
- ❖ Briefly describe how vital records (e.g., student records) will be preserved (details may be contained in a Continuity of Operations [COOP] functional annex); and
- ❖ Identify general policies for keeping financial records, tracking resource needs, tracking the source and use of resources, acquiring ownership of resources, and compensating the owners of private property used by the school.

Plan Development and Maintenance

This section discusses the overall approach to planning and the assignment of plan development and maintenance responsibilities. This section

- ❖ Describes the planning process, participants in that process, and how development and revision of different sections of the school EOP (basic plan and annexes) are coordinated before an emergency;

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- ❖ Assigns responsibility for the overall planning and coordination to a specific position or person; and
 - ❖ Provides for a regular cycle of training, evaluating, reviewing, and updating of the school EOP.

Authorities and References

This section provides the legal basis for emergency operations and activities, and includes

- ❖ Lists of laws, statutes, ordinances, executive orders, regulations, and formal agreements relevant to emergencies; and
- ❖ Provisions for the succession of decision-making authority and operational control to ensure that critical emergency functions can be performed in the absence of the school administrator.

Functional Annexes Content

Functional annexes focus on critical operational functions and the courses of action developed to carry them out. This section of the guide describes functional annexes that schools should address in developing a comprehensive, high-quality school EOP. As the planning team assesses the school's needs, it may need to prepare additional or different annexes. Also included in this section are issues the planning team should consider as it develops goals, objectives, and courses of action for these functions. While these are some of the most important issues, they are not meant to constitute an exhaustive list.

While these functions should be described separately, it is important to remember that many functions will occur consecutively. For example, a shelter-in-place during an emergency may be implemented but, if the building is damaged, the school may then initiate an evacuation.

Often, multiple functions will also be performed concurrently. For example, during an evacuation, once students are safely out of the building, the accounting for students, staff, and guests function will begin. The evacuation function, however, will still be in effect as staff or first responders work to locate and evacuate any persons not accounted for.

While functions build upon one another and overlap, it is not necessary to repeat a course of action in one functional annex if it appears in a second functional annex. For example, though an evacuation may lead to reunification, it is not necessary to list a course of action for reunification within the Evacuation Annex.

Evacuation Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action that schools will execute to evacuate school buildings and grounds.

The planning team should consider the following when developing their goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to safely move students and visitors to designated assembly areas from classrooms, outside areas, cafeterias, and other school locations.

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- ❖ How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
 - ❖ How to evacuate students who are not with a teacher or staff member.
 - ❖ How to evacuate individuals with disabilities (along with service animals and assistive devices, e.g., wheelchairs) and others with access and functional needs, including language, transportation, and medical needs.

Lockdown Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action schools will execute to secure school buildings and grounds during incidents that pose an immediate threat of violence in or around the school. The primary objective of a lockdown is to quickly ensure all school staff, students, and visitors are secured in the rooms away from immediate danger.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to lock all exterior doors, and when it may or may not be safe to do so.
- ❖ How particular classroom and building characteristics (i.e., windows, doors) impact possible lockdown courses of action.
- ❖ What to do when a threat materializes inside the school.
- ❖ When to use the different variations of a lockdown (e.g., when outside activities are curtailed, doors are locked, and visitors are closely monitored, but all other school activities continue as normal).

Shelter-in-Place Annex

A Shelter-in-Place annex focuses on courses of action when students and staff are required to remain indoors, perhaps for an extended period of time, because it is safer inside the building or a room than outside. Depending on the threat or hazard, students and staff may be required to move to rooms that can be sealed (such as in the event of a chemical or biological hazard) or without windows, or to a weather shelter (such as in the event of a tornado).

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ What supplies will be needed to seal the room and to provide for the needs of students and staff (e.g., water).
- ❖ How a shelter-in-place can affect individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, such as students who require the regular administration of medication, durable medical equipment, and personal assistant services.
- ❖ How to move students when the primary route is unusable.
- ❖ How to locate and move students who are not with a teacher or staff member.

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- ❖ Consider the need for and integration of “safe rooms” for protection against extreme wind hazards (such as a tornado or hurricane) in order to provide immediate life-safety protection when evacuation is not an option.

Accounting for All Persons Annex

This annex focuses on developing courses of action for accounting for the whereabouts and well-being of students, staff, and visitors, and identifying those who may be missing.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How staff will determine who is in attendance at the assembly area.
- ❖ What to do when a student, staff member, or guest cannot be located.
- ❖ How staff will report to the assembly supervisor.
- ❖ How and when students will be dismissed or released.

Communications and Warning Annex

The Communications and Warning annex includes communication and coordination during emergencies and disasters (both internal communication and communication with external stakeholders), as well as the communication of emergency protocols before an emergency and communication after an emergency.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How the school’s communications system integrates into the local disaster and response law enforcement communication networks (e.g., fire department and law enforcement staff).
- ❖ How to ensure relevant staff members can operate communications equipment.
- ❖ How the school will communicate with students, families, and the broader community before, during, and after an emergency.
- ❖ How to account for technology barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How to effectively address language access barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How the school will handle the media (e.g., district or school Public Information Officer [PIO]).
- ❖ How impacts on students will be communicated to the community, including the impact on activities related to the school but not necessarily at the school or during regular school hours (i.e., church use of school property and athletic events).

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- ❖ How the school will ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs (e.g., coordinating with first responders and local emergency managers to provide sign language interpreters for use during press conferences, publishing only accessible documents, ensuring information on websites is accessible).

Family Reunification Annex

The Family Reunification annex details how students will be reunited with their families or guardians.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to inform families and guardians about the reunification process in advance, and how to clearly describe their roles and responsibilities in reunification.
- ❖ How to verify that an adult is authorized to take custody of a student.
- ❖ How to facilitate communication between the parent check-in and the student assembly and reunion areas.
- ❖ How to ensure students do not leave on their own.
- ❖ How to protect the privacy of students and parents from the media.
- ❖ How to reduce confusion during the reunification process.
- ❖ How frequently families will be updated.
- ❖ How to account for technology barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How to effectively address language access barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.

Telling Family Members That Their Loved One Is Missing, Injured, or Killed

When reunification is not possible because a child is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their loved one is missing or has been injured or killed. Law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications, but all parties must understand their roles and responsibilities. This will ensure that parents and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate manner.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. Having trained personnel on hand or immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Counselors should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The school EOP should include pre-identified points of contact (e.g., counselors, police officers) to work with and support family members. These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while children are still missing but also before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long-term.

The school EOP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help in regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. Often, a family that has lost a child may have other children or another child in the school. It is critical that these families and loved ones are supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving child(ren).

The school EOP also should explicitly address how impacted families and children will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from families and students while the emergency is ongoing, and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.

Continuity of Operations (COOP) Annex

This annex describes how a school and district will help ensure that essential functions continue during an emergency and its immediate aftermath. Essential functions include business services (payroll and purchasing), communication (internal and external), computer and systems support, facilities maintenance, safety and security, and continuity of teaching and learning.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How the COOP annex will be designed so that it can be activated at any time and sustained for up to 30 days.

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- ❖ How the COOP annex will set priorities for re-establishing essential functions, such as restoration of school operations, and maintaining the safety and well-being of students and the learning environment.
 - ❖ How the COOP annex will ensure students receive applicable related services in the event of a prolonged closure.

Recovery Annex

This annex describes how schools will recover from an emergency. The four most fundamental kinds of recovery are academic recovery, physical recovery, fiscal recovery, and psychological and emotional recovery.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ Academic recovery
 - When the school should be closed and reopened, and who has the authority to do so.
 - What temporary space(s) the school may use if school buildings cannot be immediately reopened.
 - How to provide alternate educational programming in the event that students cannot physically reconvene.
- ❖ Physical recovery
 - How to document school assets, including physically accessible facilities, in case of damage.
 - Which personnel have expert knowledge of the schools' assets, and how and where they will access records to verify current assets after disaster strikes.
 - How the school will work with utility and insurance companies before an emergency to support a quicker recovery.
- ❖ Fiscal recovery
 - How district leadership will be included (e.g., superintendent, chief business officer, personnel director, and risk manager).
 - How staff will receive timely and factual information regarding returning to work.
 - What sources the school may access for emergency relief funding.
- ❖ Psychological and emotional recovery
 - Who will serve as the team leader.

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- Where counseling and psychological first aid will be provided.
 - How teachers will create a calm and supportive environment for the students, share basic information about the incident, provide psychological first aid (if trained), and identify students and staff who may need immediate crisis counseling.
 - Who will provide trained counselors.
 - How to address the immediate, short-, and long-term counseling needs of students, staff, and families.
 - How to handle commemorations, memorial activities, or permanent markers and/or memorial structures (if any will be allowed). This includes concerns such as when a commemoration site will be closed, what will be done with notes and tributes, and how students will be informed in advance.
 - How memorial activities will strike a balance among honoring the loss, resuming school and class routines and schedules, and maintaining hope for the future.
 - How the Public Health, Medical and Mental Health annex will inform the actions and plans of the Recovery annex.

Public Health, Medical, and Mental Health Annex

This annex describes the courses of action that the school will implement to address emergency medical (e.g., first aid), public health, and mental health counseling issues. Schools should coordinate these efforts with the appropriate emergency medical services, public health, mental health, law enforcement, fire department, and emergency management representatives. Mental health needs after an emergency will be addressed in the Recovery annex.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ What the role of staff members is in providing first aid during an emergency.
- ❖ Where emergency medical supplies (e.g., first aid kits, AEDs) will be located and who is responsible for purchasing and maintaining those materials.
- ❖ Which staff have relevant training or experience, such as in first aid or CPR.
- ❖ How the school will secure a sufficient number of counselors in the event of an emergency.
- ❖ How the school will promptly share and report information about outbreaks or epidemics or other unusual medical situations to the local health department.
- ❖ How the school will support the needs of students identified by the threat assessment team.

Security Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action that schools will implement on a routine, ongoing basis to secure the school from criminal threats originating from both inside and outside the school. This includes efforts done in conjunction with law enforcement personnel.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How agreements with law enforcement agencies address the daily role of law enforcement officers in and around school.
- ❖ How to make sure the building is physically secure (including implementation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design [CPTED]).

CPTED Principles

Natural surveillance – arranging physical features to maximize visibility

Natural access control – guiding people with signage, well-marked entrances and exits, and landscaping while limiting access to certain areas by using real or symbolic barriers

Territoriality reinforcement – clearly delineating space, expressing pride and ownership, and creating a welcoming environment

Management and maintenance – ensuring building services function properly and safely, and the exterior is properly maintained and organized with landscaping and plantings maintained and trimmed

The American Clearinghouse on Educational Facilities, available at <http://www.acefacilities.org>, provides additional information describing how CPTED can be applied in the school environment.

- ❖ How to get students to and from school safely (including traffic control and pedestrian safety).
- ❖ How to keep prohibited items out of school.
- ❖ How to respond to threats identified by the behavioral threat assessment team.
- ❖ How information will be shared with law enforcement officers or other responders (keeping in mind any requirements or limitations of applicable privacy laws, including the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 [FERPA]*, the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [HIPAA]*, and civil rights and other laws. More information on *FERPA* and *HIPAA* can be found in “A Closer Look, Information Sharing”).

Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes

The Threat- and Hazard-specific annexes describe the courses of action unique to particular threats and hazards. Courses of action already outlined in a Functional annex need not be

repeated in a Hazard-Specific annex. Schools will develop these based on the prioritized list of hazards determined in the assessment process. As planning teams develop courses of action for threats and hazards, they should consider the federal, state, and local regulations or mandates that often apply to specific hazards.

If there is a Functional annex that applies to one of the threat or hazard annexes, the latter will include it by reference. For example, if a “during” course of action for a fire hazard involves evacuation, and there is an evacuation annex, the Fire annex would indicate “see Evacuation annex” in the “during” course of action section rather than repeat the evacuation courses of action in the Fire annex.

Table 3: Threat and Hazard Types and Examples

Threat and Hazard Type	Examples
Natural Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Earthquakes • Tornadoes • Lightning • Severe wind • Hurricanes • Floods • Wildfires • Extreme temperatures • Landslides or mudslides • Tsunamis • Volcanic eruptions • Winter precipitation
Technological Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explosions or accidental release of toxins from industrial plants • Accidental release of hazardous materials from within the school, such as gas leaks or laboratory spills • Hazardous materials releases from major highways or railroads • Radiological releases from nuclear power stations • Dam failure • Power failure • Water failure
Biological Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infectious diseases, such as pandemic influenza, extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, <i>Staphylococcus aureus</i>, and meningitis • Contaminated food outbreaks, including <i>Salmonella</i>, botulism, and <i>E. coli</i> • Toxic materials present in school laboratories
Adversarial, Incidental, and Human-caused Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire • <i>Active shooters</i> • Criminal threats or actions • Gang violence • Bomb threats • Domestic violence and abuse • Cyber attacks • Suicide

A CLOSER LOOK

This section of the guide provides users with information on four key topics to enhance the implementation of their Emergency Operations Plans (EOP). These topics are described in the following chapters:

- ❖ “Information Sharing” provides an overview of the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act*, the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act*, and the implications that these federal statutes may have for information-sharing in the emergency planning process.
- ❖ “Psychological First Aid for Schools” (PFA-S) describes this type of aid and how schools can use it to help students, staff, and families during and immediately after a traumatic incident.
- ❖ “School Climate and Emergencies” describes how a positive school climate provides students with ready access to emotional and behavioral supports that can affect the capacity of students and staff to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies.
- ❖ “*Active Shooter Situations*” describes unique challenges involved in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a school-based shooting.

1. Information Sharing

This section of “A Closer Look” provides an overview of the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)* and the implications that this and other federal statutes have for information-sharing in the emergency planning process. This section also provides a brief overview of the more limited circumstances when the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)* may apply to impact information-sharing in the school setting.

While it is critical that schools comply with these laws, there is often confusion about their applicability, which results in schools sharing less than allowed with law enforcement officers or the appropriate authorities even when there is appropriate cause for sharing information. If schools understand when and how these laws apply, they can both ensure public safety and protect student privacy.

While this section of the guide focuses on *FERPA*, and to a lesser extent *HIPAA*, there may be federal and state civil rights and other laws that place restrictions on when and with whom schools may share information. At the federal level, for instance, public elementary and secondary schools are subject to federal civil rights laws, including laws that prohibit discrimination based on disability (the *Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]*), and *Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973*); race, color, and national origin (*Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*); sex (*Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*); and religion (*Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*). For example, *Section 504 and Title II of the ADA*⁸ prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability, and generally would prohibit unnecessary disclosures of disability status or information related to that disability, to third parties.⁹ Disclosures may be necessary when the student presents a significant, articulable threat to others.¹⁰

Schools are strongly urged to take the time to review these laws, as well as others that apply in their jurisdictions, when working with their community partners to ensure that all parties have a strong understanding of applicable laws when deciding whether to disclose information. In particular, it is critical to train school employees, including contractors, on applicable laws to ensure that schools, school officials, or employees do not release information inappropriately or make decisions about students or release of records based upon myths, fears, or stereotypes related to race, color, national origin, sex, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity.¹¹

⁸ *Title II of the ADA* prohibits discrimination based on disability by public entities, including public schools.

⁹ See 34 CFR § 104.4; 28 CFR § 35.130; “Dear Colleague Letter” and “Frequently Asked Questions on Report Cards and Transcripts for Students with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools,” October 2008. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20081017.pdf>.

¹⁰ See 28 CFR 35.139.

¹¹ For more information about applicable civil rights statutes, please visit www.justice.gov/crt, www.ed.gov/ocr or www.ada.gov. Information about appropriate training and management for school resource officers and law enforcement officials in schools may be found at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)

In this section:

- What Is *FERPA*?
- What Are “Education Records?”
- Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records?
- Balancing Safety and Privacy
 - The Health and Safety Emergency Exception to the Consent Requirement
 - The Law Enforcement Unit Record Exception to the Definition of Education Records
 - Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings
 - Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations
- Incorporating *FERPA* Into Your Emergency Planning Process
 - What Information Is *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?
 - What Information Is Not *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?
- Frequently Asked Questions Pertaining to *FERPA*
- *FERPA* Guidance and Resources

What Is *FERPA*?

FERPA is a federal law that protects the privacy of student *education records*. The law applies to all educational agencies and institutions that receive funds under any U.S. Department of Education program (termed “schools” below). *FERPA* gives parents certain rights with respect to their children's education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she reaches the age of 18 or attends a school beyond the high school level. Students to whom the rights have transferred are “eligible students.” The Family Policy Compliance Office at the U.S. Department of Education administers *FERPA*.

FERPA protects the rights of parents or eligible students to

- ❖ Inspect and review education records;
- ❖ Seek to amend education records; and
- ❖ Consent to the disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) from education records, except as specified by law.

For a thorough review of *FERPA*, in addition to what is provided in this document, please see the implementing regulations for *FERPA*, found in Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 99, and the resources and guidance documents listed at the end of this section.

What Are “Education Records?”

Different types of records and information may be protected by *FERPA* if determined to be “education records.” Education records are protected by *FERPA* and are broadly defined as records that are directly related to a student and maintained by an educational agency or institution, or by a party acting for the agency or institution.

The non-exhaustive chart below shows several examples of what types of records generally *are* and *are not* considered to be education records.

Education Records	Not Education Records
Transcripts	Records that are kept in the sole possession of the maker and used only as personal memory aids
Disciplinary records	Law enforcement unit records
Standardized test results	Grades on peer-graded papers before they are collected and recorded by a teacher
Health (including mental health) and family history records	Records created or received by a school after an individual is no longer in attendance and that are not directly related to the individual's attendance at the school
Records on services provided to students under the <i>Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)</i>	Employee records that relate exclusively to an individual in that individual's capacity as an employee
Records on services and accommodations provided to students under <i>Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973</i> and <i>Title II of the ADA</i> ¹²	Information obtained through a school official's personal knowledge or observation and not from the student's education records

See the discussion under “Balancing Safety and Privacy” below for more detail on law enforcement units under *FERPA*, what constitutes a law enforcement unit record, and how these records may be used.

Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records?

“School officials with a legitimate educational interest” may access *FERPA*-protected education records. Schools determine the criteria for who is considered a school official with a legitimate

¹² Schools should also consider carefully whether information they are requiring for student enrollment in services, including special education services, will tend to identify a student as a person with a disability and determine to what extent laws other than *FERPA* should be considered before release of that information without consent. In addition, release of details about some disabilities or accommodations that permit the student to be identified could constitute discrimination on the basis of disability pursuant to the *ADA* or the *Rehabilitation Act* or other civil rights statutes.

educational interest under *FERPA* regulations, and it generally includes teachers, counselors, school administrators, and other school staff.

The term “school official with a legitimate educational interest” may also include contractors, consultants, volunteers, and other parties if those individuals

- ❖ Perform an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees;
- ❖ Are under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and
- ❖ Are subject to the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.33(a), which specifies that individuals who receive information from education records may use the information only for the purposes for which the disclosure was made and which generally prohibits the redisclosure of PII from education records to any other party without the prior consent of the parent or eligible student. There are, however, exceptions to this prohibition.

In addition, schools must annually notify parents and eligible students of their rights under *FERPA*, and must include in this notification the criteria for who constitutes a school official and what constitutes a legitimate educational interest. The U.S. Department of Education provides model notification statements on its website at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/FERPA/lea-officials.html>.¹³

This means that if a school wishes to consider non-employee members of its threat assessment team (TAT), its contracted counseling, nursing, service, or security staff, its school resource officers (SROs), and other non-employees as “school officials” who may have access to education records, the school must ensure that these individuals meet the criteria in the bullets above and the criteria in the school’s annual notification of *FERPA* rights. Schools are encouraged to train all school officials who may have access to education records, including contractors, on *FERPA* as well as other applicable laws.

Balancing Safety and Privacy

School officials must balance safety interests and student privacy interests. *FERPA* contains exceptions to the general consent requirement, including the “health or safety emergency exception,” and exceptions to the definition of education records, including “law enforcement unit records,” which provide school officials with tools to support this goal.

The Health or Safety Emergency Exception to the Consent Requirement

FERPA generally requires written consent before disclosing PII from a student’s education records to individuals other than his or her parents. However, the *FERPA* regulations permit school officials to disclose PII from education records without consent to appropriate parties only when there is an actual, impending, or imminent emergency, such as an articulable and

¹³ See 34 CFR § 99.7(a)(3)(iii) for further information. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/reg/ferpa/index.html>.

significant threat. Information may be disclosed only to protect the health or safety of students or other individuals. In applying the health and safety exception, note that:

- ❖ Schools have discretion to determine what constitutes a health or safety emergency.
- ❖ “Appropriate parties” typically include law enforcement officials, first responders, public health officials, trained medical personnel, and parents. This *FERPA* exception is temporally limited to the period of the emergency and does not allow for a blanket release of PII. It does not allow disclosures to address emergencies that *might* occur, such as would be the case in emergency preparedness activities.
- ❖ The information that may be disclosed is limited to only PII from an education record that is needed based on the type of emergency.
- ❖ Disclosures based on this exception must be documented in the student’s education records to memorialize the
 - Emergency that formed the basis for the disclosure; and
 - Parties with whom the school shared the PII.

The U.S. Department of Education would not find a school in violation of *FERPA* for disclosing *FERPA*-protected information under the health or safety exception as long as the school had a rational basis, based on the information available at the time, for making its determination that there was an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of the student or other individuals.

For more information on the health or safety exception, see: “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” June 2011, available at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/emergency-guidance.pdf> and 34 CFR §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36.

The Law Enforcement Unit Record Exemption to the Definition of Education Records

FERPA defines a “law enforcement unit” as any individual, office, department, division, or other component of an educational agency or institution, such as a unit of commissioned police officers or non-commissioned security guards, that is officially authorized or designated by that agency or institution to

- (i) Enforce any local, state, or federal law, or refer to appropriate authorities a matter for enforcement of any local, state, or federal law against any individual or organization other than the agency or institution itself; or
- (ii) Maintain the physical security and safety of the agency or institution.

Significantly, to be considered a “law enforcement unit” under this definition, an individual or component must be officially authorized or designated to carry out the functions listed above by the school. Schools may designate a traditional law enforcement entity (such as school security staff, school resource officers [SROs], school safety officers, school police, or other school

security personnel) as a law enforcement unit, or opt to designate another non-law enforcement school official to serve as their law enforcement unit, such as a vice principal or another school official.

FERPA does not prevent schools from disclosing information from records maintained by law enforcement that were created for law enforcement purposes by the law enforcement unit to anyone, subject to state law, including outside law enforcement authorities, without the consent of the parent or eligible student during an emergency or otherwise.

Law enforcement unit records, which are not subject to the *FERPA* consent requirements, are defined as records that are

- ❖ Created by a law enforcement unit;
- ❖ Created for a law enforcement purpose; and
- ❖ Maintained by the law enforcement unit.

Law enforcement unit records *do not* include

- ❖ Records created by a law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose that are maintained by a component of the school other than the law enforcement unit, such as a principal or guidance counselor;
- ❖ Health records or PII collected about or related to the disability of a student, including information about providing an accommodation; and
- ❖ Records created and maintained by a law enforcement unit exclusively for a non-law enforcement purpose, such as a school disciplinary action or proceeding.

In designating a law enforcement unit and using law enforcement unit records, note that

- ❖ To be given access to PII from a student's education records, law enforcement unit officials who are employed by the school must meet the criteria set forth in the school's *FERPA* notification for school officials with a legitimate educational interest. While law enforcement unit officials are not required to be school officials under *FERPA*, many schools have found that it is useful for them to be school officials so that they may access education records that may be necessary to ensure school safety. For instance, if a student has been suspended for a period of time (a fact that would be recorded in the student's education records), the law enforcement unit could need to know this in case the student attempts to enter the building when not permitted to do so.
- ❖ A school's law enforcement unit officials must protect the privacy of education records they receive and may disclose them only in compliance with *FERPA*. For that reason, we recommend that law enforcement unit records be maintained separately from education records.

For more information on law enforcement unit records and *FERPA*, refer to the following sources:

- ❖ “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” June 2011
<http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/emergency-guidance.pdf>
- ❖ The discussion in the preamble to the final rule in the Federal Register published Dec. 9, 2008, starting on page 74836
<http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2008-4/120908a.pdf>
- ❖ Family Policy Compliance Office website
<http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/index.html>
- ❖ The regulatory definition of “Law Enforcement Unit” under *FERPA* in 34 CFR § 99.8(a) available at <http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=ae535d41f8bb03bedfef79634883360f&n=34y1.1.1.1.33&r=PART&ty=HTML#34:1.1.1.1.33.1.132.8>

Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings

School administrators and their partner organizations must understand *FERPA* and its implications because misinterpretations of the law and subsequent delays in information-sharing can hinder first responders’ efforts to provide necessary assistance in a health or safety emergency.

Sharing Personal Observation or Knowledge

Misinterpreting *FERPA* can lead school administrators to miss opportunities to share crucial information that could prevent an emergency situation. For instance, some schools incorrectly believe that information obtained from a school official’s personal observations or knowledge is protected by *FERPA*. In fact, personal observation or knowledge is generally not considered to be part of the student’s education records (see “What Are ‘Education Records’” above) and therefore may be disclosed. For example, if a teacher overhears a student making threatening remarks to other students, the teacher is not prohibited from sharing that information with appropriate authorities, including the parents of the students who were threatened.

However, if a school official learns of information about a student through his or her official role in creating or maintaining an education record, then that information would be covered by *FERPA*. For instance, if a principal suspends a student, the principal would not be permitted to non-consensually disclose that information (unless the disclosure met one of the exceptions in *FERPA* to consent) because he or she gained personal knowledge of that information in making that disciplinary determination.

Releasing Directory Information

In some circumstances, schools may be able to disclose “directory information” to prevent an emergency situation. Directory information means information contained in a student’s education record that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed. Some examples of directory information include a student’s name, address, telephone number, or e-mail address. Schools must follow certain requirements in publicly designating “directory information,” and they may not disclose directory information from a student’s

education record if the parent or eligible student has opted out of allowing that disclosure. For example, assuming that the parents' cell phone numbers have been properly designated as "directory information," what if the parents have not opted out of the disclosure of such "directory information," and a flood displaced families from their homes and these children are brought to a shelter? The school may disclose those parents' cell phone numbers to an emergency management agency that is trying to locate the parents.

Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations

FERPA has implications in a variety of different situations, and new questions arise as schools become more creative and innovative in developing their campus safety plans. In many cases, however, it is helpful to review the *FERPA* basics to help you clearly think through each scenario. The following are some scenarios that may arise.

❖ Infectious Disease

Under the health or safety emergency exception, school officials may, without consent, disclose PII from education records to appropriate parties in connection with an emergency. In the case of an influenza outbreak, for instance, if school officials determine that an emergency exists, they may share immunization records with parties such as state and local public health officials whose knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of students or others in the school community. Under this exception, schools may share information only during the limited period of time connected with the emergency. A blanket release of information is not allowed. You must instead determine what information to disclose on a case-by-case basis depending on the particular threat.

❖ Threat Assessment Teams

Some educational agencies and institutions may need assistance in determining whether a health or safety emergency exists for purposes of complying with *FERPA*. Federal agencies encourage schools to implement a threat assessment program, including the establishment of a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that utilizes the expertise of representatives from mental health service providers, persons familiar with emergency procedures, and law enforcement agencies in the community.

The threat assessment team must comply with applicable civil rights and other federal and state laws. Under a properly implemented threat assessment program, schools can respond to student behavior that raises safety concerns that are not based on assumptions, stereotypes, or myths about people with disabilities (including mental health-related disabilities) or people of a particular race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sex.

If a threat assessment team member meets the definition of a school official (as a party to whom the school has outsourced administrative functions or services) with a legitimate educational interest under *FERPA*, (see "Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records" above), then he or she would be able to access students' education records in which he or she has legitimate educational interests. A threat assessment team member who is appropriately designated as a school official, however, may not disclose PII from

education records to anyone without consent or unless one of the exceptions to consent under *FERPA*, such as the health or safety emergency exception, applies.

❖ **Security Videos**

Schools are increasingly using security cameras as a tool to monitor and improve student safety. Images of students captured on security videotapes that are created and maintained by the school's law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose are not considered education records under *FERPA*. Accordingly, these videotapes may be shared with parents of students whose images are on the video and with outside law enforcement authorities, as appropriate.

Incorporating *FERPA* Into Your Emergency Planning Process

Below are critical questions and concepts that schools should discuss with their community partners while in the process of developing or revising an emergency management plan. While building partnerships is critical, in gathering information to support these partnerships, schools must also take steps to consider student privacy and civil rights and other laws as well as their mission of safety. Be sure to refer to the sections elsewhere in this guidance to review any concepts with which you are unfamiliar.

What Information Is *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?

Education records are protected by *FERPA*, and schools may generally only PII from those records only with written consent from a parent or eligible student, unless a *FERPA* exception to consent applies. (See “What Are ‘Education Records’” above.) The following are examples of such exceptions.

Example: At the start of flu season, your local public health agency requests the names of those students showing influenza-like symptoms, as well as their parents’ contact information. You know that you may not disclose PII from a student’s education records without consent if there is not a health or safety emergency or another exception to consent under *FERPA* that applies. So, to facilitate this sharing of information, you opt to develop a consent form that identifies students’ names and parent contact information as specific PII from student education records. And you would like to share the form with the local public health agency, as well as the purpose of the disclosure. The form gives parents and eligible students the option to allow or to not allow this sharing of information. After collecting the signed and dated consent forms, for the students for whom you received consent you begin to share with the local health agency the names of students who are showing influenza-like symptoms and their parents’ contact information. Your purpose of this sharing of PII is to help so the health agency is able to conduct real-time surveillance to prevent the spread of the illness. (See “What Is *FERPA*” above.)

Example: Your school’s threat assessment team includes representatives from your community partners, and you have properly designated them as “school officials with a legitimate educational interest.” (See “Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Records” above.) The local law enforcement representative on your team does not share with his police chief or other law enforcement official the PII that he obtains from a student’s

education records in his capacity as a threat assessment team member while working to identify possible threats because he knows that this is not permitted. Several months after the threat assessment team initially convened to review a collection of behaviors and communications concerning a particular student and determined that there was not sufficient information demonstrating that the student posed a threat, the team learns that the student has now communicated his intent to harm the school principal. At this juncture, the law enforcement representative (and other members of the threat assessment team) shares pertinent PII from education records with appropriate parties so they can take steps, such as consulting with a police agency, to protect the health or safety of the principal (in this case). (See also the discussion of threat assessment teams under “Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations” above.)

Example: At the beginning of the school year, your school notified parents and eligible students that you had designated students’ names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses as “directory information,” explaining to them that you would disclose this information upon request to anyone contacting the school. In your notice, you explained how and by when they could opt out. When a reporter contacts your institution requesting the directory information about a student who is under 18, you check to see whether the student’s parents opted out of the disclosure of directory information. Because the student’s parents did not opt out of the school’s directory information policy, you provide that directory information to the reporter. (See “Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings” above.)

Example: A student has a severe allergic reaction to peanuts during lunch. The school nurse administers epinephrine and then calls an ambulance in accordance with applicable federal and state laws. When the emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrive, the nurse discloses PII from the student’s education record to the EMTs without obtaining parental consent under the health or safety emergency exception. (See “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.)

What Information Is Not *FERPA*-Protected and When May the School Share It?

Records that are created and maintained by a school’s law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose are not protected by *FERPA*, and there are no *FERPA* restrictions on the sharing of information in law enforcement unit records. (See “What Are ‘Education Records’” and “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.)

Example: Your school contracts with the law enforcement agency in your county to bring in an SRO and you properly designate the officer as a “school official with a legitimate educational interest.” (See “Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Records?” above.) You also properly designate the SRO as your school’s law enforcement unit. (See “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.) The SRO knows that she may not redisclose to her home agency PII that she obtains from a student’s education records while serving in her SRO capacity, unless there is a health or safety emergency or another *FERPA* exception to consent that would apply. However, she shares her law enforcement unit records about a student who was arrested for smoking marijuana on campus with other law enforcement officials because she knows that law enforcement unit records are not protected by *FERPA*.

Are Processes and Protocols, Including Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), in Place for Information Sharing and Record Keeping That Comply With *FERPA*?

It is important for schools to consider entering into MOUs with law enforcement and their other community partners to formalize roles, responsibilities, and protocols. MOUs can be tailored to the needs of the individual schools in the jurisdiction. Any policies regarding information sharing between the school and the law enforcement agency, however, must comply with applicable federal, state, and local laws, including *FERPA*. While information-sharing MOUs should be developed regarding what information can be shared between departments and what information is protected, no provision in an MOU can override a school's obligations under *FERPA*.

Frequently Asked Questions Pertaining to *FERPA*

Q: To what entities does *FERPA* apply?

A: *FERPA* applies to educational agencies and institutions that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Department of Education. This includes virtually all public schools and school districts, and most private and public postsecondary institutions, including medical and other professional schools.

Private and religious schools at the elementary and secondary school levels generally do not receive funds from the U.S. Department of Education and, therefore, are not subject to *FERPA*.

Q: Does an interagency agreement with partners such as the state or local health department enable a school to non-consensually disclose education records?

A: No. Interagency agreements do not supersede the consent requirements under *FERPA*. Although an interagency agreement would be a helpful tool for planning purposes, schools must comply with *FERPA*'s requirements regarding the disclosure of PII from students' education records.

Q: Under the health or safety emergency exception, may a school non-consensually disclose PII from a student's education records to the media?

A: No, you generally may not disclose *FERPA*-protected information to the media. While the media play a role in alerting the community of a health epidemic or a violent incident outbreak, they generally do not have a role in protecting the health or safety of individual students or others at the school.

Q: When would the health or safety exception apply?

A: Under *FERPA*, an emergency means a situation in which there is an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of students or other individuals. This determination must be made by the school.

Q: Do I need to tell parents and eligible students or otherwise document when I have disclosed PII from their education records without consent under a health or safety emergency?

A: Within a reasonable period of time after a disclosure is made under the health or safety exception, a school must record in the student's education records the articulable and significant threat that formed the basis for the disclosure, and the parties to whom the information was disclosed. Parents and eligible students have a right to inspect and review the record of disclosure, but do not need to be proactively informed that records have been disclosed.

Q: Can members of our threat assessment team have access to student education records?

A: School officials with legitimate educational interests may have access to a student's education records. Members of a threat assessment team who are not school employees may be designated as such if they are under the direct control of the school with respect to the maintenance and use of PII from education records; are subject to the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of PII from education records; and otherwise meet the school's criteria for being school officials with legitimate educational interests.

Members of a threat assessment team who are considered school officials with a legitimate educational interest generally cannot non-consensually redisclose PII from a student's education records to which he or she was privy as part of the team. However, if a threat assessment team determines that a health or safety emergency exists, members may non-consensually redisclose PII from a student's education records on behalf of the school to appropriate officials under the health or safety emergency exception.

For example, a representative from the city police who serves on a school's threat assessment team generally could not redisclose, without consent, PII from a student's education records to the city police during the initial discussions about a particular student. However, once the threat assessment team determines that a health or safety emergency exists, as defined under *FERPA*, the representative may redisclose, without consent, PII from a student's education records on behalf of the school to appropriate officials. (See the discussion under "Additional Situations with *FERPA* Considerations" above.)

Q: How does *FERPA* interact with the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)*?

A: The U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services jointly developed guidance on the application of *FERPA* and *HIPAA*. This guidance explains that records that are protected by *FERPA* are exempt from the *HIPAA* Privacy Rule. Accordingly, school officials must follow the requirements of *FERPA* with regard to the disclosure of records protected by *FERPA*. Please see the guidance at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf> for more information, as well as the *HIPAA* guidance in this "A Closer Look" section.

Q: Who should I contact for more information related to *FERPA*?

A: The U.S. Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office is available to respond to any questions about *FERPA*. For quick responses to routine questions, please e-mail the Department of Education at FERPA@ed.gov. For more in-depth technical assistance or a more formal response, you may call the Family Policy Compliance Office at 202-260-3887 or write to them at

Family Policy Compliance Office
U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20202-8520

Q: What are some of the other federal and state laws relating to emergency management planning that are relevant to access to and sharing of information about students?

A: As noted in the introduction to this “A Closer Look” section, schools may also be subject to federal and state civil rights laws that protect the disclosure of information about students. Schools and their community partners should review guidance from the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice on any applicable civil rights or other statutes governing privacy and information sharing and discuss their implications for emergency management and related planning processes. At a minimum, in determining what constitutes an “emergency,” schools and their partners must base their decisions on actual risks and not on assumptions, stereotypes, fears, or myths about people with disabilities (including mental health-related disabilities) or people of a particular race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sex.^{14, 15}

***FERPA* Guidance and Resources**

The Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) at the U.S. Department of Education administers *FERPA*. FPCO has developed, and continues to develop, extensive guidance pertaining to the implementation of *FERPA* and emergency situations. For more detailed information or additional guidance, please see the documents below and the FPCO website at www.ed.gov/fpc.

¹⁴ See Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 35.139.

¹⁵ In enacting the *Americans with Disabilities Act*, Congress relied on *School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline*, 480 U.S. 273, (1987) to “acknowledge[] that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” As explained in the preamble to the Justice Department’s 1991 *ADA* regulation, codification of the *Arline* standard was deemed essential if the *ADA* is to achieve its goal of protecting disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to legitimate concerns, such as the need to avoid exposing others to significant health and safety risks. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, sec. 36.208. This rationale applies with equal force to making determinations based on stereotypes about other characteristics protected by *Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)

In this section:

- What Is *HIPAA*?
- How Does *HIPAA* Apply in Schools?
- *HIPAA* Guidance and Resources

What Is *HIPAA*?

The *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)* and its implementing regulations, commonly known as the *HIPAA* Privacy Rule and the *HIPAA* Security Rule, protect the privacy and security of individually identifiable health information, called protected health information or PHI, held by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and most health care providers, collectively known as covered entities, and their business associates (entities that have access to individuals' health information to perform work on behalf of a covered entity).

The Privacy Rule, or *Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information*, establishes national standards to protect the privacy of individuals' identifiable health information. In doing so, the Privacy Rule sets forth the circumstances under which covered entities and their business associates may use or disclose an individual's health information, requires safeguards to protect the information, and gives individuals rights, including rights to examine and obtain a copy of their health records and to request corrections.

A major goal of the Privacy Rule is to ensure that individuals' health information is properly protected while allowing the flow of health information needed to provide and promote high quality health care and to protect the public's health and well-being. Given that the health care marketplace is diverse, the Privacy Rule is designed to be flexible and comprehensive to cover the variety of uses and disclosures that need to be addressed.

The *Security Rule*, or *Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information*, establishes a national set of security standards for protecting health information that is held or transferred in electronic form. The Security Rule sets out the technical, administrative, and physical safeguards that covered entities and business associates must put in place to secure individuals' electronic health information. The Security Rule is designed to be flexible and scalable, and technology neutral, so a covered entity or business associate can implement policies, procedures, and technologies that are appropriate for the entity's particular size, organizational structure, and risks to consumers' electronic health information.

The HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has responsibility for administering and enforcing the Privacy and Security Rules.

How Does *HIPAA* Apply in Schools?

Generally, *HIPAA* does not apply to student health information maintained by a school. While schools and school districts may maintain student health records, these records are in most cases not protected by *HIPAA*. Rather, student health information maintained at a school would be considered education records protected by the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)*.

HIPAA may apply however to patient records at a university hospital, which may include records on students and non-students, or to the health records of non-students at a university health clinic.

During the emergency planning process, if you believe health information to which access may be needed is covered by *HIPAA*, you should consult the guidance and resources below for further information about how *HIPAA* applies.

***HIPAA* Guidance and Resources**

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has developed, and continues to develop, extensive guidance pertaining to the implementation of *HIPAA* Privacy Rule and emergency situations. The OCR website has guidance about the intersection between *HIPAA* and *FERPA* and the release of PHI for common emergency preparedness issues and public health purposes, such as terrorism preparedness and outbreak investigations. For more detailed information or additional guidance, please see the HHS OCR website at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/index.html> and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/U.S. Department of Education *HIPAA/FERPA* guide at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/hipaaferpajointguide.pdf>

2. Psychological First Aid for Schools (PFA-S)

Psychological First Aid for Schools (PFA-S) is an evidence-informed intervention model to assist students, staff, and families in the immediate aftermath of an emergency and can be used by any trained staff member or community partner. Trauma-related distress can have a long-term impact. PFA-S uses brief interventions to produce positive results that last. PFA-S is designed to reduce the initial distress caused by emergencies, allows for the expression of difficult feelings and assists students in developing coping strategies and constructive actions to deal with fear and anxiety. A growing body of research shows that there are brief, effective interventions that have a long-lasting positive influence on trauma-related distress.

PFA-S is intended for students, school personnel, and families who have been exposed to a disaster or other emergency. Whether an emergency occurs on school grounds or in the community at large, schools serve as a central location for professionals to assist children, families, school personnel, and school partners.

PFA-S is most effective immediately following or even during an incident. In some circumstances, assuming the safety of students and staff has been ensured, PFA-S can be initiated while an incident is still occurring, such as in shelter-in-place or lockdown situations.

Students and staff may experience a broad range of reactions (e.g., physical, cognitive, psychological, behavioral, spiritual) to an emergency. Some of these reactions can cause distress

that interferes with adaptive coping. Support from informed, compassionate, and caring professionals can help students and staff members recover from these reactions. PFA-S has the potential to decrease the likelihood of mental health problems or long-term difficulties by identifying individuals who may need additional services and linking them to such services as needed.¹⁶

PFA-S assists students, staff, and families by

- ❖ Establishing a positive connection in a non-intrusive, compassionate manner;
- ❖ Enhancing immediate and ongoing safety and providing physical and emotional comfort;
- ❖ Calming and orienting those who are emotionally overwhelmed or distraught;
- ❖ Helping to identify their immediate needs and concerns and offering practical assistance and information to help address these needs and concerns;
- ❖ Empowering individuals to take an active role in their recovery by acknowledging their coping efforts and strengths, and supporting adaptive coping; and,
- ❖ When appropriate, linking those in need to other relevant school or community resources such as school counseling services, peer support programs, afterschool activities, tutoring, primary care physicians, local recovery systems, mental health services, employee assistance programs, public-sector services, and other relief organizations.

Training School Staff

Because PFA-S is not psychotherapy, an extended “treatment,” or a stand-alone mental health intervention, any trained staff member, regardless of whether he or she has had formal mental health training, can deliver aspects of PFA-S and can contribute to the school recovery by functioning within the PFA framework. Schools can find training resources, including the PFA-S Field Operations Guide, at <http://www.nctsn.org/content/psychological-first-aid-schoolspfa>. Similarly, trained members of community emergency response agencies and mental health professionals may provide PFA-S. During and after an emergency, teachers and other staff are a critical link in promoting resilience, in recognizing the signs of traumatic stress, and in helping students and their families regain a sense of normalcy.

3. School Climate and Emergencies

“School climate” describes a range of campus conditions, including safety, relationships and engagement, and the environment, that may influence student learning and well-being. Positive school climates that promote student learning and well-being often feature

- ❖ Safe environments free of violence, bullying, harassment, and substance use;

¹⁶ Melissa Brymer, Matt Taylor, Pia Escudero, Anne Jacobs, Mindy Kronenberg, Robert Macy, Lou Ann Mock, Linda Payne, Robert Pynoos, and Juliet Vogel, *Psychological First Aid For Schools: Field Operations Guide, 2nd Edition*. Los Angeles: National Child Traumatic Stress Network, 2012.

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- ❖ Appropriate facilities and physical surroundings;
 - ❖ Supportive academic settings;
 - ❖ Clear and fair disciplinary policies;
 - ❖ Respectful, trusting, and caring relationships throughout the school community; and
 - ❖ Available social, emotional, and behavioral supports.

Positive school climates are inclusive of and responsive to students of all backgrounds, regardless of race, color, national origin, language, disability, religion, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

Research shows that creating positive school climates can help districts, schools, and teachers meet key goals, including: boosting student achievement and closing achievement gaps; increasing high school graduation rates; decreasing teacher turnover and increasing teacher satisfaction; and turning around low-performing schools. Positive school climates also enhance safety in the school and community by increasing communication between students, families, and faculty. At the same time, schools reduce various forms of harm to students that can stem from negative school climates, including violence, bullying, and even suicide.

A positive school climate that provides students with ready access to emotional and behavioral supports can affect the capacity of students and staff to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies.

Prevention

A positive school climate can help to prevent emergencies because it can reduce the incidence of behaviors that can contribute to crisis (e.g., violence, bullying, harassment, substance abuse). Further, schools with positive school climates engage students in developing strong relationships with staff and peers, increasing the likelihood that students will quickly report potential threats to trusted adults within the school.

Response

Schools with positive school climates teach students the social and emotional competencies that enable them to develop persistence, tolerance of frustration, and ability to manage their emotions during an emergency. The teachers, counselors, school resources officers, and other staff who create positive school climates train regularly on child and adolescent development, and on how to respond appropriately to a variety of student behaviors so they are able to de-escalate aggressive behavior before it becomes a threat to school safety.

Recovery

A positive school climate can help in the recovery from an emergency because it represents a commitment, even prior to an emergency, to providing emotional and mental health services and supports to all members of the community. Schools with such a climate create an environment that recognizes the importance of social and emotional health, and so support the recovery of all members of the school community and promote an understanding that individual needs will vary in a post-emergency situation.

The following steps when implemented as part of a single, comprehensive, and integrated strategy for improving student health and safety will help schools promote a positive school climate.

Conduct a Comprehensive Needs Assessment

School communities are complex systems that include multiple stakeholders and interconnecting environmental factors that influence student health and safety. As such, comprehensive needs assessments of school climate including school engagement, school safety, and the school environment as elements to be evaluated can provide schools with the data support needed to pursue comprehensive approaches to improving school climate. A comprehensive picture of school health and safety can be created by utilizing needs assessments that include student perceptions and, where appropriate, parent and staff perceptions, to help schools identify key issues in need of attention. By monitoring indicators such as the frequency and severity of student risk behaviors, and perceptions of their safety, schools may identify threats to school safety and then use this information to implement the appropriate intervention or program to improve school safety. These data can be most effective when they are used regularly for decision-making and are disaggregated by different groups to determine how they experience the school environment. If a student survey is used to assess culture and climate, student privacy must be protected, including in accordance with the *Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment*, 20 U.S.C. 1232, if applicable.

A number of these surveys are in the compendium of school climate measures on the National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments' website at <http://safesupportiveschools.ed.gov/index.php?id=133>.

The center also houses archived webinars that provide information on how to use these surveys and the data that they collect. Visit at <http://safesupportiveschools.ed.gov/index.php?id=65>.

Use Multi-Tiered Interventions and Supports

School climate can be enhanced by a data-driven, multi-tiered framework that provides a continuum of behavioral supports and interventions to improve student behavior and achievement. A three-tiered framework would comprise the following:

1. Schoolwide or universal interventions and supports focus both on developing expected behaviors and social-emotional competence, and on preventing problem behavior.
2. A second tier of interventions targets groups of students who are at elevated levels of risk or exhibiting problem behavior (such as bullying). These groups of students can be identified more easily, and their needs or behavior can be addressed more effectively when a schoolwide foundation is in place.
3. A third tier of interventions targets individual students, including traumatized youths, who are at even more elevated levels of academic and social-emotional behavioral need and risk.

While interventions for students who are at elevated levels of risk address their needs and problem behaviors, they should also build the skills that support thriving in life and resiliency in crisis. Using an evidence-based, multi-tiered behavioral framework has been found to improve

school climate by reducing problem behaviors like bullying, drug abuse, and poor attendance, while making students feel safer and improving academic performance. Implementation of a schoolwide framework provides a structure for schools in which to customize and organize the varied practices and programs they need to provide to their students based on data on student needs and local resources. Further, such a framework may help schools to better identify students struggling with trauma post-event, and select appropriate interventions to help them to recover. For more information about a multi-tiered behavioral framework, visit the Technical Assistance Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports available at <http://www.pbis.org>.

Promote Social and Emotional Competencies

Social and emotional learning is important to enable individuals to learn to understand and manage their emotions and relationships, and to make good decisions. Social-emotional learning can help individuals stop and think before they react, control their response to stress, develop supportive and caring relationships, persist through challenge, seek help, and pay attention to theirs and others' needs and feelings. These and other social and emotional competencies can help individuals prepare for and respond to emergencies. Students are more likely to develop such competencies when they have good relationships with adults, and when the adults model these competencies.

For more information about teaching social and emotional competencies, visit <http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov>. For additional information on how social and emotional learning may be integrated into a multi-tiered framework, visit <http://www.pbis.org>.

4. Active Shooter Situations

Police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services technicians (first responders) who come to a school because of a 911 call involving gunfire face a daunting task. Though the objective remains the same – protect students and staff – the threat of an “*active shooter*” incident is different than responding to a natural disaster or many other emergencies.

Emergency calls can involve actual or future threats of physical violence. This violence might be directed not only in or at the school building, students, staff, and campus but also at nearby buildings on or off school grounds.

“*Active shooter situations*” are defined¹⁷ as those where an individual is “actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.”¹⁸ Unfortunately, schools face *active shooter situations* as well.

The better first responders and school personnel are able to discern these threats and react swiftly, the more lives can be saved. This is particularly true in an *active shooter situation* at a school where law enforcement responds to a 911 call of shots fired. Many young and innocent lives are at risk in such a concentrated space. This is why it is critical that schools work with first

¹⁷ Other gun-related incidents that may occur in a school environment are not defined as *active shooter* incidents because they do not meet this definition. Instead, they may involve a single shot fired, accidental discharge of a weapon, or incidents that are not ongoing.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Active Shooter, How to Respond*. Washington, DC: Author, October 2008. Available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf.

responders, emergency management staff, and all community partners to identify, prepare, prevent, and effectively respond to an *active shooter situation* in a coordinated fashion.

Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Because of this, individuals must be prepared to deal with an *active shooter situation* before law enforcement officers arrive on the scene.

Preparing for an Active Shooter Situation

Planning

As with any threat or hazard that is included in a school's EOP, the planning team will establish goals, objectives, and courses of action for an annex. These plans will be impacted by the assessments conducted at the outset of the planning process and updated as ongoing assessments occur. As courses of action are developed, the planning team should consider a number of issues, including, but not limited to

- ❖ How to evacuate or lock down students, staff, and visitors, including those who are not with staff or in a classroom (e.g., in the hall, bathroom, break room). Personnel involved in such planning should pay attention to disability-related accessibility concerns when advising on shelter sites and evacuation routes.
- ❖ How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
- ❖ How to select effective shelter-in-place locations (optimal locations have thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal interior windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices and duress alarms).
- ❖ How the school community will be notified that there is an *active shooter* on school grounds. This could be done through the use of familiar terms, sounds, lights, and electronic communications such as text messages. Include in the courses of action how to communicate with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as visual signals or alarms to advise deaf students, staff, and parents about what is occurring. School wide "reverse 911-style" text messages sent to predetermined group distribution lists can be very helpful in this regard. Posting this protocol near locations where an all-school announcement can be broadcast (e.g., by the microphone used for the public announcement system) may save lives by preventing students and staff from stepping into harm's way.
- ❖ How students and staff will know when the building is safe.

The planning team may want to include functions in the *Active Shooter* annex that are also addressed in other functional annexes. For example, evacuation will be different during an *active shooter situation* than it would be for a fire.

Additional considerations are included in the "Responding to an *Active Shooter*" and "After an *Active Shooter Incident*" sections below.

Sharing Information With First Responders

The planning process is not complete until the school EOP is shared with first responders. The planning process must include preparing and making available to first responders an up-to-date and well-documented site assessment as well as any other information that would assist them. These materials should include building schematics and photos of both the inside and the outside, and include information about door and window locations, and locks and access controls. Emergency responders should also have advance information on where students, staff, and others with disabilities as well as those with access and functional needs are likely to be sheltering or escaping, generally in physically accessible locations, along accessible routes, or in specific classrooms. Building strong partnerships with law enforcement officers, fire officials, and EMS technician includes ensuring they also know the location of available public address systems, two-way communications systems, security cameras, and alarm controls. Equally important is information on access to utility controls, medical supplies, and fire extinguishers.

Providing the detailed information listed above to first responders allows them to rapidly move through a school during an emergency, to ensure areas are safe, and to tend people in need. It is critically important to share this information with law enforcement and other first responders before an emergency occurs. Law enforcement agencies have secure websites where this information is stored for many schools, businesses, public venues, and other locations. All of these can be provided to first responders and viewed in drills, exercises, and walk-throughs.

Technology and tools with the same information (e.g., a portable USB drive that is compatible with computers used by first responders) should be maintained at the front of the school, in a lock box, or other secured location from which school officials can immediately provide it to responding officials or first responders can directly access it. The location of these materials at the school should be known by and accessible to a number of individuals to ensure ready access in an emergency. Every building should have more than one individual charged with meeting first responders to provide them with the school site assessment, the school EOP and any other details about school safety and the facility.¹⁹ All parties should know who these key contacts are.

Exercises

Most schools practice evacuation drills for fires and protective measures for tornadoes, but far fewer schools practice for *active shooter situations*. To be prepared for an *active shooter* incident, schools should train their staff, students, and families, as appropriate, in what to expect and how to react. If students are involved, to select the appropriate exercise the school should consider the ages of the students. In a study of 84 *active shooter* events that occurred between 2000 and 2010, 34 percent involved schools.²⁰

Good planning includes conducting drills which must include first responders and school resource officers (where applicable). Exercises with these valuable partners are one of the most effective and efficient ways to ensure that everyone knows not only his or her roles, but also the

¹⁹ See also, <http://www.ready.gov>.

²⁰ J. Pete Blair with M. Hunter Martaindale, *United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications*. San Marcos, Texas: Texas State University, 2013. Available at <http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Blair-UnitedStatesActiveShooterEventsfrom2000to2010Report-Final.pdf>.

roles of others at the scene. These exercises should include walks through school buildings to allow law enforcement to provide input on shelter sites as well as familiarize first responders with the location.

Each person carries a threefold responsibility.

- First: Learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation and ways to prevent an incident.
- Second: Learn the best steps for survival when faced with an *active shooter situation*.
- Third: Be prepared to work with law enforcement during the response.

Preventing an *Active Shooter Situation*

Warning Signs

No profile exists for an *active shooter*; however, research indicates there may be signs or indicators. Schools should learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation that may develop into an *active shooter situation* and proactively seek ways to prevent an incident with internal resources, or additional external assistance.

In 2002, the Safe School Initiative (SSI) was completed by the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service, examining 41 K–12 student attackers involving 37 incidents in the United States from 1973 through May 2000.²¹ These research results, though focused on targeted school violence and not on *active shooter situations*, remain highly useful as a guide for law enforcement officials, educators, and mental health practitioners.

The study identified 10 key findings for the development of strategies to address targeted school violence:

- ❖ There is no accurate or useful profile of students who have engaged in targeted school violence.
- ❖ Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts.
- ❖ Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or the plan to attack.
- ❖ Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

²¹ Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, William Pollack, Randy Borum, William Modzeleski, and Marisa Reddy, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf>.

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- ❖ Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.
 - ❖ Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant loss or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
 - ❖ Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
 - ❖ Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
 - ❖ In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
 - ❖ Despite prompt law enforcement officer responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.²²

By highlighting common pre-attack behaviors displayed by past offenders, federal researchers have sought to enhance the detection and prevention of tragic attacks of violence, including active shooting incidents. Several agencies within the federal government continue to explore incidents of targeted violence in the effort to identify these potential “warning signs.” In 2002, the FBI published a monograph on workplace violence, including problematic behaviors of concern that may telegraph violent ideations and plans.²³ In 2007, the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education, and the FBI collaborated to produce the report *Campus Attacks, Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Learning*, which examined lethal or attempted lethal attacks at U.S. universities and colleges from 1900 to 2008. The report was published in 2010, and featured several key observations related to pre-attack behaviors, including the following:

- ❖ In only 13 percent of the cases did subjects make verbal and/or written threats to cause harm to the target. These threats were both veiled and direct, and were conveyed to the target or to a third party about the target.
- ❖ In 19 percent of the cases, stalking or harassing behavior was reported prior to the attack. These behaviors occurred within the context of a current or former romantic relationship, or in academic and other non-romantic settings. They took on various forms, including written communications (conventional and electronic), telephonic contact, and harassment of the target and/or the target’s friends and/or family. Subjects also followed, visited, or damaged property belonging to target(s) or their families prior to the attack.
- ❖ In only 10 percent of the cases did the subject engage in physically aggressive acts toward the targets. These behaviors took the form of physical assaults, menacing actions with weapons, or repeated physical violence to intimate partners.

²² Bryan Vossekuil, Robert Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, and William Modzeleski, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf>.

²³ U.S. Department of Justice FBI Academy, *Workplace Violence: Issues in Response*. Quantico, Va.: Author, 2002. Available at <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence>.

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- ❖ Concerning behaviors were observed by friends, family, associates, professors, or law enforcement officers in 31 percent of the cases. These behaviors included, but were not limited to paranoid ideas, delusional statements, changes in personality or performance, disciplinary problems on campus, depressed mood, suicidal ideation, non-specific threats of violence, increased isolation, “odd” or “bizarre” behavior, and interest in or acquisition of weapons.

Specialized units in the federal government (such as the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit) continue to support behaviorally based operational assessments of persons of concern in a variety of settings (e.g., schools, workplaces, places of worship) who appear to be on a trajectory toward a violent act. A review of current research, threat assessment literature, and active shooting incidents, combined with the extensive case experience of the Behavioral Analysis Unit, suggest that there are observable pre-attack behaviors which, if recognized, could lead to the disruption of a planned attack.²⁴ While checklists of various warning signs are often of limited use in isolation, there are some behavioral indicators that should prompt further exploration and attention from law enforcement officers and/or school safety stakeholders. These behaviors often include

- ❖ Development of a personal grievance;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent acquisitions of multiple weapons;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent escalation in target practice and weapons training;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent interest in explosives;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and intense interest or fascination with previous shootings or mass attacks; and
- ❖ Experience of a significant real or perceived personal loss in the weeks and/or months leading up to the attack, such as a death, breakup, divorce or loss of a job.
- ❖ Few offenders had previous arrests for violent crimes.

²⁴ See Frederick Calhoun and Stephen Weston, *Contemporary Threat Management: A Practical Guide for Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent* (San Diego, CA: Specialized Training Services, 2003); Gene Deisinger, Marisa Randazzo, Daniel O’Neill, and Jenna Savage, *The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and Management Teams* (Stoneham, MA: Applied Risk Management, 2008); Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, and Gwen Holden, *Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1995); John Monahan, Henry Steadman, Eric Silver, Paul Appelbaum, Pamela Robbins, Edward Mulvey, Loren Roth, Thomas Grisso, and Steven Banks, *Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001); Bryan Vossekuil, Robert Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, and William Modzeleski, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004).

Threat Assessment Teams

As described in the previous section, research shows that perpetrators of targeted acts of violence engage in both covert and overt behaviors preceding their attacks. They consider, plan, prepare, share, and, in some cases, move on to action.²⁵ One of the most useful tools a school can develop to identify, evaluate, and address these troubling signs is of a multidisciplinary school threat assessment team (TAT). A TAT with diverse representation often will operate more efficiently and effectively. TAT members should include school principals, counselors, employees, medical and mental health professionals, law enforcement personnel and school resource officers, where applicable.

The TAT serves as a central convening body, so that warning signs observed by multiple people are not considered isolated incidents that slip through the cracks, when they actually may represent escalating behavior that is a serious concern. School districts should keep in mind, however, the importance of relying on factual information (including observed behavior) and avoid unfair labeling or stereotyping of students, to remain in compliance with civil rights and other applicable federal and state laws.

For the purposes of consistency and efficiency, a school TAT should be developed and implemented in coordination with school district policy and practice. In addition, staff already working to identify student needs can be a critical source of information about troubling student behavior for a TAT.

The TAT reviews troubling or threatening behavior of current or former students, parents, school employees or other persons brought to its attention. The TAT contemplates a holistic assessment and management strategy that considers the many aspects of the person's life—academic, residential, work, and social. More than focusing on warning signs or threats alone, the TAT assessment involves a unique overall analysis of changing and relevant behaviors. The TAT takes into consideration, as appropriate, information about classroom behaviors, various kinds of communications, not-yet substantiated information, any threats made, security concerns, parenting issues, or relationship problems that might involve a troubled individual. The TAT may also identify any potential victims with whom the individual may interact. Once the TAT identifies an individual that may pose a threat, the team will identify a course of action for addressing the situation. The appropriate course of action—whether law enforcement intervention, counseling, or other actions—will depend on the specifics of the situation.

Although not as common as in the K–12 environment, TATs are increasingly common in university settings, pushed to the forefront of concern following the 2007 shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Va., where 32 individuals were killed. In some cases, state funding mandates that colleges and universities create threat assessment teams.²⁶

²⁵ See <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/february-2010/threat-assessment-teams>.

²⁶ See *Recommended Practices for Virginia Colleges Threat Assessments at* http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/resources/tat_info/VArecommended_practices.pdf.

Even in a K–12 setting, where a designated TAT may not have been established, area law enforcement officials can help assess reported threats or troubling behavior, and reach out to available federal resources. The FBI’s behavioral experts in its National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes (NCAVC) at Quantico, Va., are available on a 24/7 basis to join in any threat assessment analysis and develop threat mitigation strategies for persons of concern. The law enforcement member of the school TAT should contact the local FBI office for this behavioral analysis assistance.

Each FBI field office has a NCAVC representative available to work with school TATs and coordinate access to the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), home to the NCAVC. They focus not on how to respond tactically to an *active shooter situation* but rather on how to prevent one. Early intervention can prevent a situation from escalating by identifying, assessing, and managing the threat. The TAT should consult with its district and develop a process to seek these additional resources.

Generally, *active shooter situations* are not motivated by other criminal-related concerns, such as monetary gain or gang affiliation. Often, situations may be prevented by identifying, assessing, and managing potential threats. Recognizing these pre-attack warning signs and indicators might help disrupt a potentially tragic event.

Responding to an Active Shooter Situation

School EOPs should include courses of action that will describe how students and staff can most effectively respond to an *active shooter situation* to minimize the loss of life, and teach and train on these practices, as deemed appropriate by the school.

Law enforcement officers may not be present when a shooting begins. The first law enforcement officers on the scene may arrive after the shooting has ended. Making sure staff know how to respond and instruct their students can help prevent and reduce the loss of life.

No single response fits all *active shooter situations*; however, making sure each individual knows his or her options for response and can react decisively will save valuable time. Depicting scenarios and considering response options in advance will assist individuals and groups in quickly selecting their best course of action.

Understandably, this is a sensitive topic. There is no single answer for what to do, but a survival mindset can increase the odds of surviving. As appropriate for your community, it may be valuable to schedule a time for an open conversation regarding this topic. Though some parents or personnel may find the conversation uncomfortable, they may also find it reassuring to know that, as a whole, their school is thinking about how best to deal with this situation.

During an *active shooter situation*, the natural human reaction, even if you are highly trained, is to be startled, feel fear and anxiety, and even experience initial disbelief and denial. You can expect to hear noise from alarms, gunfire and explosions, and people shouting and screaming. Training provides the means to regain your composure, recall at least some of what you have learned, and commit to action. There are three basic options: run, hide, or fight. You can run away from the shooter, seek a secure place where you can hide and/or deny the shooter access, or incapacitate the shooter to survive and protect others from harm.

As the situation develops, it is possible that students and staff will need to use more than one option. During an *active shooter situation*, staff will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully informed decision about which option is best. While they should follow the plan and any instructions given during an incident, often they will have to rely on their own judgment to decide which option will best protect lives.²⁷

Respond Immediately

It is not uncommon for people confronted with a threat to first deny the possible danger rather than respond. An investigation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005) into the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on 9/11 found that people close to the floors impacted waited longer to start evacuating than those on unaffected floors.²⁸ Similarly, during the Virginia Tech shooting, individuals on campus responded to the shooting with varying degrees of urgency.²⁹ These studies highlight this delayed response or denial. For example, some people report hearing firecrackers when in fact they heard gunfire.

Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately, including fulfilling their responsibilities for individuals in their charge. For example, train staff to recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and necessary action (e.g., “Gun! Get out!”) to those in their charge. In addition, those closest to the public address or other communications system, or otherwise able to alert others, should communicate the danger and necessary action. Repetition in training and preparedness shortens the time it takes to orient, observe, and act.

Upon recognizing the danger, as soon as it is safe to do so, staff or others must alert responders by contacting 911 with as clear and accurate information as possible.

Run

If it is safe to do so for yourself and those in your care, the first course of action that should be taken is to run out of the building and far away until you are in a safe location.

²⁷ As part of its preparedness mission, *Ready Houston* produces “Run, Hide, Fight” videos, handouts, and trainings to promote preparedness among residents of the Houston region. These materials are not specific to a school setting but may still be helpful. These videos are not recommended for viewing by minors. All of these items are available free of charge, and many are available at <http://www.readyhouston.tx.gov/videos.html>.

²⁸ Occupants of both towers delayed initiating their evacuation after World Trade Center 1 was hit. In World Trade Center 1, the median time to initiate evacuation was 3 minutes for occupants from the ground floor to floor 76, and 5 minutes for occupants near the impact region (floors 77 to 91). See National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005. *Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications*. Available at <http://www.mingerfoundation.org/downloads/mobility/nist%20world%20trade%20center.pdf>.

²⁹ *Report of the Virginia Tech Review Team*, available at <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf> and <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempContent/techPanelReport-docs/12%20CHAPTER%20VIII%20MASS%20MURDER%20AT%20NORRIS%20HALL.pdf>.

Students and staff should be trained to

- ❖ Leave personal belongings behind;
- ❖ Visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible routes for students and staff with disabilities as well as persons with access and functional needs;
- ❖ Avoid escalators and elevators;
- ❖ Take others with them, but not to stay behind because others will not go;
- ❖ Call 911 when safe to do so; and
- ❖ Let a responsible adult know where they are.

Hide

If running is not a safe option, hide in as safe a place as possible.

Students and staff should be trained to hide in a location where the walls might be thicker and have fewer windows. In addition:

- ❖ Lock the doors;
- ❖ Barricade the doors with heavy furniture;
- ❖ Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows;
- ❖ Turn off lights;
- ❖ Silence all electronic devices;
- ❖ Remain silent;
- ❖ Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of the view from the hallway (allowing for an ambush of the shooter and for possible escape if the shooter enters the room);
- ❖ Use strategies to silently communicate with first responders if possible, for example, in rooms with exterior windows make signs to silently signal law enforcement officers and emergency responders to indicate the status of the room's occupants; and
- ❖ Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law enforcement officers.

Fight

If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, as a last resort when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, and chairs. In a study of 41 *active shooter* events that ended before law enforcement officers arrived, the potential

victims stopped the attacker themselves in 16 instances. In 13 of those cases they physically subdued the attacker.³⁰

While talking to staff about confronting a shooter may be daunting and upsetting for some, they should know that they may be able to successfully take action to save lives. To be clear, confronting an *active shooter* should never be a requirement in any school employee's job description; how each staff member chooses to respond if directly confronted by an *active shooter* is up to him or her. Further, the possibility of an *active shooter* situation is not justification for the presence of firearms on campus in the hands of any personnel other than law enforcement officers.

Interacting With First Responders

Staff should be trained to understand and expect that a law enforcement officer's first priority must be to locate and stop the person(s) believed to be the shooter(s); all other actions are secondary. One comprehensive study determined that more than half of mass-shooting incidents—57 percent—still were under way when the first officer arrived; in 75 percent of those instances that solo officer had to confront the perpetrator to end the threat. In those cases, the officer was shot one-third of the time.³¹

Students and staff should be trained to cooperate and not to interfere with first responders. When law enforcement officer(s) arrives, students and staff must display empty hands with open palms. Law enforcement may instruct everyone to place their hands on their heads, or they may search individuals.

After an Active Shooter Incident³²

Once the scene is secured, first responders will work with school officials and victims on a variety of matters. This will include transporting the injured, interviewing witnesses, and initiating the investigation.

The school EOP should identify trained personnel who will provide assistance to victims and their families. This should include establishing an incident response team (including local first responders and other community partners) that is trained to appropriately assess and triage an *active shooter situation* (as well as other emergencies), and provide emergency intervention services and victim assistance beginning immediately after the incident and throughout the recovery efforts. This team will integrate with state and federal resources when an emergency occurs.

Within an ongoing and/or evolving emergency, where the *immediate reunification* of loved ones is *not possible*, providing family members with timely, accurate, and relevant information is paramount. Having family members wait for long periods of time for information about their

³⁰ J. Pete Blair with M. Hunter Martaindale, *United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications*. San Marcos, Texas: Texas State University, 2013. Available at <http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Blair-UnitedStatesActiveShooterEventsfrom2000to2010Report-Final.pdf>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Also see the "Functional Annexes Content" and "Recovery Annex" sections of this guide.

loved ones not only adds to their stress and frustration but can also escalate the emotions of the entire group. When families are reunited, it is critical that there be child release processes in place to ensure that no child is released to an unauthorized person, even if that person is well-meaning.

Essential steps to help establish trust and provide family members with a sense of control are

- ❖ Identifying a safe location separate from distractions and/or media and the general public, but close enough to allow family members to feel connected in proximity to their children and their loved ones;
- ❖ Scheduling periodic updates even if no additional information is available;
- ❖ Being prepared to speak with family members about what to expect when reunified with their child and their loved ones; and
- ❖ Ensuring effective communication with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as sign language interpreters for deaf family members.

When reunification is not possible because a child is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their child or loved one is missing or has been injured or killed. Law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications, but all parties must understand their roles and responsibilities. This will ensure that parents and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate way.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. Having trained personnel on hand or immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Counselors should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The school EOP should include pre-identified points of contact (e.g., counselors, police officers) to work with and support family members. These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while children are still missing but before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long-term.

The school EOP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help with regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. Often, a family that has lost a child may have another child or other children in the school. It is critical that these families and loved ones be supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving child(ren).


The school EOP also should explicitly address how impacted families and children will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from families and students while the emergency is ongoing and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.



Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education



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U.S. Department of Education
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U.S. Department of Education

Arne Duncan
Secretary

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools

Kevin Jennings
Assistant Deputy Secretary

William Modzeleski
Associate Assistant Deputy Secretary


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
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
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
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


ABBREVIATIONS

BCP	Business Continuity Plan
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
DAT	Damage Assessment Team
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
<i>FERPA</i>	<i>Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act</i>
<i>HIPAA</i>	<i>Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act</i>
IACLEA	International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators
ICS	Incident Command System
IHEs	Institutions of Higher Education
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCEF	National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities
NIC	National Integration Center
NIMS	National Incident Management System
PIO	Public Information Officer



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Expert Panel Participants*

John Beach

Director, Physical Plant Operations

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Stephen E. Brock

Associate Professor

California State University, Sacramento

Department of Special Education,
Rehabilitation, School Psychology, and Deaf
Studies

Tod A. Burnett

Vice Chancellor

California Community Colleges

Kay Goss

Director, Emergency Management and Crisis
Communications

Systems Research and Applications Corporation

Steven J. Healy

Director of Public Safety & Chief of Police
Princeton University

Thomasine Johnson

Director, Department of Public Safety
The Catholic University of America

Linda Langford

Associate Center Director

U.S. Department of Education's Higher
Education Center for Alcohol and Other Drug
Abuse and Violence Prevention

Lauri Rush

Director

Mental Health Center at Gallaudet University

Dolores A. Stafford

Chief of Police

The George Washington University

Terri Ae. Stewart

Director for Public Safety

Trinity University

Vicky M. Stormo

Retired Chief of Police

University of Washington Police Department

Gregory A. Thomas

Former Deputy Director of Planning and
Response

National Center for Disaster Preparedness
Columbia University Mailman School of Public
Health

Katrin A. Wesner

Director, Abrons Student Health Center
University of North Carolina Wilmington

Eugene L. Zdziarski, II

Former Assistant Vice President & Dean of
Students

University of Florida


External Reviewers

Meloyde Batten-Mickens

Executive Director, Facilities/Department of
Public Safety

Gallaudet University

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Kay Goss
Director, Emergency Management and Crisis
Communications
Systems Research and Applications Corporation
(SRA International)

Steven J. Charvat
Director
UW Emergency Management
A Division of the Facilities Services Department
University of Washington

Steven J. Healy
Director of Public Safety & Chief of Police
Princeton University

Eugene L. Zdziarski, II
Former Assistant Vice President & Dean of
Students
University of Florida


Institutional Resources

LaRue Williams
Director
Brian Lauffer
Instructional Designer
VMC/Homeland Security Programs
West Virginia University

Sally Logue Post
Associate Director
Office of Communications and Marketing
Texas Tech University

Yvette M. Jones
Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice
President for External Affairs
Tulane University

Terrance G. Alexander
Executive Director
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan




INTRODUCTION

THE NEED FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

There are over 4,000 two-and four-year public and private institutions of higher education (IHEs) in the United States totaling over 15 million students and several million staff, faculty, and visitors (U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics*, 2006). Each of these institutions has a commitment to ensure the safety and general welfare of those on their campuses and to provide appropriate policies, procedures, and strategies to maintain a safe campus. Because of recent violent crimes, natural disasters, and other emergencies or crises, colleges and universities are convening committees and task forces to reexamine or conduct a comprehensive review of policies, procedures, and systems related to campus safety and security. As with many critical areas on the agendas of administrators, campus safety requires building support and conducting a thorough and systematic process to produce a quality plan to prepare for and manage emergencies on campus.

Distinct Characteristics of Emergency Planning at Institutions of Higher Education

IHEs have many challenges in practicing emergency management that are related to the distinctive structure and environment of higher education. College and university campuses often cover large geographic areas, and sometimes even resemble small towns with the full extent of services in their vicinity (i.e., medical centers, sports complexes, residential centers, businesses). The campus population changes from day to day, semester to semester, and year to year. Many IHEs operate complex enterprises in addition to their academic programs. Hospitals, research and development facilities, performing arts venues, athletic complexes, agriculture centers, residential complexes, food services, and transportation systems all present a unique set of circumstances that must be considered when designing emergency management plans. These structural and environmental characteristics pose challenges for access control, monitoring movements, defining boundaries for facilities and grounds, standardizing procedures and decision-making processes, and prioritizing resource allocations.




IHE governance is also highly varied, complex, and often widely dispersed. Decentralized organizational structures and academic departments may be located in different buildings and have differing decision-making methods. The nature of higher education institutions, with faculty involvement in the governance process, is much different than the hierarchical structure of corporate entities or governmental agencies. Decision-making in such an environment can be slow, and hinder campus response to a crisis. The need for clear lines of authority and decision-making are all the more important at IHEs. Responsibility for developing, testing, and implementing an emergency management plan should be shared and communicated across all departments and functions.

Most IHEs have open access and often are geographically integrated in the surrounding community. Autonomy is encouraged and fostered for both students and faculty; at any one time, students, faculty, and staff are dispersed around the campus in classrooms, common areas, cafeterias, offices, dormitories, and numerous other facilities.

The population served by IHEs is distinct, as well. Most students are over 18 years of age—the age of majority in most states—and therefore are considered adults capable of making decisions on their own. This can present challenges and opportunities. It creates the need for a different set of roles and responsibilities for students during an emergency event (especially compared to the K–12 population of mostly minors).

Another characteristic of IHEs is that they do not operate under 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. typical business-hour schedules. A college campus is alive and engaged with activity almost around the clock. From the opening of food service operations and recreation facilities in the early morning to evening activities and late night studying in the library, the campus is constantly in motion. Unlike secondary education, most college campuses include residential facilities in which students live throughout the year. Even when classes are not in session these facilities are home to many out-of-state, international, and married students. These additional factors impact how an IHE plans, responds to, and recovers from a campus emergency.



Purpose and Uses of This Action Guide

This *Action Guide for Emergency Management at Higher Education Institutions* has been developed to give higher education institutions a useful resource in the field of emergency management. It is intended for community colleges, four-year colleges and universities, graduate schools, and research institutions associated with higher education entities, both public and private. This action guide may be used in a variety of ways:


- ▶ As a starting point in researching the topic of emergency management for those needing an overview of the subject;
- ▶ As a resource for an initiative to develop and implement an emergency management plan at a higher education institution; or
- ▶ As a reference and resource for colleges and universities looking to evaluate their emergency management programs to identify potential areas needing enhancement.

Many other resources are referenced in this document that can and should be used in conjunction with the contents of this guide. Specifically, the *Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities* published by the U.S. Department of Education (revised January 2007) and *Building a Disaster-Resistant University* published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, (August 2003) offer companion resources to help in an emergency management initiative. This action guide is not meant to prescribe exactly how emergency management should be practiced; rather, each higher education institution should decide for itself the best way to prepare to meet its own unique set of needs.

Key Principles in Emergency Management


Nine key principles serve as the foundation for the content of this action guide.

- **Effective emergency management begins with senior leadership on campus.** The IHE president, chancellor, or provost must initiate and support emergency management efforts to ensure engagement from the entire campus community. This “champion” administrator will have decision-making power and the authority to devote resources to implementing the initiative and subsequently put into action the emergency management plan. Since budgetary realities may force campus administrators to make decisions within select fiscal parameters, it



is important to have high-level support to provide both political and financial backing to the effort.

- **An IHE emergency management initiative requires partnerships and collaboration.** Every department responsible for creating a safe environment and enhancing campus functions must be involved in planning efforts. IHEs should identify and engage internal and external partners, and ensure that all planning tasks are performed within a collaborative and integrated approach. This means involving a variety of departments and functions across the campus and reaching out to community partners in the public, nonprofit, and private sectors. Partnerships with such community groups as law enforcement, fire safety, homeland security, emergency medical services, health and mental health organizations, media, and volunteer groups are integral to developing and implementing a comprehensive emergency management plan.
- **An IHE emergency management plan must adopt an “all-hazards” approach to account for the full range of hazards that threaten or may threaten the campus.** All-hazards planning is a more efficient and effective way to prepare for emergencies. Rather than managing planning initiatives for a multitude of threat scenarios, all-hazard planning develops capacities and capabilities that are critical to prepare for a full spectrum of emergencies or disasters, including natural hazards and severe weather, biological hazards, and violence and terrorism. As defined by FEMA, all-hazard planning “encourages emergency managers to address all of the hazards that threaten their jurisdiction in a single emergency operations plan, instead of relying on stand-alone plans” (FEMA’s *State and Local Guide SLG 101: Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning*; September 1996). An all-hazards plan should be flexible and specific to the campus and its needs.
- **An IHE emergency management plan should use the four phases of emergency management to effectively prepare and respond to emergencies.** Emergency plans at higher education institutions should use the four phases of emergency management as the framework for planning and implementation. Part of the founding principles of comprehensive emergency management when FEMA was created in 1979 is the four phases of emergency management: Prevention-Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. FEMA prescribes “to treat each action as one phase of a comprehensive process, with each phase building on the accomplishments of the preceding one. The overall goal is to minimize the impact caused by an emergency in the jurisdiction” (FEMA’s *State and Local Guide SLG 101: Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning*; September 1996).
- **The IHE emergency management plan must be based on a comprehensive design, while also providing for staff, students, faculty, and visitors with special needs.** Every aspect of an emergency plan also should incorporate provisions for vulnerable populations, those of which can have a wide range of needs, including: language barriers, disabilities, or other special conditions. Thus,





any procedures, products, and protocols created to prevent, prepare, respond, and recover from an emergency also must accommodate people with various levels of cognitive ability, knowledge, physical capabilities and life experience.

- **Campuses should engage in a comprehensive planning process that addresses the particular circumstances and environment of their institution.** A high-quality emergency management plan does not simply duplicate another institution's specific model. Rather, the plan must be based on the unique aspects of the campus, such as the academic programs offered, size, geographic location of the campus, number and type of buildings, such as athletic venues and research labs, availability of campus and community resources, and student demographics.
- **An IHE should conduct trainings based on the institution's prevention and preparedness efforts, prioritized threats, and issues highlighted from assessments.** Routine, multi-hazard training should be conducted with faculty, staff, and other support personnel, focusing on the protocols and procedures in the emergency management plan. Training should be conducted in conjunction with community partners, as well as integrated with responders' expertise, to ensure consistent learning.
- **Higher education institutions should conduct tabletop exercises prior to fully adopting and implementing the emergency management plan.** These exercises should cover a range of scenarios that may occur on the campus, and should be conducted with a variety of partners and stakeholders from the campus and the community. It is important for emergency planners also to evaluate and document lessons learned from the exercise(s) in an after-action review and an after-action report, and to modify the main emergency plan, as needed.
- **After adoption, disseminate information about the plan to students, staff, faculty, community partners, and families.** Dissemination efforts should include the conveyance of certain plan components to specific audiences, such as relaying shelter-in-place procedures to faculty members, or relaying campus evacuation information to the transportation department. General plans and procedures can be posted around campus or displayed on a Web site. Students, staff, faculty, and all of the varied campus support personnel should familiarize themselves with the plan and its components so they are prepared to respond in an emergency.

These key principles of emergency management are reflected throughout the four steps recommended in this action guide for developing and implementing a plan.

Before discussing in-depth each of the four steps in developing and implementing or updating a plan, it is important to cover an organizational framework relevant to the success of any emergency management planning effort: the four phases of emergency management that FEMA created and that is recognized in all relevant sectors.





THE FRAMEWORK: THE FOUR PHASES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

A comprehensive emergency management plan is based on the framework of the four phases of emergency management: prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. All phases are highly *interconnected*; that is, each phase influences the other three phases. The cycle as a whole is an ongoing process, just as the plan is a dynamic document that requires continuous updating.


Prevention-Mitigation

The first phase in the emergency management cycle is Prevention-Mitigation.

Prevention is the action colleges and universities take to decrease the likelihood that an event or crisis will occur.

Mitigation is the action colleges and universities take to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage related to an event or crisis, particularly those that cannot be prevented.

The hazards the institution is seeking to prevent, diminish, or mitigate will be defined specifically through a process of hazards identification and risk assessment (see U.S. Department of Education's *A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools* available at: <http://rems.ed.gov>). In the assessment, the campus representatives and community partners identify virtually all the hazards that could cause risks and subsequently a crisis. Prevention-Mitigation of hazards is not a new concept for IHEs because each campus historically has been involved in creating safe learning environments. However, in the context of comprehensive emergency management, prevention and mitigation efforts become more structured, formalized, and purposeful. Key steps in Prevention-Mitigation include:



- **Reviewing existing campus and community data.** The first step in the Prevention-Mitigation phase is to obtain such data as: previous community vulnerability assessments (i.e., vulnerability assessments conducted in the past by the institution or surrounding community), facility assessments (i.e., vulnerability assessments conducted on a particular structure or operation), recent community and campus specific crime data (e.g., *Clery* data¹), and weather- or natural hazard-related data, such as flood, tornado, hurricane, or earthquake probabilities.
- **Assessing facilities and grounds.** An assessment of facilities and grounds involves the selection and use of a tool to assess campus vulnerabilities (see *A Guide to Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools*, U.S. Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, 2008), as well as the application of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) assessments. Improving surveillance capabilities and access controls may mitigate some emergencies. In considering natural disasters that are common in the geographic locality of the campus, structural modifications and enhancements will help minimize damage.
- **Assessing culture and climate.** Prevention of violence, accidents, and harm in colleges and universities is enhanced by nurturing a healthy campus community. The challenge is to foster healthy societal relationships among students and to support the goal of students to feel connected to the institution and the surrounding community. In addition to supporting the learning environment, healthy relationships and connectedness are key hazard-prevention factors in that they make it less likely for violence to occur. High rates of alcohol or other drug use, for example, can bring a host of problems to a campus environment, including the increased likelihood of violence, accidents, or even poisoning or overdose. An assessment of the culture and climate at the institution is often a major aspect of an initiative for making improvements in this area and preventing such incidents from occurring.


Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a tool to assess campus grounds and structures. The three principles of the CPTED program are:

- *Natural surveillance* – the ability to easily see what is occurring in a particular setting;
- *Natural access control* – the ability to restrict who enters or exits an environment; and
- *Territoriality maintenance* – the ability to demonstrate ownership of and respect for property.

More information on CPTED is available at the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities at: <http://www.edfacilities.org/rl/cpted.cfm>.

¹ The *Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act*, codified as part of the *Higher Education Act of 1965*, is a federal law that requires colleges and universities to disclose certain timely and annual information about campus crime and security policies. All public and private institutions of postsecondary education participating in federal student aid programs are subject to it. (More information available at: http://www.securityoncampus.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=271&Itemid=60.)



Preparedness


The **Preparedness** phase designs strategies, processes, and protocols to prepare the college or university for potential emergencies. Preparedness activities may include:

- Establishing an incident command system (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) for organizing personnel and services to respond in the event of an emergency.
- Developing all-hazard policies, procedures, and protocols with input from such key community partners as law enforcement, medical services, public health, fire services, and mental health.
- Collaborating with community partners to establish mutual aid agreements that will establish formal interdisciplinary, intergovernmental, and interagency relationships among all the community partners and campus departments.
- Negotiating contracts that will provide the campus with resources (e.g., food, transportation, medical services, and volunteers) needed during an emergency.
- Assigning personnel to manage each ICS function and defining lines of succession in emergency plan as to who is in charge when key leaders are not available.

National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) offers a set of concepts, principles, procedures, processes, terminology, and standards that agencies of all different types can utilize in emergency management. The Incident Command System (ICS) is a key component of NIMS and consists of five functional areas: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. The incident commander's staff includes public information officer (PIO), safety officer, liaison officer, and campus liaison. It is important that campus administrators understand how campus personnel will perform under the ICS with local partners and agencies when responding to and managing an emergency.

The National Integration Center (NIC) Incident Management Systems Integration Division (<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims>) contains interagency tools for establishing partnerships and for adopting NIMS within a jurisdiction or organization. At the FEMA Emergency Management Institute Web site (<http://training.fema.gov>), online courses on NIMS are available, including NIMS: An Introduction (IS-700), National Response Framework (IS-800.B), Introduction to the Incident Command System (IS-100), and ICS for Single Resource and Initial Action Incidents (IS-200).



- Developing a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) and Business Continuity Plan (BCP) for all campus operations functions. The COOP plan ensures that the campus has the capability to continue essential functions (e.g., transportation, housing, food service). The BCP identifies systems needed to conduct all administrative functions (e.g., payroll, and communication) so that operations can be continued after the emergency (see Table 1).
- Developing plans to unify students, staff, and faculty with their families.
- Defining protocols and procedures for each type of response strategy, e.g., shelter-in-place, lockdown (if and where appropriate), or evacuation.
- Establishing an emergency notification system using multiple modes of communication to alert persons on campus that an emergency is approaching or occurred.
- Working with the media in the community and campus public relations office to develop a campus emergency communication plan that may include drafting template messages for communicating with the media, students, faculty, staff, community, and families prior to, during, and after an emergency. The campus public information officer (PIO) often coordinates these tasks.
- Coordinating campus emergency management plans with those of state and local agencies to avoid unnecessary duplication.
- Outlining schedules and plans for marketing emergency procedures and training staff, faculty, and students about the emergency plan procedures.
- Working with campus and community mental health professionals to establish a behavioral threat assessment process that involves mental health professionals for evaluating persons who are at-risk of causing harm to themselves or others.

Example of Business Continuity Planning: The University of Michigan

In 2006 the University of Michigan charged all campus deans, directors, and department heads to prepare a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) identifying critical functions, assigning key staff, and preparing contingency plans to keep essential functions operating during emergency operations. All campus units developed plans using a comprehensive guideline available at: <http://www.oseh.umich.edu/buscont/index.html>.

While the guideline focuses primarily on pandemic disease, it is adaptable to all hazards. In addition to a mock scenario to help analyze the impacts of a pandemic on university operations, the guideline provides checklists and templates to assist departments and units in developing specific continuity plans applicable to each unit's mission. Using this information, the units developed specific strategies for recovering business operations and undertook extensive preparation to execute those strategies.





Table 1. Illustrative Key Responsibilities During an Emergency by Organization Entity and Position Within Entity

Entity	Position Within Entity	Responsibilities
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Enforcement • Fire Department • Emergency Medical Services • Emergency Preparedness Office • Public Works Office • Public Information Officer • City or County Attorney 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct criminal investigations (sometimes, together with campus law enforcement) • Ensure that the perimeter is controlled • Provide personnel, equipment and other resources, and specialized personnel or equipment • Coordinate emergency communications • Coordinate with campus PIO
State and Regional Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Guard • Civil Support Team • HazMat Personnel • State Emergency Management Agencies • State Patrol • Public Health 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide personnel, equipment, supplies, and specialized resources • Conduct field assessments • Determine Declaration of Emergency • Seek federal assistance
Federal Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) • Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) • Center for Disease Control (CDC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead criminal investigations • Provide federal recovery assistance • Provide specialized resources
Campus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campus Executive Leadership • Campus Public Safety Officers • Emergency Management Team • Campus Public Information Officer (PIO) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide leadership on campus during an emergency • Institute the campus emergency management plan • Coordinate and support with partners • Serve as incident commander to establish the incident command system (sometimes, until partners arrive to take over ICS)

Source: Adapted from Homeland Security Planning for Campus Executives workshop, developed by VMC/West Virginia University for DHS/ FEMA under the agency's Training and Education Integration (TEI) Secretariat, available at <http://vmc.wvu.edu/projects.htm>.



- Ensuring that a process is in place for complying with the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)* and the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)* for revealing information about a student or staff member. For additional information on *FERPA* and *HIPAA* restrictions on communication relating to campus safety see *NACUA NOTES on FERPA and Campus Safety* (Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2007) available at: <http://www.nacua.org/documents/ferpa2.pdf>.


Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety

The U.S. Department of Education offers a brochure *Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act for Colleges and Universities*. It provides guidance pertaining to *FERPA*, disciplinary records, the *Clery Act*, law enforcement units, disclosure to parents, and other information that will help campus officials make decisions quickly when confronted with issues about privacy and safety. The brochure can be found at: <http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpc/brochures/postsec.pdf>.

Response

Response is taking action to effectively contain and resolve an emergency. Responses to emergencies are enhanced by thorough and effective collaboration and planning during the Prevention-Mitigation and Preparedness phases. During the response phase, campus officials activate the emergency management plan. Responses to emergencies vary greatly depending upon the severity, magnitude, duration, and intensity of the event. This is the phase of emergency management covered most intensely by the press and media, as well. Effective response requires informed decision-making and identification of clear lines of decision authority. Selected Response activities include:

- Activating the Incident Command System;
- Dialoguing with first responders and other community partners (as articulated in memorandums of understanding [MOUs] or other formal agreements) to make informed decisions and deploy resources; and
- Establishing an Emergency Operation Center (EOC).



Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

The EOC serves as a centralized management center for emergency operations. Here, decisions are made by emergency managers based upon information provided by the incident commander and other personnel. The EOC should be located in an area not likely to be involved in an incident (e.g., security department, emergency manager's office, or training center). An alternate EOC should be designated in the event that the primary location is not usable due to emergency consequences. Ideally, the EOC is a dedicated area equipped with communications equipment, reference materials, activity logs, and all the tools necessary to respond quickly and appropriately to an emergency, including:


- Communications equipment;
- A copy of the emergency management plan and EOC procedures;
- Blueprints, maps, and status boards;
- A list of EOC personnel and descriptions of their duties;
- Technical information and data for advising responders;
- Building security system information;
- Information and data management capabilities;
- Telephone directories;
- Backup power, communications, and lighting; and
- Emergency supplies.

Source: *FEMA Emergency Management Guide for Business & Industry*, available at: <http://www.fema.gov/business/guide/toc.shtm>).

- Activating communication plans using multiple modalities (e.g., e-mail, text message, phone).
- Determining and executing the appropriate response strategy.
- Accounting for students, faculty, and staff.
- Conducting an after-action report as a tool for modifying and improving the emergency management plan.

Example of Proactive Response: Texas Tech University


In the year following the tragedy at Virginia Tech, then university president of Texas Tech University (TTU) Jon Whitmore sent students and families a letter. He assured this community that TTU had a plan to respond to a variety of emergencies, and that the safety and security of the campus community was a high priority concern. He discussed recent updates to the TTU campus emergency notification system, which utilizes outdoor sirens, broadcast e-mails, text messaging, and phone calls as well as Web site postings. He invited everyone to view TTU's emergency response Web site to obtain additional information and urged faculty, staff, and students to sign up for emergency information alerts. Because emergency management is an ongoing process at TTU, he was able to reassure students and their families that the university was making a concerted effort to ensure safety and security.



Recovery

The Recovery phase establishes procedures, resources, and policies to assist an institution and its members' return to functioning after an emergency. Recovery is an ongoing process. The type and breadth of recovery activities will vary based on the nature and scope of the emergency. However, the goal of the recovery phase is to restore the learning environment. Planning for Recovery begins in the Preparedness phase, and requires support from campus leaders to ensure that decisions contribute to implementation and resolution of all four components of recovery. All decisions should be made in conjunction with local and perhaps state officials and partners. Recovery includes:

- **Physical and Structural Recovery.** Depending on the scope of the emergency, a key step to recovery can be the creation of a Damage Assessment Team (DAT). This team would likely consist of campus personnel (e.g., safety and security, facility management, risk management, budget office, transportation, food services, technology services, etc.) and community partners. This assessment will evaluate physical and structural damage, assess the availability of housing, transportation, and food services, and determine the degree to which equipment (e.g., computers, lab equipment) is functional. The major goal of the assessment is to determine the extent of the effects of the incident on campus and community physical assets and newly created vulnerabilities. Data from the assessment results will facilitate decision-making about repairs and timelines to resume learning activities.
- **Business Recovery.** IHEs can restore administrative and business function by activating the COOP and BCP plans. The plans also should identify who has the responsibility to cancel or postpone classes or to use alternative locations. Additionally, there should be a succession plan in place for each function identified in the plans, as well as strategies for accepting donations for goods and services following the emergency.
- **Restoration of the Academic-learning Environment.** Restoring the learning environment may involve housing students and conducting classes in off-site locations, implementing online learning, and implementing temporary procedures about assignments, grading, attendance, and tuition and housing payments. Campus administrators must make swift decisions about changes to class schedules and academic calendars and graduation requirements. Moreover, it is important to communicate the decisions and next steps to the media, faculty, staff, students, and families in an expedient fashion. Establishing such communication venues as a Web site or call center to manage inquiries will facilitate the communication process.




- **Psychological and Emotional Recovery.** It is critical to identify the mental health resources in collaboration with partners to promote psychological and emotional recovery. Through this collaboration students, faculty, and staff will have the opportunity to receive short- and long-term mental health services on and off campus, or obtain referrals for more long-term counseling. As part of the preparedness plan, campus mental health personnel may want to establish a prescreening and approval process for mental health personnel who could help during and after an emergency. In addition to providing mental health services for students, it is important to offer such services to workers who may be cleaning and restoring the physical and structural facilities; faculty; and staff involved in the recovery effort; as well as public safety, medical, and mental health professionals.

Hurricane Katrina and Tulane University: Recovery Set in Motion

On Aug. 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused massive destruction in New Orleans and a broad expanse of the Gulf Coast region. Tulane University, located in the heart of New Orleans, suffered major property damage and losses—estimated at more than \$600 million. University functions were brought to a standstill. Following Hurricane Katrina, Tulane University had to contend with the aftermath of the disaster, an inaccessible city, few functioning technologies, and no operational communication mechanisms. Moreover, the university had to close its doors for the fall semester and spend weeks attempting to locate faculty, staff, and students who had evacuated around the country. The university responded by establishing a Web site, call center, and remote offices to provide regular and accurate updates to the entire campus community. The university president and his staff identified several elements that needed immediate attention, including student housing and food services, parking and transportation, administrative and classroom space, media relations, and financial solvency. He set up a series of task forces with representatives from each department and asked them to develop solutions to the major issues. The university also established a policy that students would receive credit for the semester's courses taken at other universities with a passing grade. An online registration system for employees helped regain lost contact information, alleviating disruption to the payroll system. University staff read blogs to monitor the discussions circulating, including the issues of concern to families, students, and staff, in order to alleviate concerns and facilitate the return of campus community members.

The devastation of Katrina forced the university to undertake a major reorganization, which resulted in the layoff of hundreds of faculty and staff members, elimination of several undergraduate majors, removal of men's and women's sports programs, and significant changes to its school of medicine and other graduate programs. The university swiftly developed a renewal plan, approved by the Board of Tulane on Dec. 8, 2005. For Tulane University, the challenges of emergency management became a way of life and a constant struggle. However, from their experiences in this tragedy, they “gathered once again and are now called to be the architects of and witnesses to the renewal of a great American university and a great American city” (*Tulane University—A Plan for Renewal*, December 2005, available at: <http://renewal.tulane.edu/renewalplan.pdf>).



This section introduced the four phases of emergency management. These four phases provide an organizing framework for the development of an emergency management plan.

The remaining sections of this action guide cover the four recommended steps for developing and implementing a plan:

Step 1: Get Organized

Step 2: Identify Hazards and Conduct a Risk Assessment

Step 3: Develop or Update the Emergency Management Plan

Step 4: Adopt and Implement the Emergency Management Plan


This four-step process can be used in either developing a new plan or updating an existing plan.

Four-step Process for Emergency Management and Implementation

This action guide offers a four-step process² for developing and implementing an emergency management plan at higher education institutions. For each step, the guide identifies a set of tasks that must be covered in order to thoroughly address that step.

Step 1: Get Organized

- Build support by getting institutional commitment and leadership for emergency management work.
- Identify, access, and use available resources, from both inside and outside the institution.
- Formulate a project organizational structure [that consists of an advisory committee, a planning team, a project manager, or other structural components.
- Develop a project work plan that has tasks and milestones.



Step 2: Identify Hazards, Vulnerabilities, and Threats by Conducting a Risk Assessment

- Identify a vulnerability assessment tool, which assists an institution in the ongoing process of identifying and prioritizing risks.
- Identify and profile potential hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities.
- Assess vulnerabilities to potential hazards and the institution's capabilities in responding to an event.
- Assess potential consequences and impacts of various emergency events.
- Identify actions that can be taken to prevent, mitigate, or prepare for hazards and potential hazards.


Step 3: Develop or Update the Emergency Management Plan

- Ensure that the plan incorporates the nine key principles in emergency management that contribute to a successful plan.
- Incorporate the results of work done in step 2, including identification of hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities through a risk assessment.
- Address planning elements associated with each of the four phases of emergency management: Prevention and Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.

Step 4: Adopt and Implement the Emergency Management Plan


- Subject the draft plan to a thorough review and approval process.
- Communicate and distribute the plan in various forms (e.g., via the campus Web site, on posters in classrooms, in pull-out guides for specific audiences and responders) to a full range of involved parties.
- Test and practice the plan in training sessions, drills, and exercises.
- Implement action items related to prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.

² The planning process outlined in this guide closely parallels the process advocated by the FEMA for both institutions of higher education and communities as a whole. FEMA's label for this process is *mitigation planning*, drawing from the title of the *Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000*. While the FEMA process focuses heavily on natural disasters, it is fully portable in applying to an all-hazards approach.



- Monitor and update the plan on an ongoing and regular basis, with assistance from after-action reports that are compiled following exercises and corrective action reports that are compiled following actual emergencies, and using lessons learned from both.

In the process of planning and implementation, success is achieved by working carefully through each step in the process. An investment of time and energy in the plan development stage (step 3 in the four-step process) will pay dividends at the implementation stage and to an actual emergency when actions become intuitive based on ongoing training and regular exercising. Consider each of these steps and their corollary tasks in more detail.



STEP 1: GET ORGANIZED


The first step in emergency management planning is to get organized. Tasks to be accomplished in getting organized are:

- Build support and get institutional commitment and leadership for the project.
- Identify, access, and use available resources, both inside and outside the institution.
- Formulate a project organizational structure with an advisory committee, a planning team, a project manager, or other structural components.
- Develop a project work plan with tasking and milestones.

These preparatory tasks are all essential to the success of the planning project.

Build Support, Commitment, and Leadership

Launching an emergency management initiative emerges from a decision to develop a plan or update an existing plan. Implementing and sustaining an emergency management planning initiative requires a considerable investment of institutional time, energy, and resources. It is important to obtain a firm commitment from numerous stakeholders to engage in a substantive planning effort. Thus, the institution's president or provost must assume strong leadership and assign someone to lead the effort who has decision-making power and the authority to use campus resources to manage the planning initiative. It is helpful to issue an administrative directive or resolution that defines the broad objectives of the initiative and describes the general approach to achieve the activities. The objectives should incorporate the guiding principles for emergency management and should rely on the four phases of emergency management.




Identify, Access, and Use Available Resources

When beginning the emergency management planning process it is important to identify what assets and resources are available both on campus and in the community. This task is challenging because there are so many groups and individuals to consider. Ideally, a college or university should have an office of senior management, or at a minimum, a staff position, dedicated to emergency management as a primary function. If so, this office or staff position would play a lead role in the planning. Institutions vary greatly with regard to the presence of departments and functions with a direct responsibility for emergency management; for example, many institutions have their own police and fire operations, and others do not. A first order of business is to identify those departments that must play a significant role in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from an emergency.

On the campus, a major challenge is to achieve a cohesive and integrated planning initiative. The process is an opportunity to create linkage and constructive communication across a large number of potential participants. In doing so, the objective is to generate buy-in, participation, and enthusiasm for the initiative. Table 2 provides a list of on-campus resources and their potential contributions. Determining the extent of resources, knowledge, and expertise that each department brings to the initiative will be helpful throughout the process.

Table 2. IHE Emergency Management Planning: Selected Departments and Illustrative Contributions



College or University Department*	Illustrative Department Contributions
Academic Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures to communicate with and account for teaching faculty in an emergency situation. • Develop plans to identify alternate facilities where institution activities can be conducted in the event of the destruction, disablement, or denial or lack of access to existing facilities • Identify and prioritize critical support services and systems • Identify and ensure recovery of critical assets
Business Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop the processes and procedures for tracking employees' time and issuing paychecks during disaster operations • Develop procedures for procuring emergency resources for responding to and recovering from emergencies • Develop the process for documenting the financial cost of emergency response and recovery operations • Develop a Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
Central Administration or Designee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide resources and leadership support to drive the initiative • Develop procedures for declaring an emergency • Identify alternate administrative facilities • Develop procedures for increasing public information efforts • Develop and coordinate procedures for recruiting volunteers and additional staff • Develop procedures to coordinate and approve volunteers and manage donations during an emergency • Develop a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
Counseling and Mental Health Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and train appropriate staff to provide developmentally and culturally appropriate mental health services • Train mental health staff on specific interventions • Provide basic training on available resources and common reactions to trauma for all staff (including administrators) • Train teachers and other staff on early warning signs of potentially dangerous individuals • Assemble and train crisis recovery teams • Identify both internal and external partners (consider local mental health agencies who may be able to assist, and develop a structure for support) and develop partnership agreements • Develop template letters (that can be tailored) for alerting students, parents, families, staff, and the community to emergencies
Emergency Medical Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop and coordinate procedures for mobilizing resources needed for significant, longer-term emergencies • Identify sources for mutual aid agreements and assistance
Environmental Health and Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate in vulnerability and hazard assessments • Review and update office standard operating procedures to align with the campus emergency management plan • Develop procedures for pre-positioning resources and equipment • Review and update processes and procedures for state and federal disaster declaration requests • Develop, review, and update state and federally required environmental emergency response plans, including management procedures for the plans • Coordinate with public safety operations (see next entry) to develop process and procedures for increasing public information • Provide warning system information

* Across varying types of institutions of higher education these departments are key to university functioning.




Table 2. (Cont'd)

Facilities and Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate in vulnerability and hazard assessments • Provide floor plans with room layout, electrical sources, and entrance and exit points for all campus buildings • Develop procedures for pre-positioning resources and equipment • Identify sources for mutual aid agreements and assistance
Food Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify possible threats and mitigation strategies relating to food safety • Develop procedures for providing food to students, staff, faculty, and community partners during a major emergency • Develop mutual aid agreements for obtaining, preparing, and distributing food
Health Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures to determine if there are adequate supplies and equipment to triage for an emergency and to support community health partners • Develop procedures for mobilizing personnel on campus and at external sites • Develop procedures for developing mutual aid agreements • Develop pandemic flu and infectious disease plans • Develop system for disease surveillance and tracking • Coordinate with local and state public health partners
Human Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop plans to maintain the continuity of payroll, together with the business office (see above), during an emergency • Develop plans to maintain employee benefit services during an emergency • Develop plans to hire or replace staff with temporary employees, if needed • Develop plans to serve as the liaison, or organizer, or both, of volunteer assistance in the event of an emergency • Prepare to execute components of the COOP relating to staffing, including assessing faculty and staff availability, appropriation of personnel, and assisting employees with work-recovery needs (e.g., psychological help, time off for personal needs).
Information Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures and systems for checking critical information and alert systems to disseminate emergency information via Web site, cell phone, e-mail, and other mechanisms. • Identify IT resources needed to facilitate the emergency operations of all campus departments • Identify need for and sources of emergency communication devices (e.g., ham radios, cell phones) • Develop plans to continue academic programs that significantly use technology for teaching purposes
Legal Counsel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide legal counsel on campus liability to key decision makers • Coordinate investigations completed by community partners • Review messages drafted by PIO • Ensure that all campus and community actions are documented with a rationale for the action
Public Information Office (PIO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for coordinating with all departments to provide unified and factual messages to students, staff, faculty, families, and the media using multiple modalities • Develop pre-agreements with the media concerning debriefings and media holding areas during an emergency • Designate a campus spokesperson





Table 2. (Cont'd)

Public Safety Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for reviewing and updating emergency management plan • Develop procedures for facilities and equipment, including testing systems • Develop procedures for mobilizing department of public safety personnel and pre-positioning resources and equipment • Develop a process for managing incidents at the field level using the Incident Command System • Develop a process for communicating with and directing the central dispatch center, including the activation of the Emergency Contact List • Develop procedures to warn threatened elements of the population • Ensure that hazardous material procedures are consistent with the state and local environmental safety hazardous materials plans
Residential Life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures to coordinate the need for on-campus housing, temporary shelters, and temporary off-campus housing locations • Develop procedures for mobilizing residential life personnel and pre-positioning resources • Develop an on-call staffing system to ensure staff are available at all times • Develop procedures for identifying resident students in need of emergency evacuation assistance • Develop procedures for the evacuation and temporary shelter accommodations for resident students • Develop procedures for checking residential facilities and equipment
Student Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for checking student affairs facilities and equipment, including those relating to on-campus recreation, student organizations, on-campus employment, community service, and volunteerism • Develop procedures for addressing the needs of students living in Greek housing or off-campus facilities • Develop procedures for pre-positioning resources to maintain functioning of such campus elements as career services and student government • Develop mutual aid agreements and pre-negotiate services for goods and services in the event of an emergency • Ensure that all items under the <i>Americans with Disabilities Act</i> are considered throughout the planning and implementation of the emergency management plan • Ensure that the plan is accessible to students whose primary language is not English • Develop parent or family notification procedures
Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for mobilizing campus wide transportation for an emergency and for maintaining control of traffic from private vehicles • Develop evacuation procedures from various campus locales


Source: Adapted from the *University of Maryland Emergency Operations Plan* (2006) available at: http://www.umd.edu/emergencypreparedness/umeop/pdfs/sop_dev.pdf [last accessed on Sept. 30, 2008] and the *University of Florida Emergency Management Plan* (2005), available at: <http://www.ehs.ufl.edu/disasterplan/UFEMP.pdf> [last accessed on Sept. 30, 2008.]



Collaboration with community partners should support all planning efforts as well as ensure coordinated response and recovery plans. Outside the college or university system, the planning effort also should involve other community collaborators, such as organizations in government, the nonprofit sector, and the private sector in the community. Consider involving the following:

- Local emergency management offices and planning committees;
- First responders in law enforcement, fire protection, and emergency medical services;
- 911 communications centers;
- Ambulance services;
- City and county government planning agencies, including regional planning agencies;
- City, county, and state government public works departments;
- Special districts with responsibilities for infrastructure, transportation, or flood control;
- Public health agencies;
- Mental health agencies;
- Hospitals;
- State government offices with responsibilities related to emergency management (especially the state office of emergency management and the state hazards mitigation officer);
- FEMA, specifically the regional office;
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), regional office;
- Nonprofit organizations related to emergency and human services, such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and United Way; and
- Media organizations.

The objective in contacting these groups is to generate interest in planning, enlist support and participation, and determine how each stakeholder might best become involved. The magnitude and intensity of the involvement of these organizations will depend on their expertise, time, and resources. In some cases, it will be sufficient for the stakeholder to simply be aware of the planning and know that a new or updated emergency management plan is forthcoming from the IHE. Additionally, these stakeholders will be key participants in all exercises.




Formulate a Project Organizational Structure

Once the campus and community resources are identified, a structure for implementing the planning initiative is needed. This structure will be different from campus to campus, depending on size, location, and campus facilities (e.g., research facilities), and buildings and events (e.g., athletic, performing arts) organized by the institution. It may be appropriate to form an advisory committee or task force with a representative drawn from the campus as well as each of the community partners to formulate this structure. Another option is to form a core planning team with members having expertise in emergency management and such related disciplines as public safety, risk management, and public communications. Core members should consistently participate in any planning efforts to minimize information inconsistencies and provide for fluid decision-making.

While some individuals will be active participants, other stakeholders' participation in the effort may take the form of submitting information and providing feedback. For example, the core planning team may include the head of each department. The department head and his or her designated staff would collaborate to develop an all-hazards department operations plan that will help with accountability and unity of command. Components of the all-hazards plan should include:

- Data about threat and hazard assessments, department statistics, relevant campus data, and any relevant regulations or guidelines that apply to the department functions.
- A mission statement that outlines the broad objectives and general approach to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from emergencies and hazards.
- Mechanisms to trigger readiness activities and illustrative readiness activities, response activities, extended response activities, and recovery activities.
- An emergency team leader and alternative team leaders who will coordinate the resources and functions of each department during an emergency. Each person must provide contact information, such as campus, cell, and home phone numbers.
- An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) representative who will be at the EOC and serve as a liaison between the departments and the EOC.
- The primary location where emergency operations will be coordinated and an alternative location for backup.




- Procedures that the departments will use to contact personnel and ask them to report to the campus or an alternative location.
- Designation of groups of employees to perform specific functions. Each group should be assigned a group leader and members (two to seven people) and designate a location on campus or alternative location if the campus is not accessible where employees in this group will meet. This component also should include assignment configuration that will list shifts and periods of days on and off.
- Resources, materials, and equipment needed to perform each task before, during, and after the emergency. The plan also should include multiple locations on campus for the materials. The primary location may be the place where similar routine tasks are performed or where materials and equipment are routinely stored.
- Summary of available resources not available on campus, which may necessitate developing mutual aid agreements, memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or pre-emergency contracts for equipment, materials, or services.
- Summary of timelines and milestones for ensuring that all components are fully in place according to a schedule.

For some responsibilities and data collection efforts, there may be a decision to collaborate across departments. For example, it may be more efficient and cost-effective to predetermine whether to have each department conduct hazard and risk assessments or make this a campuswide activity. Regardless of the option selected, one entity should analyze all the data and develop one hazard matrix for the entire campus.

Develop a Work Plan

To formulate a work plan, it is first necessary to consider *scope* and *approach*. A first task might be to gather existing information related to emergency management at the institution, such as:

- Previous risk assessments and campus climate assessments as they pertain to potential hazards and vulnerabilities;
- Incident data, culture and climate data, and community hazard profiles;
- Any existing emergency management plans for the campus; and
- Previous media coverage (such as newspaper articles) of campus emergencies.





It always helps to know what has gone on before and what is currently in place pertaining to emergency management. It is important to identify what is working well and where there are major gaps in existing plans or procedures.

All assessment and planning efforts should be aligned with federal, state, and local requirements and guidelines (see U.S. Department of Education's *A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools* available at: <https://rem.ed.gov>). Campus emergency management teams should obtain key information from resource agencies, such as documentation on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) from the Department of Homeland Security. Information on how to access local agencies can be obtained from FEMA. Leaders also should understand any relevant regulations or guidelines that apply, such as policies related to safety and security for the college or university system. Local emergency planning committees or emergency management agencies can be a good source of information about regulations and requirements promulgated in the local community.

The work plan should identify specific timelines and milestones. Leaders should set a target date for completing a first draft of the plan. The schedule should consider, as well, what needs to happen for the plan to be officially adopted and should allow time for stakeholder review, discussion, and approval processes. If a core planning team is in place, the team should be actively involved in planning—the team as a group may construct a work plan that designates specific tasks, when they will be accomplished, and who has the lead responsibility for getting each task done.

Completing the tasks necessary to get organized requires considerable effort. A concerted effort will help launch the planning work successfully, including a transition to the next major step in the process—identifying hazards and conducting a risk assessment.






STEP 2: IDENTIFY HAZARDS, VULNERABILITIES, AND THREATS BY CONDUCTING A RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

After getting organized, the next step in developing an emergency management plan is to identify potential hazards and conduct a risk assessment. It is important to take an all-hazards approach, considering a full range of risks and threats to the college or university. The hazards identification and risk assessment will prioritize among possible hazards so that a focus can be placed on the top priority hazards, while still addressing lower priority hazards. The assessment should be comprehensive with regard to settings, encompassing the campus, the surrounding neighborhoods, and the greater community.

This step of the process typically involves five distinct tasks:

- ▶ Identify a Vulnerability Assessment tool.
- ▶ Identify and profile potential hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities.
- ▶ Assess vulnerabilities to potential hazards and the institution's capabilities in responding to an event.
- ▶ Assess potential consequences/impacts of various emergency events.
- ▶ Identify actions that can be taken to prevent, mitigate or prepare for hazards and potential hazards.



FEMA Publications on Mitigation Planning

In August 2003, FEMA published *Building a Disaster-Resistant University*, a 42-page technical assistance document with eight worksheets in an appendix. This document contains detailed information on FEMA's mitigation planning methods, including details on estimating losses from a disaster (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). The contents of *Building a Disaster-Resistant University* are based on a series of FEMA publications on mitigation planning at the state and local levels. There are four publications in this series (publication numbers 386-1 through 4):


- 386-1: *Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation Planning*
- 386-2: *Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses*
- 386-3: *Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and Implementation Strategies*
- 386-4: *Bringing the Plan to Life: Implementing the Hazard Mitigation Plan*

Although the guides are written for communities, many of the steps and procedures represented in these documents are relevant to IHEs and their planning efforts. All of these publications can be found at the FEMA Web site, www.fema.gov. Click on "Forms and Publications" and search for the documents by publication number.

Identify a Vulnerability Assessment Tool

Vulnerability assessment is the ongoing process through which colleges and universities identify potential risks and areas of weakness that could have adverse consequences for institutions and their systems. Vulnerability assessments are an important and vital part of emergency management planning for examining risks, needs, and threats. A vulnerability assessment focuses on an institution's susceptibility to specific threats or hazards and how those weaknesses or threats might be mitigated through emergency management. Vulnerability assessments should be used to inform the prevention-mitigation phases of emergency management and help institutions decide which areas should be priorities of focus.

Initial emergency management planning can be a daunting task for many reasons, not the least of which is learning the numerous terms associated with various phases of the planning. Many other terms are used in relation to assessment, such as needs assessment, threat assessment, risk analysis, safety and security audit, hazard assessment, and facility assessment. Each one of these terms can have its own meaning depending on the context in which it is used. Some of these types of assessments, such as safety and security audits and facilities assessments, focus only on specific aspects or areas of vulnerability. Some examples of the interchangeable terminology follow.




- A *needs assessment*, often used interchangeably with *vulnerability assessment*, commonly refers to an assessment done to identify gaps or areas needing improvement and to determine unmet needs, but not necessarily all vulnerabilities or potential threats.
- A *hazards assessment* focuses on general hazards and determining which hazards an institution might be prone to. A *threat assessment* also focuses on hazards that could potentially threaten the institution, but the term has generally been used in assessing students or outsiders who may post a violent threat to other students within the campus.
- A *risk analysis* usually focuses on the calculation of specific risk levels to determine how vulnerable institutions would be to specific threats or what specific consequences institutions could face in the event of emergency-related crises. Generally a risk analysis is conducted after specific hazards are identified.

The U.S. Department of Education's *Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools* (2008) encompasses all of these areas of assessment and uses vulnerability assessment as an inclusive term. It also provides several sample assessment tools for use by institutions in an assessment process. Additional resources can be found at the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) Campus Preparedness Resource Center (available at: <http://www.iaclea.org/visitors/wmdcpt/cprc/aboutcprc.cfm>)

Identify and Profile Hazards, Threats, and Vulnerabilities

There are many different categories of hazards that could potentially affect higher education institutions. Vulnerability assessments should take into consideration all hazards and threats that could potentially affect the institution instead of limiting assessments to only specific categories of hazards and threats. A hazards assessment and risk analysis often are conducted by a team of participants with expertise in various aspects of the assessment process. First, the team engages in a hazards assessment to identify and prioritize hazards.



Hazards can be described in several categories:

Natural Hazards, Including Severe Weather

Natural hazards refer to what are commonly called natural disasters as well as various types of severe weather. Examples of these types of hazards are:


- Earthquakes;
- Tornadoes;
- Lightening;
- Severe wind;
- Hurricanes;
- Floods;
- Wildfires;
- Extreme temperatures (hot or cold);
- Landslides and mudslides;
- Tsunamis;
- Volcanic eruptions; and
- Winter precipitation (ice or snow).

Biological Hazards

Biological hazards that could affect colleges and universities include:

- **Infectious diseases**, such as pandemic influenza, XDR (extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis), *Staphylococcus aureus* (“Staph”), and meningitis;
- **Contaminated food outbreaks**, including salmonella, botulism, and *E. coli*; and
- **Toxic materials present in campus laboratories**, such as chemical, radioactive, or other potentially harmful substances.

Additionally, DHS advises that colleges and universities consider how such existing biological or medical conditions of students as allergies, diabetes, or asthma could affect students in the event of an emergency. For example, because of the stress caused by a crisis, students with asthma may have greater difficulty breathing and may need access to medications or inhalers during a shelter-in-place situation.



Similarly, diabetic students may need access to insulin or snacks during a shelter-in-place scenario. Meeting the special needs of more vulnerable students and staff is a key component in any emergency management plan.

Violence

Threats of violence at colleges and universities involve:

- Weapons on campus and school shootings;
- Fights;
- Criminal or gang violence; and
- Bomb threats.


Such factors as crime rates in the area, known gang activity, and drug use in the community and on campus may contribute to the potential for acts of violence on campus.

In situations where a student or faculty may pose a threat to the institution, as manifested through actions, or words, colleges and universities should have available a specific process for early intervention, usually called a *threat assessment*. Threat assessments are used in response to the identification of a person who is at risk of causing harm to self or others. The purpose of the threat assessment is to prevent acts of violence by responding to early warning signs and taking appropriate measures.

Climate and Culture

The climate and culture of the institution can contribute to or even cause hazards. Issues of climate and culture both in the institution and in the community that could influence hazards include:

- Drug usage and trafficking;
- Crimes, both minor and serious;
- Sexual misconduct;
- Suicide;
- Hostile environments (i.e., an environment where individuals or groups of individuals feel unsafe or threatened, such as in instances of racial or religious discrimination);



- Students, personnel, or intruders that may pose a danger to others; and
- Political protests or demonstrations.

Hazards Present in the Community

There are many possible threats associated with the physical community surrounding a campus. Examples are:

- If the campus is located near an industrial plant, this poses a potential hazard to the campus in the event of an explosion or accidental release of toxins.
- If the campus is near an airport or major highway, there is a risk of a plane crash on campus grounds or a nearby vehicle crash that releases hazardous material.
- If railways run through or near campus, accidents involving cargo transportation may pose risks of fire, explosion, or hazardous material release.
- If the campus is near waterways with a major dam, dam failure could pose a risk.
- Nearby prisons could pose a threat if convicts were to escape.

Hazards Related to the Physical Campus Environment


Many hazards or risks associated with hazards within the physical campus environment have potentially serious impacts, including structural-, maintenance-, and grounds-related issues. Examples of such hazards include:

- Building fires;
- Power outages; and
- Structural failures.

These are discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Hazards Created by Terrorism and Military Conflict

Such events as Sept. 11, 2001, have prompted new concern regarding the potential for terrorist threats. Incidents associated with terrorism and subsequent military conflict could occur on campuses. According to FEMA (2006), terrorism-related threats include the following:



- Explosions;
- Bioterrorism or biological warfare threats;
- Chemical threats;
- Nuclear blasts;
- Radiological threats that could be dispersed through a bomb or radiological dispersion device (RDD), or “dirty bomb.”

Certain locale also may be a target for terrorism:

- Military installations;
- Nearby dams;
- Campus facilities conducting animal research;
- Nuclear reactors on campuses; and
- Nearby sites of mass transportation, such as airports, railroads, ports, rail transits, major highways, and bus stations.


Bioterrorism threats include proliferation of hazardous bacteria, viruses, and related toxins that could be released into the air. Chemical threats could be in the form of toxic vapors, aerosols, liquids, or solids. Nuclear events would similarly involve some sort of bomb or explosion; however, the use of an RDD would be far more likely. In the event of terrorist threats such as these, colleges and universities may need to evaluate how prepared they would be to evacuate or shelter-in-place based on the type and proximity of the threat, and the campus location and structure itself.

Mapping of Area Targeted for Emergency Management

As hazards relevant to the institution are identified, the emergency management team would benefit greatly from the creation of a map supporting emergency management purposes. The base map created ideally would be GIS-based, offering multiple layers of spatial information features and the ability to associate attribute information with those spatial features. Mapping layers might include:

- All buildings and facilities on campus;
- The location of key resources related to emergency management, such as police, fire, and emergency medical services;
- The location of hazardous materials;
- Boundaries related to specific hazards such as floodplain topography and earthquake fault zones; and
- Campus infrastructure showing roads, water lines, power lines, and telecommunications systems.

The scope of the mapping system may extend beyond campus boundaries to include the surrounding community, hazards present in the community, and infrastructure in the community critical to the emergency management program of the college or university.



Hazard Identification: First Steps

A first order of business for the assessment team is to consider the list of potential hazards and begin to identify those that pose the greatest risk to the college or university. In the case of natural disasters, it may be fairly easy to determine those that are of greatest concern. Other hazard categories, however, may take some research and analysis to uncover.

It is likely that the community in which the college or university is located has conducted a hazards assessment that could be helpful to this effort. Talk to emergency management or public safety agencies in the community to find out what has been done in identifying potential hazards. A community-based hazards assessment likely will have considered many of the same hazards that a college or university is concerned with, including natural disasters, community facilities and plants, hazardous materials from industrial and chemical accidents, and susceptibility to terrorism.

After identifying a list of hazards, it is helpful to develop *hazard profiles*. For each type of hazard, answer the related profile questions:

- Frequency of occurrence – How often is it likely to occur?
- Magnitude and potential intensity – How bad could it get?
- Location – Where is it likely to strike?
- Probable geographical extent – How large of an area will be affected?
- Duration – How long could it last?
- Seasonal pattern – What time of year is it more likely to occur?
- Speed of onset – How fast will it occur?
- Availability of warnings – Does a warning system exist and how much warning time will there be?

After completing hazard profiles, a prioritization analysis can be created using a risk matrix. A risk matrix is used to rate probability and severity on a scale of low, medium, or high. Obviously, hazards with high probability and high severity are at the top of the priorities list, and those with low probability and low severity are at the bottom. The hard part may be prioritizing hazards that get medium ratings or those that are high probability-low severity or low probability-high severity. Once an institution has determined which hazards are at the top of the list as well as those that fall in descending order following those at the top, it can prioritize planning, training, and drill efforts to focus on the hazards most likely to occur and most likely to cause significant repercussions to the campus.




Figure 1. Example of an Emergency Management Risk Matrix


PROBABILITY	HIGH			Hurricane Tornado
	MED		Flood	Violence
	LOW			Hazmat Spill
		LOW	MED	HIGH
		SEVERITY		

Source: Akers, J. & Lassiter, B. *Prevention-Mitigation*. (April 2008). Presentation at the U.S. Department of Education Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools' *Emergency Management for Schools* Training, New Orleans.

Assess Vulnerabilities and Response Capabilities

The next task for the team is an assessment of vulnerabilities and response capabilities. This entails determining the characteristics of the campus setting that contribute to susceptibility to hazards and the ability of the institution to respond to an event. As discussed previously (see p. 30), a vulnerability assessment identifies areas of weakness that could result in undesirable consequences for the campus or community. For colleges and universities, these areas of weakness could include particular aspects of an institution's structure, procedures, equipment, systems, grounds, and surroundings. As noted earlier, many campuses have open access to buildings and grounds, which increases vulnerability. Some vulnerabilities can be identified through an inspection of buildings and grounds:

- **Structural hazards** refer to actual structural issues within the building, such as weak roofs or trusses, building susceptibility to high winds or floods, unreinforced masonry, and unsecured or unsafe windows.
- **Maintenance-related hazards** could include unstable bookshelves, exposed wiring, wet floors, unsafe practices in science labs or with chemical elements, exposure to asbestos, unsecured appliances and vending machines, malfunction of heating and ventilation systems, blocked exits, and general fire hazards.
- **Grounds hazards** include such issues as unsafe landscaping, poorly maintained outdoor equipment, exposed electrical wires or gas lines, exposed nails, or unsecured storage structures.



A vulnerability assessment also is supported by applying the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED):

- Natural surveillance – ability to see what is occurring in a particular setting;
- Natural access control – ability to restrict who enters or exits an environment; and
- Territorial maintenance – ability to demonstrate ownership of and respect for property.

The assessment should identify instances where these features could be improved.

Another key component of vulnerability assessment is perhaps the most challenging—assessing campus culture and climate. Colleges and universities should foster a culture of respect and create an environment that lessens the chance of a violent incident. To do this, institutions pursue a number of strategies, such as creating connections between faculty and students and encouraging an environment of openness and disclosure. There are a number of assessment tools available to colleges and universities to evaluate their culture and climate. These tools can help point to areas that need attention. Obviously, improving culture and climate is an ongoing and long-term endeavor.

Leadership in an Emergency Situation


The incident command system, as described earlier (see p. 9), is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazard management structure that allows its users—higher education institutions and first responders—to operate together to meet the demands of emergency situations without encountering barriers in functioning due to jurisdictional boundaries. As FEMA explains in their ICS-100 course, Introduction to the Incident Command System, the basic organization of the incident command system entails several key elements relating to the organization of command.

For one, having a **unified command** establishes a single command structure for all respective agencies to work under (e.g., fire, police, SWAT). It includes common response objectives and strategies and the ability for agency incident commanders to work together in joint decision-making.

Transfer of command also ensures the emergency is handled effectively by always placing control of the situation in the hands of the best-equipped entity. Transfer of command occurs in the following circumstances:

- When a more qualified entity assumes command;
- When the incident changes so as to legally require a change in command;
- When personnel change shifts during a prolonged incident; or
- When the incident response is concluded and control is returned to the home agency (here, the higher education institution).


An emergency plan for higher education institutions will entail an incident command system made up of campus personnel, including a designated incident commander. When first responders arrive on campus to respond to an emergency, the higher education incident commander will typically transfer command to the first responders' incident commander, who will operate response efforts from a unified command structure.




If an emergency were to occur, how prepared would the institution be to respond? A major purpose for conducting an assessment and developing an emergency management plan is to improve preparedness and response capability. Ask key questions that pertain to the Preparedness and Response phases of emergency management:

- How well defined are campus policies and procedures for responding to emergencies?
- How well established are relationships with first responders and other community partners?
- Would it be clear who is in charge when responding to an emergency and how leadership responsibility will be handled as the emergency evolves (see Figure 2.)?

Figure 2. NIMS Organizational Chart, Modified for a College Campus



Source: Chart courtesy of Gallaudet University, adapted from Director Harry Aziz's presentation at ACAP's Crisis Management – Protecting our Students Workshop, Oct. 30, 2007, Baltimore, Md.



Example of NIMS Training: California Systemwide Community Colleges

In 2007, the California College Systems Office began offering systemwide training for all California community college districts and colleges on NIMS and the state Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) as a result of funding from the Governor's Office of Homeland Security. Initial training opportunities were held for two types of college personnel: chief executive officers, and emergency and safety personnel. The CEOs received training from the University of West Virginia's VMC/Homeland Security Programs and a SEMS executive course that fulfills one of the requirements for CEO training under NIMS and SEMS, while the emergency and safety personnel received training on college risk assessment planning. Trainings also included time to network with other community college personnel. Chancellor Mark Drummond encouraged all district and college CEOs and emergency and safety personnel to attend a training to ensure their colleges and communities are prepared in the area of emergency management. More information on this effort is available at: <http://emergency.cccco.edu>.


- Is there a defined procedure for communicating with students and others on the campus to alert them of the emergency? Are multiple modes of communication available, including cell phone broadcasts, Web site postings, notification through media outlets, and campus warning alarm systems?
- Are radio systems of campus police or security personnel interoperable with local law enforcement first responders?
- Are there plans in place for communicating with the media?

Thinking through these questions will help determine where the most work in developing an emergency management plan needs to be done.

Assess Potential Consequences and Impacts of Emergency Events

The assessment of consequences measures the range of loss or damage that would occur from the impact of an incident. For colleges and universities, this should include the disruption of the social and physical learning environment—whether short or long term—as well as subsequent psychological impact on the college community. Estimating the potential for death and injury is a critical aspect of consequences assessment. Another key component is estimation of financial losses, such as liability for death or injury, repairs to buildings and grounds, and loss of revenue due to disruption of operations.

To accurately estimate potential losses from an emergency event, it is necessary to take inventory of assets at the institution. For buildings, the inventory should include square footage, construction materials, contents and equipment inside of buildings, uses of the building, and occupancy levels at different points in time during the year. The inventory should address infrastructure as well—utilities, communications systems, and transportation systems. An assets inventory is critical when estimating potential losses from specific events, such as a flood, earthquake, or fire.



The estimation of losses from an emergency event is conventionally organized in broad categories of life, property, and function. For IHEs, losses may be estimated in terms of harm to persons (often measured in numbers of injuries or deaths), financial costs related to buildings and equipment, lost revenues, and other conventional measures. Other measures of loss are particular to the college and university setting—e.g., loss of instructional time, research data, and unique historical artifacts or other valuable assets present on campus.


Identifying Prevention, Mitigation, and Preparation Action Items

From the tasks performed by the assessment team, a list of action items should be compiled. These action items could include the following:

- Install access controls for selected buildings and campus areas;
- Make structural improvements to buildings;
- Conduct maintenance projects, such as securing bookshelves and display cases to walls and securing lab equipment;
- Make improvements in landscaping, such as removing objects that might impair visibility through windows to the outside;
- Install systems for communicating with students and others on campus to notify them of an emergency;
- Enhance radio systems to ensure interoperability with local law enforcement;
- Improve security technology, such as security cameras, access control, and alarm systems; and
- Update structural design as applied to new construction or the retrofitting of existing structures.


National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities

Each type of campus facility has unique safety and security needs. The National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities (NCEF) has created assessment questions and checklists for virtually every type of facility or area on a campus. The Web site also offers articles on prevention and mitigation actions that are appropriate for indoors and outside on campus grounds. The NCEF assessment tools and articles can be found at www.ncef.org.



These action items will eventually be incorporated into the emergency management plan document. The items identified should be subjected to a costs-benefit analysis. Some items can be accomplished at little cost. Others may be very costly, requiring the identification of funding sources and an analysis of budgetary impact. A prioritization of items on the list can be established using criteria of cost, benefits accrued from risk reduction, and estimated frequency of occurrence for the hazard involved.

This section discussed the second step in a four-step process for developing and implementing an emergency management plan at the IHE level. In identifying hazards and conducting a risk assessment, an IHE positions itself to write a plan based on relevant facts and systematic analysis. A thorough effort in identifying hazards and conducting risk assessment makes the job of writing a plan considerably easier and leads to a higher-quality product.



STEP 3: DEVELOPING OR UPDATING AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

The third step in developing and implementing an emergency management plan is to draft—or review and update—the emergency management plan. Using campus and community data and resources and the departmental plans, an all-hazard, campus-based emergency management plan can be developed, modified, or updated. Much of the work done during assessment (see step 2) will carry over and serve as the basis for the plan.

It is important to remember that the campus and relevant partners should collaborate to develop the comprehensive plan. In addition, certain campus entities may require separate plans of their own, such as an athletic stadium or university hospital. These plans should be stand-alone with respect to that specific entity, but also should be rolled into the campuswide emergency plan.


The tasks to be accomplished in this step are:

- ▶ Ensure that the plan incorporates the key principles that will contribute to successful emergency management operations.
- ▶ Consider the results of work done in step 2, including identification of hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities indicated by conducting a risk assessment.
- ▶ Act on planning elements emerging from each of the four phases of emergency management: Prevention-Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.

Incorporate Key Principles

Every plan should incorporate several general components. The plan should:

- Establish points of responsibility consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (see <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims> for more information on NIMS).



- Demonstrate meaningful collaboration with community partners.
- Reflect an all-hazards approach to emergency management.
- Address elements within the boundaries of the four phases of emergency management framework.
- Document approval of the plan by the appropriate authorities.
- Show alignment with federal, state, and local emergency management plans and guidelines.
- Specify accommodation for people with disabilities or other special needs.
- Provide a timeline for maintaining and updating the plan.

National Incident Management System and Higher Education Institutions


Are colleges and universities required to implement NIMS? Any colleges or universities that receive federal preparedness funds are required to adopt NIMS. In addition, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 requires all federal agencies to adopt NIMS, and requires state and local jurisdictions to adopt NIMS to receive federal preparedness funding. While colleges and universities do not qualify as first responders, it is similarly recommended that these institutions work with the community on emergency preparedness activities. This includes the collaboration of college and university emergency preparedness personnel with the community's emergency response personnel and the use of NIMS and ICS.

See National Incident Management System at the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia at: <http://www.usg.edu/publicsafety/resources/index.phtml?res=5>.

Consider Hazards, Threats, and Vulnerabilities Identification From Risk Assessment

When developing the plan, the results of step 2—identification of hazards and risk assessment—should be considered. Step 2 results could include:

- Results on research as to past occurrences of hazards at the college or university, covering all hazard types.
- Profiling and prioritization of hazards resulting from an assessment of frequency and severity of potential hazards.
- Summary information on vulnerabilities of the institution to potential hazards as identified in a facilities and grounds assessment, surveys of campus culture and climate, or other sources; also, conclusions on the ability of the institution to respond to various hazards.
- Information on the potential consequences of hazards likely to occur, including estimates of loss.



These findings should inform all components of an institution's emergency management plan, shaping the strategies, procedures, and practices implemented in each of a plan's four phases of emergency management.

Address the Four Phases of Emergency Management


Next, the plan should include a section on elements related to each of the four phases of emergency management, as earlier described. Building on the risk assessment, the plan should describe the decisions, activities, and programs that pertain to **Prevention-Mitigation** of emergencies, addressing such questions as:

- What actions have been taken and will be taken to prevent campus violence?
- What actions have been taken and will be taken to mitigate the impacts of an unavoidable natural disaster?
- Who is responsible and involved in crisis prevention and mitigation at the college or university? How are community partners involved in this?
- What training and practice has been conducted or will be conducted to support prevention and mitigation activities?

To address **Preparedness**, the plan should adopt and endorse the incident command system and acknowledge how ICS will be applied during a crisis. To the extent this can be done ahead of time, specific roles and responsibilities should be assigned to individuals or position types in the institutional system. If possible, the plan should describe how coordination with community partners will take place and what roles community partners will play in different types of emergencies. If MOUs have been developed in this regard, these MOUs can be incorporated into the plan document.

Example of Coordinated Response: Stanford University Emergency Event Classification System

The Stanford University Campus Emergency Plan calls for triaging an emergency in a three-level classification system. Level 1 is a minor incident that is quickly resolved with internal resources or limited help. Level 2 is a more significant emergency that impacts critical infrastructure, a building, or multiple buildings and that may potentially affect life safety or mission-critical functions. For level 2, the emergency plan is activated, and an operational subset of a larger emergency management team, the Situation Triage and Assessment Team (STAT), determines the magnitude of the emergency and coordinates its resolution or, if the emergency continues to develop, activates level 3 response. Level 3 is a disaster that involves the entire campus and surrounding community. At Level 3, the emergency plan is activated, and the entire emergency management organization across the campus mobilizes.




Other factors to consider in **Preparedness**:

- Articulate policies, protocols, and guidelines in the plan that directly prepare the college or university for an emergency. Examples include guidelines for when evacuation or a shelter-in-place response should be invoked, what emergency supplies need to be available, where building floor plans are to be maintained and made available, and how transportation-related issues will be handled. If contracts have been negotiated to provide supplies or transportation in an emergency, these should be identified in the plan.
- Incorporate a communications plan—one that covers communications with the campus community, the surrounding community, the media, parents and families of students, and other stakeholders.
- Outline the training and practice to be conducted. This should include a full range of training and drills, from simple orientation to full-scale simulation drills. Training and practice requirements vary greatly by role and position within the college or university. It takes some work, but it is important to think through and specify a training plan for each type of position.

If a thorough job has been done in addressing **Preparedness** in the plan, the job of addressing the Response phase will be relatively straightforward. In the **Response** section, the plan could:


- Articulate specifically *how* mobilization and activation of the plans and protocols—those that pertain to the incident command system and communications, for example—will take place.
- Articulate distinct criteria for activating an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in response to a crisis of moderate or severe intensity. Activation of the EOC is often accompanied by designation of a particular individual or position as incident commander.
- Specify how documentation of the event will occur and who is responsible for doing this. This documentation is necessary for after-event debriefing session. The debriefing is also important for reviewing with the involved emergency responders both what went right and what went wrong.


In the plan, all the components of the **Recovery** phase should be addressed—physical and structural recovery, business and administrative continuity, resumption of academic learning, and emotional and mental recovery of those involved. The plan might discuss:



- Conducting a physical and structural damage assessment and making decisions about building closures. The plan should articulate guidelines for decisions for both closures and reopenings.
- Documenting procedures for how physical and structural repairs are to be initiated.
- Drafting a continuity of operations plan (COOP) that describes how to handle payroll and other key aspects of doing business in the college or university.
- Designing guidelines for how resumption of learning activities will be accomplished. Will there need to be alternative sites for parts of or the institution's entire learning program? Flexibility and innovation may be the keys here.
- Recognizing that the emotional and mental health of students, faculty, staff, or other involved parties is a paramount concern. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a serious health concern. The early stages of Recovery are the best opportunity to mitigate the impacts of this. Resources for mental health counseling at the institution and in the surrounding community should be identified ahead of time.
- Anticipating certain practical matters that could become logistical issues, for example, procedures for receiving donations and procedures for screening volunteers to help with recovery efforts.

Drafting an emergency management plan is step 3 in the four-step process. Completing a draft of the plan is a major milestone in planning, but there is more work to be done. In step 4, the plan enters the phase of implementation, monitoring, and updating.





STEP 4: ADOPTING AND IMPLEMENTING AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

Once an emergency management plan has been drafted, attention can shift to getting the plan adopted and implemented. Plans need to be dynamic and adaptable, not documents that sit on a shelf and are never used or consulted. How does implementation happen? The tasks in this final step of the process are:


- ▶ Subject the draft plan to a thorough review and approval process.
- ▶ Communicate and distribute the plan in various forms to a full range of involved parties.
- ▶ Test and practice the plan in training sessions, drills, and exercises.
- ▶ Implement the action items outlined related to prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.
- ▶ Monitor and update the plan on an ongoing and regular basis, with assistance from after-action reports following exercises and corrective action reports following actual emergencies, and using lessons learned.

Review and Adopt the Plan

Early in the planning process, provision should have been made for review and approval of the plan document. Review and approval processes are an opportunity to communicate the contents of the plan to planning committee team members and community partners, improve upon it by incorporating review feedback, and build support for the plan with governing boards and senior administrative officials.

The campus emergency management committee, advisory board, or task force should review all documentation in collaboration with community partners. This review serves multiple purposes:

- Ensure that campus plans are aligned with and integrated into local, state, and federal law enforcement and emergency management guidelines and policies;



- Identify and resolve any inconsistencies or overlaps among departmental actions;
- Ensure that all responsibilities and procedures are consistent with NIMS and ICS functions; and
- Ensure that the campus is not subject to any legal liability.


After this review, the emergency management plan should be finalized, modified, or updated on a regular basis.

Of course, approval processes vary depending upon the structure and policies of the institution. Whatever is required, the plan should receive a formal approval and become an official policy document for the institution.

The adoption of the plan also can reflect the endorsement of several stakeholders. In addition to the approval of a chancellor or president and a governing board, endorsements can be sought from the business and administrative departments of the institution, from local emergency management agencies, local public safety agencies, and local political jurisdictions. This is also an opportunity to include student groups, for example, by obtaining an endorsement from the student government body.

Communicate and Distribute the Plan

The emergency management plan must be disseminated, communicated, and marketed to a variety of involved parties and stakeholders, including faculty, staff, students, parents, community partners, and the media. Each distinct stakeholder will receive a different part of the emergency plan—only the component most relevant to their respective roles in emergencies. For example, food service workers should receive information about food safety and infectious diseases. For maintenance and custodial staff, the emphasis may be on floor plans about campus buildings and the importance of regularly updating the floor plans and having the plans accessible in various formats (e.g., paper, electronic copies). All entities should know that a complete plan exists, but that for security reasons, the details of the master plan are not publicized. Few stakeholders will receive the complete plan.



Developing a marketing and dissemination plan of the various components will involve collaboration among campus administration, department heads, the public information officer, student affairs, community partners, and the media. Each stakeholder may require a different type of marketing strategy and a variety of communication modalities.


It is likely the full plan will be a large document organized in a notebook or posted on a secure campus Web site. For students and families, the campus Web site is the most effective communication mechanism. Faculty and staff may want to access publicly viewable parts of the plan via an Intranet Web site. Summary components tailored to stakeholders' interests and perspectives also can be presented in laminated one-page documents able to be posted and readily accessible for periodic review. Quick reference guides, or "pocket guides," may be an important format for communicating the essential components of the plan and making its contents more accessible during an emergency event.

Partnerships with the media should be strategic and ongoing. Developing a media communication plan with various media outlets will result in a collaborative effort to disseminate timely and accurate information to the public. The media can be sent press releases about the emergency plan and any exercises that the campus may conduct. Asking media outlets to be active participants in exercises will emphasize the importance of a strong working relationship between the campus and media.

Test and Practice the Plan

Higher education institutions have come to expect the unexpected. The more the plan is practiced and people are trained on the plan, the better the campus responds to emergencies in a comprehensive and effective manner. The ability to do this comes from practice. Exercises are an effective way to identify gaps and weaknesses in the plan and to train students, staff, faculty, and campus administrators in the emergency management procedures. All practicing and training must be done in conjunction with relevant community partners and should focus on the key procedures and strategies outlined in the plan. There are five types of exercises; each requires different levels of planning, time, people involved, and resources:

- **Orientation meetings** will increase awareness among all stakeholders about why and how the plan was developed and provide an overview of the plan's contents. These meetings should include campus administration, department heads, the public information officer, student affairs, community partners, first responders, and the media.




- **Tabletop exercises** are discussions about a scenario and how the campus or a department will prepare for, respond to, or recover from an emergency. Participants, from faculty and staff to department heads, campus administrators, and emergency planners, discuss potential challenges, and identify solutions.
- **Drills** involve one or only a few community partners (e.g., law enforcement, fire) and relevant campus staff that use the actual campus grounds and buildings to drill on how to respond to a scenario.
- **Functional exercises** are similar to drills but will likely involve multiple partners and campus staff. Participants react to realistic simulated events (e.g., a bomb in a residence hall and an intruder with a gun in a classroom). Participants implement the plan and procedures using the Incident Command System (ICS) protocol.
- **Full-scale exercises** are the most time-consuming activity in the exercise continuum and are a multiagency, multi-jurisdiction effort in which all resources are deployed. This type of exercise tests collaboration among the agencies and participants, public information systems, communications systems, and equipment. An EOC is established, and the ICS is activated.

What Is a Tabletop Exercise?

Tabletop exercises analyze an emergency event in an informal, stress-free environment. They provide participants with an emergency scenario to analyze and increase their awareness of the roles and responsibilities of individuals who need to respond, stabilize, terminate, and help others recover from emergencies. They are designed to prompt a constructive discussion about existing emergency response plans as participants identify, investigate, and resolve issues. (“Emergency Exercises: An Effective Way to Validate School Safety Plans,” *ERCM Express Newsletter*, Vol.2, Issue 3, 2006)

For example, a tabletop exercise might bring together campus emergency planners and local first responders to discuss planning and response efforts to any number of emergencies that might occur on campus, including an active shooter or a pandemic outbreak. Together, the institution and their partners review preventive abilities, preparedness for such a situation, and capacities for responding and recovering from the emergency to determine areas for improvement and possible revisions to the institution's emergency plan.


Before making a decision about which type of exercise to facilitate, a higher education institution should consider varying factors, including the amount of time and resources and collaborative support required to execute the activity balanced against the outcome of the experience. For example, while a tabletop exercise may be cheaper and less time-consuming to run, a full-scale exercise provides a more realistic context for the simulated response to an emergency situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to implement into plans.



To successfully execute any type of exercise, consider the following:

- Involve students, faculty, and staff in the exercise to provide a different perspective about the plan.
- Communicate information in advance to avoid panic and concern.
- Develop and practice a wide range of scenarios, based on the risk, threat, and hazard assessments of the campus.
 - Identify or try to identify the most likely event(s) the campus might encounter by consulting risk assessment data.
 - Include a variety of response procedures.
 - Practice and train under different conditions (e.g., time of day, weather, points in the academic calendar, and various campus events).
- Be consistent with common emergency management terminology, such as ICS.
- Debrief after each exercise and develop an after-action report. The report should evaluate and document results, identify lessons learned, and discuss how the emergency management plan and procedures will be modified, if needed. Designation of responsibility for modifying the plan should be specified.

It is important to remember that the emergency management plan is a dynamic document and should be practiced, modified, and updated on a yearly basis. The emergency management plan should include timelines for updating and should describe how campus staff will ensure that the plan aligns with current best practices for emergency management on campuses.



Emergency Management Plans of Institutions of Higher Education: Site-specific Documents


As mentioned earlier, there is no template or model emergency management plan that will suit every higher education institution. A strong emergency plan addresses the four phases of emergency management, defines key issues and vulnerabilities, capitalizes on institutional and community resources, and describes the roles and responsibilities of designated school officials as they integrate with community agencies. Plans should be developed based upon site-specific issues and validated through a number of collaborative exercises: site assessments, needs assessments (see page 31), inventories, meetings, and emergency exercises, including drills and tabletops.

The broad array of personnel and providers; the range of available resources; the scope and type of facilities, equipment, and structures; and the vast diversity in geographical, cultural, and social climates of an institution invariably will make plans very different from one locale to the next. As such, the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools advocates that IHEs engage in a thorough and inclusive emergency plan development process, as opposed to adapting or tailoring a preexisting plan from another institution. Only an institution that has undergone all of the aforementioned steps can know what is necessary to include in their individualized emergency plan. In addition, a plan is not only unique but also private to an institution. That is, a security interest exists in keeping aspects of an emergency management plans protected from public access.

Lest sharing of existing or sample plans be construed as prescriptive, no links or excerpts from sample or existing higher education institution emergency management plans are provided within this section of the document. However, valuable lessons from the field of emergency management relating to IHEs are eminently appropriate for distribution. In spring of 2008, the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, in partnership with Health and Human Services' Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), launched the Emergency Management for Higher Education grant program to support emergency preparedness planning for higher education institutions. In the future, important lessons learned from the subsidized efforts of these institutions will likely be shared with the field to supplement this guide and elucidate recommendations and key practices.

Implement Emergency Management Plan Action Items

As the emergency management plan was developed, a number of action items were identified, many related to prevention, mitigation, and preparedness. The risk assessment process identified areas of weakness with respect to vulnerabilities and response capabilities, coupled with specific action items for improvement in these areas. In the implementation phase, these action items are addressed one-by-one. Some may require approval and scheduling through capital improvement programs, maintenance programs, or other established systems. Some items will require the identification of funding sources and inclusion in budgets for the organization. For all items, points of responsibility and a specific schedule for implementation should be identified.




In many college and university systems, emergency management does not have a distinct or separate program budget. Institutions may want to establish a separate budget for emergency management as a means of emphasizing its support of emergency management objectives and facilitating the achievement of those objectives. A separate budget is one way to clarify what resources are needed for the emergency management program and sustain a level of commitment to the program over time.

Another type of action item in emergency management is the implementation of programs related to prevention and mitigation of hazards. For example, the institution may determine that it needs to conduct a campus culture and climate assessment (see page 33) and follow up with programs aimed at reducing the risk of violence on campus. The institution may not have a thorough threat assessment process in place in which case the development of such a process becomes a clear action item.

Monitor and Update the Plan

There are several ways to keep an emergency management plan fresh and subject to continuous improvement. Every time a training session or drill is conducted, there is an opportunity to identify weaknesses in the plan—things that need to be changed or added. Every time there is an actual emergency, be it minor or major, there is an opportunity to improve the plan based upon an after-action debriefing. After-action reports that follow exercises and corrective action reports that follow actual emergencies can provide important insights for plan improvements based on lessons learned. Over time, it is possible to identify more effective ways to prevent and mitigate emergencies, better ways to prepare for and respond to emergencies, and better ways to recover from them. Certainly, problems that surface in responding to an emergency will lead directly to ways to improve preparation. All of these improvements should be reflected in updates to the emergency management plan.

Suggestions for improvement can come from many sources. Emergency first responders in the local community are a great resource in this regard. As conditions in the community change, the plan may need to adapt. As the profession of emergency management evolves, new ideas and practices will come to light that can lead to plan updates. Suggestions for improvement also can come from faculty, staff, and others who are involved in training sessions and drills. Emergency management is everyone's concern.




After-action Reporting: Part of the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program

FEMA's Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) provides standardized policy, methodology, and terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. HSEEP recommends four performance requirements:

1. Conducting an annual training and exercise plan workshop and developing and maintaining a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan.
2. Planning and conducting exercises in accordance with the guidelines set forth in HSEEP, vols. I–III.
3. Developing and submitting a properly formatted After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP). The format for the AAR/IP is found in HSEEP, vol. III.
4. Tracking and implementing corrective actions identified in the AAR/IP.

After-action report templates, along with other information on conducting and evaluating drills and exercises, are available online at FEMA's HSEEP Web site at: https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx.


As a general rule, the emergency management plan should undergo a relatively thorough review on an annual basis. It may be necessary to update the risk assessment work in the original plan and incorporate new information or changing conditions. As with all planning and implementation initiatives, there is a danger that enthusiasm will wane as time passes. An annual review and update process is a way to combat this problem and renew enthusiasm for a vigorous emergency management program. Another tactic for sustaining interest is to publicize the successes and accomplishments of the program to campus and community members, such as the completion of building structural improvements or the launching of an improved communications and notification system on campus.



CONCLUSION

This action guide has offered many suggestions for developing and implementing an emergency management plan for institutions of higher education. The plan should address all four phases of emergency management—Prevention-Mitigation, Preparation, Response, and Recovery. It should take an all-hazards approach, which means not only should it consider a full range of potential hazards, but it should recognize as well that there are commonalities across hazard types in practicing emergency management throughout the four phases. Leadership support within the institution is critical to the success of an emergency management planning effort. As noted, colleges and universities present unique characteristics relevant to emergency management. For these reasons, emergency management planning at each institution must be individualized and take into account the circumstances and characteristics at each specific campus. Also, as noted, a collaborative approach building partnerships both inside and outside the institutional system is a key success factor in emergency management planning.


Colleges and universities are places of learning. It is only appropriate that a spirit of learning and information sharing should be reflected in the emergency management planning process. Recent events are keen reminders of the need to be ready in the event that immediate activation of a comprehensive campuswide emergency plan with procedures for coordinating responses and recovery activities, regardless of the emergency, is warranted. All institutions of higher education undoubtedly see their obligations in this critical endeavor, and it is hoped that this guide provides helpful information towards improving and strengthening the broader field of emergency management for higher education.



FEMA's Emergency Management Higher Education Project Principles to Guide Emergency Management Plan Development


1. Comprehensive—emergency managers consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders, and all impacts relevant to disasters.
2. Progressive—emergency managers anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities.
3. Risk-driven—emergency managers use sound risk management principles (hazard identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources.
4. Integrated—emergency managers ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all elements of a community.
5. Collaborative—emergency managers create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.
6. Coordinated—emergency managers synchronize the activities of all relevant stakeholders to achieve a common purpose.
7. Flexible—emergency managers use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster challenges.
8. Professional—emergency managers value a science and knowledge-based approach based on education, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship, and continuous improvement.

More information on these principles and the Higher Education Project is available at FEMA's Emergency Management Institute at: <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/emprinciples.asp>.



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
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Christian Brothers Risk Management Services

Active Shooter Resource Packet

These resources were downloaded from a variety of governmental websites and assembled for your convenience. Additional resources and training material can also be found on their websites.

Table of Contents

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Resources

- Active Shooter Booklet
- Active Shooter Pocket Card
- Active Shooter Pocket Card (Spanish)
- Active Shooter Poster
- Active Shooter Poster (Spanish)
- ISC Planning and Response to an Active Shooter
- NRF-ICSC Emergency Response Protocols – Retail Supplement (Illinois.gov)

New York City Police Department

- Active Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation

Educational Facilities

- Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans – FEMA
- Introduction to the Incident Command System for Schools – U.S. Department of Homeland Security – Web Program <https://emilms.fema.gov/is100sca/index.htm>
- Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education – U.S. Department of Education
 - Incident Command System for High Ed – Web Program
<https://emilms.fema.gov/is100he/index.htm>



ACTIVE SHOOTER

HOW TO RESPOND



National Retail Federation®
The Voice of Retail Worldwide



RETAIL INDUSTRY LEADERS ASSOCIATION
Retail's Future...Educate, Innovate, Advocate

October 2008

Emergency Numbers

EMERGENCY SERVICES: 9 -1 -1

LOCAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION LINE: _____

LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT: _____

LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT: _____

LOCAL HOSPITAL: _____

LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE: _____

FACILITY SECURITY: _____

FACILITY ADDRESS: _____

FLOOR: _____ SUITE/ROOM: _____

OFFICE #: _____ EXT. _____

PROFILE OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

An Active Shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.

Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims.

Because active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

Good practices for coping with an active shooter situation

- Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers
- Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit
- If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door
- If you are in a hallway, get into a room and secure the door
- As a last resort, attempt to take the active shooter down. When the shooter is at close range and you cannot flee, your chance of survival is much greater if you try to incapacitate him/her.

**CALL 911
WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO!**

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

Quickly determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life. Remember that customers and clients are likely to follow the lead of employees and managers during an active shooter situation.

1. Evacuate

If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises. Be sure to:

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow
- Leave your belongings behind
- Help others escape, if possible
- Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter may be
- Keep your hands visible
- Follow the instructions of any police officers
- Do not attempt to move wounded people
- Call 911 when you are safe

2. Hide out

If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active shooter is less likely to find you.

Your hiding place should:

- Be out of the active shooter's view
- Provide protection if shots are fired in your direction (i.e., an office with a closed and locked door)
- Not trap you or restrict your options for movement

To prevent an active shooter from entering your hiding place:

- Lock the door
- Blockade the door with heavy furniture

If the active shooter is nearby:

- Lock the door
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager
- Turn off any source of noise (i.e., radios, televisions)
- Hide behind large items (i.e., cabinets, desks)
- Remain quiet


If evacuation and hiding out are not possible:

- Remain calm
- Dial 911, if possible, to alert police to the active shooter's location
- If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen

3. Take action against the active shooter

As a last resort, and only when your life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by:

- Acting as aggressively as possible against him/her
- Throwing items and improvising weapons
- Yelling
- Committing to your actions



HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

Law enforcement's purpose is to stop the active shooter as soon as possible. Officers will proceed directly to the area in which the last shots were heard.

- Officers usually arrive in teams of four (4)
- Officers may wear regular patrol uniforms or external bulletproof vests, Kevlar helmets, and other tactical equipment
- Officers may be armed with rifles, shotguns, handguns
- Officers may use pepper spray or tear gas to control the situation
- Officers may shout commands, and may push individuals to the ground for their safety

How to react when law enforcement arrives:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises

Information to provide to law enforcement or 911 operator:

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- Physical description of shooter/s
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter/s
- Number of potential victims at the location

The first officers to arrive to the scene will not stop to help injured persons. Expect rescue teams comprised of additional officers and emergency medical personnel to follow the initial officers. These rescue teams will treat and remove any injured persons. They may also call upon able-bodied individuals to assist in removing the wounded from the premises.

Once you have reached a safe location or an assembly point, you will likely be held in that area by law enforcement until the situation is under control, and all witnesses have been identified and questioned. Do not leave until law enforcement authorities have instructed you to do so.

TRAINING YOUR STAFF FOR AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

To best prepare your staff for an active shooter situation, create an Emergency Action Plan (EAP), and conduct training exercises. Together, the EAP and training exercises will prepare your staff to effectively respond and help minimize loss of life.

Components of an Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

Create the EAP with input from several stakeholders including your human resources department, your training department (if one exists), facility owners / operators, your property manager, and local law enforcement and/or emergency responders. An effective EAP includes:

- A preferred method for reporting fires and other emergencies
- An evacuation policy and procedure
- Emergency escape procedures and route assignments (i.e., floor plans, safe areas)
- Contact information for, and responsibilities of individuals to be contacted under the EAP
- Information concerning local area hospitals (i.e., name, telephone number, and distance from your location)
- An emergency notification system to alert various parties of an emergency including:
 - Individuals at remote locations within premises
 - Local law enforcement
 - Local area hospitals

Components of Training Exercises

The most effective way to train your staff to respond to an active shooter situation is to conduct mock active shooter training exercises. Local law enforcement is an excellent resource in designing training exercises.

- Recognizing the sound of gunshots
- Reacting quickly when gunshots are heard and/or when a shooting is witnessed:
 - Evacuating the area
 - Hiding out
 - Acting against the shooter as a last resort
- Calling 911
- Reacting when law enforcement arrives
- Adopting the survival mind set during times of crisis

Additional Ways to Prepare For and Prevent an Active Shooter Situation

- Preparedness
 - Ensure that your facility has at least two evacuation routes
 - Post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout your facility
 - Include local law enforcement and first responders during training exercises
 - Encourage law enforcement, emergency responders, SWAT teams, K-9 teams, and bomb squads to train for an active shooter scenario at your location
- Prevention
 - Foster a respectful workplace
 - Be aware of indications of workplace violence and take remedial actions accordingly

For more information on creating an EAP contact the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, www.osha.gov.



PREPARING FOR AND MANAGING AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

Your human resources department and facility managers should engage in planning for emergency situations, including an active shooter scenario. Planning for emergency situations will help to mitigate the likelihood of an incident by establishing the mechanisms described below.

Human Resources' Responsibilities

- Conduct effective employee screening and background checks
- Create a system for reporting signs of potentially violent behavior
- Make counseling services available to employees
- Develop an EAP which includes policies and procedures for dealing with an active shooter situation, as well as after action planning

Facility Manager Responsibilities

- Institute access controls (i.e., keys, security system pass codes)
- Distribute critical items to appropriate managers / employees, including:
 - Floor plans
 - Keys
 - Facility personnel lists and telephone numbers
- Coordinate with the facility's security department to ensure the physical security of the location
- Assemble crisis kits containing:
 - radios
 - floor plans
 - staff roster, and staff emergency contact numbers
 - first aid kits
 - flashlights
- Place removable floor plans near entrances and exits for emergency responders
- Activate the emergency notification system when an emergency situation occurs

Reactions of Managers During an Active Shooter Situation

Employees and customers are likely to follow the lead of managers during an emergency situation. During an emergency, managers should be familiar with their EAP, and be prepared to:

- Take immediate action
- Remain calm
- Lock and barricade doors
- Evacuate staff and customers via a preplanned evacuation route to a safe area

Assisting Individuals with Special Needs and/or Disabilities

- Ensure that EAPs, evacuation instructions and any other relevant information address to individuals with special needs and/or disabilities
- Your building should be handicap-accessible, in compliance with ADA requirements.



RECOGNIZING POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

An active shooter in your workplace may be a current or former employee, or an acquaintance of a current or former employee. Intuitive managers and coworkers may notice characteristics of potentially violent behavior in an employee. Alert your Human Resources Department if you believe an employee or coworker exhibits potentially violent behavior.

Indicators of Potential Violence by an Employee

Employees typically do not just “snap,” but display indicators of potentially violent behavior over time. If these behaviors are recognized, they can often be managed and treated. Potentially violent behaviors by an employee may include one or more of the following (this list of behaviors is not comprehensive, nor is it intended as a mechanism for diagnosing violent tendencies):

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints
- Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene
- Depression / withdrawal
- Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures
- Repeated violations of company policies
- Increased severe mood swings
- Noticeably unstable, emotional responses
- Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation
- Suicidal; comments about “putting things in order”
- Behavior which is suspect of paranoia, (“everybody is against me”)
- Increasingly talks of problems at home
- Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems
- Talk of previous incidents of violence
- Empathy with individuals committing violence
- Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crimes

MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

After the active shooter has been incapacitated and is no longer a threat, human resources and/or management should engage in post-event assessments and activities, including:

- An accounting of all individuals at a designated assembly point to determine who, if anyone, is missing and potentially injured
- Determining a method for notifying families of individuals affected by the active shooter, including notification of any casualties
- Assessing the psychological state of individuals at the scene, and referring them to health care specialists accordingly
- Identifying and filling any critical personnel or operational gaps left in the organization as a result of the active shooter

LESSONS LEARNED

To facilitate effective planning for future emergencies, it is important to analyze the recent active shooter situation and create an after action report. The analysis and reporting contained in this report is useful for:

- Serving as documentation for response activities
- Identifying successes and failures that occurred during the event
- Providing an analysis of the effectiveness of the existing EAP
- Describing and defining a plan for making improvements to the EAP

References

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Shots Fired, When Lightning Strikes (DVD), Center for Personal Protection and Safety, 2007.

Workplace Violence Desk Reference, Security Management Group International, www.SMGICorp.com

How to Plan for Workplace Emergencies and Evacuations, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, OSHA 3088, 2001.



U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

cfsteam@hq.dhs.gov

www.dhs.gov



COPING

WITH AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

- Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers
- Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit
- If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door
- Attempt to take the active shooter down as a last resort

Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.

PROFILE

OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area, typically through the use of firearms.

CHARACTERISTICS

OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

- Victims are selected at random
- The event is unpredictable and evolves quickly
- Law enforcement is usually required to end an active shooter situation



**CALL 911 WHEN IT
IS SAFE TO DO SO**

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

1. EVACUATE

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Keep your hands visible

2. HIDE OUT

- Hide in an area out of the shooter's view
- Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager

3. TAKE ACTION

- As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger
- Attempt to incapacitate the shooter
- Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

- Remain calm and follow instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating

INFORMATION

YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters
- Physical description of shooters
- Number and type of weapons held by shooters
- Number of potential victims at the location

COMO MANEJAR

UNA SITUACIÓN CON UNA PERSONA ARMADA

- Esté pendiente de sus alrededores y de cualquier peligro potencial
- Tome nota de las dos salidas más cercanas en cualquier instalación que visite
- Si se encuentra en una oficina, quédese allí y mantenga la puerta cerrada
- Como último recurso, trate de derribar el tirador

Comuníquese con los gerentes del edificio o con el departamento de recursos humanos para mayor información y para capacitar a todo el personal sobre como responder ante una persona armada en su lugar de trabajo.



INFORMACIÓN

QUE DEBE PROVEER A LA POLICÍA O AL OPERADOR DEL 911

- Ubicación de la persona armada
- Cantidad de tiradores
- Una descripción física del tirador o los tiradores
- Cantidad y tipo de armas que lleva el tirador o los tiradores
- Cantidad de víctimas potenciales en el local

CARACTERÍSTICAS

DE UNA SITUACIÓN CON PERSONAS ARMADAS

- Las víctimas son seleccionadas al azar
- El evento es imprevisible y se desarrolla rápidamente
- Normalmente se requiere la intervención de la policía para terminar una situación con una persona armada

**LLAME AL 911
CUANDO SEA SEGURO**

COMO RESPONDER

CUANDO UNA PERSONA ARMADA SE
ENCUENTRA EN SU VECINDARIO

1. CORRER

- Tenga en mente un plan y ruta de escape
- Deje sus pertenencias
- Mantenga sus manos visibles

2. ESCONDERSE

- Escóndase en un área fuera de la vista del tirador
- Bloquee la entrada a su escondite y cierre las puertas con llave
- Ponga en silencio su teléfono celular y/o beeper

3. LUCHAR

- Como último recurso y sólo cuando su vida este en peligro inminente
- Trate de incapacitar al tirador
- Demuestre agresión física y tírele cosas al tirador

**LLAME AL 911
CUANDO SEA SEGURO**

COMO RESPONDER

COMO RESPONDER CUANDO LLEGUE
LA POLICÍA

- Mantenga la calma y siga las instrucciones de los oficiales
- Suelte cualquier artículo que tenga en la mano (como por ejemplo bolsas, chaquetas)
- Levante las manos inmediatamente y abra los dedos
- Mantenga las manos visibles en todo momento
- Evite hacer movimientos rápidos hacia los oficiales como el tratar de tocarlos para sentirse seguro
- Evite señalar y/o gritar
- No pare para pedirles ayuda o direcciones a los oficiales durante la evacuación

PERFIL

DE UN TIROTEO EN PROCESO

Un tiroteo en proceso es una situación en la cual una persona está activamente involucrada en matar o tratar de matar a personas en un área cerrada o concurrida, normalmente a través del uso de armas de fuego.

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

QUICKLY DETERMINE THE MOST REASONABLE WAY TO PROTECT YOUR OWN LIFE. CUSTOMERS AND CLIENTS ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS DURING AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION.

1. Run

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Keep your hands visible

2. Hide

- Hide in an area out of the active shooter's view.
- Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors

3. Fight

- As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger.
- Attempt to incapacitate the active shooter
- Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

**CALL 911 WHEN IT IS
SAFE TO DO SO**

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES ON THE SCENE

1. HOW YOU SHOULD REACT WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as attempting to hold on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises

2. INFORMATION YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR:

- Location of the victims and the active shooter
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- Physical description of shooter/s
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter/s
- Number of potential victims at the location

RECOGNIZING SIGNS OF POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

AN ACTIVE SHOOTER MAY BE A CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEE. ALERT YOUR HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT IF YOU BELIEVE AN EMPLOYEE EXHIBITS POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR. INDICATORS OF POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR MAY INCLUDE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism, and/or vague physical complaints
- Depression/Withdrawal
- Increased severe mood swings, and noticeably unstable or emotional responses
- Increasingly talks of problems at home
- Increase in unsolicited comments about violence, firearms, and other dangerous weapons and violent crimes



Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.

COMO RESPONDER

CUANDO UNA PERSONA ARMADA SE ENCUENTRA EN SU VECINDARIO

RÁPIDAMENTE DETERMINE LA MANERA MÁS RAZONABLE DE PROTEGER SU PROPIA VIDA. LOS CLIENTES TIENDEN A SEGUIR EL EJEMPLO DE LOS EMPLEADOS Y LOS GERENTES DURANTE UNA SITUACIÓN CON UNA PERSONA ARMADA.

1. CORRER

- Tenga en mente un plan y una ruta de escape.
- Deje sus pertenencias.
- Mantenga sus manos visibles.

2. ESCONDERSE

- Escóndase en un área fuera de la vista del tirador.
- Bloquee la entrada del lugar de su escondite y cierre las puertas con llave.

3. LUCHAR

- Como último recurso y sólo cuando su vida este en peligro inminente.
- Trate de incapacitar al tirador.
- Demuestre agresión física y tírele cosas al tirador.

LLAME AL 911 CUANDO SEA SEGURO

COMO RESPONDER CUANDO LLEGUE LA POLICÍA A LA ESCENA

1. COMO DEBE REACCIONAR CUANDO LLEGUE LA POLICÍA A LA ESCENA:

- Mantenga la calma y siga las instrucciones de los oficiales.
- Levante las manos inmediatamente y abra los dedos.
- Mantenga las manos visibles en todo momento.
- Evite señalar y/o gritar.
- Evite hacer movimientos rápidos hacia los oficiales como el tratar de agarrarlos para sentirse seguro.
- No pare para pedirles ayuda o direcciones a los oficiales durante la evacuación, solo proceda en la dirección por donde están entrando los oficiales al local.

2. INFORMACIÓN QUE DEBE PROVEER A LA POLICÍA O AL OPERADOR DE 911:

- Ubicación de la persona armada.
- Cantidad de tiradores, si hay más de uno.
- Una descripción física del tirador o tiradores.
- Cantidad y tipo de armas que lleva el tirador o los tiradores.
- Cantidad de víctimas potenciales en el local.

RECONOCIENDO LAS SEÑALES POTENCIALES DE VIOLENCIA EN EL LUGAR DE TRABAJO

UN TIROTEO PUEDE SER INICIADO POR UN EMPLEADO ACTUAL O ANTERIOR. ALERTE A SU DEPARTAMENTO DE RECURSOS HUMANOS SI CREE QUE UN EMPLEADO ESTÁ DEMOSTRANDO UN COMPORTAMIENTO POTENCIALMENTE VIOLENTO. EL COMPORTAMIENTO POTENCIALMENTE VIOLENTO PUEDE INCLUIR UNO O MÁS DE LOS SIGUIENTES INDICADORES:

- Incremento en el uso del alcohol y/o drogas ilegales.
- Un aumento inexplicable del absentismo laboral y/o quejas físicas vagas.
- Depresión/Síndrome de aislamiento.
- Un aumento en los cambios del estado de ánimo así como un aumento notable en las respuestas emocionales o inestables.
- Un aumento en las pláticas sobre los problemas en casa.
- Un aumento de comentarios no solicitados sobre la violencia, las armas de fuego y otras armas peligrosas y crímenes violentos.



Comuníquese con los gerentes del edificio o con el departamento de recursos humanos para mayor información y para capacitar a todo el personal sobre como responder ante una persona armada en su lugar de trabajo.



Planning and Response to an Active Shooter:

An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide

November 2015



Interagency
Security
Committee

Change History and Document Control

Rev. #	Date	Changes	Approver
1.0	7/21/2015	Initial Issue	ISC
2.0	11/12/2015	FOUO Information Removed for Public Release	ISC



Message from the Interagency Security Committee Chair

One of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) national priorities is the protection of Federal employees and private citizens who work within and visit U.S. government-owned or leased facilities. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), chaired by DHS and consisting of 54 Federal departments and agencies, has as its mission the development of security standards and best practices for nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States.

As Chair of the ISC, I am pleased to introduce the new document titled *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide (non-FOUO)*. The For Official Use Only (FOUO) version of this document was initially released to the Federal community only in July 2015. It streamlined existing ISC policy on active shooter incidents into one cohesive policy and guidance document to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident at Federal facilities. The non-FOUO version is being made publicly available as a reference document for the private sector so that a wider audience may benefit from the information presented herein.

In many cases, active shooter incidents can be unpredictable in nature and can evolve quickly. As such, a number of guidance documents exist on how to prepare for and respond to an active shooter incident. Although previous ISC documents discussed active shooter incidents, such as the *Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response* and *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, this single cohesive document with greater concentration on active shooter incidents serves as a resource for Federal agencies and departments, and enhances preparedness for an active shooter incident in a Federal facility.

This policy and guidance, approved with full concurrence of the ISC primary members, is a significant milestone and represents exemplary collaboration across the ISC and among the ISC Active Shooter Working Group in developing the first ISC document combining policy and planning guidance. This Policy and Best Practices Guide was approved November 12, 2015 and will be reviewed and updated as needed.

Caitlin Durkovich
Assistant Secretary
Infrastructure Protection

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ISC Policy

INTENT:

The policy outlined herein is meant to establish baseline agency/department protocols across the Federal government for active shooter situations. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), under the authority of Presidential Executive Orders 12977 and 13286, mandates that the following policy be enacted at all nonmilitary Federal facilities.¹ Additionally, wherever possible, it is recommended that Agencies commit to the implementation of the best practices outlined in the subsequent sections of this document: *Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide*.

POLICY:

- 1) Each facility shall have an active shooter² preparedness plan, which is to be updated every two years, as needed. At a minimum, a plan should comprise the following elements:
 - a. Security Assessments
 - b. Preparedness
 - c. Communication
 - d. Incident Plan (i.e., actions to take during an incident)
 - e. Training and Exercises
 - f. Post Incident Recovery
 - i. Employees
 - ii. Operations
- 2) As plans are drafted, reviewed, and updated, each facility Designated Official or designee shall collaborate with the facility security provider (e.g. Federal Protective Service [FPS], U.S. Marshals Service [USMS], etc.), on-site law enforcement agencies (if applicable), and first responder agencies likely to address an active shooter situation.
- 3) Agency representatives shall collaborate with other tenants/agencies in development of the plan.

¹ The policy outlined herein is a requirement of all agencies within the Executive Branch of the Federal government. Although this is not a requirement for agencies of the Legislative and Judiciary Branches, the ISC strongly recommends that agencies within those branches of government also implement this policy.

² An active shooter is defined as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area. While the majority of incidents involve the use of firearms, for the purposes of this policy, the term “active shooter” may also apply to an individual armed with any other type of weapon (e.g., firearm, knife, explosives, etc.). Throughout this policy and the subsequent best practices guidance, the ISC will use the term “active shooter” to describe any incident with a perpetrator who poses an active threat.

- 4) Agency representatives shall provide training, materials, and/or awareness discussions to inform employees of active shooter preparedness plans as they are updated.
 - a. Employees should be aware of the Federally-endorsed **run, hide, fight**³ concept.
 - b. Employees should be informed of the importance of having a personal plan.
 - c. New employees should be given active shooter preparedness training during the initial onboarding period.
- 5) The active shooter plan need not be a stand-alone document. The agency/facility security officials and/or Designated Official will determine the best way to incorporate the active shooter plan into existing protocols.
- 6) As previously noted, the six points above are policy requirements for all agencies within the Executive Branch of the Federal government. What follows throughout the rest of this document is a set of best practices and recommendations which are not policy requirements—these are meant to assist with the implementation of an active shooter plan as mandated by this policy.

³ Run, Hide, Fight video with closed captioning option: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video>. The video is also available in multiple languages.

Executive Summary

The primary mission of the ISC Active Shooter Working Group is to streamline existing ISC documents on active shooter into one cohesive policy and guidance document that agencies housed in Federal facilities can use as a reference to enhance prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts related to an active shooter incident.⁴ The goal of the ISC's Active Shooter Working Group is to promote the highest chance of victim and responder survivability through awareness, prevention, education, and training.

This guidance is designed to be applicable to all buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees. These include existing buildings, new construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, or being purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities; Federal campuses; where appropriate, individual facilities on Federal campuses; and special-use facilities.

Due to the nature of an active shooter event, this document contains guidance for all who might be involved, including law enforcement agencies, facility tenants, and the public. Certain responsibilities outlined within this document are specific to designated law enforcement officers or personnel possessing the authority and training to take immediate action to contain, apprehend, or neutralize an active threat. Other sections of this document are meant to educate facility tenants regarding actions they can take to save themselves or others.

⁴ The FOUO version of this document was initially released to the Federal community in July 2015. It streamlined existing ISC policy on active shooter incidents into one cohesive policy and guidance document to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident at Federal facilities. The non-FOUO version is being made publicly available as a reference document for the private sector. It is generally outside the scope of the ISC to promulgate policies and/or best practices for the private sector. However, the ISC has released this document so that a wider audience may benefit from the information presented herein. References to Federal facilities have not been removed. The private sector and other non-government entities may interpret this document as appropriate to their specific facility security plans.

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1 Introduction to Planning Guidance

Our Nation's Federal agencies are entrusted with providing a safe and secure environment for our government's most essential functions and assets, including the personnel that may occupy their facilities and the public that may pass through conducting business with the Federal government on any given day. Federal facilities are faced with planning for emergencies of all kinds, ranging from active shooters, hostage situations, and other similar security challenges, as well as natural threats to include fires, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and pandemics of infectious diseases. Many of these emergencies occur with little to no warning; therefore, it is critical for all facilities to plan in advance to help ensure the safety, security, and general welfare of all facility occupants.

The primary mission of the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Active Shooter Working Group is to streamline existing ISC policy on active shooter incident planning and response into one cohesive policy and guidance document that agencies housed in Federal facilities can use as a reference to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident.

The ISC defines Federal facilities as buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees for nonmilitary activities. These include existing buildings, new construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, to be purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities, Federal campuses, and where appropriate, individual facilities on Federal campuses; and special-use facilities.

This document provides emergency planners, disaster committees, executive leadership, and others involved in emergency operations planning with detailed discussions of unique issues faced in Federal facilities before, during, and after an active shooter event. Occupant Emergency Plans should be living documents that are routinely reviewed and updated to consider all types of hazards, including the possibility of workplace violence, an active shooter, or terrorist incident. As our Nation continues to draw on lessons learned from actual emergencies, Federal facilities should incorporate those lessons learned into existing, or newly created, plans and procedures.

2 Background

The frequency of active shooter incidents has increased in recent years, and these incidents have affected numerous places where citizens congregate, such as schools, workplaces, places of worship, shopping malls, public meetings, and movie theaters. Unfortunately, these events highlight the need to reduce the risk of active shooter incidents while improving preparedness and strengthening ongoing efforts intended to prevent future occurrences.

The ISC defines an active shooter as an individual or individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area. In most cases, firearms are the weapon of choice during active shooter incidents, but any weapon (such as a knife, etc.) can be used to harm innocent individuals. Typically, there is no pattern or method to the selection of victims. Active shooter situations are dynamic and quickly evolve. Often, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the aggressive action of a shooter to mitigate harm to potential victims. However, because active shooter situations are also frequently over prior to the arrival

of law enforcement, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation prior to law enforcement arrival.

Agencies continue to evaluate active shooter events in an attempt to generate a profile of an active shooter. There are no hard links to provide an accurate profile of an active shooter. Though there is no profile, there are several possible indicators that can give clues to the possibility of a potential active shooter; see [Section 5: Preparedness](#). Continuous evaluation of these events is necessary and should be aimed at the detection, management, and resolution of an impending crisis in order to effectively exercise early prevention mechanisms. A good basic document is the 2014 Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013*⁵ (see key research findings on page 4).

The ISC Active Shooter Working Group's primary mission was to develop one cohesive active shooter document that agencies housed in Federal facilities can use as a reference to enhance preparedness for an active shooter incident(s). This document may also be useful to other local jurisdictions across the United States.

National preparedness efforts, including planning, are based on Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8: National Preparedness, which was signed by President Obama in March 2011. This directive represents an evolution in our collective understanding of national preparedness based on lessons learned from natural disasters, terrorist acts, active shooter events, and other violent incidents.

PPD-8 characterizes preparedness using five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Emergency management officials and emergency responders engaging with Federal facilities are familiar with this terminology. These mission areas generally align with the three temporal frameworks (time frames) associated with an incident: pre-incident, incident, and post-incident environments. Most of the prevention, protection, and mitigation activities generally occur before or are modified after an incident, although these three mission areas are frequently applicable during an incident. For example, injury prevention can and should occur before, during, and after an incident. Response activities occur during an incident, while recovery activities can begin during and after an incident.

Planning teams at Federal facilities responsible for developing and revising occupant emergency plans and procedures should use the concepts and principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to incorporate planning efforts into existing emergency programs and plans that are related to active shooter incidents and other hostile threats. One component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), which provides a standardized approach for incident management, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity of the event. By using the ICS during an incident, Federal facilities will be able to work more effectively with the first responders in their communities.⁶

⁵ The study can be found at: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177.

⁶ For more information on the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System, please see <http://www.fema.gov/national-incident-management-system>.

Examples of recommended practices and matters to consider have been included in this document for planning and implementation purposes; however, Federal facility emergency managers—with the support of their leadership and in conjunction with local emergency managers and responders—must consider what is most appropriate for that facility and its occupants. Additionally, planning teams should consider Federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

There are various documents, studies, and websites devoted to the awareness of active shooter incidents; reference [Section 9: Resources/Templates](#) for a list of resources and links that may be useful in developing or reviewing active shooter plans. These websites are constantly evolving and being updated as lessons are learned. The resources vary in content, ranging from providing an overview of past shooting incidents, findings, a background analysis of the shooter, weaponry used, resolution of events, training, equipment, and best practices. The inclusion of certain references does not imply endorsement of any documents, products, or approaches. Other resources may be equally helpful and should be considered in creating or revising existing plans and procedures.

Figure 1: Key Research Findings^{7, 8}

- 160 Active Shooter incidents occurred between 2000 and 2013.
- An average of 11.4 incidents occurred annually: an average of 6.4 annually in the first seven years of the study and an average of 16.4 annually in the last seven years.
- Shootings occurred in 40 of 50 states and the District of Columbia.
- The 160 incidents resulted in 1,043 casualties: 486 killed and 557 wounded, not including the shooter.
- In incidents, the median number of people killed was two, the median wounded was two.
- Approximately 60 percent of the incidents ended before police arrived.
- 64 (40 percent) of the incidents ended with the shooter committing suicide.
- In 21 incidents (13.1 percent), the incident ended after unarmed citizens safely and successfully restrained the shooter. Of note, 11 of the incidents involved unarmed principals, teachers, other school staff, and students who confronted shooters to end the threat.
- In 45 of the 160 (28.1 percent) incidents, law enforcement had to engage the shooter to end the threat. In 21 of those 45 (46.7 percent) instances, law enforcement suffered casualties with nine killed and 28 wounded.
- In 64 cases where the duration could be ascertained, 44 (69 percent) ended in less than five minutes with 23 ending in two minutes or less.
- In five incidents (3.8 percent) the shooting ended after armed individuals who were not law enforcement personnel exchanged gunfire with the shooters.
- Active shooter incidents occurred most frequently in areas of commerce (46 percent), followed by educational environments (24 percent), and government properties (ten percent).

⁷ Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014., http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177

⁸ Note: this study examines all active shooter incidents occurring in the United States, not just those at Federal facilities. The FBI identifies the criteria for an active shooter event as “individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in populated areas (excluding shootings related to gang or drug violence).” The study contains a full list of the 160 incidents used, including those that occurred at Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook Elementary School, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Fort Hood, the Aurora (Colorado) Cinemark Century 16 movie theater, the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin, and the Washington Navy Yard.

3 Applicability and Scope

Pursuant to the authority granted to the ISC in Section 5 of Executive Order (EO) 12977, as amended by EO 13286, this ISC guidance is intended to be a reference document to provide agencies with enhanced preparedness for an active shooter incident. The goal of the ISC's Active Shooter Working Group was to promote the highest chance of victim and responder survivability through awareness, prevention, education, and training.

This guidance was designed to be applicable to all buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees. These include existing buildings, new construction, or major modernizations; facilities owned, being purchased, or leased; stand-alone facilities; Federal campuses; where appropriate, individual facilities on Federal campuses; and special-use facilities.

Due to the nature of an active shooter event, this document contains guidance for all who might be involved in an active shooter event, including law enforcement agencies, facility tenants, and the public. Certain responsibilities outlined within this document are specific to designated law enforcement officers or personnel possessing the authority and training to take immediate action to contain, apprehend, or neutralize an active threat, while other sections of this document are meant to educate facility tenants.

4 Incorporating Active Shooter Considerations into the Occupant Emergency Program

A mutually supportive relationship exists between the risk management process, facility security assessments, and the Occupant Emergency Program (OEP). The OEP establishes basic procedures for safeguarding lives and property in and around the facility during emergencies.⁹ 41 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) requires Federal agencies to have an OEP.¹⁰ The OEP should contain the Facility Security Plan (FSP) and the Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP). As mandated by 41 CFR, facility Designated Officials are responsible for establishing, staffing, and training an Occupant Emergency Organization (OEO) which will develop, implement, and maintain the OEP.

Once risks to a facility are accurately assessed, including those posed by an active shooter event, facility security managers and Designated Officials can determine whether countermeasures in place are adequate to mitigate those risks or whether additional countermeasures are required. Procedural, programmatic, and physical security countermeasures resulting from the facility security assessment regarding active shooter events and other emergency situations should be included in the Occupant Emergency Program, Occupant Emergency Plan,¹¹ and Facility

⁹ For more information, see *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, March 2013. The guide can be accessed at: <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/isc-occupant-emergency-programs-guide>.

¹⁰ 41 CFR 102-74.230 through 102-74.260

¹¹ As differentiated from the occupant emergency program, an occupant emergency plan is a document describing the actions occupants should take to ensure their safety in a particular emergency situation.

Security Plan. These plans are intended to minimize the risk to personnel, property, and other assets within the facility if an incident occurs inside or immediately surrounding the facility by providing facility-specific response procedures for occupants to follow.¹²

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, various Presidential Directives and Executive Orders have been issued requiring Federal agencies to develop and implement plans, policies, and procedures for dealing with and responding to emergency situations. Agencies can use existing guidance such as OEPs, disaster response plans, and Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans when developing an active shooter or workplace violence prevention program and plan. As with any threat or hazard that is included in an OEP, goals, objectives, and courses of action should be established for an active shooter response plan. These plans should be included in the OEP as an addendum or a functional annex. For example, evacuation will be different during an active shooter incident than it would be for a fire.

Incorporating the concept of facility protection into the site's OEP can help reduce the likelihood of workplace violence incidents (including active shooter scenarios), increase the effectiveness of response, and limit casualties. Most acts of workplace violence occur as some form of verbal or non-verbal threat, bullying, harassment, or non-fatal physical assault. However, it is important to remember acts of physical workplace violence might start as some form of non-physical assault, so agencies must take all threats seriously and respond appropriately. It is also important to note a threat will not lead to a violent act in the great majority of cases. The threat itself, however, damages workplace safety and must be addressed.

While active shooter events are rare, the random and unpredictable nature of the threat and operating area present a complex challenge to Federal security and law enforcement personnel. Ideally, Federal security and law enforcement will deter and prevent active shooter attacks altogether. Should deterrence and prevention fail, however, occupant knowledge and application of emergency procedures and protective actions will save lives. Therefore, an OEP that delineates procedures to protect life and property in federally occupied space during emergency conditions is an essential tool, both before and during an active shooter incident.

Plans should be created with input from internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders may include leadership, security, facility owners and operators, property managers, the human resources department, risk managers, and the training department. External stakeholders should include local police, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, and fire personnel.

An effective active shooter plan will include the following:

- Proactive steps that can be taken by facility tenants to identify individuals who may be on a trajectory to commit a violent act.
- A preferred method for reporting active shooter incidents, including informing all those at the facility or who may be entering the facility.
- How to neutralize the threat and achieve life safety objectives.

¹² For more information, see *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, March 2013. The guide can be accessed at: <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/isc-occupant-emergency-programs-guide>.

- Evacuation, shelter-in-place, hide, and lockdown policies and procedures for individual offices and buildings.
 - Emergency escape procedures and route assignments (e.g., floor plans, safe areas), including where to evacuate and how to evacuate when the primary evacuation routes are unusable.
 - Plans should clearly explain shelter-in-place and lockdown procedures, including the differences between the two.
 - How to select effective “hide” locations.
 - Optimal locations have ballistic protection known as “cover” which include thick walls made of steel, cinder block, or brick and mortar; solid doors with locks; and areas with minimal glass and interior windows. These areas can be stocked with accessible first aid and emergency kits designed for hemorrhage control, communication devices, and telephones and/or duress alarms.
 - Designated “shelter-in-place” locations are often designed for natural hazards (earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) and may not be ideal for active shooter incidents. Facilities and/or agencies should consider the development of safe rooms when selecting or renewing a leased facility or new construction. See below for a discussion of safe rooms.
 - Personnel involved in such planning should ensure all sheltering sites and evacuation routes are accessible for persons with disabilities.
- Integration with the facility incident commander and the external incident commander.
- Information concerning local area emergency response agencies and hospitals (i.e., name, telephone number, and distance from the location), including internal phone numbers and contacts.
- How operations will be restored.

After the procedures are approved, occupant personnel should become intimately familiar with the OEP and active shooter plan through training and exercises before an emergency strikes. Drills and exercises should occur at least annually but preferably more frequently. For building-specific risk assessments, reference the *Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Standard*.¹³

4.1 Challenges

Preparing for and responding to an active shooter incident at Federal facilities poses unique challenges. Prior to finalizing or updating incident plans, the agency/facility officials should expect to confront many potential difficulties. These challenges include but are not limited to:

¹³ The standard can be found at: http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ISC_Risk-Management-Process_Aug_2013.pdf.

facility size, facility population, existing security practices, agency mission, child care centers, protection of sensitive and classified information, interaction with the public (e.g., visitor centers, courts, multi-tenant facilities), campus environments, areas of ingress and egress, and mixed-use spaces (e.g., retail shops). It is important to note that each site will pose a unique set of challenges. For this reason, it is important that each facility's active shooter preparedness plan is tailored to address the particularities posed by the site.

Addressing these challenges requires coordination between facility managers, security personnel, emergency management personnel, employees and Federal, state, and local law enforcement. Agencies housed in Federal facilities can use this ISC guidance document to mitigate and prepare for an active shooter incident and to promote the highest chance of victim and responder survivability through awareness, prevention, and education.

5 Preparedness

A major component of any active shooter program or plan is preparedness. This section focuses on measures that can be taken to reduce the risk of violent behavior; as well as mitigate the impacts of violent behavior should it occur. All workplace violence prevention, including active shooter programs, should meet minimum requirements set forth in Section 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970, EO 12196, and the basic program elements under 29 CFR Part 1960.

The 2013 *Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings*¹⁴ identified five non-linear components of mass casualty violence prevention:

- Identifying a person posing a potential threat of violence;
- Notifying the appropriate authorities with this information;
- Evaluating the threat credibility;
- Intervening to prevent the threat; and
- Documenting the intervention and disseminating the information within applicable laws and regulations.

Internal and external partners, programs, and processes can assist with these steps.

No profile exists for an active shooter; however, research indicates there may be signs or indicators. Facility employees should learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation that could develop into an active shooter incident. Each employee should be empowered to proactively seek ways to prevent an incident with internal resources or additional external assistance.

¹⁴ Paparazzo, John, Christine Eith, and Jennifer Tocco. 2013. *Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/publications/summits-on-preventing-multiple-causality-violence/e021311546_MultiCasualty-Violence_v508_05APR13.pdf.

By highlighting pre-attack behaviors displayed by past offenders, researchers have sought to enhance the detection and prevention of tragic events, including active shooter situations. Several agencies within the Federal government continue to explore incidents of targeted violence in an effort to identify these potential “warning signs.” Lessons learned from incidents during the last decade have aided first responders in better understanding how these incidents occur and how to prevent them.

While current studies are underway, past research has proven a valuable resource. For example, in 2002, the FBI published a monograph on workplace violence, including problematic behaviors of concern that may telegraph violent ideations and plans.¹⁵ In 2010, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), U.S. Department of Education, and the FBI collaborated to produce the report *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*, which examined lethal or attempted lethal attacks at U.S. universities and colleges from 1900 to 2008.¹⁶ The report featured several key observations related to pre-attack behaviors, including the following:

- Concerning behaviors were observed by friends, family, associates, professors, or law enforcement in 31 percent of the cases. These behaviors included, but were not limited to, paranoid ideas, delusional statements, changes in personality or performance, disciplinary problems on site, depressed mood, suicidal ideation, non-specific threats of violence, increased isolation, “odd” or “bizarre” behavior, and interest in or acquisition of weapons.
- In only 13 percent of the cases did subjects make verbal and/or written threats to cause harm to the target. These threats were both veiled and explicit and were conveyed directly to the target or to a third party about the target.
- In 19 percent of the cases, stalking or harassing behavior was reported prior to the attack. These behaviors occurred within the context of a current or former romantic relationship and in academic and other non-romantic settings. They took on various forms, including written communications (conventional and electronic), telephone contact, and harassment of the target and/or the target’s friends and/or family. Subjects also followed or visited the target(s) or their families or damaged property belonging to the target(s) or their families prior to the attack.
- In only 10 percent of the cases did the subject engage in physically aggressive acts toward the targets. These behaviors took the form of physical assault, menacing actions with weapons, or repeated physical violence to intimate partners.

Specialized units in the Federal government, such as the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), continue to support behaviorally-based operational assessments of persons of concern in a

¹⁵ *Workplace Violence: Issues in Response*. U.S. Department of Justice, FBI Academy. 2002.
<http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence>.

¹⁶ *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education*. Joint publication of U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2010.
http://rems.ed.gov/docs/CampusAttacks_201004.pdf.

Vossekuil, Bryan, et al. *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004.

variety of settings (e.g., schools, workplaces, places of worship, etc.) who appear to be on a trajectory towards violence. A review of current research, threat assessment literature, and active shooting incidents, combined with the extensive case experience of the BAU, suggests that there are observable pre-attack behaviors that, if recognized, could lead to the disruption of a planned attack.¹⁷ While checklists of various warning signs are often of limited use in isolation, the FBI has identified some behavioral indicators that should prompt further exploration and attention from law enforcement and/or facility security. These behaviors often include:

- development of a personal grievance;
- contextually inappropriate and recent acquisitions of multiple weapons;
- contextually inappropriate and recent escalation in target practice and weapons training;
- contextually inappropriate and recent interest in explosives;
- contextually inappropriate and intense interest or fascination with previous shootings or mass attacks; and
- experience of a significant personal loss (whether real or perceived) in the weeks and/or months leading up to the attack, such as a death, breakup, divorce, or loss of a job.

Few offenders had previous arrests for violent crimes.

The profile of an applicant for a security clearance could contain indicators of possible future psychological or behavioral abnormalities. For this reason, investigators and screeners should be aware of such behavioral patterns revealed during an applicant's examination. If not of sufficient magnitude for immediate rejection of the clearance, additional examination should focus on the questionable elements that suggest a potential problem. These findings should be recorded and reported to the proper officials.

5.1 Reporting Indicators, Warnings, and Incidents of Workplace Violence

Procedures for reporting violent incidents vary according to the type and intensity of violence involved; most Federal workplaces have a variety of reporting options. Depending on the nature of the situation, available resources, and the need for security/law enforcement involvement, the report may be made by or be provided to:

¹⁷ Calhoun, Frederick and Stephen Weston. *Contemporary Threat Management: A Practical Guide for Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent*. San Diego, CA: Specialized Training Services. 2003.

Deisinger, Gene, et al. *The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and Management Teams*. Stoneham, MA: Applied Risk Management. 2008.

Fein, Robert, et al. *Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. 1995.

Monahan, John, et al. *Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 2001.

- the employee's manager;
- the employee's colleagues and co-workers;
- in-house security;
- Human Resources or organizations such as Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), Sexual Assault Response Coordinator, or other Federal equivalent, etc.;
- threat assessment team;
- appropriate agency security (e.g., personnel security, adjudicators, etc.);
- Federal Protective Service (FPS);
- local mental health agencies or crisis intervention organizations; or
- local police departments.

In addition to established reporting procedures, agencies should allow employees who have safety or reprisal concerns to submit anonymous (to the extent possible) reports. Regardless of the specific reporting procedures, maintaining a successful violence prevention and response program requires agencies to investigate all reports and follow up with the appropriate actions where necessary. However, agencies should keep in mind that if there is no complainant, a law enforcement entity may feel there is no crime to investigate.

Accurate and early reporting that allows for a well-timed intervention can be instrumental in resolving issues of workplace incivility and bullying before they have the opportunity to escalate into physical violence. Developing and implementing reporting procedures for workplace interpersonal issues are just as important as establishing procedures for reporting physical violence. Employees who feel they are victims of bullying, verbal or electronic harassment/cyber bullying (e.g., emails, text messages, web pages), psychological violence, emotional abuse, or any type of domestic violence need to report the problem, as these behaviors can have negative impacts on the victim, work environment, and employee productivity. Employees should be encouraged to document the incidents in order to assist with remembering details, dates, and frequency of the incidents.

Early reporting of perceived abuse allows management to quickly address and correct a problem before it becomes more severe. The level of the management chain where an employee reports this type of violence will depend on who is committing the violence. If a direct supervisor is the perpetrator, then the employee needs to move up one or more levels on the management chain to report the violence. Additionally, employees need to be encouraged to report these incidents and be ensured of non-reprisal. It is recommended that a system be created, if not already in place, so that employees have the opportunity to speak to someone (non-affiliated in the reporting chain) who can determine the appropriate measures (e.g., counseling, reporting etc.) and to whom the incident is to be reported.

5.2 Threat Assessment Teams

Research shows that perpetrators of targeted acts of violence engage in both covert and overt behaviors prior to the attacks. Another resource most agencies can use to identify, evaluate, and

address these troubling signs is a multidisciplinary Threat Assessment Team (TAT). The Threat Assessment Team's objective is to use internal agency specialists (which could include personnel from the internal security office, Office of the Inspector General, Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of General Counsel, etc.) to prevent violence from occurring. Members are responsible for addressing threats, confronting violent behavior, and assisting in assessing potential for violence. TAT members consider, plan, prepare, share, and, in some cases, move on to action. The TAT serves as a central convening body that ensures that warning signs observed by multiple people are not considered isolated incidents and do not slip through the cracks, as they actually may represent escalating behavior that is a serious concern.

Federal entities should keep in mind, however, the importance of relying on factual information (including observed behavior) and avoid unfair labeling or stereotyping to remain in compliance with civil rights, privacy, and other applicable Federal and state laws. TATs are already an established protocol in most educational settings and have proven quite valuable. TATs were pushed to the forefront of concern following the 2007 shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia, where 32 individuals were killed. For smaller facilities who do not have this capability and would like to utilize a TAT, look to the parent agency for support, or the possibility of partnering with other federal agencies who utilize a TAT.

For the purposes of consistency and efficiency, a TAT should be developed and implemented in coordination with applicable Federal policies and practices. A TAT with diverse representation will often operate more efficiently and effectively. Team members may consist of human relations/labor relations personnel, security specialists, supervisors or managers, medical and mental health professionals, general counsel, and employee assistance specialists.¹⁸ In addition, any other individuals or groups within the Federal organization already working to identify staff needs can be a critical source of information on troubling behavior for a TAT.

The TAT reviews disconcerting or threatening behavior of employees, visitors, staff, or other persons brought to their attention. The TAT utilizes a holistic assessment and management strategy that considers the many aspects of the potentially threatening person's life—familial, work, social, academic, and residential. More than focusing on warning signs or threats alone, the TAT assessment involves a unique overall analysis of changing and relevant behaviors. The TAT takes into consideration, as appropriate, information about behaviors, various kinds of communications, information that has not been substantiated, any threats made, security concerns, family issues, or relationship problems that might involve a troubled individual. The TAT also may identify any potential victims with whom the individual may interact. Once the TAT identifies an individual who may pose a threat, the team will identify a course of action for addressing the situation. The appropriate course of action—whether law enforcement intervention, counseling, or other actions—will depend on the specifics of the situation.

Law enforcement can help assess reported threats or troubling behavior quickly and privately and reach out to available Federal resources as part of the TAT process or separately. The FBI's behavioral experts in its National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) at Quantico, Virginia, are available on a 24/7 basis to join in any threat assessment analysis and

¹⁸ Team members should be cognizant of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rules. Reference [Section 9: Resources/Templates](#) for a link to HIPAA information and privacy pocket cards.

develop threat mitigation strategies for persons of concern. The law enforcement member(s) of the TAT should contact the local FBI office for this behavioral analysis assistance.

Each FBI field office has an NCAVC representative available to work with TATs and coordinate access to the FBI's BAU, home to the NCAVC. For non-Federal entities, the FBI supports requests that are made through local police departments. The analysis focuses not on how to respond tactically to an active shooter incident but rather on how to prevent one. Early intervention can prevent a situation from escalating by identifying, assessing, and managing the threat. The TAT should consult with its agency's/organization's administration and develop a process to seek these additional resources.

TATs or Federal representatives should also work with local law enforcement to gain an understanding of the threats from outside their agency/organization that may affect the facility so that, in partnership, appropriate security measures can be established.

5.3 Employee Assistance Program

It is important to properly implement and promote an Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The effectiveness of any workplace violence program that includes active shooter preparedness is greatly enhanced in an organization with an active, well-known EAP presence. Agencies with active programs promote the EAP by issuing periodic statements from top management endorsing the program and reminding employees of the services offered by the EAP; having counselors attend staff meetings to familiarize agency employees with the counselors; having counselors give special briefings and seminars for managers, employees, and union stewards; and reminding employees that by law, all services provided by the EAP are confidential.

Active and frequent information dissemination is required to adequately support EAPs. EAPs often provide booklets, pamphlets, and lend libraries of books and videos about such topics as domestic violence, stress reduction, and dealing with angry customers. Another helpful resource is *Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response*.¹⁹ Early involvement in organizational change is essential. For an agency facing reorganization, restructuring, or other organizational change that may have a negative effect on employees, for example, the EAP can help provide individual or group sessions to maintain information flow, keep feelings under control, prevent potential outbursts, provide constructive outlets for feelings, and help employees plan for the future.

Much of the employee training described in this section is conducted by EAP staff. For example, counselors can train employees on topics such as dealing with angry coworkers and customers, conflict resolution, and communications skills. Since EAP staff understands how important it is that supervisors (and coworkers) not diagnose an employee's problem, they are in an excellent position to explain the delicate balance between identifying problem behavior early on and labeling an individual as potentially violent. EAP counselors can train supervisors to deal with problems as soon as they surface.

¹⁹ The guide can be accessed at:
<http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ISC%20Violence%20in%20the%20Federal%20Workplace%20Guide%20April%202013.pdf>

5.4 Law Enforcement and First Responder Coordination

Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement personnel can be an invaluable resource in developing a prevention and preparedness component of an active shooter program. As such, it may be in the best interest of the facility and/or agency to establish a written memorandum of agreement with local law enforcement entities who may respond to an active shooter situation or other emergency. Building strong partnerships with law enforcement, fire personnel, and EMS includes ensuring they also know the location of available public announcement systems, two-way communications systems, security cameras, and alarm controls. Equally important is information on access to utility controls, medical supplies, and law enforcement equipment. Providing this detailed information to first responders allows them to move through a facility rapidly during an emergency, to ensure areas are safe, and to tend to people in need.

6 Training and Exercises

Training and exercises are the best activities to help prepare personnel to react quickly and effectively in emergency situations. When considering training options for establishing awareness and providing appropriate responses to the threat of an active shooter, the Federal agency should conduct a thorough review to identify the best training approach for their facility occupants. This review should assess the specific features of the facility itself along with the needs and capabilities of the personnel occupying the facility.

Following the examination of the target population, a needs assessment should be conducted under the assumption that the risk of an active shooter event is high. Therefore, the assessment should formulate the most favorable actions for all persons likely to be involved, including community resources. Not unlike periodic fire drills, continual awareness campaigns of the active shooter threat can ensure a much higher chance of reacting quickly and surviving an actual situation. The target population should include individuals occupying or visiting the facility on a day-to-day basis, including security personnel, law enforcement officers, and members of the public frequenting the facility. Training participation opportunities should be extended to the external emergency responders likely to support the facility in an active shooter situation.

Each target group has different training needs. For example, members of the general public are less likely to attend formal training and could be exposed to essential information through posters, brochures, or radio and television spot announcements. Employees would benefit from briefings and participation in active shooter drills. On-site law enforcement/armed security, as well as external responders, would benefit from hands-on scenario-based training; knowledge of the facilities' physical features such as entrances, exits, and construction features; and knowledge of and familiarity with the capabilities of the internal security force.

An active shooter preparedness plan should be the source document used in the development of a training program. If no plan exists, the information gained through the needs analysis would be beneficial in developing a plan.

Once the needs are identified, a survey of existing training programs should be conducted to determine if a suitable training solution already exists. More often than not, training needs can be satisfied by an existing program from a sister agency such as FEMA or through the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). Other courses are available through private sector and non-governmental entities.

In some situations, the uniqueness of the target population may require the design and development of an entirely new training instrument or the modification of an existing one. This could involve the use of professional or experienced instructional designers if sufficient in-house talent is unavailable.

6.1 Training and Awareness Material

The method of instruction delivery depends on several factors. Instructor-led training is more formal and requires a time commitment from participants for the duration of the course. In some cases, online or web-based instruction is a suitable alternative that can reduce or alleviate scheduling conflicts or travel requirements.

Posters and other visual aids illustrate key learning points and should be situated in prime locations at the facility. These resources remind facility occupants of the objectives of the training program, strengthen their retention of essential information, and ensure occupants are aware of the possibility of an active shooter event.

An active shooter training video, entitled "**Run, Hide, Fight**" was developed and produced by the Houston Mayor's Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security and funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (see [Section 7: Response](#) for further detail). This six-minute video,²⁰ endorsed by multiple Federal agencies, dramatizes an active shooter incident in the workplace exemplifying the unpredictability and quick evolution of active shooter situations. Its purpose is to educate the public by demonstrating response actions during such an incident so that they can prepare for an active shooter situation. Active shooter events often appear spontaneous and evolve quickly, therefore preparation is essential. This preparation should include training and planning that maximizes the possibility of survival.

In order for information to be actionable, it must be accessible. For example, visual and/or auditory aids and cues (such as posters, sirens, etc.) are only useful if the audience can see and/or hear them. For those with a hearing or visual disability, the information conveyed through these means may not be accessible. Partnering with local disability entities such as Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Centers, governor's disability councils, mayoral task forces, independent living centers, etc., for assistance with tools, methods, resources and protocols can make life saving differences for employees and visitors with a variety of access and functional needs or disabilities.

²⁰ Run, Hide, Fight video with closed captioning option: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents/run-hide-fight-video>. The video is also available in multiple languages.

6.2 Occupant Self-Help and First Aid

Facility staff may be trained in the basics of hemorrhage control so that care can be initiated as quickly as possible. This training can include basic information on how to improvise a bandage and apply direct wound pressure. Tourniquets have been shown to be lifesaving, but it is unlikely that commercial tourniquets will be immediately available in most circumstances. Training for staff could therefore include when to use a tourniquet, how to improvise a tourniquet, and the correct application.

6.3 Considerations for Medical First Responders (Fire and EMS)

As previously noted, it is highly recommended that facilities coordinate plans with any responding officials, including fire departments and emergency medical services. Medical first responders may already have training in the care of injuries associated with active shooter events. Facilities will need to collaborate with fire personnel and EMS during an active shooter incident. Therefore, in order to ensure facility plans do not conflict with Fire or EMS training and response, it is important that site officials familiarize themselves and their employees with the training and resources available to fire personnel and EMS organizations.

Fire personnel and EMS entities that could respond to an active shooter event should ensure that they have adequate training to provide treatment or accept patients that have received treatment. First responders will likely need additional training on safely moving to waiting ambulances, ensuring a means of ambulance egress, and making transport destination decisions in case of multiple casualties. Whenever possible, these training programs should be developed and practiced in partnership with responding law enforcement agencies.

6.4 Exercises

Most Federal facilities practice evacuation drills for fires and take protective measures for tornadoes, but conduct far fewer preparedness exercises for active shooter incidents. To be prepared for an active shooter incident, facilities should train facility occupants and on-site security staff in what to expect and how to react. After conducting training sessions, it is absolutely essential to reinforce the classroom or on-line instruction with realistic exercises. Exercises should be designed for the needs of the individual agency and conducted in a manner that includes all people normally involved in the mitigation of an active shooter incident. People with disabilities and others with access and functional needs should be included in helping develop all phases of exercises, because they are the subject matter experts regarding their disabilities and needs whose life experiences will add reality to any exercise scenario. Phases of exercises include: concept design/development, testing/designing objectives, execution/conduct, evaluation, alteration and ongoing conduct, and evaluation and alteration of exercise design.

Good planning includes conducting exercises with first responders and facility security teams, including any security or law enforcement officers who are employed in the facility. Valuable partners are one of the most effective and efficient ways to ensure that everyone knows not only

his or her role but also the role of others at the scene. These exercises should include a walkthrough of the facility to allow law enforcement officials to provide input on shelter sites and be familiar with hazardous areas within the facility (e.g., magnetic resonance imaging [MRI] devices and radioactive areas). This will also familiarize first responders with the site, including shelter locations, evacuation routes, and locations where they may find occupants who may be unable to evacuate, such as persons with access or functional needs. The facility should also consider and plan for how to care for the critically injured from the event.

There are many types of exercises, starting with discussion-based exercises such as seminars and tabletop exercises. Activities can graduate to operations-based exercises utilizing personnel and equipment from multiple jurisdictions culminating in a full-scale exercise. Exercises can be designed to involve the entire facility population, to include local responders, or be narrower in scope to address a smaller portion of the facility or population. All drills and exercises should be announced prior to conducting them. Some recommendations for exercise programs include:

- pre-designated assembly points for people who need assistance evacuating;
- verified points of accessible egress;
- internal exercise training program for all employees including volunteers to respond to specific assembly areas;
- established alert and notification procedures;
- pre-determined communications capabilities; and
- identify employees who have current and valid credentials in EMS, law enforcement, or fire services that could assist safety or security officers, if needed.

Several active shooter scenarios should be considered due to the fact that an actual event is unpredictable. Feedback from these exercise sessions will be valuable in determining weaknesses in the plan and improving both plans and training. Exercises should be conducted on a recurring basis to keep the active shooter threat fresh in the minds of the participants, and should include the latest mitigation techniques and any recent changes in the overall plan. Information for the design and conduct of exercises is available from FEMA's Independent Study (IS) program.²¹

FEMA Independent Study courses that would be beneficial in exercise planning and conduct:

- IS-120.A: An Introduction to Exercises
- IS-130: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Planning
- IS-139: Exercise Design

Planning for an OEP exercise may include the following phases: initial planning conference, venue selection, midterm planning conference, advanced ICS workshop, crime scene preservation seminar, final planning conference, controller and evaluator briefing, emergency exercise, controller and evaluator debriefing, recovery and restoration tabletop exercise, and after-action conference and lessons learned follow-up.

²¹ The FEMA IS program can be accessed online via: <http://www.training.fema.gov/IS>.

7 Response

The facility OEP should include courses of action that will describe how occupants can most effectively respond to an active shooter situation to minimize the loss of life and teach/train on these practices. When an incident occurs, it is important to follow the OEP and any instructions given during an incident; however, often individuals will have to rely on their own judgment to decide which option will best protect lives, including their own. No single response fits all active shooter situations; however, making sure each individual knows his or her response options and empowering them to react decisively will save valuable time. Depicting scenarios and considering response options in advance will assist individuals and groups in quickly selecting their best course of action.

Understandably, this is a sensitive topic. There is no definitive best response during these scenarios, but maintaining a **run, hide, fight** mindset can increase the odds of surviving. It may be valuable to schedule a time for an open conversation regarding the topic at the facility. Though some individuals may find the conversation uncomfortable, they may also find it reassuring to know that as a whole their organization is thinking about how best to deal with this situation.

Regardless of training or directions given, each employee, visitor, and facility occupant will react and respond based on his or her own instincts. Some people may not be able to leave; others may refuse to leave. Some will find comfort in a group; others will face the challenges alone. It would be difficult or impossible for a facility to inform its occupants of every eventuality. Facilities should help occupants understand there is no perfect response.

Unless otherwise directed by law enforcement or other emergency personnel, the decision to stay or leave is something best determined by the individual. However, Federal facilities can help occupants better prepare, respond, and recover by discussing active shooter considerations and inviting employees to trust that they will make the best decision they can at the time, relying on their individual circumstances. During an active shooter incident, those present will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully-informed decision about applying the **run, hide, fight** options.

It is not uncommon for people confronted with a threat to first deny the possible danger rather than respond. A 2005 investigation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) into the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001 found that people close to the floors impacted waited longer to start evacuating than those on unaffected floors. Similarly, during the Virginia Tech shooting, individuals on campus responded to the shooting with varying degrees of urgency. These incidents highlight this delayed response or denial.

When an active shooter event occurs, facility occupants will look for authority figures to provide guidance on what to do. They may not make a distinction between law enforcement officers and other uniformed personnel. In the Federal environment, uniformed personnel may be Federal agents or other security staff or law enforcement officers. These individuals may not be present when a shooting begins. Announcements of the incident may be made via building notification system, facility occupants, or upon hearing weapons fire. Therefore, all employees should receive training in techniques on responding to an active shooter event using the **run, hide, fight** model. Individuals should remain calm and try to remember the procedures they learned in

training. Agency training should explain/distinguish the procedural differences between “sheltering” for a natural disaster event versus “lockdown” for an active shooter incident.

As the situation develops, occupants need to be trained to know how to use more than one option in the **run, hide, fight** continuum. Individuals need to decide what action is appropriate based on their locations. The goal in all cases is to survive and protect others, but options will depend on how close individuals are to the shooter. Those present can run away from the shooter, seek a secure place where they can hide and deny the shooter access, or incapacitate the shooter in order to survive and protect others from harm. In many instances, an individual might first need to hide and then run to safety when able. While they should follow the plan and any instructions given by appropriate facility representatives during an incident, they will often have to rely on their own judgment. The mental rehearsal of scenarios and considering response options in advance will assist individuals and groups in quickly selecting their best course of action.

Staff should have an understanding of the response plan and how to lead or direct facility occupants to the nearest evacuation routes (run) and identified secure areas (hide). Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately. For example, train staff to recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and necessary action (e.g., “Gun! Get out!”). In addition, those closest to the public address or other communications system, or who are otherwise able to alert others, should communicate the danger and necessary action. Internal communications with those in the immediate situation is critical. Security officials are encouraged to use any means necessary, including information technology platforms, software, or devices (e.g., computer messaging, mobile phone applications, etc.) to disseminate information to the workforce in a dynamic environment. Repetition in training and preparedness shortens the time it takes to orient, observe, and act. Upon recognizing the danger, staff or others must alert responders as soon as it is safe to do so by contacting 911 with information that is as clear and accurate as possible.

While personal safety is the primary consideration in any emergency, helping others to safety increases the survivability for all potential victims. Rendering aid can be as simple as rallying victims to “Follow me!” or aiding non-ambulatory persons and performing immediate first aid in safer areas.

Response to an incident will involve the facility tenants (including visitors), building security officers (if applicable), and responding law enforcement (internal and/or outside agencies). The site security manager (SSM) or designated official is responsible for ensuring an active shooter response and communication plan is in place. If the SSM agency has armed security or law enforcement, they are also responsible for deploying on-site assets. The SSM should also coordinate with responding outside agencies (both law enforcement and EMS) to maximize effectiveness of any response and minimize confusion and delay.

Remember, during an active shooter incident the natural human reaction is to be startled, feel fear and anxiety, and even experience initial disbelief and denial. Those present can hear noise from alarms, gunfire, explosions, and people shouting and screaming. Training (e.g., table top exercises and drills) provides the means to regain composure, recall at least some of what has been learned, and commit to action. Training to remember the **run, hide, fight** mantra improves the likelihood of action.

7.1 Run

If it is safe to do so, the first course of action that should be taken is to run. When possible, individuals should exit the building through the safest route and proceed to a designated assembly location(s) or an alternate vetted site. However, given the dynamic nature of an active shooter event, exiting the building and going to an evacuation site via practiced fire drill routes may put individuals at risk or may not be possible. If doing so is not possible or puts individuals at risk, employees may need to run out of the facility or away from the area under attack and move as far away as possible until they are in a safe location. These options should be clearly conveyed to employees during facility active shooter training and/or exercises.

Despite the complexity of this situation, facility occupants and visitors at risk who can evacuate safely should do so. Recent research shows the best method to reduce loss of life in an active shooter incident is for people to immediately evacuate or be evacuated from the area where an active shooter may be located or attempting to enter.²²

Staff should be trained to:

- leave personal belongings behind;
- put their hands in the air to signal that they are unarmed to law enforcement responders;
- visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible routes for occupants, visitors, or staff with disabilities and others with access and functional needs;
- avoid escalators and elevators; and
- take others with them but not stay behind because others refuse to leave.

Call 911 when safe to do so:

Information to provide to law enforcement or dispatchers:

- Location of active shooter(s)
- Location of caller
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- If there is law enforcement on-site (if known)
- Physical description of shooter(s)
- Type and number of weapons used by shooter(s)
- Use or threat of explosives/IEDs
- If shooting is still occurring
- Number of potential victims at the scene

²² Blair, J. Pete, et al. *Active Shooter Events and Response*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 2013.

Because facility occupants may scatter, they should be given directions on who they should contact in order to account for all personnel.

Planners should consider creating a threat annex for the **run, hide, fight** scenario. While developing this annex, at a minimum, consideration should be given to the following questions:

- Have primary and alternative accessible escape routes been identified?
- Have employees rehearsed the use of escape routes?
- Will escape routes provide enough distance, cover, and concealment to provide safety?
- Has a system been developed to account for all personnel when it is safe to do so?

7.2 Hide

If running is not a safe option, staff should be trained to hide in as safe a place as possible where the walls might be thicker and have fewer windows. Likewise, for occupants that cannot run, hiding may be the only option.

In addition, occupants should do the following:

- Lock the doors and/or barricade them with heavy furniture, if possible.
- Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows.
- Turn off lights.
- Silence all electronic devices.
- Remain silent.
- Look for other avenues of escape.
- Identify ad-hoc weapons.
- When safe to do so, use strategies to silently communicate with first responders, if possible (e.g., in rooms with exterior windows, make signs to silently signal law enforcement and emergency responders to indicate the status of the room's occupants).
- Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of view from the hallway (which would allow the best option for ambushing the shooter and for possible escape if the shooter enters or passes by the room).
- Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law enforcement.

Consider these additional actions:

- Identify a safe location on each floor before an incident occurs where occupants and visitors may safely barricade themselves during an event.
- Train people in how to lock down an area and secure the unit, including providing a checklist of instructions on the back of doors and by phones.
- Ensure emergency numbers are available at all phone locations.

Consider the following questions if developing a threat annex for the **run, hide, fight** scenario:

- Have shelter-in-place locations been identified?
- Is there a method to secure the access to these locations?
- Have employees rehearsed the movement to and positioning within these locations?
- How will communications be established with these locations?

7.3 Fight

If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, when confronted by the shooter individuals in immediate danger should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, chairs, etc. Research shows there is strength in numbers, as indicated in the earlier mentioned study. The potential victims themselves have disrupted 17 of 51 separate active shooter incidents before law enforcement arrived.²³

Speaking with staff about confronting a shooter may be daunting and upsetting for some individuals, but great comfort can come from the knowledge that their actions could save lives. To be clear, confronting an active shooter should never be a requirement of any non-law enforcement personnel's job; how each individual chooses to respond if directly confronted by an active shooter is up to him or her.

Consider the following questions if developing a threat annex for the **run, hide, fight** scenario:

- Have discussions about when it might be appropriate to defend been addressed?
- Have discussions about available equipment to be used to assist in their defense been addressed?
- Have discussions related to the concepts of superiority of numbers, surprise, speed, and violence of action been addressed?

7.4 Run, Hide, Fight for Occupants with Disabilities

Any actions taken during activation of the plan must be as effective for individuals with disabilities as those actions provided for the other occupants of the facility. When developing or making changes to an occupant emergency plan, it is imperative the needs of individuals with disabilities be addressed throughout the process. Applicable laws and regulations include but are not limited to:

- The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990;

²³ Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) "A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 – 2013": http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177.

- The Rehabilitation Act of 1973;
- EO 12196 “Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees” 1980; and
- EO 13347 “Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness” 2004.

As discussed earlier in this section, no one should be forced to stay or leave the premises during an active shooter situation (unless otherwise directed by law enforcement or other emergency personnel). Supervisors are ultimately responsible to ensure that members of their staff or visitors with a disability are properly taken care of during all emergency incidents. Federal managers and supervisors should be trained to:

- ensure those occupants identified as requiring assistance during an evacuation or shelter-in-place (SIP) have a customized plan that includes the assistance required, the name of the person(s) volunteering to assist, accountability protocol, type of equipment required (if any), and the evacuation route from the assigned work space;
- identify any volunteer(s) willing to assist person(s) with disabilities or needing assistance; and
- ensure those occupants under their supervision with self-identified assistance needs can be accounted for during an incident.²⁴

Additionally, notifications should be made in a variety of formats so that they are accessible to those with special needs. Proper planning and execution should consider:

- vibrating alerts for employees who are deaf or hard of hearing;
- employees who are blind;
- alternative notification measures;
- employees whose disabilities go beyond deafness or hard of hearing;
- including people with temporary disabilities;
- visitors;
- people with limited English proficiency;
- sign cards with text and picture based emergency messages/symbols; and
- involving people with disabilities in all planning.

7.5 Interacting with First Responders

Facility occupants should be aware that the first priority for responding law enforcement is to respond to the threat, engage, and neutralize the active shooter as soon as possible; all other actions are secondary. One comprehensive study found that in more than half (57 percent) of

²⁴ For more information, see *Occupant Emergency Programs: An Interagency Security Committee Guide*, March 2013.

active shooter incidents where a solo officer arrived on the scene, shooting was still underway when the officer arrived. In 75 percent of those instances, that solo officer had to confront the perpetrator to end the threat. In those cases, the officer was shot one-third of the time.²⁵

Facility standard operating procedures (SOP) should address when transportation resources should be brought to the scene and address maintaining a transportation corridor to assist law enforcement and first responders. There should be guidance on prioritization of patients, use of treatment areas versus CCPs, and what destination hospitals may be used.

Law enforcement, firefighters, and EMS personnel (first responders) coming to a Federal facility because of a 911 call involving gunfire face a daunting task. Though the objectives remain the same—protect and save lives—the threat of an active shooter incident differs from responding to a natural disaster or many other emergencies. Emergency calls can involve actual or future threats of physical violence. Information coming in may be inaccurate and conflicting. This violence might be directed not only in or at the facility and its occupants, but also at nearby buildings off-site.

Active shooter incidents are one of the most dangerous situations facing law enforcement today. If there is active shooting, officers will assemble as a contact team, enter the facility, and proceed directly to the sounds of violence (gunshots, pleas for life, etc.). If no shouts or sounds of violence are heard, a quick and methodical search of the facility will be conducted. Should the gun shots start up, or sounds of violence be heard, the contact team will stop searching and proceed directly to this source. Facility occupants should not be alarmed if officers shout commands and push individuals to the ground for their safety. The first officers to arrive on the scene will not stop to assist with injured personnel. Rescue teams consisting of additional officers and, if authorized by facility/local law enforcement agency SOP, medical personnel will follow the first wave and will enter the facility as soon as possible.

Occupants should be trained to cooperate and not to interfere with the response of FPS or other first responders. The sooner law enforcement is able to discern the threat and react, the more lives can be saved. This is particularly true in an active shooter incident where law enforcement responds to a 911 call of shots fired. Many innocent lives are at risk in concentrated areas. This is why it is critical that facilities work with their local partners (e.g., first responders, emergency managers) to identify, prepare, prevent, and effectively respond to an active shooter incident in a coordinated fashion.

In actual emergencies, timely intelligence is critical. Staff should be trained to contact the police and share with them essential information. Law enforcement encourages all calls, and no one should assume that someone else has called. Video surveillance that is accessible to smart phones and other electronic devices must be shared with responding units as soon as practical.

²⁵ Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000 - 2013. Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C. 2014., http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177

7.6 Roles and Responsibilities

First and subsequent arriving resources should have clearly defined tasks and roles. This should include basic activation of the active shooter event response and what initial information should be conveyed. Roles and responsibilities should be developed by a multiagency team to ensure interoperability. It should include who is responsible for and when incident command should be established.

7.7 Access and Staging

When and how law enforcement officers (LEO) establish an initial contact team should be clearly defined in any multiagency SOP. In addition, the LEOs should have a basic understanding of the desirable elements of a CCP to include security, proximity to occupants, and routes of egress. The management of active shooter events requires early insertion of medical responders into a potentially hostile environment, a philosophy contrary to that traditionally used. When, how, and under what conditions medical responders should enter the scene should be clearly defined by a multidisciplinary team, integrated into the SOP, and communicated to all. If any ongoing threat exists, law enforcement is responsible for maintaining medical responder safety. LEOs should also be responsible for determining when it is safe to evacuate occupants or if occupants should be managed in the CCP and for placing emphasis on maintaining a safe evacuation route for facility personnel.

Early identification of an active shooter event is critical to establishing an effective response. Federal facility staff engaged in security roles should receive training in agreed upon methods of notification and common terminology.

7.8 Tenant Cooperation with Law Enforcement

Tenants in a facility where an active shooting is taking place should keep the following in mind (as reinforced through training):

- (a) Quickly determine what actions to take to protect life: options include **run, hide, and fight**. Use best judgment based on the specific circumstances of the incident.
- (b) When encountering responding LEOs, remain calm and follow any and all instructions from the officers. Officers may shout commands and push individuals to the ground for his/her safety as well as their own.

When law enforcement personnel arrive at the scene, tenants should be aware of the following:

- Follow all official instructions from police;
- Remain calm, think, and resist the urge to panic;
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers;
- Keep hands visible at all times;
- Put down any items;

- Avoid making sudden or quick movements toward officers;
- Do not point, scream, or yell;
- Do not ask for help from the officers when evacuating;
- Proceed in the direction as advised by the officers; and
- Provide all relevant information to police.

7.9 Communications/Media Messaging

The public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for developing and releasing information about the incident to the news media, incident personnel, and other agencies and organizations, as appropriate. The public affairs officer at the affected facility should coordinate all external communications with the incident command through the joint information center (JIC). Once a JIC is established, a primary public affairs officer will be designated to coordinate all public information including that from the facility PAO.

Planning for successful crisis communications includes the following:

- Establish working relationships with local media and local law enforcement beforehand;
- Frontload agency websites with mission, key leaders, etc.;
- Have a public affairs plan (funding, backups, resources, etc.);
- To the extent possible, develop standard talking points for senior and crisis leadership to use when engaging the media;
- Get accurate information out early to avoid misinformation due to social media;
- FBI and other local law enforcement will send public affairs specialists, as requested, in an assist role;
- Include PAO in training;
- Establish main news contacts in advance ; and
- Have a checklist of necessary and appropriate information to provide.

7.10 The Importance of Effective Communication in a Crisis Environment

Communication during an incident is critical. Once an active shooter event has been identified, the response should be activated using uniform and agreed upon language by responding agencies. Whenever possible, communication should be in plain language. There should be a standardized communications plan to ensure all responding agencies are able to communicate. This should include establishing a common radio frequency where practical and use of common terms to describe actions, locations, roles, etc. Planning for active shooter events should include a predetermined communication plan that should be available to all agencies that may respond to

an active shooter event. The presence of a communication plan is of particular importance in the airport environment given the number of local, state, and Federal agencies involved in the daily operations of that setting. Communication plans should also include early notification of the health care system and facilities that may be called upon to receive casualties.

Lessons learned from past incidents include the following:

- Always have multiple communications options;
- Use any communication option available;
- Do not rely on others to relay critical information;
- Do not make assumptions of who knows what;
- Do not assume others know what you know;
- Do not assume you know everything you need to know;
- Ensure all standard emergency notification is accessible in alternative formats so that all people have situational awareness;
- Establish a knowledgeable liaison with the first responder command post; and
- Communication can be a challenge despite best efforts of trained professionals.

Training to Communicate Effectively

Teaching managers and emergency personnel how to communicate effectively is as critical as training staff and management in evacuation procedures. Accessible and Section 508 compliant scenario-based training addressing a wide range of variables is strongly encouraged and should include communication with facility staff/security and first responders.²⁶

8 Recovery

Once the active shooter has been incapacitated or apprehended and is no longer a threat, and law enforcement have evacuated the wounded, human resources and/or management should engage in post-event assessments and activities in coordination with local law enforcement and emergency personnel, including:

- accounting for all individuals at one or more designated assembly points to determine who, if anyone, is missing or potentially injured;
- coordinating with first responders to account for any occupants who were not evacuated;
- determining the best methods for notifying families of individuals affected by the active shooter, including notification of any casualties in coordination with law enforcement;

²⁶ For more information on accessibility and Section 508 compliance, please visit the FEMA Office of Disability Integration and Coordination website at: <https://www.fema.gov/office-disability-integration-and-coordination>. Additionally, the Federal website for Section 508 compliance can be accessed at: <https://www.section508.gov/>.

- assessing the psychological state of individuals at the scene and referring them to health care specialists accordingly;
- employing continuity of operations plans to ensure mission essential functions are carried out; and
- determining a transition plan that includes when to resume normal operations.

It is important to note that once the active shooter is apprehended or incapacitated, the situation and the location will be an active crime scene. Nothing should be touched unless it involves tending to the wounded. Discuss the implications of the facility as a crime scene with local law enforcement officials in advance.

Facility administrators and key personnel should plan for an extended, evolving situation and the mass casualty or internal disaster plan may be activated to manage the continuing situation. This may include altering daily activities in order for law enforcement and first responders to adequately investigate and clear the scene and to rehabilitate the facility to an acceptable level for work activity.

The OEP should identify trained personnel who will provide assistance to victims and their families. This should include establishing an incident response team (including first responders) that is trained to appropriately assess victims. They will provide emergency intervention services and victim assistance beginning immediately after the incident and throughout the recovery efforts. This team will integrate with state and Federal resources when an emergency occurs.

Federal and state laws mandate the care of victims of crimes in certain circumstances. Therefore, substantial resources and processes are already in place to aid victims and their families, most notably through state agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the FBI's Office for Victim Assistance. Prior familiarity with these resources—such as existing, dedicated toll-free numbers for victims and their families—will permit officials to immediately provide valuable information to victims, victim families, staff, and others affected by the tragedy.

8.1 Reunification

Where the immediate reunification of loved ones is not possible, providing family members with timely, accurate, and relevant information is paramount. The local or regional mass fatality plan may call for the establishment of a family assistance center (FAC) to help family members locate their loved ones and determine whether or not they are among the casualties. This center should be placed away from media view or exposure and it is recommended the families of the victims be separated from the family of the active shooter. Although the FAC should be away from the incident command, care should be taken to ensure that it is not so far away from the incident site that family members feel excluded.

Having family members wait for long periods of time for information about their loved ones not only adds to their stress and frustration, but can also escalate the emotions of the entire group. [Section 8.2: Psychological First Aid](#) describes in more detail how to prepare for and handle victims' emotional and psychological needs. When families are reunited, it is critical that there are child release processes in place where minors might be involved (e.g., childcare or

discharged patients) to ensure that no child is released to an unauthorized person, even if that person is well-meaning.²⁷

Essential steps to help establish trust and provide family members with a sense of control can be accomplished by identifying a safe location separate from distractions and/or media and the general public, but close enough to allow family members to feel connected in proximity to their children/loved ones; scheduling periodic updates even if no additional information is available; being prepared to speak with family members about what to expect when reunited with their loved ones; and ensuring effective communication with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as sign language interpreters for deaf or hard of hearing family members.

When reunification is not possible because an individual is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their loved one is missing or has been injured or killed, keeping in mind that law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications related to criminal activity. This will ensure that families and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate way.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. In cases where an individual has been killed, describe the importance of processing the scene for forensic, investigative purposes and to ensure accurate identification of victims. It is best to avoid making promises that cannot be kept with regard to timing of identification and release of victims' remains. Training personnel immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Crisis responders should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The OEP should include pre-identified points of contact to work with and support family members (e.g., Federal victim assistance personnel counselors, police officers). These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while an individual is still missing but before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long term.

The OEP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help with regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. It is critical that families and loved ones are supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving family members.

The OEP also should explicitly address how impacted families will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from

²⁷ A useful resource regarding this topic is the *Post-Disaster Reunification of Children: A Nationwide Approach*, published by FEMA, the American Red Cross, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. It can be accessed at: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1384376663394-eef4a1b4269de14faff40390e4e2f2d3/Post+Disaster+Reunification+of+Children+-+A+Nationwide+Approach.pdf>.

families and staff while the emergency is ongoing and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.

8.2 Psychological First Aid

An important aspect of recovery is to treat the emotional side effects of violence and stress. Psychological first aid (PFA) is an evidence-informed, modular approach used by mental health and disaster response workers to help individuals of all ages in the immediate aftermath of disaster and terrorism. PFA is designed to reduce the initial distress caused by traumatic events and to foster short- and long-term adaptive functioning and coping.

PFA does not assume that all survivors will develop mental health problems or long-term difficulties in recovery. Instead, it is based on an understanding that disaster survivors and others affected by such events will experience a broad range of early reactions (e.g., physical, psychological, behavioral, spiritual). Some of these reactions may cause enough distress to interfere with adaptive coping, and recovery may be helped by support from compassionate and caring disaster responders.

PFA is designed for delivery by mental health and other disaster response workers who provide early assistance to affected children, families, and adults as part of an organized disaster response effort. These providers may be embedded in a variety of response units, including first responder teams, the incident command structure, primary and emergency health care, incident crisis response teams, faith-based organizations, community emergency response teams, Medical Reserve Corps, the Citizen Corps, the Department of Defense Disaster Mental Health Response teams, and other disaster relief organizations.

Basic objectives of PFA:

- Establish a human connection in a non-intrusive, compassionate manner.
- Enhance immediate and ongoing safety and provide physical and emotional comfort.
- Calm and orient emotionally overwhelmed or distraught survivors.
- Help survivors specifically discuss what their immediate needs and concerns are and gather additional information as appropriate; offer practical assistance and information to help survivors address their immediate needs and concerns.
- Connect survivors as soon as possible to social support networks, including family members, friends, and neighbors.
- Support adaptive coping, acknowledge coping efforts and strengths, and empower survivors; encourage adults, children, and families to take an active role in their recovery.
- Provide information that may help survivors cope effectively with the psychological impact of disasters.
- When appropriate, link the survivor to another member of a disaster response team or to local recovery systems, mental health services, public sector services, and organizations.
 - PFA is designed for delivery in diverse settings. Mental health and other disaster response workers may be called upon to provide PFA in the following:

- General population shelters;
- Shelters for those with disabilities and others with access/functional needs;
- Field hospitals and medical triage areas;
- Acute care facilities (e.g., emergency departments);
- Staging areas or respite centers for first responders or relief workers;
- Emergency operations centers;
- Crisis hotlines or phone banks;
- Mobile dining facilities;
- Disaster assistance service centers;
- Family reception and assistance centers;
- Homes;
- Businesses; and
- Other community settings.²⁸

8.3 Training on Psychological First Aid

PFA training can be provided in person or online. The online version²⁹ is broadly used and is a six-hour interactive course that puts the participant in the role of a provider in a post-disaster scene. This professionally narrated course is for individuals new to disaster responses who want to learn the core goals of PFA, as well as for seasoned practitioners who want a review. It features innovative activities, video demonstrations, and mentor tips from the Nation's trauma experts and survivors. PFA online also offers a learning community where participants can share experiences using PFA in the field, receive guidance during times of disaster, and obtain additional resources and training.

The *Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide*³⁰ provides information for adults, families, first responders, disaster relief workers, crisis counselors, and volunteers to help survivors immediately in the aftermath of a traumatic event. The guide describes key steps for providing PFA, including how to approach someone in need, how to talk to them, how to help stabilize someone, and how to gather information. Appendices include resources about service delivery sites and settings, provider care, and worksheets and handouts.

²⁸ The content for this section was taken from *Psychological First Aid Field Operations Guide*, which is available at http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/pfa/english/1-psyfirstaid_final_complete_manual.pdf.

²⁹ For more information, visit <http://learn.nctsn.org/>.

³⁰ For more information, visit <http://www.nctsn.org/content/psychological-first-aid>.

Following disasters or emergencies, the PFA Mobile application can assist responders who provide PFA to adults, families, and children. Materials in PFA Mobile are adapted from the *Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide* (2nd Edition).³¹

The application allows responders to:

- read summaries of the eight core PFA actions;
- match PFA interventions to specific stress reactions of survivors;
- get mentor tips for applying PFA in the field;
- self-assess to determine their own readiness to conduct PFA; and
- assess and track survivors' needs to simplify data collection and referrals.

8.4 Managing the Responses to Victims and Families

Victim and family support is a critical component to ensuring a successful overall response to a critical incident. It is important to ensure the response is coordinated through each phase including the immediate response, transition process, and post-crisis support in a way that integrates into the investigative and operational response. There are predictable challenges and practical solutions in mass casualty events. Coordination with local resources is critical to ensure a smooth provision of services throughout the longevity of the case. The quality of the overall operational response to a mass casualty will, in large part, be judged by the response to victims and families, and should be based upon trust, cooperation, and respect shown to victims, families, and eye witnesses. Response planning should always track and adjust to meet the needs of the victim/family and the dynamics of the situation. Some considerations include (but are not limited to):

- information sharing;
- victim identification;
- family response management teams;
- communications plans; and
- resource coordination.

For more information, please see [Appendix A: Victim and Family Support Considerations](#).

9 Resources/Templates

The list below contains links to useful active shooter websites, with a brief description for each:

1. FBI Active Shooter Statistics 2000-2013:
<http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter->

³¹ For more information, visit <http://www.nctsn.org/content/pfa-mobile>.

[incidents/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177](https://www.fbi.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/05/20150511-fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-incidents?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-top-stories&utm_content=359177)

2. FBI Active Shooter public site:
<http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents>
3. FEMA Active Shooter Training (IS-907: Active Shooter: What You Can Do):
<http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/courseOverview.aspx?code=IS-907>
4. FEMA Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33007?id=7649>
5. FEMA Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plan:
<http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33599?id=7849>
6. FEMA Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33597?id=7848>

9.1 ISC Documents Referencing Active Shooter

1. ISC Violence in the Federal Workplace: A Guide for Prevention and Response and Appendix, 1st Edition (April 2013): <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/interagency-security-committee-violence-federal-workplace-guide-april-2013>
2. ISC Occupant Emergency Programs Guide, 1st Edition (March 2013):
<http://www.dhs.gov/publication/isc-occupant-emergency-programs-guide>

9.2 Other Government Resources

1. Air Force Be Ready Active Shooter:
<http://www.beready.af.mil/disasters&emergencies/activeshooter.asp>
2. DHS Active Shooter Video: <http://www.dhs.gov/video/options-consideration-active-shooter-training-video>
3. DHS Active Shooter Preparedness website: <http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>
4. DHS Office for Bombing Prevention counter-IED training courses and information:
<http://www.dhs.gov/bombing-prevention-training-courses>
5. DOJ/FBI/NTSB – Mass Fatality Incident Family Assistance Operations: Recommended Strategies for Local and State Agencies:
<http://www.nts.gov/tda/doclib/Mass%20Fatality%20Incident%20Family%20Assistance%20Operations.pdf>
6. DOJ Traumatic Incident Management: <http://www.justice.gov/jmd/hr/hrorder/chpt7-2.htm>

7. DOJ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings:
https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/publications/summits-on-preventing-multiple-causality-violence/e021311546_MultiCasualty-Violence_v508_05APR13.pdf
8. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin “Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2012” written by J. Pete Blair, M. Hunter Martaindale, and Terry Nichols. The article can be found on FBI.gov at <http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-from-2000-to-2012>.
9. FBI Active Shooter Events from 2000-2012: <http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-from-2000-to-2012>
10. FEMA – Mass Casualty Training (IS-360: Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship):
<http://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-360>
11. FEMA – Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools (IS-362A):
www.training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-362.a
12. FLETC – Active Shooter How to Respond, Supervisor Edition:
http://www.co.lincoln.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/sheriff039s_office/page/3780/activeshooterhowtorespondonesupervisor.pdf
13. Navy Active Shooter:
http://www.ready.navy.mil/be_informed/terrorism/active_shooter.html
14. Texas State University compiled statistics (published by the FBI) on active shooter events from 2000-2012: <http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-from-2000-to-2012>

9.3 HIPAA and FERPA Resource Cards for Printing

HIPAA and FERPA reference cards with Privacy Rule information can be found at: <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cirg/active-shooter-and-mass-casualty-incidents> or readers of this document may use the images pasted below to print them directly without the link (see next page).

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide for Law Enforcement

What is the HIPAA Privacy Rule?

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule provides Federal privacy protections for individually identifiable health information, called protected health information or PHI, held by most health care providers and health plans and their business associates. The HIPAA Privacy Rule sets out how and with whom PHI may be shared. The Privacy Rule also gives individuals certain rights regarding their health information, such as the rights to access or request corrections to their information.

Who must comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule?

HIPAA applies to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain health care transactions electronically (e.g., billing a health plan). These are known as covered entities. Hospitals, and most clinics, physicians and other health care practitioners are HIPAA covered entities. In addition, HIPAA protects PHI held by business associates, such as billing services and

others, hired by covered entities to perform services or functions that involve access to PHI.

Who is not required to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule?

Many entities that may have health information are not subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, including:

- employers,
- most state and local police or other law enforcement agencies,
- many state agencies like child protective services, and
- most schools and school districts.

While schools and school districts maintain student health records, these records are in most cases protected by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and not HIPAA. HIPAA may apply however to patient records at a university hospital or to the health records of non-students at a university health clinic.



Under what circumstances may a HIPAA covered entity disclose PHI to law enforcement?

A HIPAA covered entity may disclose PHI to law enforcement with the individual's signed HIPAA authorization.

A HIPAA covered entity also may disclose PHI to law enforcement without the individual's signed HIPAA authorization in certain incidents, including:

- To report PHI to a law enforcement official reasonably able to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an individual or the public.
- To report PHI that the covered entity in good faith believes to be evidence of a crime that occurred on the premises of the covered entity.
- To alert law enforcement to the death of the individual, when there is a suspicion that death resulted from criminal conduct.
- When responding to an off-site medical emergency, as necessary to alert law enforcement to criminal activity.
- To report PHI to law enforcement when required by law to do so (such as reporting gunshots or stab wounds).

- To comply with a court order or court-ordered warrant, a subpoena or summons issued by a judicial officer, or an administrative request from a law enforcement official (the administrative request must include a written statement that the information requested is relevant and material, specific and limited in scope, and de-identified information cannot be used).

- To respond to a request for PHI for purposes of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material witness or missing person, but the information must be limited to basic demographic and health information about the person.
- To respond to a request for PHI about an adult victim of a crime when the victim agrees (or in limited circumstances if the individual is unable to agree). Child abuse or neglect may be reported, without a parent's agreement, to any law enforcement official authorized by law to receive such reports.

For More Information

This is a summary of the relevant provisions and does not include all requirements that are found in the HIPAA Privacy Rule. For complete information, please visit the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service's Office for Civil Rights HIPAA web site at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy>.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act A Guide for First Responders and Law Enforcement

What is FERPA?

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (*FERPA*) is a Federal law that protects the privacy of student education records. The law applies to all educational institutions and agencies (termed “schools” below) that receive funds under any U.S. Department of Education program. *FERPA* gives parents certain rights with respect to their children’s education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she reaches the age of 18 or attends a postsecondary institution. Students to whom the rights have transferred are “eligible students.”

FERPA protects the rights of parents or eligible students to:

- *inspect and review education records;*
- *seek to amend education records;*
- *consent to the disclosure of information from education records, except as specified by law.*



What information can schools provide to law enforcement?

Generally, schools may disclose personally identifiable information (PII) from students’ education records to outside parties, including local law enforcement, only if the parent or the eligible student has provided prior written consent. “Education records” are defined as those records that are directly related to a student and maintained by a school or a party acting for the school, and include student records such as transcripts, disciplinary records, immunization records, and other similar records.

However, there are exceptions to the definition of “education records.” One of these exceptions is for school “law enforcement unit (LEU) records.” These records are defined as records that are (1) created by a LEU; (2) created for a law enforcement purpose; and (3) maintained by the LEU. These records are not protected under *FERPA* and can be disclosed according to school policy or as required by law. Education records that are in the possession of the LEU do not lose their status as education records and must continue to be protected under *FERPA*.



FERPA permits the non-consensual disclosure of PII from “education records” for health and safety emergencies and judicial orders.

Discussed below are some relevant exceptions to *FERPA*’s general consent rule that permit the non-consensual disclosure of PII from education records to law enforcement agencies:

Schools may non-consensually disclose designated “directory information” to law enforcement agencies.

This is permitted if the school has provided notice to parents and eligible students of PII from student education records that the school has designated as directory information and if the parents and eligible students have not opted out of directory information disclosures. Directory information is information from an education record that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed and may include items such as name, address, telephone listing, and participation in sports.



Schools may non-consensually disclose PII from education records in connection with a health or safety emergency.

When an articulable and significant threat exists – anything from an active shooter to a hazardous weather event to a chemical spill – school officials are permitted to disclose PII from education records to appropriate parties, such as law enforcement, in order to protect the health and safety of students or other individuals. Schools are allowed to share this information only during the period of the emergency, and they have to meet certain recordkeeping requirements.

Schools may non-consensually disclose PII from education records in order to comply with a judicial order or a lawfully issued subpoena. Prior notification to parents and students is generally required, though there are some exceptions for law enforcement subpoenas where the court or issuing agency has ordered that the existence or contents of the subpoena or the information furnished in response to the subpoena not be disclosed.

Questions about FERPA?


Email the U.S. Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office with questions about *FERPA* at FERPA.Customer@ed.gov. You may also contact your legal counsel for advice.



9.4 DHS Active Shooter Pocket Cards for Printing

DHS Active Shooter Pocket Cards information can be found at:

<http://www.dhs.gov/publication/active-shooter-pocket-card> or readers of this document may use the images pasted below to print them directly without the link (see below).

COPING	PROFILE
WITH AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION	OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers• Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit• If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door• Attempt to take the active shooter down as a last resort	<p>An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area, typically through the use of firearms.</p>
	CHARACTERISTICS
	OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Victims are selected at random• The event is unpredictable and evolves quickly• Law enforcement is usually required to end an active shooter situation
<p>Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.</p>	
CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO	
HOW TO RESPOND	HOW TO RESPOND
WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY	WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES
1. RUN <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Have an escape route and plan in mind• Leave your belongings behind• Keep your hands visible	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Remain calm and follow instructions• Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)• Raise hands and spread fingers• Keep hands visible at all times• Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety• Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling• Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating
2. HIDE <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hide in an area out of the shooter's view• Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors• Silence your cell phone and/or pager	
3. FIGHT <ul style="list-style-type: none">• As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger• Attempt to incapacitate the shooter• Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter	
CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO	INFORMATION
	YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Location of the active shooter• Number of shooters• Physical description of shooters• Number and type of weapons held by shooters• Number of potential victims at the location

9.5 Non-Federal Government Resources

The Federal Government does not officially endorse the organizations below or their products. These materials have been provided here for educational purposes only.

1. Texas State University Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training: <http://www.alerrt.org>
2. National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC): https://www.justnet.org/About_NLECTC.html
3. Tactical Emergency Casualty Care website: <http://www.c-tecc.org/>
4. Counseling Team International: <http://www.thecounselingteam.com/>
5. International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF): <http://www.icisf.org/>
6. Active Response Training: <http://www.activeresponsetraining.net/>
7. Behavioral Threat Assessment: http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/Implementing_Behavioral_Threat_Assessment.pdf
8. Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Mar 2014 Report “The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents”: http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.pdf
9. Stratfor Video Reacting to Active Shooter Situation: <http://www.stratfor.com/video/conversation-reacting-armed-assailants>
10. New York City Police Department's "Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation" 2012: <http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/Activeshooter.pdf>

9.6 Foreign Resources

1. Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee – Active Shooter Guidelines for Places of Mass Gathering: <http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/active-shooter-guidelines-places-mass-gathering.pdf>

List of Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initializations

TERM	DEFINITION
ADA	Americans with Disabilities Act
ALERRT	Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training
ASO	Armed Security Officer
ASTITP	Active Shooter Threat Instructor Training Program
ASTTP	Active Shooter Threat Training Program
BAU	Behavioral Analysis Unit
CCP	Casualty Collection Point
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
COOP	Continuity of Operations
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
EAP	Employee Assistance Program
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EO	Executive Order
FAC	Family Assistance Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FERPA	Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FPS	Federal Protective Service
FSP	Facility Security Plan
HIPAA	Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
IARD	Immediate Action Rapid Deployment
ICS	Incident Command System
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFAK	Individual First Aid Kit
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
IS	Independent Study
ISC	Interagency Security Committee
JIC	Joint Information Center
LEFRTTP	Law Enforcement First Responder Training Program

LEO	Law Enforcement Officer
MRI	Magnetic Resonance Imaging
NCAVC	National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OEO	Occupant Emergency Organization
OEP	Occupant Emergency Program or Plan
OSH	Occupational Health and Safety
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PFA	Psychological First Aid
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
SALT	Sort-Assess-Lifesaving Interventions-Treatment/Transport
SIP	Shelter-In-Place
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSM	Site Security Manager
START	Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment
TAT	Threat Assessment Team
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USMS	United States Marshals Service
USSS	United States Secret Service

Glossary of Terms

TERM	DEFINITION
Active Shooter/Active Threat	An individual or individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and/or populated area. In most cases, firearms are the weapon of choice during mass casualty incidents but any weapon (such as a knife, etc.) can be utilized to harm innocent individuals and typically there is no pattern or method to the selection of victims.
Contact Team	A group of law enforcement officers who assemble and proceed directly to the sounds of violence with the goal of making contact with the perpetrator(s).
Designated Officials	Those individuals responsible for a facility's OEO and OEP. This includes staffing, training, developing, maintaining, and implementation of the OEO and OEP.
Employee Assistance Program	Federally required program which provides short-term counseling and referral services to employees at no cost.
Family Assistance Center	An area where families may gather to ascertain information about loved ones after a mass casualty emergency.
Federal Facilities	Government leased and owned facilities in the United States (inclusive of its territories) occupied by Federal employees for nonmilitary activities.
Mitigation	The capabilities necessary to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage by lessening the impact of an event or emergency. Mitigation also means reducing the likelihood that threats and hazards will happen.
Occupant Emergency Plan	Preparedness documents which cover a spectrum of emergency situations ranging from essential services interruptions, communicated threats, incidents posing a risk of injury or significant property damage, hazardous conditions, and incidents posing an immediate threat to life or property, including active shooter attacks.
Preparedness	PPD-8 characterizes preparedness using five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.
Prevention	The capabilities necessary to avoid, deter, or stop an imminent threat. Prevention is the action agencies take to keep a threatened or actual incident from occurring.
Protection	The capabilities to secure facilities against acts of terrorism and man-made or natural disasters. Protection focuses on ongoing actions that protect employees, visitors, networks, and property from a threat or hazard.
Psychological First Aid	An evidence-informed, modular approach used by mental health and disaster response workers to help individuals of all ages in the immediate aftermath of disaster and terrorism.
Public Affairs Officer	Responsible for developing and releasing information about an incident to the news media, incident personnel, and other agencies and organizations, as appropriate.

Recovery	The capabilities necessary to assist facilities affected by an event or emergency in restoring the work environment as soon as possible.
Response	The capabilities necessary to stabilize an emergency once it has already happened, restore and establish a safe and secure environment, save lives and prevent the destruction of property, and facilitate the transition to recovery.
Threat Assessment Team	Responsible for addressing threats, confronting violent behavior, and assisting in assessing potential for violence.

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Interagency Security Committee Participants

Interagency Security Committee

Bernard Holt
Acting Executive Director

Interagency Security Committee Representative

Lindsey E. Blair
Acting Deputy Executive Director

Working Group Chair

Glen Legus
United States Marshals Service

Working Group Participants

Jeffrey Afman
Federal Emergency Management Agency

William (Chip) Ayers
Customs and Border Protection

Douglas Baker
General Services Administration

Katheryn (Denise) Ballew
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jerry Castleberry
Round Rock Police Department

Brice Cook
Department of Energy

Craig Cruz
Environmental Protection Agency

Keith Dressel
Customs and Border Protection

Megan Drohan
Interagency Security Committee

Jim Gallagher
Department of Interior

Timothy Gregg
Internal Revenue Service

Michael Griffin
General Services Administration

Dennis Jahnke
Hennepin County Sheriff's Office

Heather King
National Security Council

David Knoff
California Highway Patrol

David Leighton
United States Coast Guard

James P. Leonard
Customs and Border Protection

Scott Ley
United States Marshals Service

Charles Lombard
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Kenneth Marsalis
Federal Aviation Administration

William Morrison
Federal Aviation Administration

Peter Orchard
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jennifer Parkinson
Federal Bureau of Investigation

James Pelkofski
Pentagon Force Protection Agency

Bayne Rector
Smithsonian Institute

Katherine Schweit
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jerry Stanphill
Federal Aviation Administration

Keith Szakal
Department of Transportation

Darryl Ward
Department of Interior

Rob Marohn
Federal Protective Service

Sandra Mayhall
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mark Murray
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

Jim Palmer
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Roger Parrino
Department of Homeland Security

Charles Pipkins
Department of Energy

Terry Register
Pentagon Force Protection Agency

Bruce Skean
Federal Protective Service

John (JT) Stroud
United States Department of Agriculture

David Vaughan
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Jesse Williamson
Interagency Security Committee

Appendix A: Victim and Family Support Considerations

There are several elements of a successful response. They include the right plan, the right people, and the right focus. The first element is ensuring the right people are involved. These responders will manage and coordinate as well as deliver services. Responders should have an understanding of the issues and needs, and the ability to access and apply resources. Appropriate support to victims and families should be provided by experienced front-line providers. Not all law enforcement agencies have internal victim assistance personnel and resources and knowing what community resources and partners are available to assist will help in the absence of a victim assistance program. Having the right plan is also part of a successful response. The victim assistance response should be integrated into incident planning/response, and informed by experience and best practices. It is crucial that the relevant players are integrated into this plan. Develop a plan that can be adapted and scalable based on the incident response. Exercises can serve as a way to modify and improve the response plan. The last element of a successful response is having the right focus. Prioritizing addressing victim needs in a timely, compassionate, and professional manner is key. Remembering why responders do this work is imperative. The focus starts from the top down. It is important to identify a point of contact or a manager to oversee the lead agency's response and to plan and to coordinate with other partners. A successful response plan has investigative and operational benefits. Victims and families tend to be more cooperative when an agency proactively provides them with support and resources. It also assists with identifying, locating, communicating with additional victim/witnesses. The plan also ensures a continuous flow of information to and from the victims.

While each incident will have unique factors, there are predictable response elements in all incidents. Victims need accurate and timely information and the availability of a support system. Preparation and planning can make the difference in meeting these challenges. The role of law enforcement will intersect with victims/families around certain issues including information collection and provision including briefings, interviews, and investigative updates. Victim identification is another intersection between victims/families and law enforcement. This includes ante mortem data collection and missing person reporting in addition to the development of a victim list. In addition, death notification is a major interaction between the family members and law enforcement, as well as the management of personal effects, both evidentiary and non-evidentiary.

Identifying victims is one of the predictable challenges. The legal definition of a victim tends to be more inclusive than exclusive. An incident can result in injured, missing/deceased, walking wounded, and eyewitnesses who may be identified as victims. Closed populations include a set group of impacted individuals such as an airline manifest. Victim identification and notification is less problematic when there is a closed population of victims. In a closed population, victims are known and can be accounted for. In an open population, there are unknown number of victims, missing persons lists, and identification of whole or fragmented human remains. If a death notification is to be delivered to the next of kin, using an effective model can assist with reducing the stress of the individual notifying the family as well as the next of kin. The victim identification process is likely to be drawn out with open populations and when victim remains are disfigured, severely damaged, or fragmented. Victim populations tend to be diverse, which

necessitates planning for multi-cultural issues, language barriers, foreign citizens, injured victims and other special populations with unique needs.

There are practical solutions for identifying victims. Law enforcement generally has the legal responsibility to identify victims. This process starts at the scene. It is imperative to manage expectations. Carefully describing the importance of processing the scene for forensic, and investigative purposes, and to ensure accurate identification of victims is critical. There may be a need to inform families if the loved ones' remains are significantly disfigured. Eventually, the number of victim remains will begin to align with the number of families who have not located their loved ones. This has to be addressed, sooner rather than later. "Provisional" notification can be made by telling these families what is known at that point in time about the number of deceased victims, what needs to be done to identify victims, and how long the process is estimated to take. It is best to avoid making promises that cannot be kept with regard to timing of identification and release of victims' remains. Working collaboratively with the medical examiner to determine the most accurate and efficient victim identification process can be of great value. Ante-mortem interviews with families to collect identifying information should be conducted with a professionally trained victim support person present. When possible, avoid showing photographs to families for identification purposes. Ensure the relevant jurisdictions are clear on who will be doing the death notifications (Medical Examiner vs. Law Enforcement). Death notification should be done in teams (Law Enforcement and victim services provider) using a model. How these issues and death notification are handled has a major impact on families, as well as their relationship to officials and their perception of responding agencies.

Management of victim/family response is another predictable challenge. The National Transportation Safety Board estimates that an average of eight to twelve family members for each missing victim will respond to the incident location or city. Family structures may be very complex and may include parents, step-parents, and estranged family members. There will be family members who are unable to travel to the site but who still deserve information and support. Different victim populations (missing/deceased/hospitalized) may require different resources and services. Victims and families will begin asking about personal belongings. For the families of the deceased these items assume special significance as they are among the last things their loved ones touched and help maintain a physical connection when it is needed most.

There are quite a few practical solutions to manage the victim/family response. A strong, cohesive management team can ensure that the victim response goes smoothly, coordinates and maximize resources, and keeps senior officials informed. The team should consist of a representative from each responsible agency that is identified prior to an active shooter incident. Victim/Family Assistance Centers have been established in response to many events. FAC models generally are intended to support families of the missing/deceased in the immediate aftermath until all the victims have been recovered and identified. FACs may need to remain open through the period of funerals/burials. Considerations should be made for victims who are unable to travel, such as using phone conference bridges and websites. FBI Victim Specialists are located around the country and may be called upon to personally assist with notifications and other support to out of town family members. The plan should include all types of victims and multiple delivery points. Some victim needs are the same – information, emergency assistance, support – but some needs will be distinctly different (families of deceased vs. families of hospitalized injured). The needs of victims and the responsibilities for addressing these needs evolve along a continuum to include:

- the immediate aftermath;
- identifying victims and providing initial information and support;
- transition to services that help stabilize victims and families; and
- long-term provision of information and support associated with protracted investigations and potential prosecutions.

Other considerations include various victim populations specifically, children, persons with disabilities, elderly, non-English speaking victims. If the shooter killed members of his/her own family, there needs to be a separate process for working with surviving family members. A compassionate and supportive approach may enhance their cooperation.

Communication is another predictable challenge. Communication is the key to an effective response. Communicating with victims, families, responders and service providers is paramount for a successful outcome. A massive number of inbound calls from family, friends, and the public may incapacitate the emergency operations center. Victims have a primary need for information from an official source, as soon as it becomes available, and before the media receives it. There are practical solutions to work through communication issues. First, determine, in advance, one hotline number that will be issued to receive calls from families, friends and the public. Second, identify how the hotline will be staffed. A DOJ-funded, professional crisis call center may be a potential asset for local agencies. Ensure that the command post is coordinating and communicating with the lead victim assistance agency to provide critical victim information to victims and families. Deliver accurate information to families. Avoid speculation. It is acceptable to explain why complete or specific information cannot be provided at a given point in time, especially if it means taking the time necessary to ensure a thorough and accurate identification, autopsy, and criminal investigation. Respect victims' need to know the truth, even painful facts, and ensure that information is provided in a sensitive and supportive manner. Share victim information as appropriate while protecting victim privacy. The Family Assistance Center is usually the best place to deliver briefings as it provides privacy and support. The FAC ensures families remain at a centralized location. When identifying a media staging area, consider a location some distance from the FAC to avoid unintended interactions between media and families. When transitioning after the incident, ensure a formal structure for ongoing communication with victims and families to relay ongoing investigative findings and other information, as appropriate. To assist with interagency collaboration, Law Enforcement Online is a helpful tool to use when discussing victim issues within your agency or with other law enforcement agencies and responders.

Resource coordination is yet another predictable challenge. Many “helpers” and donations will show up at scenes and places where victims/families gather. Most will not be needed or helpful, especially when families are in acute crisis and having difficulty absorbing information and making decisions. Victim needs are basic. They include information, support, practical assistance, and privacy from media and well-meaning but unhelpful people. During the immediate aftermath of the incident, victims and families are less interested in the criminal charges and prosecutions. Acute distress is a common and normal reaction to sudden, violent trauma and loss but it does not necessitate mental health counseling, especially in the immediate aftermath. Most people cope over time but some will benefit from counseling at a later point.

A successful overall response to a critical incident includes a plan to respond to victims and families of the event. A coordinated response is critical in order to respond to the predictable challenges and practical solutions. Local resources ensure a seamless transition in the aftermath. A community's response to an active shooter event is largely dependent on the support provided to victims and their family members.



National Retail Federation[®]

The Voice of Retail Worldwide

2008

NRF-ICSC Emergency Response Protocols to Active Shooters

Retail Supplement to DHS Active Shooter Materials

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NRF-ICSC Emergency Response Protocols to Active Shooters

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Section 1: Introduction

We live in a dangerous world and the stakes keep getting higher. Following the shootings, which occurred in retail stores, during the 2007 holiday season and continued into 2008, retailers, mall developers and law enforcement across the country recognized the need for additional planning and response protocols, similar to the efforts currently underway in schools and churches, to handle these critical incidents.

On March 31, 2008 over 30 retail loss prevention executives, law enforcement officers and mall/property management executives met to discuss emergency response protocols to active shooter situations. The nature of these events, various store scenarios (specialty stores versus department stores) and case studies from past incidents were used to create the information below.

The National Retail Federation (NRF) and International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) worked directly with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and retailers to expand the information made available to the private and public sectors. The purpose of this document is to supplement the information published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Commercial Facilities Sector Team as a retail-specific document. DHS published training materials to address response protocols to active shooters in any commercial facility. This document is a guide for the retail community and can be adapted for the development of your crisis response in the event of an active shooting incident at a retail store.

Section 2: Active Shooter Overview

What is an Active Shooter?

According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, an **Active Shooter** is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims. Because active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

Section 3: Timeline of Recent Shooting Incidents, 2004 – 2008

Table 1 provides an overview of shooting incidents in/near retail locations. These incidents and other violent crimes occurring in mall parking lots are receiving nationwide media attention and causing legislators to react via revised gun control laws, gun-carry laws (allowing employees to carry guns to work), as well as camera requirements on mall/store parking lots.

Date	Location	Shopping Center/Store	Wounded
Nov. 18, 2004	St. Petersburg, FL	Gateway Shopping Center	1 wounded, 3 killed (2 victims & shooter)
Feb. 13, 2005	Kingston, NY	Hudson Valley Mall	2 wounded
Nov. 1, 2005	Tacoma, WA	Tacoma Mall	6 wounded
May 27, 2006	Oklahoma City, OK	Crossroads Mall	1 injured, 1 killed (shooter)
Nov. 18, 2006	Annapolis, MD	Westfield Annapolis Mall	2 injured
Feb. 12, 2007	Salt Lake City, UT	Trolley Square Mall	4 wounded, 6 killed (5 victims & shooter)
Apr. 29, 2007	Kansas City, MO	Ward Parkway Center	2 wounded, 4 killed (3 victims & shoot
June 13, 2007	Columbia, SC	Columbiana Shopping Center	1 wounded (estranged wife), 1 killed (her father)
Nov. 27, 2007	Houston, TX	Greenspoint Mall	2 dead (shooter & his girlfriend)
Dec. 5, 2007	Omaha, NE	Westroads Mall, Von Maur Department Store	4 wounded, 9 killed (including shooter)
Jan. 26, 2008	Jacksonville, FL	Regency Square Mall	1 killed (shoplifter), 1 wounded (police officer)
Feb. 2, 2008	Tinley Park, IL	Lane Bryant Store	1 wounded, 5 killed (1 associate, 4 customers)
Mar. 3, 2008	West Palm Beach, FL	Wendy's Restaurant	4 wounded (customers), 2 killed (1 diner, 1 shooter)
Mar. 15, 2008	Tukwila, WA	Westfield Southcenter Mall	1 wounded, not life-threatening
Apr. 3, 2008	Miami, FL	Dolphin Mall	5.5 hour lock-down of mall to search for 4 suspects.
Jun. 17, 2008	Tampa, FL	Lakeland Mall	1 wounded (gang member involved in fight)
Jul. 2, 2008	Atlanta, GA	Popular Coffee Shop	2 wounded, not life-threatening

Profile of Shooter

- In 100% of the shootings above the suspect was male
- In over 71% of the incidents, the shooter was between the ages of 15-25, with 20% ages 50-60.
- In 24% of the shootings, the shooter committed suicide before police were able to respond.

The frequency and devastating effects of the 2007 Holiday Season shootings initiated reaction from the retail loss prevention community, mall developers and law enforcement to work together more closely on planning for these occurrences.

Section 4: Active Shooter Policy Reference

Whether you are a retailer, employee, customer, mall management associate or law enforcement officer, the basic rules apply for shootings that occur within:

- department stores
- specialty stores
- anchor stores/big box
- the common area of a mall
- strip center stores
- parking lot of a mall/strip center

Basic Guidelines for individuals present during an active shooting incident:

1. Assess the situation
2. React
 - a. Evacuate
 - b. Hide out/Shelter-in-Place
 - c. Take action
3. Call 911 when it is safe to do so

For retailers of all sizes and sectors needing assistance, refer to the Supplementary Document “Active Shooters: In-Store Response Protocol Sample”, which contains sample policy language being used by retailers. The sample protocols document is intended to be a reference to help you navigate establishing your own company’s active shooter policy.

Section 5: Crisis Response – Overall Considerations for a Retailer

Crisis Response

Before April 20, 1999, not many people knew about Columbine, Colorado. Now, people automatically associate “Columbine” with one of the deadliest school shootings in U.S. history. Based on the learning’s from Columbine, first responding officers to active shooting crises will now quickly assess the situation and immediately take action. Anyone perceived as a vital threat will be eliminated.

Pre-Columbine, law enforcement would contain the area, fully assess the situation and then attempt to negotiate with the offender(s) until resolution of the incident. If negotiation failed or the offender(s) escalated the incident, the local SWAT team/Quick Response Team (QRT) would then initiate a tactical response. The learning’s from Columbine and other massacres have proven that it is better for law enforcement to enter the situation immediately and try to stop the violence. Shooters who have the intent of harming as many victims as possible typically go into the situation not expecting to leave alive (suicide-by-cop), thus the shooter inevitably engages with police officers.

Shooting incidents begin and end in such a short period of time (usually under 10 to 15 minutes) that by the time first responders arrive on the scene, the shooting is usually over and either the shooter has fled or has killed himself. Since these incidents are so spontaneous and lethal, off-duty officers and concerned citizens respond instinctually and engage the shooter. The five components of a crisis response plan should address how a retailer will:

- Prepare
- Prevent
- Respond
- Stabilize
- Recover

Will your policy serve your employees and customers during an emergency?

Prepare: How can a retailer prepare for an active shooter situation?

- Align communication strategy for/with:
 - Internal store operations (employee-to-employee)
 - Communicating to customers and all employees (employee-to-customer)
 - Mall security
 - Retailers located in the mall/shopping center/strip center
 - Law enforcement
 - Team/leadership at corporate headquarters

- Coordinate with mall/shopping center management
 - Conduct regular meetings for retailers within the mall/shopping center, mall management and law enforcement
 - Establish points of contact between retailers/mall management
 - Outline roles of retailers/mall management
 - Coordinate when off-duty police officers are on the payroll of retailers/mall management
- Coordinate with local police
 - Provide access to the building (provide master keys)
 - Provide building plans for emergency responders
- Consider altering existing facilities set-up, if necessary
 - All store phones should have 911 access or clear emergency dialing instructions so employees or customers are not put at risk
 - Store phones without access to dial 911 or clear alternate dialing instructions could put employees/customers at risk
 - Keys for the drop gate in the back office or on a lanyard carried only by a few authorized personnel might not ensure that a gate is dropped/door is locked if shooting breaks out in a common area and your store is located within a mall
 - Refer to the Supplementary Document “Active Shooters/Random Threat Plan: Risk Assessment” as a reference when conducting an assessment of your stores/facilities
- Coordinate escape plans
 - Designate an evacuation meeting location and inform all employees
 - Coordinate how to meet and account for employees once evacuated (check-in procedure)
 - Outline how you will evacuate multi-floor stores
 - Outline how you will account for your associates
 - Train employees to encourage customers to follow them to the evacuation area
- Train associates on what to expect visually and verbally from first responders. **First responders will:**
 - Proceed to the area where shots were last heard
 - Stop the shooting as quickly as possible, including with lethal force (if necessary)
 - Typically respond in teams of four
 - May be dressed in regular patrol uniforms or may be wearing external bulletproof vests, Kevlar helmets and other tactical equipment
 - Arrive at the scene armed with rifles, shotguns or handguns, and might use pepper spray or tear gas to gain control of the situation
 - First responder teams will assume control and mandate the actions of all persons in the area

- Educate associates to assist law enforcement and:
 - **remain calm and quiet**
 - follow instructions of first responders (Note: Law enforcement officers in tactical gear may appear intimidating because of their protective gear.)
 - keep their hands empty & visible at all times (put down bags/packages)
 - point out the location of the shooter to law enforcement officers (if it's known)
- Inform associates that:
 - first-responding law enforcement will **NOT** help any of the wounded/injured until the shooter is no longer a threat; rescue teams will come in later to aid the wounded/injured
 - they may be treated as a suspect
 - they will need to remain on the premises for a while after the shooting; the entire area is a crime scene and law enforcement will usually keep everyone in the area until they have been processed
 - your store might be turned into a temporary processing center for law enforcement officials
 - dependent on proximity and amount of casualties, your store may turn into a temporary recovery unit/emergency room/morgue
- Outline store response and recovery protocol for key departments
- Run a table top exercise and/or simulate an active shooter situation
 - Get the key stake holders involved within the mall/shopping center
 - Customers
 - Law enforcement/first responders
 - Mall developers
 - Retailers (specialty and department stores)
 - Employees at store locations
 - Employees at corporate headquarters

Prevent: How do you prevent an active shooter?

- **Suspicious Individuals** – Store/Mall Security response to observing suspicious individuals
- **Associates** – An active shooter may be a current or former employee. Employees typically display indicators of potentially violent behavior over time. Create a method for associates to notify human resources/management of this behavior.
- **Associates with tenuous domestic situations** – An active shooter may be related to an associate and or a spouse/domestic partner. Create a method for associates to notify human resources/management of domestic troubles.
- **Local Trends** – Establish relationships with law enforcement to stay abreast of any local trends and understand first responder activities.

Respond: What is the right response for your store?

- Considerations For Your Response Program
 - Store Profile (specialty or department store)
 - Security/Loss Prevention Personnel/Store Management on-site
 - Assess the Situation
 - Contact the Police (911)
 - Decision to Evacuate or Hide Out/Shelter-in-Place
 - Public Address Announcement
 - Company Notification
- Training Considerations
 - Simple and instinctual response
 - Implemented by various management levels
 - Include drills or walkthroughs
 - Follow up on a periodic basis

Stabilize: How can you stabilize a situation during the midst of a critical/crisis situation?

- Plan ahead and have a contingency plan
- Inform employees of the plan and train on how to react/respond
- Have a public relations plan in place to mitigate the damages after the shooting

Recover: What will your recovery efforts entail?

- Immediate Response
 - Thoroughly document the series of events through interviews and forensics
 - Dependent on proximity to the shooting and the extent of casualties, your store may become:
 - a temporary processing center
 - a temporary recovery unit/emergency room/morgue
- Associates & Customers
 - Obtain available counseling for all involved
 - Create 'safe' feeling so associates and customers will return
- Business Interests
 - Media Strategies with mall management

Section 6: Conclusion

In conclusion, this type of training is outside the bounds of what most retailers, customers and employees should expect when reporting to work/enjoying a leisurely afternoon of shopping. However, history has told us that it is critical to think about these situations, prepare for the worst and hope/expect the best. People will respond instinctually to these panic situations, however by training and teaching employees some of the basics, they will have that to fall back on during these crisis situations.

Active shooting situations may not be preventable however the amount of damage and life lost can be minimized. Working with industry experts and law enforcement/first responders, the sample response protocols below have been outlined.

Active Shooters: In-Store Response Protocol Sample

**If an active shooter or other violent situation occurs in/near your Store,
TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION!**

1. **ASSESS THE SITUATION** – Determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life. Customers are most likely to follow the lead of in-store associates and management during an active shooter situation. **Do not endanger your safety or the safety of others.**
2. **REACT** – Determine the location of the shooter (inside or outside store). Based on your assessment, react to the situation at hand in the method safest possible for you and those around you. The shooter may be moving through the mall, store, back corridors, entrances, or out to the parking areas. There may be danger from the gunfire of the attacker, and responding police officers. You must choose which action to take:
 - a. **EVACUATE** – If the shooter is in the store, and it is safe to do so, evacuate the store. Have an escape route and plan in mind and leave your belongings behind. Keep hands visible so it is clear to first responders that you are not armed. Run away from the sound, putting as much distance between you and the shooter as possible. Go to pre-established company meeting spot.
 - b. **HIDE OUT/SHELTER-IN-PLACE** – **Stay hidden** if possible and away from windows and exterior doors.
 - i. **HIDE OUT/SHELTER-IN-PLACE** – Take staff and customers to the back area, away from exposure to glass and the mall common area or the outside area. Go to a secure stockroom, office, emergency stairwells, utility closet, mall corridors, etc. Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors.
 - ii. **KEEP SAFE** – Stay inside your Store, unless instructed to do otherwise by the police officials or other local authorities. **Do NOT open the door** for anyone that cannot provide you with appropriate first responder/security identification and/or show you a badge.
 - c. **TAKE ACTION** – As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger. Attempt to incapacitate the active shooter. Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter.
 - d. **LOCK UP** – If it is safe to do so, **lock all Store doors**. Determine key holders, as they may vary by company. For stores with multiple exits, lock Store doors closest to vicinity/direction of shooter, if it is safe to do so. Determine the automatic and manual ways to close the door.

3. **COMMUNICATE** – When it is safe to do so: Call out and describe the situation.
 - a. **Inform customers and associates** – State over the Public Announcement System and store radios that a person is in the building with a weapon. Sample announcement: ***"Attention we have a 911 situation occurring please move to a secure area immediately."*** Repeat 3 times.
 - b. **Call 911** – Be prepared to provide as much information about the shooter as possible, including physical description/location of shooter:
 - i. Location of the active shooter
 - ii. Number of shooters, if more than one
 - iii. Physical description of shooter/s
 - iv. Number and type of weapons held
 - v. by the shooter/s
 - vi. Number of potential victims at the location
 - c. **Contact appropriate internal and external partners** – When safe to do so contact and update loss prevention/store management, mall security, corporate office.
4. **GET OUT – Follow all instructions given to you by authorities.** You may be requested to exit your area with your hands above your head and be told to leave all bags and packages in the Store. Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions.
5. **How should you react when law enforcement arrives**
 - a. Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions.
 - b. Immediately raise hands and spread fingers.
 - c. Keep hands visible at all times.
 - d. Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as attempting to hold on to them for safety.
 - e. Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling.
 - f. Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises.
6. **After the Event**
 - a. As soon as possible, the appropriate individuals at store operations and corporate should be contacted.
 - b. Establish an area outside the store for all Associates and Executives to evacuate to after the situation is resolved.
 - c. Set up Store Command Center. This should be the store's central communication post. Ensure someone is always stationed at the Command Center phone to take and give information as needed.

Active Shooters/Random Threat Plan: Risk Assessment

The chart below may be used to assist you in identifying considerations for your plan.

	YES	NO
PHYSICAL		
1) Is your store in a mall?		
2) Is your location a stand-alone store?		
3) Is your store near a major highway?		
4) Is your store near a major train route?		
5) Is your parking lot adequately lit?		
6) Is your parking lot patrolled regularly by either mall security or the police?		
7) Do you have a full time Loss Prevention staff?		
8) Does your store have a closed circuit (CCTV) system?		
9) Does your store have an emergency generator?		
10) Does your store have a P.A. system? If not, do you have a megaphone?		
11) How close is your cash office to an exit?	ft.	
12) Are your stockrooms locked at all times?		
13) Does management know where risers and utility shut-offs are located?		
13) Does management know where risers and utility shut-offs are located?		
ENVIRONMENT		
14) Has there been prior criminal activity or civil complaints against your store?		
15) Do you have an active cooperative alliance with mall security and the local police?		
16) Is your store in a tornado-prone area?		
17) Is your store near a crime magnet, such as a late night entertainment venue or near property in disrepair or abandoned?		
18) Is there a history of crime in the area where your store is located?		
19) Are there AED (automatic defibrillator devices) in the mall?		
20) How far is the closest medical facility?	mi.	
21) What is the average response time from the local police, fire and paramedics?	min.	
PEOPLE		
22) Do you have adequate staffing levels for each shift?		
23) Do you have emergency contact information for all associates?		
24) Are any associates trained in first aid, CPR or AED's?		



About the National Retail Federation

The National Retail Federation is the world's largest retail trade association, with membership that comprises all retail formats and channels of distribution including department, specialty, discount, catalog, Internet, independent stores, chain restaurants, drug stores and grocery stores as well as the industry's key trading partners of retail goods and services. NRF represents an industry with more than 1.6 million U.S. retail establishments, more than 24 million employees - about one in five American workers - and 2006 sales of \$4.7 trillion. As the industry umbrella group, NRF also represents more than 100 state, national and international retail associations. www.nrf.com

NRF Contacts

Joseph LaRocca
VP, Loss Prevention
202-783-7971
laroccaj@nrf.com

Angélica Rodríguez
Sr. Director, Loss Prevention
202-626-8142
rodrigueza@nrf.com



**325 7th Street, NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20004
www.nrf.com**



New York City Police Department

Active Shooter

*Recommendations and Analysis
for Risk Mitigation*

Raymond W. Kelly
Police Commissioner



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Part I: Introduction

Active shooter attacks are dynamic incidents that vary greatly from one attack to another. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” In its definition, DHS notes that, “in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.” The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has limited this definition to include only those cases that spill beyond an intended victim to others.¹

The type of police response to an active shooter attack depends on the unique circumstances of the incident. In the event of such an attack, private security personnel should follow the instructions of the first-responders from the NYPD.

Because active shooter attacks are dynamic events, the NYPD cannot put forward a single set of best-practices for private security response to such incidents. However, the NYPD has compiled a list of recommendations for building security personnel to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The recommendations draw on previous studies of active shooter attacks and are presented in Part II.²

The NYPD developed these recommendations based on a close analysis of active shooter incidents from 1966 to 2010. This Compendium of cases, presented in the Appendix, includes 281 active shooter incidents. It is organized chronologically by type of facility targeted, including office buildings, open commercial areas, factories and warehouses, schools, and other settings.

The NYPD performed a statistical analysis on a subset of these cases to identify common characteristics among active shooter attacks. This analysis is presented in Part III and the underlying methodology is presented in Part IV. The analysis found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution.

¹ *E.g.*, a case of a grievance against an employer leads to an attack targeting not only the direct supervisor but also others in the workplace.

² U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond,” October 2008, http://www.lpinformation.com/Portals/0/DHS_ActiveShooter_FlipBook.pdf; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, “Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips,” 2008, www.ucpd.ucla.edu/2008/activeshootersafetytips.pdf; US Secret Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States,” May 2002, http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, “Workplace Violence; Issues in Response,” June 2002, <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/violence.pdf>; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, “Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery,” October 2001, http://hawaii.gov/ag/cpja/quicklinks/workplace_violence/WVfull.pdf; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, “Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees,” <http://www.doli.state.mn.us/WSC/PDF/WorkplaceViolencePreventionGuide.pdf>.

Part II: Recommendations

The NYPD compiled a list of recommendations to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The NYPD developed these recommendations based on analysis of past active shooter incidents and careful review of previous studies.³ Unlike other works on active shooter attacks, this guide provides recommendations tailored to building security personnel. The NYPD organized its recommendations into three categories: procedures, systems, and training.

Procedures:

- Conduct a realistic security assessment to determine the facility's vulnerability to an active shooter attack.
- Identify multiple evacuation routes and practice evacuations under varying conditions; post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout the facility; ensure that evacuation routes account for individuals with special needs and disabilities.
- Designate shelter locations with thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal interior windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices, and duress alarms.
- Designate a point-of-contact with knowledge of the facility's security procedures and floor plan to liaise with police and other emergency agencies in the event of an attack.
- Incorporate an active shooter drill into the organization's emergency preparedness procedures.
- Vary security guards' patrols and patterns of operation.
- Limit access to blueprints, floor plans, and other documents containing sensitive security information, but make sure these documents are available to law enforcement responding to an incident.
- Establish a central command station for building security.

Systems:

- Put in place credential-based access control systems that provide accurate attendance reporting, limit unauthorized entry, and do not impede emergency egress.
- Put in place closed-circuit television systems that provide domain awareness of the entire facility and its perimeter; ensure that video feeds are viewable from a central command station.

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Active Shooter: How to Respond"; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, "Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips"; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, "Workplace Violence: Issues in Response"; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, "Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery"; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, "Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees."

- Put in place communications infrastructure that allows for facility-wide, real-time messaging.
- Put in place elevator systems that may be controlled or locked down from a central command station.

Training:

- Train building occupants on response options outlined by the Department of Homeland Security in “Active Shooter: How to Respond” when an active shooter is in the vicinity:⁴
 - **Evacuate:** Building occupants should evacuate the facility if safe to do so; evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualize their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators or escalators.
 - **Hide:** If evacuating the facility is not possible, building occupants should hide in a secure area (preferably a designated shelter location), lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, cover all windows, turn off all lights, silence any electronic devices, lie on the floor, and remain silent.
 - **Take Action:** If neither evacuating the facility nor seeking shelter is possible, building occupants should attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by throwing objects, using aggressive force, and yelling.
- Train building occupants to call 911 as soon as it is safe to do so.
- Train building occupants on how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene: follow all official instructions, remain calm, keep hands empty and visible at all times, and avoid making sudden or alarming movements.

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond.”

Part III: Analysis

The NYPD identified a subset of the active shooter cases included in the Compendium and ran statistical analyses of the data set (see Part IV for an explanation of the analytic methodology). This subset, called the “active shooter data set,” includes all cases in the Compendium, except: 1) those that occurred outside of the United States; 2) those that did not result in casualties of either victims or attackers; and 3) those that were foiled before the attack occurred. In total, the active shooter data set includes 202 cases.

Although this analysis identified some common characteristics among active shooters, the NYPD found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution.


Sex of Attacker

The NYPD’s analysis demonstrates that active shooters are an overwhelmingly male group. Only 8 out of 202 cases (4%) in the active shooter data set involved female attackers. Taking into account reporting biases (*i.e.*, the possibility that the relative rarity of female attackers leads to increased attention paid to those attacks), the actual percentage of female attackers may be even lower.

Age of Attacker

The NYPD’s analysis demonstrates that the median age of active shooters in the active shooter data set is 35. This median, however, conceals a more complicated, yet unsurprising distribution, depicted in Figure 1. The distribution of ages is bimodal, with a first peak for shootings at schools by 15-19 year-olds, and a second peak in non-school facilities by 35-44 year-olds.

Figure 1: Attacker Ages by Number of Attackers



Number of Attackers

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that 98% of active shooter incidents in the active shooter data set were carried out by a single attacker.

Planning Tactics


The NYPD's analysis demonstrates a broad range of tactical sophistication in the planning stage of active shooter attacks. Some active shooters do little to no planning and attack impulsively, while others do extensive planning, including pre-operational surveillance. A few active shooters even set up pre-planned defenses intended to trap victims and prolong their attacks, such as chaining doors and blocking entrances. Some attackers appear to have learned from previous active shooter incidents.

Targets

The NYPD organized relationships between attackers and victims in the active shooter data set into five categories: professional, academic, familial, other, and none.⁵

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that active shooters are often members of the communities they target. Figure 2 shows that the majority of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set occurred when the perpetrator had either a professional or academic relationship with at least one of the victims.⁶ However, 22% of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set occurred when the active shooter had no prior relationship to the victims, demonstrating that active shooter attacks can occur even without any prior altercation or grievance.

Figure 2: Attacker's Relationship to Victims



Moreover, of the 82 attacks that involved professional relationships, fewer than one-third were perpetrated by individuals who were no longer employed by the organization at the time of the attack, implying that the threat from active shooter attacks is not limited to

⁵ The NYPD categorized attacks against significant others and former significant others as "Other."

⁶ In cases in which the attacker had multiple victims, the NYPD determined the relationship classification based on the attacker's relationship to the "closest" victim. *E.g.*, In an active shooter incident in which an attacker shoots his spouse and his spouse's coworker, the relationship classification is "familial."

downsized employees. In fact, in many cases, active shooter attacks resulted from disagreements among current employees of the organization.

Number of Casualties


Determining the typical number of casualties in an active shooter attack is complex because the distribution of the number of deaths and woundings in the active shooter data set has a long tail.⁷ In other words, the active shooter data set includes a small number of attacks with a large number of casualties; these cases inflate the average. For this reason, the median is a better measure of the typical number of casualties than the average.

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that the median number of deaths in cases included in the active shooter data set is 2, and the average is 3.0. The majority of attacks included in the active shooter data set resulted in 0 to 5 deaths. The median number of wounded is 2, and the average is 3.6.

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that the distribution of the number of wounded is similar to the distribution of the number of dead. The distributions differ slightly in that there are a few more attacks with large numbers of wounded than there are attacks with large numbers of dead.

Figure 3 shows the distributions of the number of attacks by casualty count for both dead and wounded. These distributions demonstrate that a typical active shooter attack results in 0-2 deaths and 0-2 wounded.

Figure 3: Casualty Counts by Number of Incidents



⁷ In this section, the NYPD only included deaths or woundings of victims (not attackers) in the casualty counts.

Location of Attack

The NYPD organized attack locations in the active shooter data set into five categories: office buildings, open commercial areas,⁸ schools, factories and warehouses, and other facilities.⁹

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that less than one-third of attacks included in the active shooter data set took place at schools; and roughly one-half occurred at commercial facilities, such as office buildings, factories and warehouses, and open commercial areas. Moreover, Table 1 shows that attacks at restricted commercial facilities, such as office buildings, factories, and warehouses, occurred more frequently than attacks at open commercial facilities, such as retail stores or restaurants.¹⁰

Table 1: Number of Incidents by Location

Location Type	Number of Incidents	Percentage
School	64	29%
Office Building	29	13%
Open Commercial	52	23%
Factory/Warehouse	30	13%
Other	49	22%
Total	224*	100%

* The 202 cases in the active shooter data set occurred at 224 locations because several attacks involved more than one location.

Weapons

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that 36% of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set involved more than one weapon. In some instances, one of the weapons was a close combat weapon, such as a knife. In one case, a single attacker carried seven weapons, including a rifle, two shotguns, and four handguns.

In several cases, the attackers used firearms that they had stolen from relatives or friends. This pattern was most apparent in school-related shootings where attackers stole weapons from parents.

Reporting on weapons involved in active shooter attacks is often inconsistent and inaccurate. For some attacks, news reports state the exact make and model of the firearm involved; for other attacks, reports do not include specific information on weapons. Moreover, reports often refer to semi-automatic rifles as "machine guns" or "assault weapons"; neither term is particularly descriptive, and often times both terms are inaccurate. Additionally, in some cases, the make and model of a weapon is not enough

⁸ The NYPD defines "Open Commercial" as commercial locations to which members of the public have open, unfettered access. *E.g.*, shopping malls, department stores, restaurants, etc.

⁹ Several of the cases included in the "Other" category occurred at: airports, medical centers, and religious facilities. The NYPD chose not to break these types of locations out into their own categories because the number of attacks at each type of location did not exceed a 5% threshold.

¹⁰ Classification of some events required analyst judgment.

information to fully decipher its capabilities, since aftermarket kits are available to convert certain firearms from semi-automatic to fully-automatic.

Attack Resolution

The NYPD organized attack resolutions in the active shooter data set into four categories: applied force, no applied force, suicide or attempted suicide, and attacker fled.

Table 2 shows that the vast majority of attacks in the active shooter data set ended violently, either by force applied by law enforcement, private security, bystanders, or the attackers themselves. Only 14% ended without applied force, such as by a negotiated surrender.

Table 2: Number of Incidents by Incident Resolution

Resolution	Number of Incidents	Percentage
Applied Force	93	46%
No Applied Force	28	14%
Suicide/Attempted Suicide	80	40%
Attacker Fled	1	<1%
Total	202	100%

Part IV: Analytic Methodology

The Compendium of active shooter incidents presented in the Appendix includes 281 cases: 244 attacks with at least one casualty, two attacks resulting in zero casualties, and 35 plots foiled in the planning stages. The incidents in the Compendium occurred between 1966 and December 31, 2010. The NYPD compiled these cases from internet news sources identified using online search. The NYPD did not use special-access government sources to compile the cases in the Compendium; all information is open-source and publicly available.

The NYPD included only those incidents carried out by attackers that met the DHS definition of an active shooter: an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. The NYPD further restricted this definition to exclude: gang-related shootings, shootings that solely occurred in domestic settings, robberies, drive-by shootings, attacks that did not involve a firearm, and attacks categorized primarily as hostage-taking incidents.

The search technique used by the NYPD to identify the cases included in the Compendium had some limitations that resulted in sampling biases. First, since the NYPD gathered the data through an internet search, the Compendium has a strong sample bias towards recent incidents. For attacks that occurred between 2000 and 2010, the Compendium is nearly comprehensive. For attacks that occurred prior to 2000, the Compendium may not be comprehensive because the attacks pre-date widespread internet news reporting. Second, for incidents that occurred before 2000, the Compendium is biased towards attacks with higher dead and wounded counts, which tended to attract greater media attention and were thus easier to find in news reports.

To facilitate the quantitative analysis, the NYPD organized the information about each case into categories. Some incidents were difficult to classify and required analyst judgment to resolve. For all cases, the Compendium includes a footnote to the original source material that allows readers to obtain further detail or clarification.

Occasionally, multiple sources related to a single attack presented conflicting information about that attack. Generally, when the NYPD identified discrepancies between sources, the NYPD included the information presented in the more recent source; this is particularly relevant for the counts of dead and wounded, where later sources tend to be more accurate. In cases where the NYPD identified discrepancies between a government source and a news outlet, the NYPD included the information presented in the government source.

The NYPD prepared a subset of the Compendium cases suitable for quantitative analysis. The active shooter data set includes all cases in the Compendium, except: 1) those that occurred outside of the United States; 2) those that did not result in casualties of either victims or attackers; and 3) those that were foiled before the attack occurred. In total, the active shooter data set includes 202 cases.

The NYPD chose to restrict quantitative analysis to cases that took place within the United States because the NYPD limited its internet searches to English-language sites, creating a strong sampling bias against international incidents. Table 3 presents the number of cases in the Compendium by country.

Table 3: Number of Incidents by Country

Country	Number of Incidents	Country	Number of Incidents
U.S.	237	Denmark	1
Canada	8	Egypt	1
Germany	6	France	1
Australia	5	Greece	1
Israel	3	Italy	1
United Kingdom	4	The Netherlands	1
Finland	2	Slovakia	1
India	2	Somalia	1
Argentina	1	Sweden	1
Austria	1	Thailand	1
Bosnia	1	Yemen	1

The NYPD chose to restrict quantitative analysis to cases with one or more documented casualties to compensate for a strong sampling bias. Although the NYPD identified in the Compendium 35 foiled attacks and two attacks resulting in zero casualties, this portion of the Compendium is not comprehensive, given the comparatively limited amount of news coverage these attacks received.¹¹

Although it would be useful to comment on trends in the frequency of active shooter incidents, the NYPD determined that it is not possible to do so given the limitations of the active shooter data set. The sampling bias caused by using internet news as the primary source skews any observed patterns.

As a general rule, the ability to make generalizations regarding a group of events improves as the number of events in the sample increases. Accordingly, it is difficult to make precise statistical judgments with limited data. For this reason, many research questions that would have been interesting to investigate, such as the average number of deaths in active shooter incidents in each state, cannot be answered with this data set.

¹¹ Incidents in which the attacker was the only casualty may also suffer from limited news reporting, making this portion of the data set incomplete.

APPENDIX

COMPENDIUM OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS (1966-2010)

OFFICE BUILDINGS

Case #1

August 17, 2010: Patrick Sharp opened fire outside the Department of Public Safety in McKinney, Texas. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Sharp began his attack by setting his truck on fire to lure people out of the building. He then retreated across the street and fired 100 rounds of ammunition on employees standing outside the building. Sharp was unsuccessful in attempting to ignite the trailer attached to his truck, which was filled with explosives. Prior to the attack, Sharp made references to his plot on a social networking site and expressed his desire to kill people in correspondence with a Facebook friend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Department of Public Safety in McKinney, Texas
Attacker Information:	Patrick Gray Sharp (29/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun (12-gauge); handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Matthew Haag, Dallas Morning News, “‘I Enjoy Watching People Beg for their Life,’ McKinney Shooter Patrick Sharp told Facebook Friend,” August 19, 2010, <http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/081810dnmetmckinneyshoot.66e01f0d.html>.
2. CNN, “Heavily Armed Man Orchestrates Attack on Texas Police Building,” August 17, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-17/justice/texas.shooting_1_kowalski-public-safety-building-assault-rifle?_s=PM:CRIME.

Case #2

July 12, 2010: Robert Reza opened fire at Emcore Corporation, where he was formerly employed, killing two people and wounding four others, including his ex-girlfriend. Reza began his attack outside the office building and then later forced his way inside the facility. Reports state that the attack occurred after Reza and his ex-girlfriend were involved in a domestic dispute.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Emcore Corp in Albuquerque, New Mexico
Attacker Information:	Robert Reza (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Edecio Martinez, CBS News, "Emcore Shooter Robert Reza Kills Two, Self, Say Police," July 12, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20010291-504083.html.
2. Trip Jennings, The New Mexico Independent, "Two Women Killed by Shooter Monday were Victims of Chance, APD Chief Says" July 13, 2010, <http://newmexicoindependent.com/59273/two-women-killed-by-shooter-monday-were-victims-of-chance-apd-chief-says>.

Case #3

March 4, 2010: John Bedell opened fire on Pentagon police officers after an officer asked him for his credentials at the security checkpoint of the Pentagon's main entrance. Three guards returned fire and fatally wounded the gunman.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia
Attacker Information:	John Patrick Bedell, (36/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handguns (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Christian Davenport, Washington Post, "Officers who Shot Pentagon Gunman Recall Moments of Mayhem," March 9, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/08/AR2010030803897.html>.

Case #4

November 10, 2009: Robert Beiser opened fire in a drug-testing clinic where his wife was employed, killing her and injuring two of her co-workers. The attack came one week after Beiser's wife filed for divorce.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Legacy Metro Lab in Tualatin, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Robert Beiser (39/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 injured
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun; handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, KPTV, "Gunman Had Multiple Weapons, Police Say," November 10, 2009, <http://www.kptv.com/news/21575706/detail.html>.
2. Bill Oram, Oregonian, "Gunman Kills Estranged Wife at Tualatin Lab, Injures Two, Kills Self," November 10, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/tualatin/index.ssf/2009/11/police_responding_to_tualatin_shooting.html.

Case #5

November 6, 2009: Jason Rodriguez opened fire at his former workplace, killing one employee and wounding five others. The assailant surrendered at his mother's apartment after a two hour manhunt.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Reynolds, Smith & Hills in Orlando, Florida
Attacker Information:	Jason Rodriguez (40/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, Shaila Dewan, "Lawyer Cites Mental Illness in Orlando Shooting," November 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/us/08orlando.html?_r=2.
2. Orlando Sentinel, "Jason Rodriguez: Shooting at Downtown Orlando Office Building Leaves 5 Hurt, 1 Dead," November 6, 2009,

<http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/crime/os-shooting-reported-downtown-orlando-20091106,0,2873337.story>.

Case #6

November 14, 2008: Jing Hua Wu opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people, including the CEO. Wu had been laid-off hours prior to the attack and returned to the office to request a meeting with company officials. Wu shot and killed all three victims during this meeting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	SiPort Company offices in Santa Clara, California
Attacker Information:	Jing Hua Wu (47/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Michael Harvey, Times Online, "Tech Engineer Kills Three Bosses at Silicon Valley Start-Up After Being Sacked," November 16, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5167198.ece.

Case #7

October 4, 2007: John Ashley, a Baptist deacon, opened fire in a downtown law office, killing two people and injuring three others. Police shot and killed him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Giordano & Giordano Law Office in Alexandria, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	John Ashley (63/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Abbey Brown and Warren Hayes, USA Today, "Standoff at Louisiana Law Firm Leaves 3 Dead," October 5, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-05-louisiana-shooting_N.htm.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Louisiana Police Kill Gunman Who Killed 2, Wounded 3 in Law Office," October 5, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,299507,00.html>.

Case #8

August 30, 2007: Paulino Valenzuela, a terminated janitor, opened fire at his former workplace, killing his ex-supervisor and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	RiverBay Corporation in Bronx, New York
Attacker Information:	Paulino Valenzuela (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Nicole Bode, Kerry Burke and Tina Moore, New York Daily News, "Bronx Slay Suspect Paulino Valenzuela Claiming Self-Defense," September 3, 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/09/03/2007-09-03_bronx_slay_suspect_paulino_valenzuela_cl-1.html.
2. WCBSTV.com, "Bronx Workplace Shooting Leaves 1 Dead, 2 Wounded," August 30, 2007, <http://wcbstv.com/topstories/shooting.the.bronx.2.246871.html>.

Case #9

April 9, 2007: Anthony LaCalamita opened fire at an accounting firm where he was formerly employed, killing one person and injuring two others. LaCalamita had been fired from the company prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Gordon Advisors in Troy, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Anthony LaCalamita (38/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Source:

1. Ellen Piligian and Libby Sandler, New York Times, "Shooting at Accounting Firm Leaves One Dead and 2 Hurt," April 10, 2007,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B06EEDD153FF933A25757C0A9619C8B63>.

Case #10

February 13, 2007: Vincent J. Dortch opened fire in a conference room at the Naval Business Center, killing three business executives and wounding a fourth.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Philadelphia Naval Business Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information: Vincent J. Dortch (44/M)
Casualties: 3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons: 2
Weapon Information: Rifle (AK-47); handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Richard G. Jones, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 3 Members of Investment Firm and Himself," February 14, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/us/14board.html>.
2. Adam Taylor, Terri Sanginiti and Andrew Tangel, Delaware Online, "Bear Man Kills 3, Himself Over Deal Gone Bad,"
<http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20070214/NEWS/702140361/Bear-man-kills-3-himself-over-deal-gone-bad>.

Case #11

December 9, 2006: Joe Jackson opened fire at a law firm, killing three people and wounding one other. Jackson forced a security guard, at gunpoint, to take him to the 38th floor of the legal offices. He chained the office doors behind him. SWAT snipers fatally shot Jackson after a 45-minute standoff, during which he took a bystander hostage. Reports state that Jackson believed he had been cheated over an invention of a toilet designed for tractor-trailers.

Number of attack locations: 1

Location Information:	Wood, Phillips, Katz, Clark & Mortimer in Chicago, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Joseph Jackson (59/M)
Casualties:	3 dead, 1 wounded
Number of weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Revolver; knife; other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Chicago Tribune, "Deadly Pursuit," December 11, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-12-11/news/0612110299_1_joe-jackson-attorney-george-jackson.
2. Amy S. Clark, CBS News, "Shooting May Be Over 'Truck Toilet' Patent," December 9, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/08/national/main2243640.shtml?source=RSSattr=HOME_2243640.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Ill. Gunman Felt Cheated Over Invention," December 9, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16114776/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.

Case #12

October 21, 2004: Pelayo Errasti opened fire at the Beltservice Corporation Headquarters, injuring one employee. Reports state that Errasti, who had been fired from the company a year prior to the attack, intended to shoot his former boss.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Beltservice Corporation Headquarters in Earth City, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Pelayo Errasti (48/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. St. Louis County Police, "Press Release: Warrants Issued on 48 Year Old Man Suspected of Office Shooting in Earth City," October 22, 2004, <http://www.co.st-louis.mo.us/scripts/PD/press/view.cfm?ViewMe=5255>.
2. Associated Press, Washington Post, "Nation in Brief," October 24, 2004, <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/721913001.html?FMT=ABS>

&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Oct+24%2C+2004&author=&desc=NATION+IN+BRIEF.

Case #13

April 2, 2004: William Case opened fire at his workplace, killing his manager and wounding a co-worker. Reports state that Case had an argument with his manager about unemployment benefits prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Employment Security Commission office in Hendersonville, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	William Case (30/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. WRAL.com, "Hendersonville ESC Office Set to Reopen," April 8, 2004, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1090411/>.

Case #14

February 2, 2004: Louis Darrell Kinyon opened fire at his workplace, killing his supervisor. He then attempted to commit suicide. The attack occurred one week after Kinyon was suspended for violating company policy.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Provo River Water Users Association in Pleasant Grove, Utah
Attacker Information:	Louis Darrell Kinyon (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted suicide

Sources:

1. Jesse Hyde Deseret, Deseret News, "'Gentle Giant' Loved Family," February 4, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20040204/ai_n11443709/.

2. Jesse Hyde Deseret, Deseret News, "Shooting Suspect is Offered a Plea Deal," April 12, 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20050412/ai_n13593327/.

Case #15

February 25, 2003: Emanuel Burl Patterson opened fire at a temporary employment agency, killing four people and injuring another. Reports state Patterson had argued with people who were waiting in line prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Labor Ready Inc. in Huntsville, Alabama
Attacker Information:	Emanuel Burl Patterson (23/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Gunman Kills Four at Alabama Job Agency," February 26, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/26/us/gunman-kills-four-at-alabama-job-agency.html>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "Four Dead in Shooting in Ala., Gunman Surrenders," February 25, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-02-25-ala-shooting_x.htm.

Case #16

December 26, 2000: Michael McDermott opened fire at the Edgewater Technology firm, killing seven co-workers. At the end of his rampage, McDermott sat in the reception area and waited for law enforcement to arrive.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Edgewater Technology in Wakefield, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Michael McDermott (42/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); shotgun; handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Carey Goldberg, New York Times, "A Deadly Turn to a Normal Work Day," December 28, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/28/us/a-deadly-turn-to-a-normal-work-day.html>.
2. New York Times, "Man Convicted of Killing 7 Co-Workers," April 25, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/25/us/man-convicted-of-killing-7-co-workers.html>.

Case #17

November 2, 1999: Bryan Koji Uyesugi opened fire at a Xerox facility, killing his supervisor and six co-workers. Uyesugi fled in a van and was arrested after a five-hour standoff with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Xerox Engineering Systems in Iwilei, Hawaii
Attacker Information:	Bryan Uyesugi (40/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Jaymes K. Song, Star Bulletin, "7 Dead in Nimitz Hwy. Xerox Shooting," November 2, 1999, <http://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/11/02/news/story1.html>.

Case #18

August 5, 1999: Alan Eugene Miller opened fire at a heating and air conditioning firm, killing two co-workers. Miller then shot and killed his former supervisor at another company.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Ferguson Enterprises and Post Airgas offices in Pelham, Alabama
Attacker Information:	Alan Eugene Miller (34/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "Alabama Man Faces Murder Charges for Office Shooting Spree," August 5, 1999, <http://www-cgi.cnn.com/US/9908/05/alabama.shooting.03/>.

Case #19

July 29, 1999: Mark Barton opened fire at two brokerage offices, including one where he was formerly employed, killing nine people and wounding 12 others. Prior to the attack, Barton killed his wife and two children at their home with a hammer. Reports state that he had lost more than \$400,000 on his investments shortly before the attacks.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Momentum Securities and the All-Tech Investment Group in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Mark O. Barton (44/M)
Casualties:	9 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter and one .45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Kevin Sack, New York Times, "Shootings in Atlanta: The Overview," July 30, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/30/us/shootings-in-atlanta-the-overview-gunman-in-atlanta-slays-9-then-himself.html?scp=2&sq=Barton Shooting atlanta 1999&st=cse>.

Case #20

June 11, 1999: Joseph Brooks opened fire at his former psychiatrist's clinic, killing two people and injuring four others. Brooks then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Office of Dr. Bar-Levav in Southfield, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Joseph Brooks, Jr. (27/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Ex-Patient Kills Psychiatrist, Self," June 12, 1999, <http://articles.latimes.com/keyword/murder-suicides-michigan>.
2. Associated Press, Lundington Daily News, "Family, Friends Remember Slain Psychiatrist as Mentor, Teacher," June 14, 1999, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&dat=19990614&id=AdILAAAAIBAJ&sjid=0FUDAAAIBAJ&pg=4308,8035071>.

Case #21

March 18, 1999: Walter Shell opened fire at his ex-wife's lawyer's law offices, killing the lawyer and one of the lawyer's clients. Reports state that Shell was upset that the lawyer excluded him from his ex-wife's will days before she died.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Goodin Law Office in Johnson City, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Walter K. Shell (71/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. Becky Campbell, TimesNews.net, "DA Vows to Fight 'Tooth and Nail' to Keep Man Who Shot Johnson City Attorney, Judge Behind Bars," March 6, 2009, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9012237>.

Case #22

January 13, 1999: Di-Kieu Duy opened fire in the lobby of the KSL television station, wounding the building manager. Duy then shot an AT&T employee before being tackled by the victim's co-worker. Reports state that Duy, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, believed she had been harassed by an employee of KSL-TV.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Triad Center Office building in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	De-Kieu Duy (24/F)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Leigh Dethman, Desert Morning News, "Woman in Triad Case Still Cannot be Tried," September 1, 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20050901/ai_n15336865/.
2. Wendy Ogata, Desert News, "Infamous Shooting Incidents in Salt Lake County," January 14, 1999, <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/660195182/Infamous-shooting-incidents-in-Salt-Lake-County.html>.

Case #23

March 6, 1998: Matthew Beck opened fire at the Connecticut Lottery, killing four of his supervisors. Reports state that Beck was unhappy about his salary and his failure to earn a promotion prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connecticut Lottery headquarters in Newington, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Matthew Beck (35/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Jonathan Rabinovitz, New York Times, "Connecticut Lottery Worker Kills 4 Bosses, Then Himself," March 7, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/07/nyregion/rampage-connecticut-overview-connecticut-lottery-worker-kills-4-bosses-then.html>.

Case #24

July 19, 1995: Willie Woods opened fire at the C. Erwin Piper Technical Center in Los Angeles, killing four supervisors in their cubicles.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	C. Erwin Piper Technical Center in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Willie Woods (42/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (Glock, semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "9 Fatally Shot in California in 2 incidents over 2 Days," July 20, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/20/us/9-fatally-shot-in-california-in-2-incidents-over-2-days.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #25

December 2, 1993: Alan Winterbourne, an unemployed computer engineer, opened fire at a state unemployment center in Oxnard, killing four people and injuring four others. Winterbourne was fatally shot after he led responding officers on a car chase towards Ventura's unemployment center. Winterbourne concealed his weapons in a brown bag.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	California Employment Development Department in Oxnard and Ventura, California
Attacker Information:	Alan Winterbourne (33/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Handgun; shotgun; 2 rifles
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Julie Fields, Los Angeles Times, "Gunman Kills 4, Is Slain By Police," December 3, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-12-03/news/mn-63376_1_police-officers.

2. Seth Mydans, New York Times, "5 Die in Gunman's Rampage in 2 California Cities," December 3, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/03/us/5-die-in-gunman-s-rampage-in-2-california-cities.html?scp=1&sq=december%203,%201993%20winterbourne%20&st=cse>.
3. Tom Kiskien, Ventura County Star, "Shattered Lives," November 30, 2003, <http://www.vcstar.com/news/2003/Nov/30/shattered-lives/>.

Case #26

July 1, 1993: John Luigi Ferri opened fire at the Pettit & Martin law office, killing eight people and wounding six others. Reports state that Ferri was dissatisfied with the legal services he received.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pettit & Martin Law Offices in San Francisco, California
Attacker Information:	John Luigi Ferri (55/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (two semi-automatic TEC-9s and one .45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Robert Reinhold, New York Times, "Seeking Motive in the Killing of 8: Insane Ramblings Are Little Help," July 4, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/04/us/seeking-motive-in-the-killing-of-8-insane-ramblings-are-little-help.html>.
2. SFGate, Susan Sward, "101 California -- Legacy of Horror / Highrise Massacre Left Behind Change, Challenges," June 30, 1998, http://articles.sfgate.com/1998-06-30/news/17724389_1_response-system-police-chief-earl-sanders-assault-weapons.

Case #27

June 18, 1990: James Edward Pough opened fire at a General Motors Acceptance Corporation Office, killing nine people and wounding four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	General Motors Acceptance Corporation office in Jacksonville, Florida
Attacker Information:	James E. Pough (42/M)

Casualties:	9 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	June 19, 1990
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ronald Smothers, New York Times, "Florida Gunman kills 8 and Wounds 6 in office," June 18, 1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/19/us/florida-gunman-kills-8-and-wounds-6-in-office.html?scp=1&sq=June%201990,%20General%20Motors%20shooting&st=cse>.
2. Ron Word, Associated Press, St. Petersburg Times, "10th GMAC Victim Dies," June 28, 1990, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=8-YNAAAAIAAJ&sjid=eXUDAAAAIAAJ&pg=7007,1942591&dq=james+edward+pough>.

Case #28

February 16, 1988: Richard Farley opened fire at his former workplace, killing seven people and injuring four others. Farley surrendered after a five-hour standoff with police officers. Reports state that prior to the attack, Farley was angry that a former co-worker rejected his advances. Farley was fired from the company in 1986 after threatening to kill that same co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Electromagnetic Systems Lab Corp. in Sunnyvale, California
Attacker Information:	Richard Farley (40/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	7
Weapon Information:	1 rifle; 2 shotguns; 4 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "California: Another Fatal Attraction," February 29, 1988, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,966785,00.html?promoid=googlep>.
2. National Institute for the Prevention of Workplace Violence, "An Obsession with Laura," <http://www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/20010406-19.htm>.

FOILED OFFICE BUILDING

Case #29

December 29, 2010: Five men were arrested for planning a shooting attack on the offices of Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper that published satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen, Denmark
Attacker Information:	unknown (44/M); unknown (29/M); unknown (30/M); unknown (26/M); unknown (37/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun; handgun
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when authorities learned of the assailants' plans, following months of investigation.

Sources:

1. Jan M. Olsen, Washington Post, "Iraqi Suspect Says Unaware of Danish Terror Plot," December 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123100657.html>.
2. J. David Goodman, New York Times, "Police Arrest 5 in Danish Terror Plot," December 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/world/europe/30denmark.html>.
3. Niclas Rolander and Paul Sonne, Wall Street Journal, "Alleged Terror Plot Foiled in Denmark," December 29, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203525404576049431521312142.html>.

OPEN COMMERCIAL

Case #30

August 30, 2010: Lubomir Harman opened fire in his neighbor's apartment, killing six people. Harman then left the apartment and indiscriminately opened fire on bystanders in the street, killing one person and wounding 15 others. Reports state that Harman may have been motivated by racism, as well as loud noise emanating from the neighbor's apartment.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Devinska Nova Ves District in Bratislava, Slovakia
Attacker Information:	Lubomir Harman (48/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 15 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns; submachine gun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, "Slovakia Stunned by Rampaging Gunman," August 30, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/31/world/europe/31slovak.html>.
2. Rafael Gurbisz, Washington Times, "Police: Slovak Shooter Angry Over Neighbors' Noise," August 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/31/police-slovak-shooter-angry-over-neighbors-noise/>.

Case #31

August 14, 2010: Riccardo McCray opened fire in a crowded restaurant, killing four people and injuring four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Grill in Buffalo, New York
Attacker Information:	Riccardo M. McCray (23/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Matt Gryta and Lou Michel, Buffalo News, "Grand Jury Indicts McCray in City Grill Killings; Bail Revoked," September 1, 2010, <http://www.buffalonews.com/city/article178208.ece>.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Suspect in Deadly Buffalo, NY, Street Shooting Pleads Not Guilty to 4 Counts of Murder," August 26, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/08/26/suspect-deadly-buffalo-ny-street-shooting-pleads-guilty-counts-murder/>.

Case #32

June 6, 2010: Gerardo Regalado opened fire outside the restaurant where his estranged wife was employed, killing four people and injuring three others. Regalado fled the scene and was found dead several blocks away.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Yoyito Restaurant in Hialeah, Florida
Attacker Information:	Gerardo Regalado (38/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Caroline Black, CBS News, "Florida Man Kills Four Women in Restaurant Shooting," June 7, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20006983-504083.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
2. Christian Red, New York Daily News, "Former Yankees, Mets Pitcher Orlando 'El Duque' Hernandez "in shock" Over Half-Brother's Shootings," June 9, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseball/yankees/2010/06/09/2010-06-09_shootings_put_duque_in_shock.html.
3. CBS4, "Hialeah Shooting Spree Survivor Recalls Crime," June 16, 2010, <http://cbs4.com/local/Hialeah.Restaurant.Masacre.2.1755823.html>.

Case #33

June 2, 2010: Derrick Bird opened fire during a three-hour shooting spree, killing 12 people and wounding 11 others. Bird began his attack by shooting his twin brother, family lawyer and three fellow taxi drivers. He then drove across Cumbria County, firing randomly at bystanders and occasionally pulling over to shoot more victims.

Number of Attack Locations:	6
Location Information:	Cumbria in England, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Derrick Bird (52/M)
Casualties:	12 dead; 11 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. John F. Burns, New York Times, "Cameron Rejects Rush to Tighten Gun Laws," June 3, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/world/europe/04britain.html>.
2. Alistair Macdonald and Paul Sonne, Wall Street Journal, "U.K. Mulls Tighter Gun-control Laws After Shootings," June 4, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704025304575284243009612802.html>.
3. James Tozer, Chris Brooke and Paul Sims, Daily Mail, "Timetable of Mass Murder: Derrick Bird's Slaughter in the Lake District Reconstructed," June 4, 2010, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1283579/CUMBRIA-SHOOTINGS-Derrick-Birds-killing-spree-moment-moment.html>.

Case #34

January 12, 2010: Jesse James Warren opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people and wounding two others. Warren was fired from the truck rental company several months prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Penske Truck Rental in Kennesaw, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Jesse James Warren (60/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Shane Blatt, Alexis Stevens and Ralph Ellis, Cobb County News, "Cobb Shooter Chose Victims at Random, Company Official Says," January 14, 2010, <http://www.ajc.com/news/cobb/cobb-shooter-chose-victims-273801.html>.
2. Jon Gillooly, Marietta Daily Journal, "Accused Penske Killer of 3 Enters Plea of Not Guilty," July 24, 2010,

- http://www.mdjonline.com/view/full_story/8869872/article-Accused-Penske-killer-of-3-enters-plea-of-not-guilty.
3. MyFoxAtlanta, "Man Pleads Not Guilty in Penske Shooting," July 23, 2010, http://www.myfoxatlanta.com/dpp/news/local_news/Penske-Shooting-Suspect-Due-in-Court-20100723-am-sd.

Case #35

November 29, 2009: Maurice Clemmons opened fire at a coffee shop, killing four uniformed Washington police officers who were working on their laptops. Clemmons was found and killed by a policeman following a two-day manhunt. Reports state that Clemmons had confided to a friend his plans to shoot police officers the night before his attack.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Forza Coffee Shop in Lakewood, Washington
Attacker Information:	Maurice Clemmons (37/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Seattle Times, "Lakewood Police Shooting Suspect Killed by Officer in South Seattle Early Today," December 1, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010393433_webarrest01m.html.
2. William Yardley, New York Times, "Tacoma Suspect Said to Threaten to Shoot Officers," November 30, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/us/01tacoma.html>.
3. Lewis Kamb, News Tribune, "Clemmons' Last Days: A Timeline of Tragedy," December 3, 2009, <http://www.thenewstribune.com/2009/12/02/v-printerfriendly/977113/clemmons-last-days-a-timeline.html>.

Case #36

November 20, 2009: Li Zhong Ren opened fire at a shooting range where he was employed, killing two adults and two children. Ren then drove to a park where he opened fire on a group of Korean tourists. Ren had left several suicide notes prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
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Location Information:	Kannat Tabla and Last Command Post Park in Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands
Attacker Information:	Li Zhong Ren (42/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 6-9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 Rifles (.223-caliber and .22-caliber Magnum); shotgun (.410-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Police Identify Gunman in Saipan Rampage," November 22, 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/22/world/main5735021.shtml>.
2. Ferdie de la Torre, Saipan Tribune, "Gunman Fired Guns More Than 40 Times," November 26, 2009, <http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=95381&cat=1>.
3. Ferdie de la Torre, Saipan Tribune, "Shooting Rampage Stuns CNMI," <http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=96206&cat=1>.

Case #37

November 8, 2009: Richard Moreau opened fire in a bar, killing one customer and injuring three others. Reports state that Moreau got into an argument inside the bar and was escorted out by employees prior to the attack.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Sandbar Sports Grill in West Vail, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Richard Moreau (63/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Washington Times, "Suspect in Vail Bar Shooting Faces Murder Charge," November 9, 2009, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/9/suspect-vail-bar-shooting-faces-murder-charge/print/>.
2. Beth Potter, Denver Post, "One dead in Vail Bar Shooting; Suspect Jailed," November 8, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_13743040.

3. Huffington Post, “Ricahrd Moreau Murder Charges: Vail Bar Killer May Have Had PTSD,” November 8, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/09/richard-moreau-murder-cha_n_350920.html.

Case #38

August 4, 2009: George Sodini opened fire on a L.A. Fitness dance class, killing three women and injured nine others. Reports state that Sodini was angry about being disrespected by women.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	L.A. Fitness in Collier Township, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	George Sodini (48/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (two 9-millimeter semi-automatic, one .45-caliber semi-automatic revolver, and one .32-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CTV.ca, “Gunman in Health Club Shooting a 48-Year-Old Loner,” August 5, 2009,
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090805/health_club_090805/20090805?hub=World.
2. Lee Ferran, Chris Cuomo, Sarah Netter, Lindsay Goldwert, ABC News, “Pa. Gunman ‘Hell-Bent’ on Killings, Had 4 Guns,” August 5, 2009,
<http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=8255530&page=1>.

Case #39

September 9, 2009: Todd Buchanan opened fire at a bar, wounding three people. Reports state that Buchanan was involved in a fight at the bar and was ejected prior to the attack. He was arrested in his home several hours after the shooting.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Independent Bar in Orlando, Florida
Attacker Information:	Todd Garland Buchanan (29/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Walter Pacheco, Orlando Sentinel, "Naked Man Arrested After Shooting at Bar," September 10, 2009, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-09-10/news/0909100010_1_downtown-orlando-buchanan-orlando-man.
2. WFTV, "Accused Orlando Bar Gunman Denied Bond," September 10, 2009, <http://www.wftv.com/news/20835174/detail.html>.
3. WFTV, "Suspect Arrested in Shooting at Downtown Orlando Club," September 9, 2009, <http://www.wftv.com/news/20807598/detail.html>.

Case #40

July 24, 2009: An unknown assailant opened fire at a nightclub, killing one employee and wounding two others. Reports state that the assailant had been ejected from the club following a disturbance prior to the attack. The gunman fled the scene.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Club LT Tranz in North Houston, Texas
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attacker fled

Sources:

1. ABC News, "Nightclub Employee Killed in Shooting," July 25, 2009, <http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/local&id=6932947>.
Alexander Supgul, MyFox, "Images from Night of Deadly Club Shooting," July 29, 2009, http://www.myfoxboston.com/dpp/news/local/090729_pasadena_shooting_convenience.

Case #41

June 10, 2009: James W. Von Brunn opened fire at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, killing a security guard. Reports state that von Brunn was a white supremacist.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.
Attacker Information:	James W. von Brunn, (88/M)
Casualties:	1 dead
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. David Stout, New York Times, "Museum Gunman a Longtime Foe of Government," June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/11shoot.html?_r=1.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Guard Dies After Holocaust Museum Shooting," June 10, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31208188/>.

Case #42

May 30, 2009: Marcus J. Blanton opened fire at a strip club, killing one person and injuring four others. Blanton stabbed a sixth person before he was arrested on scene.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Club 418 in Springfield, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Marcus J. Blanton (24/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 4 wounded
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun; knife
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. John M. Guilfoil, Boston Globe, "One Dead, Several Injured in Springfield Strip Club Rampage," May 30, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2009/05/one_death_sever.html.

Case #43

April 3, 2009: Jiverly Wong, a naturalized immigrant, opened fire at the American Civic Association Immigration Center in Binghamton, killing 13 people and injuring four others. Wong had been taking English classes at the Center prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	American Civic Association Immigration Center in Binghamton, New York
Attacker Information:	Jiverly Wong (41/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter and one .45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Richard Esposito et al., ABC News “Binghamton Rampage Leaves 14 Dead, Police Don’t Know Motive,” April 3, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=7249853&page=1>.
2. Ray Rivera and Nate Schweber, New York Times, “Before Killings, Hints of Plans and Grievance,” April 4, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/nyregion/05suspect.html>.

Case #44

March 24, 2009: Lonnie Glasco, a veteran Metropolitan Transit System employee, opened fire at a bus depot complex, killing one co-worker and injuring another.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Metropolitan Transit System in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Lonnie Glasco (47/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 magnum)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Tony Perry, Los Angeles Times, “Man Shoots 2 Co-workers; 1 dies,” March 25, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/25/local/me-briefs25.S2>.

2. R. Stickney and Monica Dean, NBC San Diego, "MTS Shooter, Victim Identified," March 24, 2009, www.nbcsandiego.com/.../2-Shot-in-MTS-Workplace-Shooting.html.
3. San Diego10News, "Motive Remains Mystery in Bus Depot Shooting," March 25, 2009, <http://www.10news.com/news/19015034/detail.html>.

Case #45

February 24, 2009: An unknown gunman indiscriminately opened fire at a Mardi Gras parade, wounding seven people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Charles Ave. in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/unknown)
Casualties:	0 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter semi-automatic and one .40-caliber); revolver
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Corey Dade, Wall Street Journal, "Mardi Gras Revives, but Shooting Scars Party," February 25, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123551171997163137.html>.
2. United States of America v. Mark Brooks. 10-212. U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana, http://www.justice.gov/usao/lae/press/2010/downloads/factual_basis_mark_brooks.pdf.
3. Gwen Filosa, Times-Picayune, "Jury Frees 19-year-old New Orleans Man of 2009 Mardi Gras Parade Shooting Charge," August 26, 2010, <http://nola.live.advance.net/news/t-p/neworleans/index.ssf?/base/news-15/1282890635287520.xml&coll=1>.
4. Gwen Filosa, Times-Picayune, "Prosecutors Work to Keep Cases Touched by Danziger Bridge Investigation on Track," April 08, 2010, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/04/prosecutors_work_to_keep_cases.html

Case #46

January 24, 2009: Erik Salvador Ayala opened fire outside a nightclub, killing two people and injuring 7 others.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	The Zone in Portland, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Erik Salvador Ayala (24/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 injured
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Steve Miletich, Seattle Times, "Washington Exchange Student From Peru Among Portland Shooter's Victims," January 26, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/localnews/2008670663_whitesalmon26m.html.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Gunman in Portland, Oregon Shooting Spree Dies," January 27, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28882699/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.

Case #47

November 26, 2008: 10 militants launched a series of coordinated shooting and bombing attacks throughout Mumbai, killing 188 people and wounding 372 others. The attackers were trained in Pakistan by the Islamic terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba. Nine of the assailants were killed during the standoff with law enforcement.

Number of Attack Locations:	10
Location Information:	Cama Hospital; Rail Terminus; Leopold Café; Mumbai Chabad House; Oberoi Trident Hotel; Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai
Attacker Information:	Ajmal Kasab (21/M); Ismail Khan (25/M); Hafiz Arshad (23/M); Javed (22/M); Shoaib (21/M); Nazir (28/M); Nasr (23/M); Babr Imran (25/M); Abdul Rahman (21/M); Fahad Ullah (23/M)
Casualties:	188 dead; 372 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter); 2 rifles (one AK-47 and one AK-56)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	November 29, 2008
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Jeremy Kahn and Robert F. Worth, New York Times, "Mumbai Attackers Called Part of Larger Band of Recruits," December 9, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/world/asia/10mumbai.html>.
2. China Daily, "India Charges Mumbai Gunman with Murder," February 25, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-02/25/content_7513194.htm.

Case #48

March 12, 2008: Robert Lanham opened fire at the bank where his ex-wife worked, killing her, a customer and a bank manager. Reports state that Lanham was distraught over his recent divorce.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Regions Bank in McComb, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Robert Lanham (35/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun/ (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. McComb-Enterprise Journal, "Four, Including Gunman, Killed in Bank Shooting," March 12, 2008, <http://www.enterprise-journal.com/articles/2008/03/12/news/01.txt>.

Case #49

March 3, 2008: Alburn Edward Blake opened fire in a Wendy's restaurant, killing a paramedic and wounding five other people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Wendy's in West Palm Beach, Florida
Attacker Information:	Alburn Blake (60/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Times Online, "Police Baffled by Mystery of Gunman Who Shot Dead Firefighter at Wendy's," March 4, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article3482368.ece.

Case #50

December 5, 2007: Robert Hawkins opened fire at an Omaha mall, killing eight people and wounding 5 others. Reports state that Hawkins was angry about losing his job and breaking up with his girlfriend prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Westroads Mall in Omaha, Nebraska
Attacker Information:	Robert Hawkins (19/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Teen's Downward Spiral Ends in Gunfire, Death," December 6, 2007,
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22116784//;http://www.kptm.com/Global/story.asp?S=7457887>.
2. CNN, "Police: Nine Killed in Shooting at Omaha Mall, Including Gunman," December 6, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/12/05/mall.shooting/>.
3. Associated Press, CBS News, "Omaha Mall, Scene of Mass Killing, Reopens," December 8, 2007,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/08/national/main3594414.shtml>.

Case #51

April 30, 2007: David Logsdon opened fire at a crowded Target parking lot, killing two people and wounding seven others. Logsdon was fatally shot by police following the attack. Reports state that Logsdon was unhappy over his termination from the Target store prior to the attack. Police believe the gunman was also responsible for the death of his neighbor earlier that day.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ward Parkway Shopping Center in Kansas City, Missouri

Attacker Information:	David W. Logsdon (51/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns; rifle (.30-caliber carbine)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Kansas City Mall Shooter Disgruntled Over Denied Security Job License," April 30, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,269215,00.html>.
2. KMBC, "Police: Gunman Wanted to Cause Havoc at Mall," April 30, 2007, <http://www.kmbc.com/r/13220624/detail.html>.
3. The Estate of Luke A. Nilges, Joann Nilges, and Wayna Nilges v. Shawnee Gun Shop, Kansas State Court of Appeals, 103, 175. <http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/CtApp/2010/20101105/103175.pdf>.

Case #52

February 12, 2007: Sulejman Talovic opened fire at Trolley Square Mall, killing five bystanders and wounding four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	Sulejman Talovic (18/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Sean Alfano, CBS News, "Police: Off-Duty Cop Saved Lives in Mall," February 13, 2007, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/13/national/main2466711.shtml>.
2. Martin Stolz, New York Times, "After a Rampage, Trying to Grasp What Led a Son to Kill," February 20, 2007, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E2DE123EF933A15751C0A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.

Case #53

April 18, 2006: Herbert Chalmers Jr. opened fire at his workplace, killing two people and wounding another. Chalmers launched his attack shortly after raping an ex-girlfriend and killing the mother of his child at separate locations.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Finneger's Catering in St. Louis, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Herbert Chambers Jr. (55/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Man Kills Woman, 2 Others," April 18, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12375826/from/RSS/>.
2. New York Times, "National Briefing, Midwest: Missouri: Another Victim in Shooting Rampage," April 22, 2008, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2D9153FF931A15757C0A9609C8B63>.
3. Jeremy Kohler, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "I Could Have Stopped Them," April 20, 2006, <http://www.newnation.vg/forums/showthread.php?t=40370>

Case #54

April 4, 2006: Grant Gallaher opened fire in the Baker City Post Office parking lot, killing his supervisor after initially striking him with his vehicle. Gallaher also intended to kill his postmaster. Reports state that Gallaher was upset about his supervisor's decision to add extra work to his delivery route.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Baker City Post Office in Baker City, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Grant Gallaher (41/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. Chris Collins, Baker City Herald, "Shooting Car Was Allegedly Suspect's Last Act," April 7, 2006, <http://www.bakercityherald.com/Local-News/Shooting-car-was-allegedly-suspect-s-last-act>.

Case #55

February 13, 2005: Robert Bonelli opened fire at the Hudson Valley Mall, wounding two people. He was tackled by mall employees when he ran out of ammunition.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hudson Valley Mall, Kingston, New York
Attacker Information:	Robert Bonelli (26/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Mid-Hudson News, "Bonelli to Appear in Court," March 15, 2006, http://www.midhudsonnews.com/News/Archive/Bonelli_ct-15Mar06.htm.
2. CNN, "Shooter Wounds Two at New York Mall," February 13, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/13/mall.shooting/>.

Case #56

December 8, 2004: Nathan Gale, a former marine, opened fire at a nightclub, killing four people and wounding two others. Gale was shot by responding police officers after taking a hostage behind the stage.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alrosa Villa in Columbus, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Nathan Gale (25/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter Beretta)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rick Lyman and Albert Salvato, New York Times, "After a Concert Shooting, a Who but Not a Why," December 10, 2004,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400EEDE1131F933A25751C1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1>.
2. John Esterbrook, CBS News, "Inside the Mind of a Killer," December 10, 2004,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/14/national/main661127.shtml>.

Case #57

November 18, 2004: Justin Cudar opened fire in a Radioshack store, killing two people and wounding another. Cudar was being investigated for a road-rage incident and managed to evade police prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Radioshack in St. Petersburg, Florida
Attacker Information:	Justin Cudar (25/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Jamie Thompson and Carrie Johnson, St. Petersburg Times, "Gunman Kills Two, Self at Gateway Mall," November 19, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/19/Tampabay/Gunman_kills_two__sel.shtml.
2. Jamie Thompson and Carrie Johnson, St. Petersburg Times, "Shooting is Last Act of a Traumatic, Violent Life," November 20, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/20/Southpinellas/Shooting_is_last_act_.shtml.

Case #58

August 29, 2003: Thomas Edgar Harrison opened fire at his ex-girlfriend's workplace, killing one employee. Harrison was initially denied access to the workplace but returned shortly thereafter and began his attack. He engaged in an hour-long standoff with a SWAT team before committing suicide. Prior to the attack, Harrison raped and kidnapped his ex-girlfriend, who was then issued an order of protection against him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Electric Picture Co. in Nashville, Tennessee

Attacker Information:	Thomas Edgar Harrison (43/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	August 30, 2003
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Two Dead in Tennessee Store Shooting," August 30, 2003, <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/30/nation/na-shooting30>.
2. Seattle Times, "Man Kills Shop Owner, Self in Pursuit of Ex-Girlfriend," August 31, 2003, <http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=20030831&slug=ndig31>.

Case #59

July 28, 2003: Andres Casarrubias opened fire at the nursery where his estranged wife worked, killing two employees, including his wife, and injuring another. Reports state that Casarrubias believed his wife was having an affair with a co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Gold Leaf Nursery in Boynton Beach, Florida
Attacker Information:	Andres Casarrubias (44/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. WPBF.com, "Man Shoots Estranged Wife, Co-Worker at Garden Center," July 29, 2003, <http://www.wpbfl.com/news/2363718/detail.html>.

Case #60

July 23, 2003: Ron Thomas opened fire at the Century 21 real estate office where he was employed, killing two people and wounding another. Thomas committed suicide after engaging the police in a car chase.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Century 21 office in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Ron Thomas (unknown/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Two Women Dead, One Hurt in San Antonio Office Shooting," July 24, 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,92766,00.html>.
2. Jim Ventura, Laredo Morning Times, "Police: Shooter Was 'Control Freak,'" July 25, 2003, <http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archive/072503/pagea8.pdf>.

Case #61

March 20, 2000: Robert Wayne Harris opened fire at his former workplace, killing five employees and injuring another. Harris was fired three days prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mi-T-Fine Car Wash in Irving, Texas
Attacker Information:	Robert Wayne Harris (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Matt Curry, ABC News, "Guilty Verdict in Car Wash Killings," September 26, 2000, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95626&page=1>.

Case #62

December 20, 1997: Anthony Deculit opened fire at his workplace, killing one employee and wounding two others, including his supervisor. Reports state that Deculit had been reprimanded by a supervisor for sleeping at work and rejected for a promotion prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Milwaukee Post Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Anthony Deculit (37/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Postal Worker Kills Self After Fatal Rampage," December 20, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-521>.

Case #63

November 17, 1997: Six gunmen opened fire at the ancient Temple of Queen Hatshepsut, killing 62 people, including 58 foreigners, and wounding 26 others. Following the attack, the assailants' bodies were discovered in a cave in an apparent suicide. The Islamic Group and Jihad Talaat al-Fath claimed credit for the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Temple of Hatshepsut in Deir el-Bahri, Egypt
Attacker Information:	Karam Mohammad Ismail (18/M); Essmat Erian (24/M); Mahmoud Ahmed Karim (23/M); Saeed Mohammed Shawaki (23/M); Medhat Abdel Rahman (32/M); unknown (unknown/unknown)
Casualties:	62 dead; 26 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle; handgun; knife; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Daniel J. Wakin, New York Times, "Egypt Shores Up Security, but Tourism is Shaky," November 3, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/03/world/egypt-shores-up-security-but-tourism-is-shaky.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. BBC News, "Egypt Tourist Massacre," November 17, 1997, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/31958.stm>.
3. BBC News, "Swiss Abandon Luxor Massacre Inquiry," March 10, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/673013.stm.

4. BBC News, "Massacre at Luxor," December 6, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/2546737.stm>.
5. Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower* (New York, NY: Random House, 2006). p. 292.

Case #64

October 7, 1997: Charles Lee White opened fire at the ProtoCall store where his ex-girlfriend worked, killing two people. White then fatally shot himself.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ProtoCall retail store in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Charles Lee White (42/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Victoria Advocate, "Gunman Kills 2, Takes Own Life," October 8, 1997, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=861&dat=19971008&id=ljUKAAAAIBAJ&sjid=PEsDAAAIBAJ&pg=6951,1352262>.
2. Chip Brown, Associated Press, "Three Dead, One Wounded in Shooting at San Antonio Business," http://www.sosinc.org/victim_stories.php.

Case #65

September 2, 1997: Jesus Antonio Tamayo open fired at a post office, wounding two women, including his ex-wife.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Miami Beach Post Office, Florida
Attacker Information:	Jesus Antonio Tamayo (64/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. New York Times, "Postal Worker Shoots 2 and Then Kills Himself," September 3, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/03/us/postal-worker-shoots-2-and-then-kills-himself.html?scp=1&sq=September%203rd,%201997%20Jesus%20Antonio%20Tamayo&st=cse>.

Case #66

February 23, 1997: Ali Abu Kamal opened fire at the Empire State Building's observation deck, killing one person and wounding six others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Empire State Building in New York, New York
Attacker Information:	Ali Abu Kamal (69/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber Beretta)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "Gunman Shoots 7, Kills Self at Empire State Building," February 24, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/24/empire.shooting/>.

Case #67

April 28, 1996: Martin Bryant opened fire during an extended shooting spree, killing 35 people and wounding 21 others. Bryant began the attack by stabbing the owner of a Seascope guest accommodation site. He then entered the Broad Arrow café and shot 20 people dead in a span of 15 seconds. The gunman continued to open fire on the crowd outside of the café as well as under a tour bus where tourists were hiding for cover. Bryant then escaped in a car, shooting pedestrians and vehicle passengers along the way. Following the shooting spree, Bryant took a man hostage and entered a Seascope guest house, where authorities negotiated with Bryant for six hours until his phone battery died. Bryant was captured the next morning.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Broad Arrow Café and Port Arthur in Tasmania, Australia
Attacker Information:	Martin Bryant (28/M)
Casualties:	35 dead; 21 wounded

Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one AR 15 and one FN)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	April 29, 1996
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Australia Gunman Called a Loner with a Mental History," April 30, 1996,
[http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/30/world/australia-gunman-called-a-loner-with-a-mental-history.html?scp=3&sq="Martin+Bryant"&st=nyt](http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/30/world/australia-gunman-called-a-loner-with-a-mental-history.html?scp=3&sq=).
2. Patrick Bellamy, TruTV.com, "Suddenly One Sunday,"
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/bryant/index_1.html.

Case #68

May 6, 1993: Larry Jasion opened fire at a post office, killing one person and wounding two others. Reports state that Jasion, a postal worker, was angry over losing a promotion to a woman prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Dearborn, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Larry Jasion (unknown/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "Post Office Murders," May 17, 1993,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978524,00.html>.

Case #69

May 6, 1993: Mark Hilbun opened fire at a post office, killing a co-worker and wounding three others. Reports state that Hilbun was fired prior to the attack for stalking a co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dana Point Post Office in Dana Point, California
Attacker Information:	Mark R. Hilbun (38/M)

Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Ex-Postal Employee is Arrested in Deaths of Two in California," May 9, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/09/us/ex-postal-employee-is-arrested-in-deaths-of-two-in-california.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Marle Cone and Jodi Wilgoren, Los Angeles Times, "Fired Mail Carrier Said to be Manic-Depressive," May 7, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-07/news/mn-32377_1_mail-carrier.

Case #70

November 14, 1991: Thomas McIlvane opened fire at a post office, killing three people and injuring six others. McIlvane had been fired from the post office prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Royal Oak Post Office in Royal Oak, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Thomas McIlvane (31/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Doron P. Levin, New York Times, "Ex-Postal Worker Kills 3 and Wounds 6 in Michigan," November 15, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/15/us/ex-postal-worker-kills-3-and-wounds-6-in-michigan.html?scp=1&sq=November%2015,%201991%20Royal%20Oak&st=ce>.

Case #71

October 16, 1991: George Jo Hennard opened fire in a restaurant during lunchtime, killing 22 people and wounding 20 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Luby's Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas
Attacker Information:	George Jo Hennard (35/M)
Casualties:	22 dead; 20 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Thomas C. Hayes, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 22 and Himself in Texas Cafeteria," October 17, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/17/us/gunman-kills-22-and-himself-in-texas-cafeteria.html?sec=travel>.

Case #72

October 10, 1991: Joseph Harris opened fire at a post office, killing two former co-workers. The night before, Harris had killed his former supervisor with a three-foot samurai sword and fatally shot her fiancé in their home. During the post office attack, Harris was armed with several guns, hand grenades, and a samurai sword.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ridgewood Post Office in Ridgewood, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Joseph Harris (35/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Machine gun; other; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Services Conducted in New Jersey for Slain Postal Service Workers," October 15, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/15/nyregion/services-conducted-in-new-jersey-for-slain-postal-service-workers.html>.

Case #73

August 17, 1991: Wade Frankum opened fire in a shopping mall, killing six people and wounding eight others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Strathfield Shopping Plaza in Strathfield, Australia
Attacker Information:	Wade Frankum (33/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 8 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "A Masked Gunman Kills 6 at a Mall in Australia," August 18, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/18/world/a-masked-gunman-kills-6-at-a-mall-in-australia.html>.

Case #74

August 10, 1989: John Merlin Taylor opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing two co-workers and injuring another. Prior to the attack, Taylor fatally shot his wife in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Orange Glen, California
Attacker Information:	John Merlin Taylor (52/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Tom Gorman and Richard Serrano, Los Angeles Times, "Postal Employee Kills Wife, 2 Co-Workers," August 11, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-11/news/mn-207_1_postal-employee.

Case #75

December 14, 1988: Warren Murphy opened fire at the post office where he was employed, wounding two co-workers and his supervisor. Murphy surrendered after holding a female hostage for 13 hours.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	New Orleans Post Office in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Warren Murphy (39/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	December 15, 1988
Resolution:	No Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Mail Handler Shoots 3 at Post Office," December 15, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-12-15/news/mn-524_1_post-office.
2. Washington Post, "3 Shot in New Orleans as Suspect Holes Up," December 15, 1988, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1295435.html>.

Case #76

December 8, 1987: Frank Vitkovic opened fire on three floors at a post office, killing eight people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Melbourne, Australia
Attacker Information:	Frank Vitkovic (22/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. The Age, "Melbourne Remembers Queen Street Massacre," December 6, 2007, <http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Melbourne-remembers-Queen-St-massacre/2007/12/06/1196812912743.html>.
2. Kenneth Polk, *When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 137.

Case #77

August 19, 1987: Michael Ryan opened fire during a shooting spree, killing 16 people and wounding 15 others. Ryan's attack began in Wiltshire where he shot a woman in a forest and a cashier at a gas station. The assailant then killed his mother and fired

indiscriminately on bystanders as he drove to a busy shopping area. Ryan committed suicide shortly after the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Wiltshire and Hungerford in Berkshire, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Michael Ryan (27/M)
Casualties:	16 dead; 15 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Kalashnikov); rifle (automatic); handgun (Beretta); other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Douglas Hurd, Economicexpert.com, "Report of Mr. Colin Smith CVO QPM. Chief Constable Thames Valley Police to the RT Hon Douglas Hurd CBE, MP. Secretary of State for the Home Department," August 1987, <http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Hungerford:Report.html>.
2. Stewart Tendler, Andrew Morgan, David Sapsted and Michael McCarthy, Times Online, "Times Archive, 1987: 14 Die as Gunman Runs Amok," August 20, 1987, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/tol_archive/article7142452.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1.
3. Richard Ford, Times Online, "Factfile: British Shooting Massacres," August 1987, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article7142484.ece>.

Case #78

August 20, 1986: Patrick Sherrill opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing 14 people and injuring seven others. Reports state that prior to the attack, Sherrill believed he was going to be fired from his job.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Edmond Post Office in Edmond, Oklahoma
Attacker Information:	Patrick Henry Sherrill (44/M)
Casualties:	14 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (two .45-caliber semi-automatic and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rachael Bell, TruTV.com, "Workplace Homicide," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/work_homicide/4.html.

Case #79

March 6, 1985: Steven Brownlee opened fire at a post office, killing two co-workers and wounding a third.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlanta Post Office in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Steven W. Brownlee (30/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Felicity Barringer, New York Times, "Postal Officials Examine System After 2 Killings," May 8, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/08/us/postal-officials-examine-system-after-2-killings.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Clerk Kills Fellow Worker, Wounds Two in Shooting Spree at Atlanta Post Office," March 7, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-07/news/mn-34494_1.

Case #80

July 18, 1984: James Huberty opened fire in a McDonald's restaurant, killing 21 people and injuring 19 others. Huberty was dressed in camouflage during his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	McDonald's in San Ysidro, California
Attacker Information:	James Oliver Huberty (41/M)
Casualties:	21 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun (Uzi); shotgun; handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Jessica Gresko, Associated Press, "20 Years Later, San Ysidro McDonald's Massacre Remembered," July 18, 2004, http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/article_2ba4343e-7009-54ce-98df-79a23ff8d0d7.html.

Case #81

December 2, 1983: James Howard Brooks opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing one person and wounding another. He then surrendered to police. Reports state that Brooks was angry at having been criticized by his supervisor.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Anniston Post Office in Anniston, Alabama
Attacker Information:	James Howard Brooks (53/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, *The Copycat Effect: How the Media and Popular Culture Trigger the Mayhem in Tomorrow's Headlines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pg. 151.
2. Associated Press, Ocala Star-Banner, "Postal Worker Held in Death of Postmaster," December 3, 1983, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=qZoTAAAAIBAJ&sjid=YQYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6908,1058534&dq=anniston+alabama+shooting+1983>.

Case #82

August 19, 1983: Perry Smith opened fire at a post office, killing a co-worker and wounding two others. Reports state that Smith felt he was mistreated by co-workers after his son committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post office and convenience store in Johnston, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Perry Smith (unknown/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Felicity Barringer, New York Times, "Postal Officials Examine System After 2 Killings," May 8, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/08/us/postal-officials-examine-system-after-2-killings.html?pagewanted=all>
2. Mark Ames, AlterNet, "Excerpt: Breaking Down at the Post Office," October 3, 2005, http://www.alternet.org/media/24798/excerpt:_breaking_down_at_the_post_office/.

Case #83

August 20, 1982: Carl Brow opened fire in a welding shop, killing eight people and injuring three others. Reports state that Brown was upset that the welding shop charged him \$20 for repairs on a lawnmower engine.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Bob Moore's Weldong & Machine Services, Inc. in Miami, Florida
Attacker Information:	Carl Brown (51/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "Murderer's Row," August 30, 1982, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921255,00.html?iid=chix-sphere>.

Case #84

January 1, 1972: Mark Essex launched a series of attacks over the course of a week, killing nine people and wounding 13 others. In one attack Essex hid in a parking lot across the street from the New Orleans Police Department and randomly shot at officers. Essex then broke into various facilities shooting civilians and responding officers before being killed by police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Mark James Robert Essex (23/M)
Casualties:	9 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.44-caliber Magnum); handgun (.38-caliber Colt revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	January 7, 1972
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Anthony Walsh, *Race and Crime: A Biosocial Analysis* (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2004, pp. 38-39.
2. Chuck Hustmyre, TruTV.com, "Notorious Murders: Mark Essex," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/mark_essex/index.html.

FACTORIES & WAREHOUSES

Case #85

September 9, 2010: Yvonne Hiller opened fire at her workplace, killing two people and wounding another. Hiller was suspended from her job and escorted off the premises ten minutes prior to the attack. She drove through a security barrier before entering the facility on foot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kraft Food plant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Yvonne Hiller (43/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 Magnum)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Troy Graham, Mike Newall and Michael Brocker, Philadelphia Inquirer, "Before Kraft Shooting Rampage Growing Alarm Over Suspect's Behavior," September 11, 2010, http://www.philly.com/inquirer/front_page/20100911_Before_Kraft_shooting_rampage_growing_alarm_over_suspect_s_behavior.html.
2. Sean Alfano, NY Daily News, "Suspended Female Employee Guns Down Two in Shooting Spree at Kraft Factory in Philadelphia," September 10, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/09/10/2010-09-10_suspended_female_employee_opens_fire_at_kraft_foods_facility_in_philly_killing_t.html.

Case #86

August 3, 2010: Omar Thornton opened fire at his workplace, killing eight people and injuring two others. Thornton hid his weapons in a lunchbox. Reports state that he was angry after being asked to resign for stealing beer from the warehouse in which he worked.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hartford Distributors in Manchester, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Omar Thornton (34/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 2 wounded

Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ray Rivera and Christine Haughney, New York Times, "Amid Mourning, Eerie Details Emerge About Connecticut Shootings," August 4, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/nyregion/05shooting.html?pagewanted=1&r=1>.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Conn. Warehouse Gunman Targeted Managers," August 4, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/08/03/dead-wounded-conn-workplace-shooting/>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "9 Dead in Shooting at Connecticut Beer Distributor," August 4, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38535909/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts.
4. Emily Friedman, ABC News, "911 Tapes from Connecticut Shooting Describe Gunman's Deadly Rampage," August 4, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/connecticut-shooter-omar-thornton-chased-victims-beer-distributor/story?id=11322281&page=1>

Case #87

January 7, 2010: Timothy Hendron opened fire at the electrical equipment plant where he worked, killing three people and injuring five others. Hendron was in the midst of a 2006 lawsuit against his employer regarding the company's retirement plan.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ABB Inc. in St. Louis, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Timothy Hendron (51/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 injured
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun; handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CNN, "Police Investigating Motive for Shooting in St. Louis That Left 4 Dead," January 8, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-08/justice/factory.shootings_1_abb-motive-dead?_s=PM:CRIME.
2. Liz Robbins, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 3 Co-Workers in St. Louis Factory and Then Himself," January 7, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/us/08gunman.html>.

Case #88

August 1, 2008: Robert Diamond opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, killing two former co-workers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Simon & Schuster book warehouse in Bristol, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Robert Diamond (32/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Smith & Wesson)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. CBS, "Former Employee Arrested in Deadly Pa. Shooting," August 2, 2008, <http://cbs3.com/topstories/shooting.simon.and.2.785808.html>.
2. ABC, "Former Employee Kills Two at Bristol Warehouse," August 2, 2008, <http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=6301504>.

Case #89

June 25, 2008: Wesley Neal Higdon opened fire at his workplace, killing five co-workers and wounding another. Reports state that Higdon had been reprimanded by a supervisor for having an argument with a co-worker prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlantis Plastics in Henderson, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Wesley Neal Higdon (25/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Bob Driehaus, New York Times, "Man in Kentucky Kills 5 Co-Workers," June 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/us/26kentuckycnd.html?_r=1.

Case #90

April 1, 2008: Howard Trang opened fire in a factory, injuring one co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alloy Fabricators in Randolph, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Howard Trang (48/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. TheBostonChannel.com, "1 Dead, 1 Wounded in Workplace Shooting," April 1, 2008, <http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/15760103/detail.html>.
2. EnterpriseNews.com, "Family of Randolph Shooting Victim Gropes for Answers," April 1, 2008, <http://www.enterprisenews.com/homepage/x325171363>.

Case #91

March 19, 2008: Lee Isaac Bedwell Leeds opened fire at the Black Road Auto office, killing his father, a customer and two co-workers. His father owned the office.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Black Road Auto wrecking yard in Santa Maria, California
Attacker Information:	Lee Isaac Bedwell Leeds (31/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Keyt.com, "Lee Leeds Makes Court Appearance," April 1, 2008, <http://www.keyt.com/news/local/17194121.html>.
2. Associated Press, North County Times, "Son of Owner Held in Santa Maria Wrecking Yard Slayings," March 20, 2008, http://www.nctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/article_e2ffbed6-d594-50f0-8150-d64fe67a60f7.html.

Case #92

April 27, 2007. Steven Harold Smith opened fire at the Lode Street Wastewater Facility where he was employed, killing his estranged wife and a supervisor.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lode Street Wastewater Facility in Santa Cruz, California
Attacker Information:	Steven Harold Smith (50/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "2 Die in Shootings at Water Plant," April 28, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/28/local/me-shooting28>.

Case #93

March 5, 2007: Jose Mendez opened fire at his workplace, wounding three co-workers. Reports state that Mendez was angry that his working hours had been reduced at the menu printing plant.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kenyon Press plant in Signal Hill, California
Attacker Information:	Jose Mendez (68/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Megan Garvey, Los Angeles Times, "Man Wounds 3 Co-Workers and Then Kills Himself in Signal Hill," March 6, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/06/local/me-shooting6>.

Case #94

January 11, 2007: Jason Burnam opened fire at Crossroads Industrial Services, where he was employed, wounding three people in the cafeteria and one in an office of the factory. Reports state that Burnam had been taking medication for bipolar disorder and claimed that he launched the attack to gain respect.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Crossroads Industrial Services in Indianapolis, Indiana
Attacker Information:	Jason Burnman (24/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "4 Hurt in Ind. Workplace Shooting," January 11, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-01-11-indiana-shooting_x.htm.

Case #95

June 26, 2006: Michael Julius Ford opened fire at a Safeway warehouse, killing one co-worker and wounding four other people, including a police officer.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Safeway Inc. in Denver, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Michael Julius Ford (22/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. The Denver Channel, "Suspect, Victims in Safeway Shooting Rampage Identified," June 27, 2006, <http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/9424239/detail.html>.
2. Associated Press, New York Times, "Gunman Killed After Fatal Denver Shooting," June 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/26/us/26gunman.html?_r=1.

Case #96

April 21, 2006: Julian English opened fire at a Tyson Foods Inc. poultry processing plant where he was employed, wounding a co-worker. English had been suspended from his job prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tyson Foods Inc. in Pine Bluff, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Julian English (24/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, "Suspended Worker Opens Fire at Plant," April 21, 2006, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=s7IaAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=JEUEAAAAIIBAJ&pg=5058,353778&dq=tyson+worker+shoots+co-worker&hl=en>.

Case #97

January 29, 2006: Jennifer San Marco opened fire at a postal facility, killing six people hours after killing her neighbor. San Marco then fatally shot herself. The assailant was a former postal worker at the facility she targeted and was on medical leave. Reports state that San Marco entered the facility gates by following closely behind another car and gained access through the front door by taking another employee's electronic identification badge at gunpoint.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Santa Barbara Processing and Distribution Center in Santa Barbara, California
Attacker Information:	Jennifer San Marco (44/F)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Profesional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC "Police Look for Motive in Deadly Postal Shooting," January 31, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11107022/>.

2. Randal C. Archibold, et. al., New York Times, "Death Toll Climbs to 8 in California Postal Plant Rampage," February 2, 2006,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04E7D91F3FF931A35751C0A9609C8B63>.

Case #98

November 23, 2005: Joe Cobb opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, wounding two supervisors. Cobb then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	H&M Wagner and Sons food distribution office in Glen Burnie, Maryland
Attacker Information:	Joseph Allen Cobb (54/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "Fired Man Shoots Supervisors, Himself," November 23, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-11-23-job-shooting_x.htm
2. Jeff Horseman and Penny Riordan, The Maryland Gazette, "Shooting Victims Out of Hospital," November 26, 2005,
<http://www.hometownglenburnie.com/news/mdgazette/2005/11/26-07>

Case #99

September 27, 2005: Victor M. Piazza opened fire at a nail polish factory where he was formerly employed, killing one supervisor and wounding two others. Piazza was fired from the company after child pornography charges were filed against him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Verla International factory in New Windsor, New York
Attacker Information:	Victor M. Piazza (55/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-Caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. John Holl, New York Times, "Shot on Job, Woman Dies 4 Days Later," October 1, 2005,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E1DF1030F932A35753C1A9639C8B63>.
2. John Doherty and Alexa James, Times Herald-Record, "Fired Sex Offender Shoots 3, Kills Self," September 27, 2005,
<http://archive.recordonline.com/archive/2005/09/27/shoot27.htm>.
3. Michelle O'Donnell and John Holl, New York Times, "Ex-Employee Kills Himself After Shooting 3 in Factory," September 27, 2005,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/nyregion/27shoot.html>.

Case #100

February 21, 2005: Alexander L. Lett opened fire at his workplace, wounding two co-workers. The attack ended when Lett was detained by other employees.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Northrop Grumman Ships Systems in Pascagoula, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Alexander L. Lett (41/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Los Angeles Times, "Two Hurt in Shipyard Shooting; Worker Held," February 22, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/22/nation/na-briefs22.2>.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Suspect in Miss. Shipyard Shooting Held," February 21, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148258,00.html>.

Case #101

January 26, 2005: Myles Meyers opened fire at his workplace, killing one person and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jeep Liberty Plant in Toledo, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Myles Meyers (54/M)

Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (20-gauge, double-barrel shotgun)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Autoworker's Grudge Turns Deadly," January 27, 2005, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/26/national/main669662.shtml>.
2. George Windau, Labor Notes, "Pressure Led to Shootings at Jeep," March 1, 2005, <http://www.labornotes.org/node/843>.

Case #102

July 2, 2004: Elijah Brown opened fire at the food plant where he was employed, killing five people and injuring two others. Brown then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ConAgra Foods Inc. plant in Kansas City, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Elijah Brown (21/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Six Dead in Kansas Workplace Shooting," July 3, 2004, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5353964>.

Case #103

December 9, 2003: John Gardner opened fire at the PrintXcel plant, killing one employee. He then set multiple fires in the plant. Gardner had been fired from the company prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	PrintXcel in Visalia, California
Attacker Information:	John Gardner (45/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Azadeh Moaveni, Los Angeles Times, "Man Fatally Shoots Worker, Then Himself," December 10, 2003, <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/dec/10/local/me-workshoot10>.

Case #104

August 27, 2003: Alexander L. Lett opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, killing six former co-workers. Lett was fired shortly before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Windy City Core Supply in Chicago, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Salvador Tapia (36/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Joel Roberts, CBS News, "7 Dead in Chicago Rampage," August 27, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/national/main570552.shtml>.

Case #105

August 19, 2003: Ricky Shadle opened fire at his workplace, killing one co-worker and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Andover Industries in Andover, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Ricky Shadle (32/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (one 10-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. R. Kropko, Associated Press, "Man Threatened Suicide Before Factor Shooting, His Parents Say," August 21, 2003,
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/08/21/loc_oh-plantshooting21.html.

Case #106

July 9, 2003: Douglas Williams opened fire at the Lockheed Martin assembly plant where he was employed, killing five people and injuring nine others. Williams then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lockheed Martin assembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Doug Williams (48/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); rifle (.223-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Jarrett Murphy, CBS News, "Six Dead in Mississippi Massacre," July 9, 2003,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/09/national/main562301.shtml>.

Case #107

July 1, 2003: Jonathon Russell opened fire at his workplace, killing three people and wounding five others. Russell committed suicide following a shootout with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Modine Manufacturing Co. in Jefferson City, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Jonathon Russell (25/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Paul Sioca, Associated Press, "Three Killed, Several Injured in Shooting at Missouri Manufacturing," July 2, 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20030702/ai_n11402211/.

Case #108

December 6, 2001: Robert Wissman opened fire at the Nu-Wood Decorative Millwork plant, killing one person and wounding six others. Reports state that prior to the attack, Wissman was involved in a dispute with his employer over his possible termination.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Nu-Wood Decorative Millwork factory in Goshen, Indiana
Attacker Information:	Robert Wissman (36/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Jodi Wilgoren, New York Times, "Indiana Factory Shooting Leaves 2 Dead and 6 Hurt," December 7, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/us/indiana-factory-shooting-leaves-2-dead-and-6-hurt.html>.
2. John W. Fountain, New York Times, "Factory Feud Is Cited in Shooting in Indiana," December 8, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/08/us/factory-feud-is-cited-in-shooting-in-indiana.html>.
3. Katina Hull, Laredo Morning Times, "Factory Gunman in Indiana Rampage in 'Love Triangle,'" December 8, 2001, <http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archive/120801/page11.pdf>.

Case #109

February 5, 2001: William Baker opened fire at the Navistar International factory where he was employed, killing four co-workers and wounding four others. Baker concealed his weapons in a golf bag.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Navistar International plant in Melrose Park, Illinois
Attacker Information:	William D. Baker (66/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, "Five Workers Die in Shooting Rampage at Chicago Navistar Plant," February 6, 2001, http://www.lubbockonline.com/stories/020601/nat_020601041.shtml.

Case #110

September 15, 1997: Arthur Hastings Wise opened fire at his former workplace, killing four people and injuring three others, including a security guard. Wise had been recently fired from the company prior to the attack. Reports state that after Wise shot the security guard, he tore out the telephone lines in the guard station and then entered the building.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	R.E. Phelon Co. factory in Aikens County, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Arthur Hastings Wise (43/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted Suicide

Sources:

1. State v. Wise. 25819., South Carolina Judicial Department, May 11, 2004, <http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25819>.
2. Jeffrey Collins, The Times and Democrat, "Hastings Wise a 'Volunteer' for Execution; His is Scheduled for This Evening," http://www.thetandd.com/news/article_931d7ad1-28eb-53a8-aa06-cd5bf8d05595.html.
3. Joshua Quinn, NBC Augusta, "Arthur Hastings Wise Put to Death for Aiken Murders," August 16, 2007, <http://www.nbcaugusta.com/news/local/1835431.html>.

Case #111

June 5, 1997: Daniel S. Marsden opened fire at his workplace, killing two co-workers and wounding four others. He committed suicide two hours later. Reports state that

Marsden began his attack after retrieving a gun from his car following an argument with co-workers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Omni Plastic plant in Santa Fe Springs, California
Attacker Information:	Daniel S. Marsden (38/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Matea Gold and John Cox, Los Angeles Times, "Gunman Felt He Was Taunted, Police Say," June 7, 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/1997-06-07/local/me-919_1_santa-fe-springs.

Case #112

April 3, 1995: James Simpson opened fire at on oil refinery inspection plant where he was formerly employed, killing five workers. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Walter Rossler Company in Corpus Christi, Texas
Attacker Information:	James Simpson (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic); handgun (.32-caliber semi-automatic revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. New York Times, "6 Die in Texas Office Shooting," April 4, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/04/us/6-die-in-texas-office-shooting.html?scp=3&sq=April%204,%201995%20Corpus%20Christi&st=cse>.
2. Kelly Shannon, Associated Press, "Employee Kills 5, Self at Texas Refinery," April 5, 1995, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19950404&id=fzUVAAAI BAJ&sjid=xgcEAAAIBAJ&pg=6965,2886531>.

Case #113

March 14, 1994: Tuan Nguyen opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people and wounding two others. Nguyen was fired from the company shortly before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Extron Electronics factory in Santa Fe Springs, California
Attacker Information:	Tuan Nguyen (29/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Seattle Times, "Some Recent Workplace Shootings," July 31, 1999,
<http://www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/WorkplaceViolenceIncidents.html>.
2. "Across the Nation," March 15, 1994,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19940315&slug=1900389>.

Case #114

September 14, 1989: Joseph T. Wesbecker opened fire in the printing plant where he was employed, killing eight people and wounding twelve others. Wesbecker was on disability leave for mental illness at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Standard Gravure Corporation plant in Louisville, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Joseph T. Wesbecker (47/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	6
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (two semi-automatic MAC-11s, one .38-caliber revolver, and one 9-millimeter); rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, “Worker on Disability Leave Kills 7, Then Himself, in Printing Plant,” September 15, 1989,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/15/us/worker-on-disability-leave-kills-7-then-himself-in-printing-plant.html?scp=1&sq=September%2015,%201989%20Kentucky%20shooting&st=cse>.
2. Associated Press, The Victoria Advocate, “Records Show Killer Having Mental Illness,” September 24, 1989,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=wb8LAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cVYDAAAIBAJ&pg=3936,4855278&dq=joseph+wesbecker>.

SCHOOLS

Case #115

December 14, 2010: Clay A. Duke opened fire at a Florida school board meeting. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Duke, who had an extensive criminal record, held the board members hostage at gunpoint and tried to shoot the superintendent. Duke committed suicide after a security guard shot him in the leg. Reports state that the assailant was unhappy about paying taxes and his wife being fired from her workplace.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Bay District School Board meeting in Panama City, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clay A. Duke (56/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Anahad O’Conner, New York Times, “Video Captures Man Confronting School Board Before Shooting,” December 14, 2010, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/video-captures-man-confronting-school-board-before-shooting/>.
2. Associated Press, Washington Post, “School Board Shooting: Clay Duke Kills Self After Pulling Gun at Meeting,” December 15, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/15/AR2010121500632.html>.
3. Nina Mandell, Meena Hartenstein and Michael Sheridan, NY Daily News, “School Board Shooting: Florida Man Clay Duke Opens Fire at Meeting, Kills Himself, Police Say,” http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/12/15/2010-12-15_school_board_shooting_florida_man_opens_fire_at_meeting_kills_self_video_capture.html.

Case #116

October 8, 2010: Brendan O’Rourke opened fire on the playground of Kelly Elementary School, wounding two girls. O’Rourke then walked to a second playground and shot and missed at three boys and a school aide. Three construction workers tackled O’Rourke while he was reloading his gun, and held him until police arrived.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Kelly Elementary School in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Brendan O'Rourke (41/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 Magnum revolver); other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Paul Krueger, Lindsay Hood, Eric S. Page and Michelle Wayland, NBC San Diego, "Details Emerge About School-Shooting Suspect," October 11, 2010, <http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local-beat/Kelly-Elementary-Gunman--104734879.html>.
2. Elliot Spagat, SFGate.com, "School Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty," October 14, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-10-14/bay-area/24134110_1_court-judge-marshall-hockett-school-shooting-school-aide.
3. Sarah Gordon, North County Times, "Accused School Shooter Pleads Not Guilty to Attempted Murder," October 13, 2010, http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/carlsbad/article_9edbfd8d-f9e4-557a-8122-adce57af7c83.html.

Case #117

September 27, 2010: Colton Joshua Tooley opened fire on the University of Texas in Austin campus. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Tooley, wearing a dark suit and ski mask, fired toward a campus church before entering the library where he committed suicide. The attack began near the University of Texas Tower, the site of Charles Whitman's deadly shooting rampage in 1966.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Texas in Austen, Texas
Attacker Information:	Colton Joshua Tooley (19/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Texas: Gunfire at a University," September 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/us/29brfs-guntexas.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS News, "Student Opens Fire at UT Austin, Kills Self," September 28, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/28/national/main6907650.shtml>.

Case #118

August 30, 2010: Thomas Cowan entered Sullivan Central High School, where his brother was employed as a custodian, and pointed a gun at the principal's head. A school officer intervened and urged Cowan to drop his weapon. Cowan lunged for the school officer's gun and a 13-minute standoff ensued until two deputies arrived and fatally shot him to death. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Reports state that Cowan repeatedly asked for the whereabouts of the school fire alarm, allegedly to lure students out of the building and into the line of fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Sullivan Central High School in Blountville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Thomas Richard Cowan (62/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .38-caliber semi-automatic and one .25-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rain Smith, Times News, "We Have a Man With a Gun at Central High School...He's Ready to Shoot...Listen to the 911 Calls," August 31, 2010, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9025927>.
2. Rain Smith, Times News, "Police Officers Kill Gunman at Sullivan Central," August 30, 2010, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9025899>.
3. Claire Galofaro and Daniel Gilbert, TriCities, "Gunman Killed at Sullivan Central," August 31, 2010, <http://www2.tricities.com/news/2010/aug/31/incident-sullivan-central-high-school-ar-479580/>.

Case #119

March 9, 2010: Nathaniel Brown opened fire in an Ohio State University facility, killing one co-worker and injuring another. He then committed suicide. Brown was an Ohio State University custodian who had recently been informed that he would be fired.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Maintenance building at Ohio State University
Attacker Information:	Nathaniel Brown (51/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ian Urbina, New York Times, "Ohio State Employee Kills Co-Worker, Then Self, Police Say," March 9, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/us/10ohio.html>.
2. Everdeen Mason, The Lantern, "Updated: OSU Janitor Kills a Supervisor, Wounds Another, Then Shoots and Kills Himself," March 9, 2010, <http://www.thelantern.com/campus/updated-osu-janitor-kills-a-supervisor-wounds-another-then-shoots-and-kills-himself-1.1260849>.

Case #120

February 26, 2010: Jed Waits open fired in the parking lot of Birney Elementary School, killing a special education teacher. Before he was killed by a deputy sheriff, Waits also shot at and missed a bystander who had witnessed the shooting. Reports states that the victim had obtained a civil anti-harassment order against Waits in 2008 after he had repeatedly stalked her beginning in 2003.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Birney Elementary School in Tacoma, Washington
Attacker Information:	Jed Waits (30/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	1 handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Nancy Bartley and Christine Clarridge, Seattle Times, "Slain Tacoma Teacher had Been Harassed by Gunman for Years," February 26, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/localnews/2011195554_teachershot26m.html.

Case #121

February 23, 2010: Bruce Strongeagle Eastwood opened fire in the parking lot of Deer Creek Middle School, injuring two students. Eastwood was tackled by a math teacher who held him until police arrived.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Deer Creek Middle School in Littleton, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Bruce Strongeagle Eastwood (32/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Carlin DeGuerin Miller, CBS News, "David Benke, Hero Teacher: Hailed for Tackling Gunman, Says He Hope He Would Be Ready," February 25, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-6239395-504083.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
2. Kirk Mitchell, Denver Post, "Suspect's Dad Laments Lack of Mental-Health Care," February 28, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_14485435?source=rss.

Case #122

February 12, 2010: Amy Bishop, an assistant professor of biological science at the University of Alabama, opened fire in a faculty meeting, killing three people and wounding three others. Five of the victims were members of the faculty and the sixth was an employee of the university. Reports state that Bishop was angry after being denied tenure.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	The University of Alabama in Huntsville, Alabama

Attacker Information:	Amy Bishop (42/F)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	1 handgun (9 millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. USA Today, "Alabama Campus Reels After Shooting," February 15, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-02-15-professor_N.htm.

Case #123

April 26, 2009: Odane Greg Maye opened fire at a Hampton University dormitory, wounding a pizza delivery man and the dormitory manager. Before the shooting began, Maye, a former student at Hampton University, parked his car off campus to avoid a vehicle checkpoint. He then attempted to commit suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hampton University in Hampton, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Odane Greg Maye (18/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted suicide

Sources:

1. Janet DiGiacomo, CNN, "Three Wounded in Hampton University Shooting," April 26, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/26/hampton.university.shooting/>.
2. Associated Press, WSAV.com, "Richmond Man Charged in Hampton University Shooting," April 30, 2009, http://www2.wsav.com/sav/news/national/article/richmond_man_charged_in_hampton_university_shooting/11833.

Case #124

March 11, 2009: Tim Kretschmer opened fire at his high school in Germany, killing 15 people and wounding nine others. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Albertville-Realschule Winnenden school in Winnenden, Germany
Attacker Information:	Tim Kretschmer (17/M)
Casualties:	15 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "German Rampage Victims Mostly Female," March 12, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/03/11/germany.school.shooting/>.

Case #125

October 16, 2008: Two teenage gunmen opened fire after exiting from a black sport utility vehicle, killing one person and wounding three others. The gunmen targeted students who were leaving school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Henry Ford High School in Detroit, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Devon Bell (18/M); William Morton (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. ClickonDetroit.com, "3 Arraigned on Murder Charges for Shooting," October 20, 2008, <http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/17735433/detail.html>.
2. Robert Brignall, Examiner, "Second Shooter Gets Prison Term for Role in 2008 High School Ambush," November 26, 2009, <http://www.examiner.com/crime-in-detroit/second-shooter-gets-prison-term-for-role-2008-high-school-ambush>.

Case #126

September 23, 2008: Matti Juhani Saari opened fire at his university in Finland, killing 10 people. He then committed suicide after setting a fire on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Kauhajoki School of Hospitality in Kauhajoki, Finland
Attacker Information:	Mattie Juhani Saari (22/M)
Casualties:	10 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. BBC News, "Finnish College Gunman Kills 10," September 23, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7630969.stm>.

Case #127

March 6, 2008: Alaa Abu Dhein opened fire in a crowded library at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, killing eight teenage students and wounding 11 others. The gunman was killed in a gunfight between the assailant and Israeli security forces.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, Israel
Attacker Information:	(26/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 11 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Terror Shooting at Mercaz Harav Kook Yeshiva in Jerusalem," March 6, 2008, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Terror+shooting+at+Mercaz+Harav+Yeshiva+in+Jerusalem+6-Mar-2008.htm>.

Case #128

February 14, 2008: Steven Phillip Kazmierczak, a former graduate student at Northern Illinois University, opened fire in a university lecture hall, killing five people. Kazmierczak carried his weapons onto the campus in a guitar case, stepped from behind a screen on the stage, and began firing at students.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Steven Phillip Kazmierczak (27/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	3 handguns; shotgun (pump-action)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. MSNBC, "College Shooter's Deadly Rampage Baffles Friends," February 16, 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23171567/%20http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/02/15/illinois-shooting.html>.

Case #129

February 8, 2008: Latina Williams opened fire in a classroom at Louisiana Technical College in Baton Rouge, killing two students.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Louisiana Technical College in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Latina Williams (23/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "List of Recently Deadly Campus Shootings," February 15, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-15-campus-shootings_N.htm.
2. Doug Simpson, Associated Press, "Student Kills 2, Self at La. College," February 8, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/02/08/woman_kills_2_then_self_at_la_college/.

Case #130

December 9, 2007: Matthew Murray opened fire in a missionary training center dormitory, killing two people and wounding four others. He then walked 70 miles to an evangelical church in Colorado Springs and fatally shot two more people. Murray had been expelled from the training center three years prior to the attack. Reports state that he sent hate mail to the center several weeks prior to the attack.

Number of attack locations:	2
Location Information:	Youth With a Mission Training Center in Arvada, Colorado; New Life Church in Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Matthew Murray (24/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	1 rifle; 2 handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Maria Newman and John Holusha, New York Times, "Man Committed Both Colo. Shootings, Police Say," December 10, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/us/10cnd-shoot.html>.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Colorado Church Gunman Sought Revenge After He Was Kicked Out of Missionary Training," December 11, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,316387,00.html>.
3. Eric Marropodi, CNN, "Colorado Gunman Killed Himself," December 11, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/12/11/colorado.shootings/>.

Case #131

November 7, 2007: Pekka-Eric Auvinen opened fire at his high school, killing seven students and a teacher and wounding 12 other people. Auvinen had previously posted a video on the internet stating he was going to "eliminate" everyone who he deemed "unfit."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jokela High School in Tuusula, Finland
Attacker Information:	Pekka-Eric Auvinen (18/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. BBC News, "Finland Mourns Shooting Victims," November 8, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7084349.stm>.
2. YLE.fi, "Nine Dead in School Shooting," November 7, 2007, http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/news/2007/11/nine_dead_in_school_shooting_256579.html.

Case #132

October 10, 2007: Asa Coon opened fire in his school, injuring two students and two teachers. Reports state that prior to the attack Coon was angry at being suspended for his involvement in a fight.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	SuccessTech in Cleveland, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Asa H. Coon (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .38-caliber and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Chris Maag and Ian Urbina, New York Times, "Student, 14, Shoots 4 and Kills Himself in Cleveland School," October 11, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/us/11cleveland.html>.

Case #133

September 21, 2007: Loyer D. Braden, a student at Delaware State University, opened fire in the campus dining hall, killing one student and injuring another.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Delaware State University in Dover, Delaware
Attacker Information:	Loyer Braden (18/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Victim in Delaware State University Shooting Dies of Injuries," October 23, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,304625,00.html>.
2. Susan Kinzie, Washington Post, "Freshman Charged in Shooting of Two at Delaware State," September 25, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401822.html>.

Case #134

April 16, 2007: Seung-Hui Cho, a Virginia Polytechnic Institute student, opened fire inside a university dormitory and in several classrooms, killing 32 people and wounding 20 others. He committed suicide after the attack. Reports state that Cho had a history of mental and behavioral problems.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia
Attacker Information: Seung-Hui Cho (23/M)
Casualties: 32 dead; 20 wounded
Number of Weapons: 2
Weapon Information: 2 handguns (one .22-caliber semi-automatic and one 9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Source:

1. Virginia Tech Review Panel, "Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel," <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport.cfm>.

Case #135

November 20, 2006: Sebastian Bosse opened fire at his former high school, injuring five people. The gunman was armed with guns, pipe bombs and smoke bombs. Reports state that Bosse had left a suicide note prior to the attack and indicated his plans on an internet site.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Geschwister Scholl in Erfurt, Germany
Attacker Information: Sebastian Bosse (18/M)

Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 rifles (one small-bore and two sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Gulf Times, "School Shooter in Germany Shot Himself, Autopsy Shows," November 22, 2006, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=118844&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21.

Case #136

October 2, 2006: Charles Carl Roberts IV opened fire in a one-room Amish schoolhouse, killing five female students. Roberts barricaded himself in the school before carrying out the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Amish schoolhouse in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Charles Carl Roberts, IV (32/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (semi-automatic); rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "Fifth Girl Dies After Amish School Shooting," 10/3/2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/02/amish.shooting/index.html>.

Case #137

September 29, 2006: Eric Hainstock aimed a shotgun at his high school teacher before the weapon was wrestled from him by a custodian. The gunman then took his second firearm and opened fire, killing a principal. Hainstock had previously complained to teachers and school administrators about being teased by his fellow students. Additionally, he had been issued a disciplinary warning for possessing tobacco the day before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Weston Schools in Cazenovia, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Eric Hainstock (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "Wisconsin Principal Dies after School Shooting," September 30, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-09-29-principal-shot_x.htm.

Case #138

September 13, 2006: Kimveer Singh Gill opened fire on students in a Canadian college, killing one person and wounding 19 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dawson College in Montreal, Canada
Attacker Information:	Kimveer Gill (25/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CBS News, "Montreal Gunman Called Himself 'Angel of Death,'" September 14, 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/09/14/gunman-shooting.html>.

Case #139

August 30, 2006: Alvaro Castillo opened fire and set off pipe bombs in the parking lot of his former high school, wounding two students. Prior to the attack, Castillo fatally shot his father in his home and sent an e-mail to the principal of Columbine High School warning of his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Orange High School in Hillsborough, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	Alvaro Castillo (19/M)

Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (sawed-off); rifle (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Teenager is Accused of Multiple Shootings," September 1, 2006,
[http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E3D81E3EF932A3575AC0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=.](http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E3D81E3EF932A3575AC0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=)
2. Beth Karas, CNN, "Man Obsessed with Columbine Convicted of Murder," August 21, 2009,
[http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/08/21/north.carolina.castillo.trial/.](http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/08/21/north.carolina.castillo.trial/)

Case #140

August 24, 2006: Christopher Williams opened fire at the school where his ex-girlfriend taught, killing one teacher and wounding another. Reports state that the gunman was angry over his breakup with his girlfriend and was searching for her at the school. Prior to the school attack, Williams fatally shot his ex-girlfriend's mother in her home. After the attack, the gunman drove to his friend's house and shot his friend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Essex Elementary School in Essex, Vermont
Attacker Information:	Christopher Williams (27/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Christian Avar, Vermont Guardian, "Beyond the Abuse: Putting the Essex Murders in Context," September 1, 2006,
[http://www.vermontguardian.com/local/092006/EssexMurders.shtml.](http://www.vermontguardian.com/local/092006/EssexMurders.shtml)
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Suspect in Vermont School Shooting Rampage Pleads Not Guilty," August 25, 2006,
[http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210531,00.html.](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210531,00.html)

Case #141

March 14, 2006: James Scott Newman opened fire outside his middle school cafeteria, injuring two classmates.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pine Middle School in Reno, Nevada
Attacker Information:	James S. Newman (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Two Hurt in Reno Middle School Shooting," March 14, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187860,00.html>.

Case #142

November 8, 2005: Kenneth Bartley Jr. opened fire in his high school principal's office, killing one assistant principal and wounding two others. Bartley began his attack when he was called into the principal's office because students had seen him with a gun on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Campbell County Comprehensive High School in Jacksboro, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Ken Bartley, Jr. (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Boy in School Shooting May be Tried as an Adult," November 9, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9970713/>.

Case #143

March 21, 2005: Jeff Weise opened fire at an Indian reservation high school, killing seven fellow students and wounding seven others. The shooting spree lasted 10 minutes. Prior to the attack Weise fatally shot his grandparents at their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Red Lake High School in Red Lake, Minnesota
Attacker Information:	Jeff Weise (16/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "High School Shooting Spree Leaves 10 Dead," March 22, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,151085,00.html>.
2. BBC News, "Town Reels from Teenage Killing," March 22, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4373661.stm>.

Case #144

September 28, 2004: A middle school student opened fire at his school, killing four students and wounding five others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Middle school in Carmen de Patagones, Argentina
Attacker Information:	Rafael (15/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "4 Die in Argentina School Shooting," September 28, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/28/world/main646126.shtml>.
2. China Daily, "Teen Opens Fire in Argentine School: 4 Dead," September 29, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/29/content_378671.htm.

3. Bill Cormier, Associated Press, "School Shooting in Argentina Kills Four," September 29, 2004,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20040929/ai_n14586339/.

Case #145

February 9, 2004: John Romano opened fire at his high school, injuring a teacher. An assistant principal tackled and disarmed Romano. Reports state that Romano loaded his gun in the bathroom prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Columbia High School in East Greenbush, New York
Attacker Information:	Jon W. Romano (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge pump-action)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Marc Santora, New York Times, "Student Opens Fire at a High School near Albany, Hitting a Teacher," February 10, 2004,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/nyregion/student-opens-fire-at-a-high-school-near-albany-hitting-a-teacher.html>.

Case #146

September 24, 2003: John McLaughlin opened fire at his high school, killing two students. He then aimed his gun at a gym coach, but ultimately put the gun down. The gym coach then took the suspect to the school office without a struggle.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Rocori High School in St. Cloud, Minnesota
Attacker Information:	John Jason McLaughlin (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Minnesota Public Radio, "Teen Convicted of Murder in Rocori High School Shootings," July 18, 2005,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/07/18_postt_rocoriverdict/.
2. Minnesota Public Radio, "Veteran Teacher Called Hero in Cold Spring School Shootings," September 25, 2003,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/09/25_baxtera_reax/.

Case #147

July 17, 2003: Richard Dean "Rusty" Bright opened fire at a Kanawha County Board of Education meeting, wounding a teacher. Bright, a maintenance worker for the Board of Education, began his attack by dousing his supervisor and a personnel official with gasoline. After his lighter failed, he shot the teacher. Police later discovered additional weapons in Bright's vehicle.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kanawha County Board of Education school board meeting in Charleston, West Virginia
Attacker Information:	Richard Dean "Rusty" Bright (58/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, Tuscaloosa News, "School Board Meeting Onlookers Thwart Attack by Maintenance Worker," July 19, 2003,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1817&dat=20030719&id=DEcuAAAAI BAJ&sjid=f6YEAAAIBAJ&pg=6717,4505726>.

Case #148

June 6, 2003: Anatcha Boonkwan opened fire in a school field, killing two people and wounding four others. Boonkwan targeted students gathering to listen to a campaign speech from a student body presidential candidate. He used a pistol that he stole from his father.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pak Phanang in Nakorn Srithammarat, Thailand
Attacker Information:	Anatcha Boonkwan (17/M)

Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, "One Killed, Several Injured in Southern Thailand School Shooting," June 6, 2003, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-74476631.html>.
2. Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, "Second Student Dies of Gunshot Wound," June 9, 2003, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-23495780_ITM.

Case #149

May 9, 2003: Biswanath Halder opened fire at a Case Western Reserve University building, killing one person and wounding two others. The attack lasted seven hours. Reports state that Halder was upset because he believed a university student hacked into his web site.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Biswanath Halder (62/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Danny Hakim, New York Times, "Ex-Employee Held in Campus Attack," May 11, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/ex-employee-held-in-campus-attack.html?pagewanted=all>.

Case #150

October 29, 2002: Robert Flores opened fire in an instructor's office at the University of Arizona Nursing College, killing three of his instructors. Reports state that Flores was a failing student.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona

Attacker Information:	Robert S. Flores, Jr. (41/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic, one .40-caliber semi-automatic, one .357-caliber revolver, and one 9-millimeter revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. M. Broder, New York Times, "Arizona Gunman Chose Victims in Advance," October 30, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/30/us/arizona-gunman-chose-victims-in-advance.html>.

Case #151

October 21, 2002: Huan Yun Xiang opened fire in a Melbourne University classroom, killing two students and wounding five others. Reports state that before firing, Xiang, a fourth-year honors student, stood on his desk, pointed his gun at students and yelled, "you never understand me."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Monash University in Melbourne, Australia
Attacker Information:	Huan Yun "Allen" Xiang (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Padraic Murphy, Misha Ketchell, and Andrew Heasley, Sydney Morning Herald, "Two Die as Gunman Attacks His Own Class," October 22, 2002, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/21/1034561446759.html>.
2. Jamie Barry, The Age, "Student Believed Monash Killings Were 'His Destiny,'" September 12, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/11/1063268520181.html>.
3. David Rood, The Age, "Reluctant Heroes Draw Positives from Pain," October 21, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/10/20/1066631353598.html>.

Case #152

April 29, 2002: Dragoslav Petkovic opened fire at his high school, killing one teacher and wounding another.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Vlasenica High School in Vlasenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Attacker Information:	Dragoslav Petkovic (17/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (7.65-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. New York Times, "Bosnia Student Kills Teacher and Himself," April 30, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/30/world/bosnia-student-kills-teacher-and-himself.html>.

Case #153

April 26, 2002: Robert Steinhäuser opened fire at a German high school, killing 13 teachers, two students, and a policeman. The attack lasted for 20 minutes. Steinhäuser was expelled from the school prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Johann Gutenberg High School in Erfurt, Germany
Attacker Information:	Robert Steinhäuser (19/M)
Casualties:	16 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CNN, "Brave Teacher Stopped Gun Rampage," April 27, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/04/27/germany.shooting/>.
2. Edmund L. Andrews, New York Times, "Shooting Rampage at German School," April 27, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/27/world/shooting-rampage-at-german-school.html>.

Case #154

February 19, 2002: A gunman opened fire at a factory where he was formerly employed, killing two people. The gunman then opened fire at his former school, killing a headmaster and wounding a teacher. The assailant also detonated at least two homemade pipe bombs in the school. He had been expelled from the school prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Factory in Eching; high school in Freising, Germany
Attacker Information:	unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, *The Copycat Effect: How the Media and Popular Culture Trigger the Mayhem in Tomorrow's Headlines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pg. 177.
2. "A School Principal is Killed by Gunfire," <http://www.keystosaferschools.com/FREISINGGermany21902.htm>.

Case #155

January 16, 2002: Peter Odighizuwa opened fire on the campus of the Appalachian School of law, killing the dean, a student and a professor, and wounding three other people. Reports state that Odighizuwa, a graduate student, was angry over recently being dismissed from the school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Appalachian School of Law in Grundy, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Peter Odighizuwa (42/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Thomas J. Lueck, New York Times, "3 Slain at Law School; Student is Held," January 17, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/17/college/coll17SHOO.html>.

Case #156

May 17, 2001: Donald Cowan opened fire at a Pacific Lutheran University dormitory, killing a music professor. Cowan left a 16-page suicide note expressing anger at a colleague of the victim, whom Cowan briefly dated as a teenager.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma, Washington
Attacker Information:	Donald Cowan (55/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rebecca Cook, ABC News, "Professor Shot in Tacoma," <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93280&page=1>.

Case #157

March 22, 2001: Jason Hoffman opened fire at his high school, wounding five people. The attack began when a school dean questioned Hoffman as to why he was carrying a gun over his shoulder. After shooting and missing the dean, Hoffman ran toward the administration offices while randomly shooting into windows and a doorway.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Granite Hills High School in El Cajon, California
Attacker Information:	Jason Anthony Hoffman (18/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Greg Krikorian, Los Angeles Times, "Violence Marks Life of School Gunfire Suspect," April 23, 2001, <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/23/local/me-54634>.

Case #158

March 5, 2001: Charles Andrews Williams opened fire at his high school, killing two schoolmates and wounding 13 others. He began his shooting spree by firing randomly inside a bathroom and around the courtyard. Reports state that Williams had warned classmates he would bring a weapon to school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Santana High School in Santee, California
Attacker Information:	Charles Andrews Williams (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CNN, "Suspect Had Talked About Shooting at School," March 5, 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/03/05/school.shooting.07/index.html>.
2. Michigan Daily, "2 Dead, 13 Hurt in Rampage," March 6, 2001, <http://www.michigandaily.com/content/2-dead-13-hurt-rampage>.

Case #159

December 7, 1999: A gunman opened fire at his high school, injuring five people. The gunman began targeting students in a hallway and a computer room. Reports state that the attack was fueled by a feud between the assailant's family and one of the victims' family. Prior to the attack, one of the victim's family members had asked police for protection from the assailant, but their request was denied.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	De Leijgraaf High School in Veghel, Netherlands
Attacker Information:	Unknown (17/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Victoria Advance, "Family Feud Behind Dutch School Shooting, Police Say," December 9, 1999,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=861&dat=19991209&id=qiYPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=VIUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5645,1881212>.
2. Anthony Deutsch, Laredo Morning Times, "Student Wounds Four in Denmark," December 8, 1999,
<http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache%3AVNdHkrg4HI0J%3Aairwolf.lmtonline.com%2Fnews%2Farchive%2F1208%2Fpagea14.pdf+Dutch+school+shooting+%2B+17&hl=en&gl=us&sig=AFQjCNHSYl4rNhRBxN7jiWXc3Be6ykAvJA&pli=1>.
3. Emergency Disaster Management, Inc., "School Shootings,"
http://www.emergency-management.net/school_shoot.htm.

Case #160

December 6, 1999: Seth Trickey opened fire on a crowd of students at his middle school, wounding four people. He was then subdued by a teacher.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Gibson Middle School in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma
Attacker Information:	Seth Trickey (13/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Renee Ruble, Associated Press, "Four Wounded in Oklahoma School Shooting; Suspect in Custody," December 6, 1999,
<http://www.boston.com/news/daily/06/shooting.htm>.

Case #161

May 21, 1999: Thomas Solomon opened fire at his high school, wounding six students. Solomon was eventually disarmed by an assistant principal after attempting to commit suicide. Authorities later discovered printouts of bomb recipes and notes detailing his plot to plant explosives in the school building in Solomon's bedroom. Reports state that Solomon was distraught over a recent breakup with his girlfriend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Heritage High School in Conyers, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Thomas Solomon, Jr. (15/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. TIME, "Just a Routine School Shooting," May 31, 1999,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991076,00.html>.

Case #162

April 28, 1999: Todd Smith, a high school drop-out, opened fire at his former high school, killing one person and wounding one other. Reports state that Smith's mother claimed her son was obsessed with violent movies and video games, endured incessant bullying by his peers and displayed signs of depression before the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	W.R. Myers High School in Alberta, Canada
Attacker Information:	Todd Cameron Smith (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Calgary Herald, "Grim Record of School Killings," December 5, 2009,
<http://www2.canada.com/nanaimodailynews/news/story.html?id=2307283>.
2. CBS News Online, "Tragedy in Taber," April 27, 2004,
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/taber/>.

Case #163

April 20, 1999: Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold opened fire at Columbine High School, killing 12 fellow students and a teacher and wounding 24 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Eric Harris (18/M); Dylan Klebold (17/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 24 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 shotguns (sawed-off); handgun (TEC-9); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, Michael A. Lindenberg, "Ten Years After Columbine, It's Easier to Bear Arms," April 20, 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891416,00.html>.
2. Greg Toppo, USA Today, "10 Years Later, the Real Story Behind Columbine," April 14, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-04-13-columbine-myths_N.htm.

Case #164

April 16, 1999: Shawn Cooper opened fire at his high school. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Students barricaded themselves in classrooms when Cooper began firing his shotgun at students and faculty. Cooper surrendered after a 20-minute standoff with police. Reports state that Cooper had been taking Ritalin prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Notus Junior-Senior High School in Notus, Idaho
Attacker Information:	Shawn Cooper (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. University of Michigan, "School Violence," http://sitemaker.umich.edu/356.dolan/list_of_school_shooters.
2. Kelly Patricia O'Meara, Insight on the News, "Doping Kids," June 28, 1999, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_24_15/ai_54968252/.

Case #165

May 21, 1998: Kip Kinkel opened fire in the cafeteria of his high school, killing two students and wounding 22 other people. Prior to the attack, Kinkel fatally shot his parents at home. Although several students were aware that Kinkel had devised a “hit-list” prior to the attack, no one alerted authorities.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Kip Kinkel (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 22 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Unknown

Sources:

1. ABC News, “School Shooter: ‘I Didn’t Realize’ They Would Die,”
<http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?id=5040342&page=2>.
2. Sam Howe Verhovek, New York Times, “Teenager to Spend Life in Prison for Shootings,” November 11, 1999,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/11/us/teenager-to-spend-life-in-prison-for-shootings.html>.

Case #166

March 24, 1998: Mitchell Johnson and Andrew Golden opened fire outside their middle school, killing five people and wounding 10 others. Prior to the attack, Johnson and Golden pulled the fire alarm, luring the students and teachers outside the building and into the gunmen’s line of fire. The boys stole a cache of weapons from Golden’s grandfather’s house. Reports state that the boys had warned classmates of the impending attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Andrew Golden (11/M); Mitchell Johnson (13/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 10 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-06 Remington); rifle (.30 carbine Universal); handgun (semi-automatic); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Rick Bragg, et. al., New York Times, "From Wild Talk and Friendship to Five Deaths in a Schoolyard," March 29, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/29/us/from-wild-talk-and-friendship-to-five-deaths-in-a-schoolyard.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.
2. Kenneth Heard, Arkansas Democrat Gazette, "Public Defenders Agency to Pay for Jonesboro Shooters Civil Case," July 27, 1999, <http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/1999/jul/27/public-defenders-agency-pay-jonesboro-shooters-civ/>.
3. Rick Bragg, New York Times, "Judge Punishes Arkansas Boys Who Killed 5," August 12, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/us/judge-punishes-arkansas-boys-who-killed-5.html?ref=andrewgolden&pagewanted=1>.

Case #167

December 15, 1997: Joseph Colt Todd opened fire outside his high school, injuring two students. Todd hid in the woods next to his school and shot at students in the parking lot. Reports state that Todd was angry at being teased by classmates.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Stamps High School in Stamps, Arkansas
Attacker Information: Joseph "Colt" Todd (14/M)
Casualties: 0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons: Unknown
Weapon Information: Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Rick Bragg, New York Times, "5 Are Killed at School; Boys, 11 and 13 are Held," March 25, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/25/us/5-are-killed-at-school-boys-11-and-13-are-held.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Los Angeles Times, "Boy, 14, Charged in Shooting at School," December 20, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-660>.

Case #168

December 1, 1997: Michael Carneal opened fire on a prayer group at Heath High School, killing three girls and wounding five others. A classmate and friend of the

assailant persuaded Carneal to put the gun down. Carneal had warned several classmates of his plan.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Michael Carneal (17/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 shotguns; 2 rifles (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Julie Grace and West Paducah, Time Magazine, "When the Silence Fell," June 24, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,137027,00.html>.
2. CNN, "Third student dies in Kentucky school shooting," December 2, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9712/02/school.shooting.on/>.

Case #169

October 1, 1997: Luke Woodham opened fire at his high school, killing two people and wounding seven others. Prior to the attack, Woodham stabbed his mother to death in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Luke Woodham (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-.30)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Howard Chua-Eoan, Time Magazine, "Mississippi Gothic," June 24, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,136736,00.html>.
2. CNN, "Teen pleads innocent in high school shooting," October 2, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9710/02/miss.shooting.folo/>.

Case #170

March 30, 1997: Mohammad Ahman al-Naziri (also known as Hassan Ali al-Baadani) opened fire at two neighboring schools, killing eight people, including six children and wounding 14 others. The gunman claimed his daughter was raped by an administrator at one of the schools.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tala'l Private School and Musa Bin Nusayr School in Sanaa, Yemen
Attacker Information:	Mohammad Ahman al-Naziri (48/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Kalishnikov)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CNN, "Gunman kills eight at two schools in Yemen," March 30, 1997;
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/30/briefs/yemen.html>.
2. Seattle Times, "Around The World," April 2, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970402&slug=2531929>.

Case #171

February 19, 1997: Evan Ramsey opened fire at his high school, killing a student, a principal, and wounding two others. Reports state that Ramsey had been bullied by classmates and had openly discussed his plans with friends prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Bethel Regional High School in Bethel, Alaska
Attacker Information:	Evan Ramsey (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Jim Avila, Reynolds Holding, Terri Whitcraft and Beth Tribolet, ABC News, "School Shooter: 'I Didn't Realize' They Would Die," June 11, 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5040342&page=1>.
2. CBS News, "Rage: A look at a Teen Killer," March 7, 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/08/17/60II/main58625.shtml>.

Case #172

March 13, 1996: Thomas Hamilton opened fire at a primary school, killing 17 students and teachers. Hamilton was fired from his post as a Scout Master prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dunblane Primary School in Dunblane, Scotland
Attacker Information:	Thomas Hamilton (43/M)
Casualties:	17 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rachael Bell, TruTV.com, "The Dunblane Massacre," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/dunblane_massacre/index.html.

Case #173

February 8, 1996: Douglas Bradley opened fire on his high school's basketball court, injuring three students. Bradley drove his car onto the court and threw money out the window to draw people into his line of fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mid-Peninsula Education Center in Palo Alto, California
Attacker Information:	Douglas Bradley (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, Public Entity Risk Institute, "The Copycat Effect: School Shootings and Recommendations," 2004
https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/component/option,com_bookmarks/Itemid,44/camid,30/navstart,0/task,detail/mode,0/id,796/search.
2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 37.

Case #174

February 2, 1996: Barry Loukaitis opened fire on his middle school algebra class, killing a teacher and two students and wounding another. Loukaitis held hostages for 10 minutes and released some of the wounded before he was disarmed by a gym instructor. Loukaitis wore a duster jacket to hide his weapons.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Frontier Middle School in Moses Lake, Washington
Attacker Information:	Barry Loukaitis (14/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-.30); 2 handguns (one .22-caliber revolver and one .25-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Celin Childs, AssociatedContent.com, "Barry Loukaitis: Teenage Killer," November 28, 2007,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/458224/barry_loukaitis_teenage_killer.html?cat=17.
2. Alex Tizon, Seattle Times, "Scarred by Killings, Moses Lake asks: What has this Town Become?" February 23, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970223&slug=2525360>.
3. Ronald K. Fitten and Arthur Santana, Seattle Times, "Teen's Trial a No-Win Case – Loukaitis' Attorney Calls for New Kind of Verdict: Guilty but Mentally Ill," September 25, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970925&slug=2562274>.

Case #175

November 15, 1995: Jamie Rouse opened fire at his high school, killing a teacher and a student, and wounding another teacher. Reports state that Rouse was angry at being socially ostracized at school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Richland High School in Lynville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Jamie Rouse (17/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber rifle)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rebecca Leung, CBS News, "Student Serving Life Sentence for Killing Two Teachers, One Friend," April 14, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/12/48hours/main611470.shtml>.
2. Laurie Goodstein and William Glaberson, New York Times, "The Well-Marked Roads to Homicidal Rage," April 10, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/10/us/the-well-marked-roads-to-homicidal-rage.html?sec=health&spon=&pagewanted=1>.

Case #176

October 12, 1995: Toby Sincino opened fire at his high school, killing one teacher and wounding another. Sincino began his attack by shooting his math teacher in the face. He then walked to the guidance counselor's office, but after being unable to unlock the door, he shot another math teacher. Reports state that Sincino was angry over being bullied at school and warned classmates that he possessed a gun. He had been suspended the day before the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Blackville-Hilda High School in Blackville, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Toby Sincino (16/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.32-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Neil Ribner, The California School of Professional Psychology, *Handbook of Juvenile Forensic Psychology*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), p. 232.
2. James R. Langford, *Augusta Chronicle*, "Teen's Life Full of Contradictions – the 15-year-old who shot two teachers and then himself hinted that he would not be alive much longer," October 22, 1995, <http://www.ssristories.com/show.php?item=1568>.
3. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 339.

Case #177

November 7, 1994: Keith A. Ledeger opened fire at his former middle school, killing a custodian and wounding two staff members. He then shot a police officer near the main entrance. Ledeger had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Wickliffe Middle School in Wickliffe, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Keith A. Ledeger (37/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Man Fires Shotgun in School, Killing One and Injuring 3," November 8, 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/08/us/man-fires-shotgun-in-school-killing-one-and-injuring-3.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #178

October 20, 1994: Ta Phu Cuong opened fire at a high school, injuring two staff members. Reports state that Cuong was disappointed with his grades.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Brockton High School in Toronto, Canada
Attacker Information:	Ta Phu Cuong (27/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. TheStar.com, "Shooting violence in Canadian schools 1975-2007," May 23, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/news/article/217023>.
2. Alan Cairns, Toronto Sun, "Green is No Stranger to Justice Perception of Fairness is Crucial, Says New Judge," August 17, 2006, <http://www.caf.ca/Admin.aspx?AppModule=TxAppFramework.Web.Admin&Command=EMBEDDEDFILE&DataObjectID=701&ColumnID=3581&FieldName=CONTENT&Lang=EN&RecordID=726>.

Case #179

January 18, 1993: Gary Scott Pennington opened fired at a high school English class, killing a teacher and a custodian. Pennington then held 22 students hostage.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: East Carter High School in Grayson, Kentucky
Attacker Information: Gary Scott Pennington (17/M)
Casualties: 2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons: Unknown
Weapon Information: Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: No force

Sources:

1. Jerry Buckley, U.S. News, "The Tragedy in Room 108," October 31, 1993, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/931108/archive_016061_4.htm.
2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 337.
3. Susan Reed, People.com, "Reading, Writing and Murder," June 14, 1993, <http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20110610,00.html>.

Case #180

December 14, 1992: Wayne Lo opened fire on his school's campus, killing two people and wounding four others. Lo began his attack by shooting a security guard and a professor before targeting students in the library and dormitories. Prior to the attack, school administrators were notified that Lo had received a package from an ammunition company, but determined the school had no authority to interfere with the package. In

addition, the school resident director was warned that Lo threatened to kill her and her husband.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Simon's Rock College of Bard in Great Barrington, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Wayne Lo (18/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Anthony DePalma, New York Times, "Questions Outweigh Answers in Shooting Spree at College," December 28, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/28/us/questions-outweigh-answers-in-shooting-spree-at-college.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. FindLaw.com, *RLI INSURANCE COMPANY* vs. *SIMON'S ROCK EARLY COLLEGE & others*, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=ma&vol=appslip/appmarc h02i&invol=1>.

Case #181

September 11, 1992: Randy Matthews opened fire at his high school pep rally, wounding six fellow students. Another student was trampled by the fleeing mob of students. Reports state that although Matthews initially targeted a student with whom he had fought, he continued to spray bullets at other students in the hallway.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Palo Duro High School in Amarillo, Texas
Attacker Information:	Randy Earl Matthews (17/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Student Wounds 6 at High School," September 12, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/12/us/student-wounds-6-at-high-school.html>.

Case #182

August 24, 1992: Valery Fabrikant, a mechanical engineering professor, opened fired at Concordia University's Henry F. Hall Building, killing four colleagues and wounding another. Fabrikant barricaded himself in an office with two hostages who ultimately tackled and disarmed him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Concordia University in Quebec, Canada
Attacker Information:	Valery Fabrikant (52/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, one 6.35-millimeter semi-automatic, and one 7.65-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. John Scott Cowan, "Lessons from the Fabrikant File: A Report to the Board of Governors of Concordia University," May 1994, http://archives3.concordia.ca/timeline/histories/Cowan_report.pdf.
2. David R. Lyon, Stephen D. Hart, and Christopher D. Webster, "Violence and Risk Assessment," in *Introduction to Psychology and Law: Canadian Perspectives* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2001), chap. 11, pp. 314-315.
3. Wilfred Cude, "The Rogue Professor," in *The Ph.D Trap Revisited* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), chap. 5, pp. 114-130, http://books.google.com/books?id=9HlgQOHVcRMC&dq=The+Ph.D+Trap+%2B+Wilfred+Cude&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=TjahS8mJlCgblgfqzuGkDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CBIQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=&f=false.

Case #183

May 14, 1992: John McMahan opened fire on a middle school science class, wounding two fellow students. Reports state that McMahan was angry over being bullied in school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Silverado Middle School in Napa, California
Attacker Information:	John McMahan (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 83.
2. Lynn M. Stuter, "Weapons of Violence in Schools since 1990," March 2005, http://www.learn-usa.com/relevant_to_et/Youth_Violence.pdf.

Case #184

May 1, 1992: Eric Houston opened fire at his former high school, killing four people and wounding nine others. During the attack, Houston held dozens of students hostage on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lindhurst High School in Hoyt, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Eric Houston (20/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Mark Gladstone and Carl Ingram, Los Angeles Times, "Man Surrenders After Terrorizing School," May 02, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-02/news/mn-1318_1_high-school-diploma.
2. Kymm Mann, Appeal-Democrat.com, "School Shooting Turns Unwanted Attention to Lindhurst," April 16, 2007, <http://www.appeal-democrat.com/news/school-47104-shooting-eckardt.html>.
3. Meg Sommerfeld, Education Week, "Classes to Resume at California School where Gunman Killed 4 and Wounded 9," May 13, 1992, <http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1992/05/13/34olive.h11.html>.

Case #185

November 1, 1991: Gang Lu, a graduate student, opened fire on the University of Iowa campus, killing five people and wounding another. Lu's victims included two professors, a department chair, an associate professor, an associate vice president and a student

employee. Reports state that Lu was angry over the unenthusiastic reception his dissertation received. Investigators recovered letters in which Mr. Lu enumerated a list of targets and outlined his plans to exact revenge.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa
Attacker Information:	Gang Lu (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	handgun (.38-caliber revolver); handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Michel Marriott, New York Times, "Iowa Gunman was Torn by Academic Challenge," November 4, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/04/us/iowa-gunman-was-torn-by-academic-challenge.html>.
2. Steve Maravetz, *FYI Faculty & Staff News*, "Remembering November 1: A University Tragedy 10 Years Later," October 2001, http://www.uiowa.edu/~fyi/issues/issues2001_v39/10192001/november.html.

Case #186

December 6, 1989: Marc Lepine opened fire at a university, killing 14 people and wounding 14 others. Lepine began his attack by splitting up students in a classroom by gender and systematically shooting nine female students. He then targeted women in the corridors, cafeteria and classrooms.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ecole Polytechnique in Quebec, Canada
Attacker Information:	Marc Lepine (25/M)
Casualties:	14 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Sturm Ruger brand rifle, mini-14 model)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Teresa Z. Sourour, "Report of Coroner's Investigation," May 10, 1991 http://www.diarmani.com/Montreal_Coroners_Report.pdf.

Case #187

January 17, 1989: Patrick Purdy opened fire at an elementary school playground, killing five people and wounding 29 others. Purdy had attended the school 16 years prior to his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Cleveland Elementary School in Stockade, California
Attacker Information:	Patrick Edward Purdy (24/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 29 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.56-caliber); handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Robert Reinhold, New York Times, "After Shooting, Horror but Few Answers," January 19, 1989, <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/19/us/after-shooting-horror-but-few-answers.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Time Magazine, "Slaughter in a School Yard," June 24 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,151105,00.html>.

Case #188

December 16, 1988: Nicholas Elliot opened fire at his high school, killing a teacher and wounding two others. Elliot hid his gun in his backpack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlantic Shores Christian School in Virginia Beach, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Nicholas Elliot (16/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Erik Larson, *The Atlantic*, "The Story of a Gun," January 1993, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/01/the-story-of-a-gun/3531/>.

2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 336.

Case #189

September 26, 1988: James Wilson opened fire at an elementary school, killing two young girls and wounding nine other people. Reports state that Wilson was angry about being teased for his weight and for taking psychiatric drugs.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Oakland Elementary School in Breenwood, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	James William Wilson (19/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Man Held in School Shooting is Depicted as Jobless," September 28, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/28/us/man-held-in-school-shooting-is-depicted-as-jobless-recluse.html>.
2. Associated Press, New York Times, "Second Victim Dies after School Shooting Incident," September 30, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/30/us/second-victim-dies-after-school-shooting-incident.html>.

Case #190

May 20, 1988: Laurie Dann opened fire at an elementary school, killing a second-grader and wounding five other students. Dann then shot a man in a nearby house. Prior to the attacks, Dunn, who had a history of mental illness, lit a house on fire, attempted to firebomb a school, and delivered poisoned snacks to people she knew.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hubbard Woods School in Winnetka, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Laurie Dann (30/F)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .22-caliber semi-automatic and one .32-caliber)

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. ABC News, "School Shooting Remembered 20 Years Later," May 20, 2008, <http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=6154968>.
2. Mark Walsh, Education Week, "Winnetka School's Staff is Praised for Courage Amid Shooting Spree," June 1, 1988, <http://www.edweek.org/login.html?source=http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1988/06/01/x36nut.h07.html&destination=http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1988/06/01/x36nut.h07.html&levelId=2100>.
3. Jennifer Halperin, Northern Illinois University Libraries, "The Education of a Crusader," December 14, 1993, <http://www.lib.niu.edu/1993/ii931211.html>.

Case #191

December 4, 1986: Kristofer Hans opened fire at his high school, killing one person and wounding three others. Hans initially tried to kill his teacher, but shot and killed her substitute instead. Hans then fired several shots as he fled the school building, wounding two students and a vice principal. Reports state that Hans was angry about failing a French class.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fergus High School in Lewiston, Montana
Attacker Information:	Kristofer Hans (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, "Failing Grade is Linked to Shooting of Teacher," December 6, 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/06/us/failing-grade-is-linked-to-shooting-of-teacher.html>.
2. Len Iwanski, The Free Lance-Star, "Student on Rampage Kills Teacher, Hurts 3," December 5, 1986, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=19861205&id=LXEQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=UosDAAAIBAJ&pg=6835,761096>.
3. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 336.

Case #192

December 10, 1985: Floyd Warmasley opened fire at his junior high school, killing a custodian and injuring the principal and secretary. After shooting the three victims, Warmasley roamed the school and took a student hostage for more than a half-hour.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Portland Junior High School in Portland, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Floyd Warmasley (13/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Connecticut Student Held in Shooting Death of Custodian," December 11, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-11/news/mn-898_1.
2. Associated Press, Reading Eagle, "13-year old Fatally Guns Down School Custodian, Injures Two," December 11, 1985, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19851211&id=BBoiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=gqYFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3025,244519>.
3. Associated Press, Lewiston Daily Sun, "Concord Superintendent Offers to Help Conn. School," December 13, 1985, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1928&dat=19851213&id=sIIpAAAAIBAJ&sjid=FGgFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3413,2700214>.

Case #193

January 21, 1985: James Alan Kearbey opened fire at his high school, killing the principal and wounding two teachers and a student. Kearbey's classmates claimed he was fascinated with military weapons and war.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Goddard Junior High School in Goddard, Kansas
Attacker Information:	James Alan Kearbey (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (M1-A); handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Free Lance-Star “14-year-old charged in Shooting Spree,” January 22, 1985,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=19850122&id=V1MQAAA AIBAJ&sjid=V4sDAAAAIIBAJ&pg=5241,2995151>.
2. Indianapolis Star, “School Violence Around the World,” October 2, 2006,
http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/crime/school_violence/school_shootin gs.html.

Case #194

January 21, 1983: David F. Lawler opened fire in his junior high school study hall, killing one student and wounding another. After Lawler committed suicide, investigators discovered a three-page suicide note in his bag.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:Parkway South Junior High School in
Manchester, Missouri**Attacker Information:**

David F. Lawler (14/M)

Casualties:

1 dead; 1 wounded

Number of Weapons:

3

Weapon Information:

2 handguns (.22-caliber); knife

Closest Relationship to the Victim:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. United Press International, New York Times “Around the Nation: 8th Grader Kills Youth, then Himself at School,” January 21, 1983,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/21/us/around-the-nation-8th-grader-kills-youth-then-himself-at-school.html>.
2. Mark Ribbing, Baltimore Sun, “Fatal Junior High Shooting Still Haunts 16 Years Later,” May 02, 1999, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-05-02/topic/9905040373_1_senti-firecracker-beneath.

Case #195

January 29, 1979: Brenda Spencer opened fire at an elementary school, killing the principal and a custodian and wounding eight children and a police officer. Spencer fired the shots from her house across the street from the school.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:	Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Brenda Spencer (16/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Peter Rowe, San Diego Union-Tribune "1979 School Shooting Inspired Boy to Teach," October 6, 2007, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071006/news_1n6teacher.html.
2. Katherine Ramsland, TruTV.com, "School Killers," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial_killers/weird/kids1/index_1.html.
3. Associated Press, USA Today.com, "Parole Denied in School Shooting," June 19, 2001, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001-04-18-spencer.htm>.

Case #196

July 12, 1976: Edward Charles Allaway opened fire in the basement of a library where he was employed as a custodian, killing seven people and wounding two others. Allaway then called the police and surrendered.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	California State University in Fullerton, California
Attacker Information:	Edward Charles Allaway (37/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Rene Lynch, Los Angeles Times, "Slayer of Seven is Sent Back to Atascadero," December 17, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-17/local/me-3115_1_napa-state-hospital.
2. Associated Press, Anchorage Daily News, "Library Shooting Kills 7," July 19, 1976, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1828&dat=19760710&id=XjUeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fb4EAAAAIBAJ&pg=1447,1114782>.

Case #197

October 27, 1975: Robert Poulin opened fire in a classroom at St. Pius X High School, killing one person and injuring five others. Prior to the attack, Poulin raped and fatally burned a female teenager at his home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Pius X High School in Ottawa, Canada
Attacker Information:	Robert Poulin (18/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 334.
2. Associated Press, The Miami News, "Student Opens Fire on Class, Kills Self," October 27, 1975,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19751027&id=k5YzAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DuwFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3696,2884442>.

Case #198

May 28, 1975: Michael Slobodian opened fire at a secondary school, killing a teacher and a student and injuring 13 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Centennial Secondary School in Ontario, Canada
Attacker Information:	Michael Slobodian (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one .44-Magnum lever action and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Andrew Hanon, Edmonton Sun, "Canada's First School Shooting Recalled," March 12, 2009, <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2009/03/12/8718126-sun.html>.
2. Associated Press, Bulletin, "Teenager Takes Own Life After Killing 2, Wounding 13," May 29, 1975, <http://news.google.de/newspapers?id=eTYVAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=8vcDAAAAIIBAJ&pg=1363,432029&dq=>.
3. Associated Press, Ocala Star-Banner, "School Killer 'Sought Revenge,'" May 28, 1975, http://news.google.de/newspapers?id=_BcVAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=8QUEAAAAIIBA&pg=3004,6164509&dq=slobodian&hl=en.

Case #199

December 30, 1974: Anthony Barbaro opened fire at his high school, killing three people and wounding nine others. Equipped with guns and homemade bombs, Barbaro began his attack by setting several fires in the school. He then shot a janitor and fired from a third-floor window at responding firemen and bystanders. A search Barbaro's home revealed handmade bombs and a diary detailing five months of planning.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Olean High School in Olean, New York
Attacker Information:	Anthony Barbaro (18/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Caitlin Lovinger, New York Times, "The Nation: After the Madness, Violence, Even Before the Internet," April 25, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/weekinreview/the-nation-after-the-madness-violence-even-before-the-internet.html>.
2. St. Petersburg Times, "Sniper Suspect Found Hanged in New York Jail Cell," November 2, 1975, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=XLgMAAAAIBAJ&sjid=K2ADAAAAIBAJ&pg=6000,541166&dq=olean>.
3. New York Times, Ford Fessenden, "They Threaten, Seethe and Unhinge, Then Kill in Quantity," April 9, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/09/us/they-threaten-seethe-and-unhinge-then-kill-in-quantity.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1>.

Case #200

May 15, 1974: Terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine opened fire at an elementary school in a series of attacks that killed 26 people and wounded 70 others. The assailants then took students hostage and demanded that Israel release political prisoners. Prior to attacking the school, the gunmen attacked a van, killed a family in an apartment and shot a bystander. They were ultimately killed by Israeli fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Netiv Meir School in Ma'a lot, Israel
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	26 dead; 70 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "Middle East: Bullets, Bombs and a Sign of Hope," May 27, 1974, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911276-1,00.html>.
2. Jack Khoury, Haaretz, "U.S. Filmmakers Plan Documentary on Ma'alot Massacre," March 7, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/833554.html>.
3. BBC, "1974: Teenagers Die in Israeli School Attack," http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/15/newsid_4307000/4307545.stm.

Case #201

August 1, 1966: Charles Joseph Whitman, an architectural engineering student, opened fire from an observation desk on the University of Texas campus, killing 13 people and wounding 31 others. Whitman's attack ended after he was shot by a police officer.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Texas in Austin, Texas
Attacker Information:	Charles Joseph Whitman (25/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 31 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (high-power .30-06); shotgun (sawed-off); and handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "The Madman in the Tower," August 12, 1966,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842584,00.html>.

FOILED SCHOOL

Case #202

August 26, 2010: Austin Cook was arrested when authorities uncovered his plan to "break the record" of the Columbine and Virginia Tech school shootings at his high school. Police seized a rifle, bow and arrow, several gun-related books and a Columbine video game from the suspect's home. Prior to his arrest, Cook attempted to recruit someone to help him conduct the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Leto High School in Tampa, Florida
Attacker Information:	Austin James Cook (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22 caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when law enforcement investigated a tip that was reported to Campus Crime Stoppers.

Sources:

1. Jessica Vander Velde, St. Petersburg Times, "Tip About Planned Shooting at Leto High School Leads to Arrest of 17-Year-Old," August 26, 2010,
<http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1117431.ece>.
2. Bill Logan, ABC News, "Leto High Moves on After Mass Murder Threat," August 26, 2010,
http://www.abcactionnews.com/dpp/news/region_tampa/leto-high-moves-on-after-mass-murder-threat.
3. Theresa Collington, WTSP News, "Deputies: Mass Shooting Thwarted at Leto High School," August 26, 2010,
<http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=142887>.

Case #203

May 7, 2010: Christopher Franko and his girlfriend, Dana Saltzman, were arrested for planning an attack on their high school. Reports state that the suspects sought to purchase

shotguns and randomly shoot students, faculty and staff at Franko's former school. Prior to this plot, Franko had been accused of similar shooting attempts at his school.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connetquot High School in Long Island, New York
Attacker Information:	Christopher Franko (17/M); Dana Saltzman (16/F)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Shotguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when Franko's social worker alerted police as to her suspicions that the two suspects might be planning an attack.

Sources:

1. Frank Eltman, Huffington Post, "Christopher Franko Charged: Connetquot High School Student charged with Second Columbine-Style Plot in three Years," June 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/christopher-franko-charge_n_604717.html.
2. Carlin DeGuerin Miller, CBS News, "Columbine-Style Attack on Long Island High School Foiled, Two Teens Arrested, Say Police," May 10, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20004559-504083.html.
3. Associated Press, Huffington Post, "Dana Saltzman, Christopher Franko Arrested in Plot to Attack Long Island High School: Columbine-Style Shooting Planned for Connetquot High School," May 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/08/dana-saltzman-christopher_n_568930.html.

Case #204

March 4, 2010: Charles Mustoe was arrested for planning an attack at Chelan High School. Mustoe planned to carry out the attack on April 20, 2011, the anniversary of the Columbine High school shooting. Reports state that Mustoe was angry about being bullied at school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Chelan High School in Chelan, Washington
Attacker Information:	Charles T. Mustoe (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	10
Weapon Information:	3 shotguns; 5 rifles; 2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the parents of a girl with whom Mustoe had discussed his plans alerted authorities.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Columbian, "Brewster Teen Charged in Alleged School Shooting Plot," March 4, 2010, <http://www.columbian.com/news/2010/mar/04/brewster-teen-charged-alleged-school-shooting-plot/>.
2. K.C. Mehaffey, Wenatchee World, "Charges Reduced for Teen Police Say Planned Columbine-Type Shooting," December 2, 2010, <http://www.wenatcheeworld.com/news/2010/dec/02/charges-for-brewster-teen-reduced/>.

Case #205

February 14, 2010: A student was arrested for planning a shooting spree at Marshall High School.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Marshall High School in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect revealed his plans to a man with whom he was playing an online video game; the man immediately notified law enforcement.

Sources:

1. Crystal Mazza, WOAI, "Student Arrested for Plotting Attack Against High School," February 15, 2010, http://www.woai.com/news/local/story/Student-arrested-for-plotting-attack-against-high/I6d_yPrPjUenlu5DnyGrGg.csp.
2. ABC News – KSAT, "Alleged School Shooting Plot Foiled," February 15, 2010, <http://www.ksat.com/news/22570319/detail.html#>.

Case #206

May 4, 2009: Two high school students were arrested for plotting to randomly shoot classmates at Covina High School during a school assembly. Authorities discovered two loaded handguns as well as violent drawings at the home of one of the teenagers. The boys admitted to having brought their weapons to the school three times in the past.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Covina High School in West Covina, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one Glock .40-caliber and one Smith & Wesson .357-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a man reported the theft of two handguns from his home, enabling police to trace the theft to the victim's stepson.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: 2 Teens were Plotting School Shooting," May 1, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30526342/>.
2. KTLA.com, "Local Teens Plead Not Guilty in School Shootings," May 4, 2009, <http://www.ktla.com/news/local/ktla-covina-guns-school,0,5371888.story>.

Case #207

April 9, 2009: During an investigation of two teenagers who were arrested in New Mexico on suspicion of burglary, authorities uncovered the teenagers' plans for a shooting attack at Dove Creek High School. The teenagers planned to shoot students, the school principal, the superintendent, the County Sheriff, and the Undersheriff. A stash of weapons was discovered in one of the teenagers' home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dove Creek High School in Colorado
Attacker Information:	Cody Barr (19/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Over 9
Weapon Information:	7 rifles; handguns (.22-caliber); shotguns; rifle (M1 carbine); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when one of the suspects informed his family about the plot.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Sheriff: Teen Planned School Shooting," April 9, 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/09/national/main4933195.shtml>.
2. Associated Press, Denver Post, "2 Teens Arrested in Shooting Plot at Dove Creek School," April 09, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_12109381.

Case #208

April 8, 2009: Three high school students were arrested for plotting to bomb their high school after police discovered 28 pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, shotguns, violent videos, and a hit-list of students' names at one of the teenagers' home. Two years prior, one of the teenagers had served three months of supervised probation for possessing a hoax explosive device around the date of the Columbine High School attack anniversary.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Landstown High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia

Attacker Information:

Phillip Bay (17/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

Over 30

Weapon Information:

2 shotguns; other

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when the suspects' friend alerted authorities of their plan to bomb the school.

Sources:

1. Kathy Adams and Shawn Day, Virginia Pilot, "Beach Teen Charged with Making Explosives in Plot on School," April 8, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/04/beach-teen-charged-making-explosives-plot-school>.
2. Kathy Adams, Virginia Pilot, "More Arrests Made in Possible Bomb Plot at Va. Beach School," April 18, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/04/more-arrests-made-possible-bomb-plot-va-beach-school>.
3. Shawn Day, Virginia Pilot, "Sanity is at Issue in case of Landstown Bomb Plot Teen," August 27, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/08/sanity-issue-case-landstown-bomb-plot-teen>.

Case #209

December 8, 2008: Gregory Nason was arrested for plotting to shoot students at Blue Mountain High School. Police found multiple weapons, replica guns, a gas mask, a fake hand grenade, shooting gloves, replica explosive devices and paramilitary clothing at his home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Blue Mountain High School in North Manheim, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Gregory N. Nason (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	5
Weapon Information:	2 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when several students informed school officials that they suspected Nason might conduct a school shooting.

Sources:

1. Mike Urban, ReadingEagle.com, "Student Charged in Planned Assault at Blue Mountain High School after Arms Cache is Found," December 19, 2008, <http://readingeagle.com/article.aspx?id=118243>.
2. Chris A. Courogen, Patriot News, "Schuylkill County Student Charged with Planning School Shooting," December 19, 2008, http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2008/12/schuylkill_county_student_char.html.

Case #210

December 4, 2008: Richard Yanis was arrested after stealing three guns and hundreds of rounds of ammunition from his father. Reports state that Yanis's intention was to conduct a shooting spree at Pottstown High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pottstown High School in Montco, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Richard Yanis (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one Smith & Wesson .357 caliber revolver; one Smith & Wesson .22 caliber semi-automatic; one Colt .45 caliber semi-automatic)

Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect's father reported three handguns stolen from a secured gun locker in his basement. Simultaneously, a school friend of the suspect alerted a teacher about his friend's weapons. The teacher immediately contacted authorities.

Sources:

1. CNN, "Pennsylvania Teen Charged with Plotting to Kill School Enemies," December 9, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/09/school.plot/index.html>.
2. ABC Local, "Alleged Plot Foiled at Pottstown H.S.," January 7, 2009, <http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=6545748>.

Case #211

October 29, 2008: Five teenage boys were arrested for plotting to shoot students, teachers, and staff at Big Bear High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Big Bear High School in Big Bear, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when fellow students overheard the plans and alerted school authorities.

Source:

1. David Kelly, Los Angeles Times, "Teens Allegedly Plotted Shooting," October 31, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/31/local/me-briefs31.S4>.

Case #212

March 6, 2008: A high school student was arrested when his plot to murder classmates and teachers in New Jersey was foiled by fellow students. Reports state that the student had begun surveying school security and mapping escape routes. The student had also drafted a hit-list of intended victims.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Belvidere High School in Belvidere, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Unknown (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect warned classmates about a hit-list he had drafted. Worried students notified school administrators.

Sources:

1. Laura Batchelor, CNN, "Student's School Shooting Plot Foiled, Police Say," March 6, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/06/nj.school.plot/index.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS News, "Alleged 'Plot to Kill' Foiled at N.J. School," March 6, 2008, <http://cbs3.com/topstories/Plot.to.Kill.2.670663.html>.

Case #213

November 28, 2007: Three high school students were arrested for planning to attack their school on the 11th anniversary of the Columbine High School shooting attacks.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Arlington High School in Lagrangeville, New York
Attacker Information:	Patrick Quigley (16/M); Joseph Saia (16/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when a student saw a MySpace posting detailing the attack and reported it to the high school principal.

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Daily News, "Hudson Valley High Students Arrested, Charged with Plotting School Attack, November 28, 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/11/28/2007-11-28_hudson_valley_high_students_arrested_cha.html.

Case #214

November 18, 2007: Two teenagers were arrested for planning an attack on their high school on the anniversary of a 2006 school shooting in Germany. After being questioned by law enforcement, one of the youths committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a train. The other suspect confessed to the plot. Air guns, crossbows and a possible hit-list of intended victims were discovered in one of the suspects' home.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Georg-Buechner Gymnasium in Cologne, Germany

Attacker Information:

Unknown (17/M); unknown (18/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

Unknown

Weapon Information:

Other

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when classmates informed school authorities that the suspects were studying a website containing images of the Columbine massacre. One of the suspects had also warned several students of an imminent attack.

Sources:

1. BBC News, "Germany 'Fails School Massacre,'" November 19, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7101689.stm>.
2. CNN, "Attack on German High School Prevented, Police Say," November 18, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/18/germany.school.plot/index.html>.

Case #215

October 12, 2007: Dillon Cossey was arrested for stockpiling weapons and plotting a school attack. Police found more than 35 weapons, a bomb-making book and violent journals and videos of the 1999 Columbine High School shooting in Cossey's bedroom. Reports state that Cossey was angry about being bullied at his school and told a friend that he wanted to stage an attack similar to the assault on Columbine High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Plymouth Whitemarsh High School in Norristown, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Dillon Cossey (14/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Over 35
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber); 2 rifles (one .22-caliber and one 9-millimeter semi-automatic); 30 rifle (air-powered); rifle (9-millimeter semi-automatic with a laser scope)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a high school student informed police officers of the impending attack.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Mother Bought Guns for Pennsylvania Boy Charged with School Plot," October 12, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,301379,00.html>.
2. David Schoetz and Russell Goldman, ABC News, "Online, Teens 'Idolized Columbine Killers,'" November 13, 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3848474&page=1>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "14-year-old Admits to Illegally Stockpiling Guns," October 26, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21490224/wid/6448213/>.
4. Associated Press, CBS News, "Pa. Student Admits Stockpiling Weapons," October 26, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/26/national/main3414966.shtml?source=related_story.

Case #216

July 13, 2007: Two teenagers were arrested for planning an assault at the Connetquot High School in Long Island on the anniversary of the Columbine High School rampage. The teenagers detailed their plot in journals and a video in which they identified several

victims by name. The teenagers also considered throwing bombs in the McDonald's where they worked and made numerous unsuccessful attempts to purchase weapons.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connetquot High School in Long Island, New York
Attacker Information:	Michael McDonough (17/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one Uzi automatic one AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a journal belonging to one of the suspects was turned over to authorities after it was discovered by a customer in a McDonald's parking lot. The journal contained numerous threats and detailed plans to attack the school.

Sources:

1. Winnie Hu, New York Times, "Long Island Teenagers Are Accused in Attack Plot on a School," July 14, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/14/nyregion/14school.html>.
2. David Schoetz, ABC News, "Samaritan Helps Foil Columbine-Style Shooting," July 13, 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=3374965&page=1>.
3. Verena Dobnik, USA Today, "2 NY Teens Charged with School Plot," July 14, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-13-3180234222_x.htm.
4. Associated Press, USA Today, "Boy, 15 Pleads Guilty to School Plot," August 1, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-08-01-3180234222_x.htm.

Case #217

September 21, 2006: Three high school seniors were arrested for plotting an attack on their high school. Investigators discovered an arsenal of guns and bombs in the suspects' homes. Reports state that the teenagers spent two years planning the attack because they were angry over being disrespected by female students. Authorities also confiscated a black leather trench coat and a book titled "Bully: A True Story of High School Revenge."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	East High School in Green Bay, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	William Cornell (17/M); Shawn Sturtz, (17/M); Bradley Netwal (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; rifles; handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a friend of the suspects informed an associate principal of the plan.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "3 Wisconsin Teens Charged in Planned School-Shooting Plot," September 22, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,215145,00.html>.
2. Corinthia McCoy, Green Bay Press Gazette, "Cornell gets Six Years in Prison for East High Bomb Plot," October 2, 2007, <http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/article/20071002/GPG0101/710020536/Cornell-gets-six-years-in-prison-for-East-High-bomb-plot>.

Case #218

April 25, 2006: Brian Michael Evans was arrested for plotting a shooting attack on his high school. Investigators discovered weapons and a book containing directions to make explosives in Evans's home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Rogers High School in Puyallup, Washington
Attacker Information:	Brian Michael Evans (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	5
Weapon Information:	2 rifles; 2 handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student who had received an online message from Evans outlining his shooting plans alerted school authorities.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Student Plotting Washington School Shooting Charged," April 25, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193003,00.html>.

2. Christine Lagorio, CBS News, "School Plot Stopped in Washington," April 25, 2006, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/25/national/main1541731.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody>.

Case #219

April 24, 2006: A group of six seventh-graders were arrested for planning an attack on their middle school. The students intended to cut off power and telephone service to their school and kill classmates and faculty with guns and knives. Reports state that the students claimed to have been bullied by other students and sought to exact revenge.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	North Pole Middle School in Anchorage, Alaska
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student informed a parent about rumors that were circulating in school regarding the plot; the parent alerted police.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "North Pole Unnerved by Alleged Plot to Kill Students," April 25, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,192981,00.html>.
2. Associated Press, Sydney Morning Herald, "School Slaughter Plot Foiled in Alaska," April 23, 2006, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/school-slaughter-plot-foiled-in-alaska/2006/04/23/1145730804837.html>.

Case #220

April 20, 2006: Five students were arrested hours before they planned to carry out a shooting spree on their school campus. Police were notified about a hit-list as well as a message on MySpace that warned students to wear bullet proof vests and flak jackets to school on April 20 – the anniversary of the Columbine High School massacre. Weapons

and coded messages were discovered in the bedroom of one suspect and documents about firearms and references to Armageddon were found in two suspects' school lockers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Riverton High School in Riverton, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M);
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when school officials were notified about a threatening message on one of the suspects' MySpace page. A teenager who chatted with one of the suspects on MySpace received a list of a dozen potential victims from the suspect and immediately notified law enforcement.

Sources:

1. Christine Lagorio, CBS News, "Kansas School Shooting Plot Foiled," April 20, 2006, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/20/national/main1524759.shtml>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "5 Kan. Students Arrested in Alleged Plot," April 21, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-20-kansas_x.htm.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Charges Mulled in Alleged School Shooting Plot," April 23, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12409480/>.

Case #221

April 10, 2006: Four students were arrested for plotting to shoot fellow students, teachers and residents of their community. The students planned to start a food fight during school lunch to cause a distraction and then begin executing students and teachers from a hit-list before continuing their shooting rampage off-campus. The students surveyed school security and mapped escape routes but failed to obtain any weapons before school officials were alerted to the plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Winslow Township High School in Camden, New Jersey

Attacker Information:	Edwin DeLeon, (15/M); Peter Cunningham (16/M); David Cruz Jr. (16/M); James Whelan (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	N/A
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the principal at Winslow Township High School heard about the alleged plot and alerted police.

Sources:

1. Laura Batchelor, CNN, "Student's School Shooting Plot Foiled, Police Say," March 6, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/06/nj.school.plot/index.html>.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "New Jersey Teen Gets 6 Years in Prison for School Shooting Plot," October 6, 2006, <http://origin.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,218362,00.html>.
3. Associated Press, New York Times, "Camden: Teenagers Admit to Shooting Plan," August 11, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/nyregion/11mbrfs-008.html>.
4. Troy Graham, Philadelphia Inquirer "Boy, 15 to Get 5 Years in School Plot," July 12, 2006, <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-148112791/boy-16-get-5.html>.

Case #222

December 15, 2005: Two teenage friends were arrested for plotting an attack on their high school. The teenagers obtained ammunition and improvised explosive devices which they practiced detonating in the Antelope Valley Desert.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Quartz Hill High School in Quartz Hill, California
Attacker Information:	Johnny Alvarez Cases (17/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student who overheard the suspects discussing their plans

to cut her arms and legs off during the attack alerted the assistant principal.

Sources:

3. Jonathan Abrams, Los Angeles Times, "Columbine II? Behind the Alleged Plot," May 20, 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/20/local/me-quartz20>.
4. Associated Press, FOX News, "Officials: Students Plotted Attack on California High School," May 21, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196318,00.html>.

Case #223

September 21, 2005: Two boys were arrested for planning a shooting at their middle school. The students planned to shoot a school resource officer before randomly firing on students. One of the suspects had already caught the attention of authorities after firing a handgun in his bedroom.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pickens Middle School in Pickens, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Unknown (11/M); unknown (12/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic and one .25-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	A suspect's sister alerted her parents about her brother's plot.

Source:

1. Charmaine Smith, Anderson Independent-Mail, "No Motive Apparent in Foiled School Shooting," September 21, 2005, <http://www.independentmail.com/news/2005/sep/21/no-motive-apparent-in-foiled-school-shooting/>.

Case #224

March 16, 2005: Two students were arrested for plotting to open fire in their high school. Upon searching the boys' homes, authorities discovered a rifle as well as maps and notes detailing the plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	St. John Bosco High School in Bellflower, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when one of the suspects confided in a school counselor and admitted to the plot.

Source:

1. Nicholas Shields, Los Angeles Times, "2 Boys Charged in Plot," March 16, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/16/local/me-plot16>.

Case #225

February 10, 2004: Two high school students were arrested for plotting to shoot fellow students and detonate explosive devices on campus. The students had planned to burglarize a store, obtain weapons, and use those weapons to shoot fellow students. One of the teenagers obtained a map of the school and stole his parents' .22-caliber rifle from their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Laguna Creek High School in Elk Grove, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a parent overheard a conversation about the plot and alerted authorities.

Sources:

1. Cynthia Daniels, Los Angeles Times, "Teen Charged in Attack Plot at High School," February 12, 2004, <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/12/local/me-plot12>.
2. KCRA.com, "Students Arrested In Alleged Campus Plot," February 11, 2004, <http://www.kcra.com/news/2837756/detail.html>.

Case #226

November 2001: Three teenagers were arrested after they confessed to planning a school attack that would surpass the death toll at the Columbine High School massacre. The students called themselves the Trenchcoat Mafia, the name used by the Columbine High School attackers, and planned to blow up the school and then gun down fleeing teachers and students. They were caught with a stash of ammunition, knives, Nazi photographs, bomb-making recipes and drug paraphernalia at their homes. In addition, a school janitor found a letter outlining plans for an attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	New Bedford High School in New Bedford, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Eric McKeehan (17/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student alerted authorities to the plot after hearing a rumor on campus about an imminent shooting.

Sources:

1. Fox Butterfield and Robert D. McFadden, New York Times, "3 Teenagers Held in Plot at Massachusetts School," November 26, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/26/us/3-teenagers-held-in-plot-at-massachusetts-school.html>.
2. Jim Avila, Reynolds Holding, Teri Whitcraft and Beth Tribolet, ABC News, "School Shooter: 'I Didn't Realize' They Would Die," June 11, 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5040342>.
3. ABC News Online, "US Students Charged with School Massacre Plot," November 27, 2001, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200111/s426269.htm>.

Case #227

February 14, 2001: Jeremy Getman was arrested after carrying a cache of weapons into his school. His bag contained firearms, pipe bombs, a propane tank and a bag full of ammunition. Reports state that Getman planned to kill as many of his classmates and teachers as possible.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Southside High School in Elmira, New York

Attacker Information:	Jeremy Getman (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	20
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.22-caliber); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student received a threatening note from the suspect claiming that he had a gun. She then alerted authorities to the suspect's cache of weapons.

Source:

1. CBS News, "Arsenal in a Gym Bag," February 15, 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/02/15/national/main272129.shtml>.

Case #228

February 8, 2001: Alexander Vukodinovich, Scott William Parent and Chad Meininger were arrested for plotting an attack on their junior high school. One of the boys admitted to having shown drawings of the planned attack to several students. Reports state that the teenagers had discussed trying to replicate the Columbine High School attacks at their school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Preston Junior High School in Fort Collins, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Alexander Vukodinovich (14/M); Scott William Parent (14/M); Chad Meininger (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	6
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one TEC-9 semi-automatic and one .38-caliber); 2 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when four girls alerted police to a phone conversation they had with one of the suspects in which he threatened their lives and discussed the plot.

Source:

1. Kevin Vaughan and Deborah Frazier, Rocky Mountain News, "'Columbine' Talk Escaped Adults," February 9, 2001,

<http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2001/feb/09/columbine-talk-escaped-adults/>.

Case #229

February 6, 2001: Three students were arrested for planning an attack on their high school. Upon searching their homes, police discovered firearms, 400 rounds of ammunition, bomb making materials, a floor plan of their high school, Nazi drawings and black trench coats similar to those worn by the Columbine High School gunmen.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Royal Valley High in Hoyt, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (17/M); unknown (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (modified assault); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student notified school officials after hearing rumors about the students' alleged plan.

Source:

1. ABC News, "In Kansas Police Stop School Attack," February 6, 2001,
<http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94120&page=1>.

Case #230

January 29, 2001: Al DeGuzman was arrested for planning to attack his community college. Reports state that DeGuzman spent two years crafting his attack plan. Police discovered a 19-minute audiotape detailing DeGuzman's plot to kill as many people at the college as possible.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	De Anza Community College in Cupertino, California
Attacker Information:	Al DeGuzman (19/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	54
Weapon Information:	3 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when a drugstore photo clerk notified police that a customer had developed photos of himself surrounded by guns and bombs.

Sources:

1. Johanna McGeary, Time Magazine, "The Copycat?" February 4, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,97997,00.html>.
2. Bay City News, "Man who Planned Massacre at De Anza College Commits Suicide," August 9, 2004, http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-08-09/news/17437299_1_prison-officials-sentence-folsom.
3. Maria Alicia Gaura, Matthew B. Stannard and Stacy Fin, San Francisco Chronicle, "De Anza College Bloodbath Foiled," January 31, 2001, http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-01-31/news/17582292_1_miceli-al-deguzman-bombs.
4. May Wong, ABC News, "Police Thwart 'Columbine-Style' Campus Assault," January 30, 2001, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94253&page=1>.

Case #231

April 23, 1999: Four boys were arrested for plotting to attack their junior high school with guns and explosives. Authorities discovered gunpowder and bomb-making instructions in the suspects' homes. Reports state that the students drafted a list of teachers and students they wished to target.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Danforth Junior High School in Wimberley, Texas

Attacker Information:

Unknown (14/M); unknown (14/M);
unknown (14/M); unknown (14/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

N/A

Weapon Information:

N/A

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Students alerted authorities after overhearing the suspects bragging about their planned attack.

Sources:

1. Tammerlin Drummond, Hilary Hylton, Austin and Andrew Purvis, Time Magazine, "Battling the Columbine Copycats," May 10, 1999, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,990949,00.html>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "Five Texas Teens Charged in Assault Plot," April 24, 1999, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/colo/colo64.htm>.

Case #232

November 16, 1998: Five teenagers were arrested for plotting to kill staff members and students at their high school. Reports state that the teenagers planned on using guns stolen from one of the suspects' home and intended to target people who had bullied them in school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Burlington High School in Burlington, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	N/A
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the girlfriend of a suspect told her parents about the alleged plot. Rumors of the plot had been circulating among the student body after one of the suspects told certain individuals not to be in school on the day of the proposed attack.

Sources:

1. Pam Belluck, New York Times, "Students Accused of Plotting Mass Slayings," November 17, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/17/us/students-accused-of-plotting-mass-slaying.html>.
2. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Teens Accused in School Murder Plot," November 17, 1998, <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/nov/17/news/mn-43830>.

Case #233

October 7, 1997: Six teenagers were arrested in Mississippi for plotting to kill classmates at their high school. The arrest came nearly a week after their friend, Luke Woodham, killed two students and wounded seven in a shooting at the same school. The six students planned to terrorize the school by starting fires, cutting telephone lines and killing classmates. Reports state that they then planned to flee to Louisiana, Mexico and Cuba. Several suspects documented their plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Marshall Grant Boyette Jr. (18/M); Donald Brooks Jr. (17/M); Justin Sledge (16/M), Wesley Brownell (17/M); Daniel Thompson (16/M); Delbert Shaw (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when police were advised by students and parents to investigate Woodham's friends following his attack. One particular suspect came to the attention of authorities for publicly defending Woodham during a candlelight vigil for victims of Woodham's shooting rampage.

Sources:

1. Kevin Sack, New York Times, "Southern Town Stunned by Arrests in Murder Plot," October 9, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/09/us/southern-town-stunned-by-arrests-in-murder-plot.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Los Angeles Times, "6 Teenagers Charged with Murder Plot," October 8, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/08/news/mn-40448>.

OTHER

Case #234

October 4, 2010: Clifford Miller Jr. opened fire throughout his neighborhood during a 13-minute shooting spree, killing his father and wounding five others. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	5
Location Information:	Gainesville neighborhood, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clifford Miller Jr. (24/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Fla. Gunman Kills Father, Self, Wounds 5," October 5, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39509403/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.
2. Chad Smith, Cindy Swirko & Karen Voyles, Gainesville Sun, "Details Emerge About Gunman in Shooting," October 6, 2010, <http://www.gainesville.com/article/20101006/ARTICLES/101009671>.

Case #235

September 19, 2010: Sabine Radmacher opened fire in the gynecology unit of St. Elisabeth Hospital in Germany, killing a nurse and wounding three other people, including a police officer. Radmacher killed her estranged husband and son at their apartment across the street minutes before the attack at the hospital.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Elisabeth Hospital in Lorrach, Germany
Attacker Information:	Sabine Radmacher (41/F)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Allan Hall, News.Scotman.com, “Woman Who Opened Fire at Hospital Had Killed Family,” September 21, 2010, <http://news.scotsman.com/world/Woman-who-opened-fire-at.6541415.jp>.
2. BBC News, “Fatal Shooting at German Hospital,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11366024>.

Case #236

September 19, 2010: Two gunmen opened fire on tourists at a 17th century New Delhi mosque, wounding two people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jama Masjid Mosque in New Delhi, India
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attacker fled

Sources:

1. Jim Yardley and Hari Kumar, New York Times, “Taiwanese Tourists Shot in New Delhi,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/world/asia/20delhi.html>.
2. Associated Press, BBC News, “Tourists Shot Near Delhi Mosque,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11361549>.

Case #237

August 24, 2010: A group of three Al-Shabaab insurgents opened fire at the Muna Hotel in Somalia, killing roughly 30 people and injuring 16 others. The gunmen, who were disguised in government military uniforms, targeted bystanders, hotel staff and armed guards. The insurgents moved throughout different floors in the hotel during the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Muna Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia
Attacker Information:	2
Casualties:	30-33 dead; 16 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (assault)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Sarah Childress, Wall Street Journal, "Militants Kill at Least 31 in Somalia," August 25, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575448932323995708.html>.
2. Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post, "Al-Qaeda-Linked Somali Militants Storm Mogadishu Hotel, Kill at Least 33," August 24, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082403049.html>.
3. Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, "At Least 30 Killed in Somalia Hotel Attack," August 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/world/africa/25somalia.html?_r=4&hp.

Case #238

April 19, 2010: Abdo Ibssa opened fire in the Parkwest Medical Center parking lot, killing one hospital employee and wounding two others. Reports state that Ibssa, who had a history of mental illness, was convinced that a monitoring device had been implanted in him during an appendectomy in 2001.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Parkwest Medical Center in Knoxville, Tennessee
Attacker Information: Abdo Ibssa (38/M)
Casualties: 1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons: 1
Weapon Information: Handgun (.357-caliber magnum revolver)
Closest Relationship to Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Hospital Shooter Thought Doc Implanted Chip," April 20, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/20/national/main6414982.shtml>.
2. Chloe Morrison, Daily Times, "Parkwest Shooter was Mentally Ill, Left Note at Home," April 21, 2010, <http://www.thedailytimes.com/article/20100421/NEWS/304219984>.

Case #239

January 4, 2010: Johnny Wicks opened fire in the lobby of a federal courthouse, killing a security officer and wounding a deputy United States Marshal. Wicks was fatally shot by police. Reports state that the gunman was disgruntled over a reduction in his Social Security benefits.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Federal District Courthouse in Las Vegas, Nevada
Attacker Information:	Johnny Lee Wicks (66/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Steve Friess, New York Times, "Two Killed in Las Vegas Courthouse," January 4, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/us/05vegas.html>.
2. Ashley Powers, Los Angeles Times, "Shootout at Las Vegas courthouse Kills 2," January 4, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/04/nation/la-naw-vegas-shooting5-2010jan05>.

Case #240

November 5, 2009: Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, opened fire at the Fort Hood army base, killing 13 people and wounding 31 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Hood Solider Readiness Center in Killeen, Texas
Attacker Information:	Nidal Malik Hasan (39/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 31 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one FN Herstal 5.7 tactical semi-automatic and one .357-magnum Smith & Wesson revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. James C. McKinley Jr. and James Dao, New York Times, "Fort Hood Gunman Gave Signals Before his Rampage," November 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/us/09reconstruct.html?_r=2&hp.
2. CNN, "Investigators look for Missed Signals in Fort Hood Probe," November 10, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/09/fort.hood.shootings/>.

Case #241

July 2, 2009: Jamie Paredes opened fire at a dental office, killing his wife and wounding three other people. Reports state that Paredes was distraught about his wife seeking a divorce.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Family Dental Care Center in Simi Valley, California
Attacker Information:	Jaime Paredes (29/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS, "Victim ID'd in SoCal Dental Office Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://cbs2.com/local/dental.office.shooting.2.1069067.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS, "1 Dead, 3 Injured in Simi Valley Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://cbs2.com/local/1.Dead.3.2.1068016.html>.
3. Keyt.com, "A suspected Lover's Quarrel Spurred Simi Valley Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://www.keyt.com/news/local/49716897.html>.

Case #242

June 1, 2009: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad opened fire outside an Army recruiting booth, killing a soldier and wounding another. Reports state that Muhammad targeted soldiers because of U.S. policies toward the Muslim world.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	U.S. Army Recruiting Booth in Little Rock, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed (23/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2

Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber); handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Steve Barnes and James Dao, New York Times, "Gunman Kills Soldier Outside Recruiting Station," June 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/us/02recruit.html?_r=1.

Case #243

April 17, 2009: Mario Ramirez opened fire at the hospital where he worked, killing his boss and wounding another person. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Long Beach Memorial Medical Center in Long Beach, California
Attacker Information:	Mario Ramirez (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. James Wagner and Jessica Garrison, Los Angeles Times, "Long Beach Hospital Shootings Make 'no sense'," April 18, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/18/local/me-hospital-shooting18>.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "California Hospital Shooter Described as Family Man," April 17, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30255221/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts.

Case #244

March 29, 2009: Robert Stewart opened fire at a nursing home, killing seven elderly residents and a nurse, and wounding four other people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pinelake Health and Rehab Center in Carthage, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	Robert Stewart (45/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 4 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Shaila Dewan, New York Times, "Alleged Gunamn's Wife Worked at Nursing Home," March 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/us/31shooting.html?_r=2&scp=3&sq=carthage shooting&st=cse.

Case #245

March 21, 2009: Lovelle Mixon opened fire near a police substation, killing four police officers and wounding another. Mixon was on parole at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Police station in Oakland, California
Attacker Information:	Lovelle Mixon (26/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Demian Bulwa and Jaxon Van Derbeken, San Francisco Chronicle, "Killer of 4 Officers Wanted to Avoid Prison," March 23, 2009, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/23/MNH016L58R.DTL>.
2. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, San Francisco Chronicle, "Doomed SWAT Sergeants Didn't Expect an AK-47," March 23, 2009, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/22/BAV116KEU0.DTL>.

Case #246

February 14, 2009: Frank Garcia opened fire at his former workplace, killing a nurse and a bystander. Reports state that Garcia, who worked at the hospital as a nursing supervisor before being fired, was angry at co-workers who had accused him of sexual harassment. Earlier in the day, Garcia also killed another former co-worker and her husband in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Lakeside Memorial Hospital in Brockport, New York
Attacker Information:	Frank Garcia (35/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Ben Dobbin, Huffington Post, "Frank Garcia Guilty of Murder Rampage," December 16, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/16/frank-garcia-guilty-of-mu_n_394172.html.
2. Ben Dobbin, Huffington Post, "Frank Garcia Guilty: Valentine's Day Killer Convicted," November 30, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/01/frank-garcia-guilty-valen_n_375066.html.

Case #247

July 27, 2008: Jim D. Adkisson opened fire at a church during a children's performance of the musical "Annie," killing two people and wounding seven others. Adkisson, an anti-liberal activist, left a suicide note in his car explaining his motives for the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tennessee Valley Unitarian Church in Knoxville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Jim D. Adkisson (58/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Shaila Dewan, New York Times, "Hatred Said to Motivate Tenn. Shooter," July 28, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/us/28shooting.html>.
2. J.J. Stambaugh, Knoxville.com, "Takedown of Alleged Shooter Recounted," July 29, 2008, <http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/29/takedown-alleged-shooter-recounted/>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Killer Targeted Church for Liberal Views," July 28, 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25872864>.

Case #248

February 7, 2008: Charles Lee “Cookie” Thornton opened fire on Kirkwood’s City Council, killing five people and wounding two others. Thornton began his attack by fatally shooting a police sergeant outside City Hall. He then grabbed the sergeant’s gun, and continued his shooting spree inside the council chambers. Reports state that Thornton had a history of disputes with the city government and had been arrested twice at council meetings prior to the attack. The gunman left a suicide note.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Hall in Kirkwood, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Charles Lee Thornton (50/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Times Online, “Missouri Man, Charles Lee Thornton, Shoots Dead Five in Row Over Kirkwood Council Fines,” February 8, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article3333114.ece.
2. CBS News, “Six Dead in Missouri City Council Shooting,” February 8, 2008, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/07/national/main3805672.shtml>.
3. Monica Davey, New York Times, “Gunman Kills 5 People at City Council Meeting,” February 8, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/us/08missouri.html>.

Case #249

May 20, 2007: Jason Hamilton opened fired at a courthouse, killing a police officer and wounding a sheriff's deputy and a bystander. Hamilton then killed a caretaker in a nearby church.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Latah County Courthouse and First Presbyterian Church in Moscow, Idaho
Attacker Information:	Jason Hamilton (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one Springfield M-1A and one AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Bill Loftus and William Yardley, New York Times, "Idaho Gunman Also Killed Wife, Police Say," May 22, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/us/22sniper.html>.
2. John K. Wiley, Fox News, "Police Probe Idaho Shooter's Arsenal," May 23, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2007May23/0,4675,IdahoShootings,00.html.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Idaho Police Officer Injured in Shooting Dies," May 21, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18766089/>.

Case #250

May 9, 2005: Gregory Gray opened fire at his former workplace, killing a former co-worker. An employee tackled and subdued Gray as he reached for his second gun. Gray was fired from the mental health center a year prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Conard Community Service Center in San Francisco, California
Attacker Information: Gregory Gary (54/M)
Casualties: 1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons: 1
Weapon Information: Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Source:

1. Jaxon Van Derbeken and Wyatt Buchanan, San Francisco Chronicle, "Colleagues Recall Clashes with man Held in Slaying," May 18, 2005,
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/05/18/BAGSLCQQ1L1.DTL>.

Case #251

February 25, 2005: A gunman opened fire at his workplace, killing his boss and another employee. The maintenance worker began his attack after being reprimanded for arriving late to work.

Number of Attack Locations: 1

Location Information:	Bureau of Street Services maintenance yard in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Hector Becerra, Los Angeles Times, "L.A. River Marker System is Getting Back on Track," November 16, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/16/local/me-river16>.
2. Natasha Lee, Los Angeles Times, "2 Are Shot to Death at Maintenance Yard," February 25, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/25/local/me-double25>.

Case #252

May 7, 2004: Jean Delagrave opened fire at his workplace, killing one person and wounding two others. Delagrave surrendered to law enforcement shortly after the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Liquiterminals Ltd. Trucking facility in Mississauga, Canada
Attacker Information:	Jean Delagrave (49/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Canadian Press, CTV.ca, "Suspect in Workplace Shooting Has Bail Hearing," May 08, 2004, http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/an/plocal/CTVNews/20040508/workplace_shooting_040508/20040508/?hub=TorontoHome.
2. Bob Mitchell, The Star, "Family Wants Killer in Maximum Security," January 24, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/article/174228>.

Case #253

November 6, 2003: Tom West opened fire at his former workplace, killing two people and wounding three others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Watkins Motor Lines in West Chester, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Tom West (50/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. ABC News, "Two Dead, Three Wounded in Ohio Shooting," November 6, 2003, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=90171&page=1>.

Case #254

October 7, 2003: Michael Gardner opened fire at his workplace, targeting employees and responding police officers. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Gardner surrendered when law enforcement arrived on scene. Gardner had been taking medication for mental health issues at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alvin C. York Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Michael Gardner (50/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Rob Johnson, Tennessean, "VA Pharmacist Treated Troubled Man," March 7, 2005, <http://www.hwyllaw.com/CM/Articles/VA-pharmacist-treated-troubled-man.pdf>.
2. Ian Demsky, Tennessean, "Friends Support Suspect in Shooting at VA Hospital," October 25, 2003, <http://www.hwyllaw.com/CM/Articles/Friends-support-suspect-in-shooting-at-VA-hospital.pdf>.

Case #255

October 5, 2003: Sheila W. Chaney Wilson opened fire at an Atlanta church before Sunday morning services, killing her mother and the minister. She then committed suicide. Wilson had recently been taken out of a mental health facility.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Turner Monumental AME Church in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Sheila W. Chaney Wilson (43/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.44-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Lauren Johnston, CBS News, "Murder-Suicide in Atlanta Church," October 6, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/19/national/main574325.shtml>.
2. Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, "Pastor and 2 Others Are Killed in Shooting at Atlanta Church," October 6, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/06/us/pastor-and-2-others-are-killed-in-shooting-at-atlanta-church.html>.

Case #256

July 23, 2003: Othniel Askew opened fire at City Hall in New York City, killing a city councilman. Askew was a political rival of the victim. Authorities found extra cartridges in the Askew's socks.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Hall in New York, New York
Attacker Information:	Othniel Askew (31/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Smith & Wesson)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "NYC Councilman Killed by Political Rival," July 24, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/07/23/ny.shooting/>.

Case #257

October 2 2002: John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo opened fire on random targets during a three-week sniper rampage along Interstate 95 around the Virginia and Washington, D.C. Metro area.

Number of Attack Locations:	14
Location Information:	Various locations in the Washington, D.C. metro area
Attacker Information:	John Allen Muhammad (42/M); Lee Boyd Malvo (16/M)
Casualties:	10 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Bushmaster XM-15); handgun (.223-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	October 22, 2002
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. J.J. Stambaugh, Knoxnews.com, "Takedown of Alleged Shooter Recounted," July 29, 2008, <http://m.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/29/takedown-alleged-shooter-recounted/>.
2. Liza Porteus, Fox News, "Timeline: Tracking the Sniper's Trail," October 29, 2002, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,66630,00.html>.

Case #258

July 8, 2002: Patrick Gott opened fire in the Louis Armstrong International Airport, killing one person and wounding another. Reports state that Gott, a former Marine, was angry about bystanders ridiculing his turban.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Louis Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Patrick Gott (43/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, CBS News, "Cops: Airport Shooter Acted Alone," May 23, 2002,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/23/national/main509955.shtml>.
2. Free Republic, "Man Declared Insane in N.O. Airport Killing," July 11, 2005,
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1440602/posts>.

Case #259

July 4, 2002: Hesham Mohamed Hadayet opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport, killing two people and wounding four others. Hadayet began his attack while standing in line at the ticket counter of Israel's El-Al Airlines.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Los Angeles International Airport in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Hesham Mohamed Hadayet (41/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "Los Angeles Airport Shooting Kills 3," July 5, 2002,
<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/>.

Case #260

March 27, 2002: Richard Durn opened fire at a meeting of councilors in Nanterre Town Hall, killing eight counselors and wounding 19 other people. Durn died the following day after leaping from a police station window during questioning. Police officers discovered a 13-page suicide note at Mr. Durn's home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Nanterre Town Hall in Nanterre, France
Attacker Information:	Richard Durn (33/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one semi-automatic and one .357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Suzanne Daley, New York Times, "Man Who Fatally Shot 8 French Officials Jumps to His Death," March 29, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/29/world/man-who-fatally-shot-8-french-officials-jumps-to-his-death.html?pagewanted=2>.
2. CNN, "Paris Killer Leap: Police Cleared," April 6, 2002, http://articles.cnn.com/2002-04-06/world/police.shooting_1_apparent-suicide-richard-durn-licence?_s=PM:europa.
3. BBC News, "Eight Dead in Paris Shooting," March 27, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1895751.stm>.

Case #261

September 9, 2001: Joseph Ferguson opened fire at his workplace, killing five people, including his girlfriend, and wounding two others. The attack occurred a week after Ferguson had been suspended from his job as a security guard. During the 24-hour incident, Ferguson took hostages and left behind a suicide video explaining the motives behind his attack. The attack concluded when Ferguson committed suicide amidst a standoff with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	City equipment yard and City marina in Sacramento, California
Attacker Information:	Joseph Ferguson (20/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	1 rifle (AK-47); 1 handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	September 10, 2001
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Eric Baily and Robin Fields, Los Angeles Times, "Shootout Vowed in Chilling Video," September 11, 2001, <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/11/news/mn-44550>.
2. Andrew Gumbel, The Independent, "Gunamn's Suicide Ends Sacramento Rampage," September 11, 2001, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/gunmans-suicide-ends-sacramento-rampage-668920.html>.
3. New York Times, "Suspect Sought in Killings of 4 in Sacramento," September 9, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/10/us/suspect-sought-in-killings-of-4-in-sacramento.html>.

4. CNN, "Gunman was 'Hellbent on Killing More,'" September 11, 2001,
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/10/sacramento.shooting/index.html>.

Case #262

July 23, 2001: Keith Adams opened fire at a construction site where he was employed, killing a co-worker and wounding another. Police recovered more than 80 live rounds from Adam's truck.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Construction site in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida
Attacker Information:	Keith James Adams (28/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Bob Markey, Sun Sentinel, "Shooting Victim Battles Serious Injuries to Leg," August 1, 2001, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-08-01/news/0108010125_1_co-worker-assault-rifle-keith-adams.
2. BNET, "Construction Worker Opens Fire; 1 Dead," July 24, 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4179/is_20010724/ai_n11768176/.

Case #263

December 30, 1999: Silvio Izquierdo-Leyva opened fire at the Radisson Hotel where he was employed, killing four co-workers and wounding three others. Izquierdo-Leyva then killed a fifth person who would not give him her car.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Radisson Bay Harbor Hotel in Tampa, Florida
Attacker Information:	Silvio Izquierdo-Leyva (38/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter semi-automatic and one .38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Christopher Goffard, St. Petersburg Times, "He Killed ... For No Reason," April 18, 2002,
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/04/18/TampaBay/_He_killed_for_no_re.shtml.
2. Law Enforcement News, "Shooting Gallery," December 15/31, 1999,
<http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/1999/12.30/gallery.html>.

Case #264

November 4, 1999: Kevin Cruz opened fire at a shipyard, killing two people and wounding two others. Cruz fled the scene and was arrested months later.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Northlake Shipyard in Seattle, Washington
Attacker Information:	Kevin Cruz (29/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Elizabeth Murtaugh, Associated Press, "Cruz Gets Life in Prison for Shipyard Slayings," March 8, 2002,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=20020308&slug=webcruz08>.
2. Nancy Bartley, The Seattle Times, "Testimony Begins in Trial for '99 Shipyard Slayings; Victim Reported 'Threats,'" January 3, 2002,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=20020103&slug=cruz03m>.
3. Mike Carter, Steve Miletich, Nancy Bartley, and Dave Birkland, The Seattle Times, "Manhunt in Seattle – Shooting Not Random – Killer Had a Target, Police Say," November 4, 1999,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=19991104&slug=2993178>.

Case #265

September 14, 1999: Dung Trinh opened fire at a hospital, killing three employees. He was disarmed by an employee of the hospital. Reports state that Trinh was distraught over his mother's death and intended to kill his mother's nurse.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	West Anaheim Medical Center in Anaheim, California
Attacker Information:	Dung Trinh (43/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (revolver); handgun (revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CBS News, "3 Dead in Hospital Shooting," September 14, 1999, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/09/14/national/main11932.shtml>.
2. Jack Leonard and Scott Gold, Los Angeles Times, "Police Study Motives for Hospital Shooting," September 16, 1999, <http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/16/local/me-10747/2>.
3. City of Anaheim, "Anaheim Police Department History: 1990," <http://www.anaheim.net/article.asp?id=674>.

Case #266

August 12, 1999: Buford O'Neal Furrow Jr. opened fire at a day care center in the North Valley Jewish Community Center, injuring five people. Furrow then shot and killed a letter carrier after leaving the community center. Furrow had an extensive criminal record prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jewish Community Center in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Buford O'Neal Furrow, Jr. (38/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AR 15); submachine gun (Uzi); Handgun (Glock 9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Timothy Egan, New York Times, "Racist Shootings Test Limits of Health System, and Laws," August 14, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/14/us/racist-shootings-test-limits-of-health-system-and-laws.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.
2. Mike Carter and Keiko Morris, Seattle Times, "Furrow's Gun Originally a Police Weapon," August 13, 1999,

<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19990813&slug=2977109>.

3. Frank Gibney Jr., Pat Dawson, Julie Grace, David Jackson, Michael Krantz, Flora Tartakovsky and Dick Thompson, Time Magazine, "The Kids Got in the Way," <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991784-2,00.html>.

Case #267

April 15, 1999: Sergei Babarin opened fire at a Mormon library, killing two people and wounding five others. He was shot by police. Reports state that Barbarin, a diagnosed schizophrenic, had stopped taking his medication for several months leading up to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Temple Square Mormon Church in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	Sergei S. Barbarin (70/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. James Brooke, New York Times, "3 Are Killed and 5 Hurt in Shootout in Utah City," April 16, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/16/us/3-are-killed-and-5-hurt-in-shootout-in-utah-city.html?scp=4&sq=Sergei Babarin 1999 salt lake&st=cse>.

Case #268

July 24, 1998: Russell Eugene Weston Jr. opened fire at a security checkpoint at the United States Capitol, killing a police officer and wounding a tourist. Weston then fatally shot a plain-clothed detective stationed outside of Representative Tom Delay's office. Weston began his attack when a Capitol police officer confronted Weston about trying to avoid the metal detector.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	United States Capitol Building in Washington, D.C.
Attacker Information:	Russell E. Weston, Jr. (41/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Martin Weil, Washington Post, "Gunman Shoots His Way into Capitol; Two Officers Killed, Suspect Captured," July 25, 1998, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/main072598.htm>.
2. CNN, "Weston: A Man with a History of Mental Illness," July 26, 1998, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9807/26/cap.shooting.weston/>.

Case #269

December 18, 1997: Arturo Reyes Torres opened fire at a California maintenance yard where he was formerly employed, killing four employees and wounding two others. The attack concluded when Torres was killed by police. He had recently been fired from the company for stealing.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Caltrans Maintenance Yard in Orange County, California
Attacker Information:	Arturo Reyes Torres (unknown/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Dismissed Worker Kills 4 and Then is Slain," December 20, 1997, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9907E1DD163EF933A15751C1A961958260>.
2. Nick Anderson, David Reyes and Esther Schrader, Los Angeles Times, "4 Workers, Gunman Die in Caltrans Yard Attack," December 19, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/19/news/mn-172>.
3. Nick Anderson, Lee Romney and David Haldane, Los Angeles Times, "Aftermath of a Killer's Fury," December 29, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-431>.

Case #270

April 24, 1996: Kenneth Tornes opened fire at the firehouse where he worked, killing four supervisors. He then engaged police in a shootout at a shopping center after leading the officers on a chase. Prior to the attack, Tornes killed his estranged wife in her home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jackson Fire Department in Jackson, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Kenneth Tornes (32/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic and one TEC-9semi-automatic); rifle (Mac 11)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Firefighter Kills Wife and 4 Officials," April 25, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/25/us/firefighter-kills-wife-and-4-officials.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
2. Associated Press, Eugene Register Guard, "Firefighter Guns down Wife, Superiors," April 25, 1996, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1310&dat=19960425&id=EnYVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6-oDAAAIBAJ&pg=6888,5993878>.

Case #271

February 9, 1996: Clifton McCree opened fire in a trailer, killing five former colleagues and wounding another. Reports state that McCree, a former maintenance crew worker, was angry about being fired from his job for illegal drug use 14 months earlier.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Lauderdale Beach in Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clifton McCree (41/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one revolver and one semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Florida Killer Said Victims Were Racists, Police Say," February 11, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/us/florida-killer-said-victims-were-racists-police-say.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #272

June 11, 1994: Mattias Flink, a police lieutenant, opened fire at an army base and on public streets, killing seven people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Army base and public streets in Falun, Sweden
Attacker Information:	Mattias Flink (24/M)
Casualties:	7 dead
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-5)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Reuters, "TIMELINE – Shooting Incident in Finland," December 31, 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-45088320091231>.
2. The Local, "Mass Murderer Denied Request for Reduced Sentence," September 3, 2008, <http://www.thelocal.se/14112/20080903/>.
3. The Local, "Court Affirms Mass Murderer's Life Sentence," October 27, 2008, <http://www.thelocal.se/15240/20081027/>.

Case #273

December 7, 1993: Colin Ferguson opened fire in a crowded car on a Long Island Railroad train, killing six passengers and wounding 19 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Long Island Railroad car to Hicksville, Garden City, New York
Attacker Information:	Colin Ferguson (37/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter Ruger)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Francis X. Clines, New York Times, "DEATH ON THE L.I.R.R.: The Rampage; Gunman in a Train Aisle Passes Out Death," December 9, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/09/nyregion/death-on-the-lirr-the-rampage-gunman-in-a-train-aisle-passes-out-death.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Legal Information Institute, "The 'Insanity Defense' and Diminished Capacity: Colin Ferguson – the Long Island Railroad Gunman," Cornell Law School, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/insane/lirr.html>.
3. Pat Milton, Associated Press, "Ferguson Guilty in LIRR Massacre," February 18, 1995, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=OtrppQHxQ5wC&dat=19950218&printsec=frontpage>.

Case #274

April 30, 1989: Robert Sartin opened fire throughout the town of Monkseaton, killing one person and wounding 14 others. Sartin's 20-minute shooting spree concluded when he was cornered by police officers near a seafront. He stole his father's shotgun to carry out the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Monkseaton in North Tyneside, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Robert Sartin (22/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Adrian Pitches, BBC News, "Town Struggles to Recall Shooting," May 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/tyne/8029888.stm.
2. Rob Pattinson, Sunday Sun, "Monkseaton Mourns Victim of Gunman Robert Sartin," April 26, 2009, <http://www.sundaysun.co.uk/news/north-east-news/2009/04/26/monkseaton-mourns-victim-of-gunman-robert-sartin-79310-23473229/>.

Case #275

August 9, 1987: Julian Knight opened fire on pedestrians and cars from atop a billboard platform, killing seven people and wounding 19 others. Knight was a failed army cadet.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hoddle Street in Melbourne Australia
Attacker Information:	Julian Knight (19/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber Ruger); shotgun (12-gauge pump-action); rifle (M14)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No Force

Sources:

1. Reuters, Los Angeles Times, "Australia Killer Gets 460 Years in Prison," November 11, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-11/news/mn-863_1_years-prison-australia.
2. Elissa Hunt, Herald Sun, "Hoddle St. Killer Julian Knight has Legal Win in Parole Bid," August 11, 2010, <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/hoddle-st-killer-julian-knight-has-his-first-legal-win-parole-bid/story-e6frf7kx-1225903849955>.
3. Australian Government Attorney General's Department, *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, November 2004, [http://www.ag.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/\(3273BD3F76A7A5DEDAE36942A54D7D90\)~AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf/\\$file/AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf](http://www.ag.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(3273BD3F76A7A5DEDAE36942A54D7D90)~AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf/$file/AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf).
4. "Hoddle Street," Victoria Police Magazine, August 2007, pg. 6-11, www.police.vic.gov.au/retrievemedias.asp?Media_ID=20148.

Case #276

December 27, 1985: Four gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization opened fire at the El-Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport, killing 13 people and wounding 75 others. Italian police and Israeli security guards killed three of the gunmen and captured the fourth. The gunmen were armed with grenades and automatic rifles.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Rome, Italy
Attacker Information:	Ibrahim Mohammed Khaled (unknown/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 75 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle; other

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Roberto Suro, New York Times, "Palestinian Gets 30 Years for Rome Airport Attack," February 13, 1988,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/13/world/palestinian-gets-30-years-for-rome-airport-attack.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,"
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>.

Case #277

December 27, 1985: Three gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization opened fire at the El-Al ticket counter at Vienna's Schwechat Airport, killing three people and wounding 30 others. Austrian police killed one of the gunmen and captured the other two.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Schwechat Airport in Vienna, Austria
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	3 dead; 30 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Roberto Suro, New York Times, "Palestinian Gets 30 Years for Rome Airport Attack," February 13, 1988,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/13/world/palestinian-gets-30-years-for-rome-airport-attack.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,"
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html

Case #278

August 5, 1973: Sehud Muhammad and Talat Hussan opened fire and threw grenades in a crowded passenger lounge at Athens Airport, killing three people and wounding 55

others. The passengers in the lounge were about to board a flight for Israel. The Palestinian gunmen surrendered after taking 35 passengers hostage for two hours.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Athens Airport in Athens, Greece
Attacker Information:	Sehud Muhammad (unknown/M); Talat Hussan (unknown/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 55 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. BBC, "1973: Athens Attack Leaves Three Dead,"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/5/newsid_4533000/4533763.stm.

Case #279

May 29, 1972: Kozo Okamoto, Tsuyoshi Okudaira and Yasuyuki Yasuda opened fire on crowds at the Lod International Airport in Israel, killing 26 people and injuring 72 others. As the three Japanese gunmen arrived at the airport from Paris, they began randomly targeting victims using automatic guns and hand grenades. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine recruited the gunmen from the Japanese Red Army.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lod International Airport in Airport City, Israel
Attacker Information:	Kozo Okamoto (24/M); Tsuyoshi Okudaira (unknown/M); Yasuyuki Yasuda (unknown/M)
Casualties:	26 dead; 72 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force and suicide

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "Israel: Terrorist on Trial," July 24, 1972,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906148-1,00.html>.

2. BBC, "1972: Japanese Kill 26 at Tel Aviv Airport,"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthistday/hi/dates/stories/may/29/newsid_2542000/2542263.stm.

FOILED OTHER

Case #280

May 8, 2007: Mohamad Ibraim Shnewer, Dritan Duka, Eljvir Duka, Shain Duka, Serdar Tatar, and Agron Abdullahu were arrested for planning an attack on the Fort Dix Army Base. The six men from Eastern Europe and the Middle East were apprehended by authorities while trying to purchase automatic weapons from undercover FBI agents. They also spoke of attacking U.S. warships and conducted surveillance on Fort Monmouth in New Jersey, Dover Air Force Base in Delaware and other military installations.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Dix Army base in Burlington County, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Mohamad Ibraim Shnewer (22/M); Dritan Duka (28/M); Eljvir Duka (23/M); Shain Duka (26/M); Serdar Tatar (23/M); Agron Abdullahu (24/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	AK-47 assault weapons, M-16s, other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a shopkeeper at a video store alerted authorities to the men after he had been asked to copy a suspicious video onto a DVD. The video displayed 10 young men shooting weapons at a firing range while calling for jihad.

Sources:

1. Kareem Fahim, New York Times, "Six Ordinary Lives That Took a Detour to a World of Terror," May 9, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/nyregion/09suspects.html?pagewanted=print>.
2. David Kocieniewski, New York Times, "6 Men Arrested in a Terror Plot against Fort Dix," May 9, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09plot.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1.

3. Associated Press, FOX News, "Store Clerk Helps Feds Bust 6 in Alleged 'Jihad' Plot to Kill U.S. Soldiers at Fort Dix," May 8, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,270601,00.html>.
4. NPR, "Plot to Attack Fort Dix Foiled, Authorities Say," May 8, 2007, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10072697>.

Case #281

June 24, 2009: John Rosser was arrested for plotting to kill his former boss at the Duke Energy Convention Center. Rosser was fired from the Convention Center two years before the plot was uncovered.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Duke Energy Convention Center in Cincinnati, Ohio
Attacker Information:	John Rosser (28/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when Rosser told his landlord about the plot, who then alerted authorities. Officers captured Rosser, who was armed with a gun, about 100 yards from the Convention Center.

Source:

1. United Press International, "Cincy Police Foil Workplace Shooting," June 24, 2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/06/24/Cincy-police-foil-workplace-shooting/UPI-20451245863259/.

GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS



FEMA



GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING HIGH-QUALITY SCHOOL EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANS

U.S. Department of Education
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency

2013

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U.S. Department of Education

Arne Duncan
Secretary

Office of Elementary and Secondary Education

Deborah S. Delisle
Assistant Secretary

Office of Safe and Healthy Students

David Esquith
Director

June 2013

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Download **online** at Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013. *Emergency Planning Webpage*. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/index.html>, or Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance (TA) Center, 2013. Available at <http://rem.ed.gov/EOPGuides>.

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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Each school day, our nation's schools are entrusted to provide a safe and healthy learning environment for approximately 55 million elementary and secondary school students¹ in public and nonpublic schools. Families and communities expect schools to keep their children and youths safe from threats (human-caused emergencies such as crime and violence) and hazards (natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents). In collaboration with their local government and community partners, schools can take steps to plan for these potential emergencies through the creation of a school Emergency Operations Plan (school EOP).

Lessons learned from school emergencies highlight the importance of preparing school officials and first responders to implement emergency operations plans. By having plans in place to keep students and staff safe, schools play a key role in taking preventative and protective measures to stop an emergency from occurring or reduce the impact of an incident. Although schools are not traditional response organizations, when a school-based emergency occurs, school personnel respond immediately. They provide first aid, notify response partners, and provide instructions before first responders arrive. They also work with their community partners, i.e., governmental organizations that have a responsibility in the school emergency operations plan to provide a cohesive, coordinated response. Community partners include first responders (law enforcement officers, fire officials, and emergency medical services personnel) as well as public and mental health entities.

We recommend that planning teams responsible for developing and revising school EOPs use this document to guide their efforts. It is recommended that districts and individual schools compare existing plans and processes against the content and processes outlined in this guide. To gain the most from it, users should read through the entire document prior to initiating their planning efforts and then refer back to it throughout the planning process.

The guide is organized in four sections:

1. The principles of school emergency management planning.
2. A process for developing, implementing, and continually refining a school EOP with community partners (e.g., first responders and emergency management personnel) at the school building level.
3. A discussion of the form, function, and content of school EOPs.
4. "A Closer Look," which considers key topics that support school emergency planning, including addressing an *active shooter*, school climate, psychological first aid, and information-sharing.

As the team that developed this guide began its work to respond to the president's call for model emergency management plans for schools, it became clear that there is a need to help ensure that

¹ U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics 2011*. Washington, DC: Author, 2012. Available at <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/index.asp>.

our schools' emergency planning efforts are aligned with the emergency planning practices at the national, state, and local levels. Recent developments have put a new emphasis on the process for developing EOPs.

National preparedness efforts, including planning, are now informed by *Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8*, which was signed by the president in March 2011 and describes the nation's approach to preparedness. This directive represents an evolution in our collective understanding of national preparedness, based on the lessons learned from terrorist attacks, hurricanes, school incidents, and other experiences.

PPD-8 defines preparedness around five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.

- ❖ **Prevention**,² for the purposes of this guide, means the capabilities necessary to avoid, deter, or stop an imminent crime or threatened or actual mass casualty incident. Prevention is the action schools take to prevent a threatened or actual incident from occurring.
- ❖ **Protection** means the capabilities to secure schools against acts of violence and manmade or natural disasters. Protection focuses on ongoing actions that protect students, teachers, staff, visitors, networks, and property from a threat or hazard.
- ❖ **Mitigation** means the capabilities necessary to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage by lessening the impact of an event or emergency. In this document, "mitigation" also means reducing the likelihood that threats and hazards will happen.
- ❖ **Response** means the capabilities necessary to stabilize an emergency once it has already happened or is certain to happen in an unpreventable way; establish a safe and secure environment; save lives and property; and facilitate the transition to recovery.
- ❖ **Recovery** means the capabilities necessary to assist schools affected by an event or emergency in restoring the learning environment.

Emergency management officials and emergency responders engaging with schools are familiar with this terminology. These mission areas generally align with the three timeframes associated with an incident: before, during, and after.

The majority of Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation activities generally occur before an incident, although these three mission areas do have ongoing activities that can occur throughout an incident. Response activities occur during an incident, and Recovery activities can begin during an incident and occur after an incident. To help avoid confusion over terms and allow for ease of reference, this guide uses "before," "during," and "after."

² In the broader *PPD-8* construct, the term "prevention" refers to those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. The term "prevention" also refers to preventing imminent threats.

As schools plan for and execute response and recovery activities through the emergency operations plan, they should use the concepts and principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). One component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), which provides a standardized approach for *incident management*, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. By using ICS during an incident, schools will be able to more effectively work with the responders in their communities. For more information on ICS and NIMS, please see the Resources section.

While some of the vocabulary, processes, and approaches discussed in this guide may be new to the education community, they are critical. The vocabulary, processes, and approaches are critical to the creation of emergency management practices and plans that are integrated with the efforts of first responders and other key stakeholders, and that incorporate everything possible to keep children safe. If a school system has an existing plan, revising and adapting that plan using the principles and process described in this guide will help ensure alignment with the terminology and approaches used across the nation.

The Departments issuing this guidance are providing examples of good practices and matters to consider for planning and implementation purposes. The guidance does not create any requirements beyond those included in applicable law and regulations, or create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization. The information presented in this document generally constitutes informal guidance and provides examples that may be helpful. The inclusion of certain references does not imply any endorsement of any documents, products, or approaches. There may be other resources that may be equally helpful.

This guide replaces “*Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities*” (January 2007), which is rescinded.

All websites listed in this guide were last accessed on May 30, 2013.

PLANNING PRINCIPLES

The following principles are key to developing a comprehensive school emergency operations plan (school EOP) that addresses a range of threats and hazards:

Planning must be supported by leadership. At the district and school levels, senior-level officials can help the planning process by demonstrating strong support for the planning team.

Planning uses assessment to customize plans to the building level. Effective planning is built around comprehensive, ongoing assessment of the school community. Information gathered through assessment is used to customize plans to the building level, taking into consideration the school's unique circumstances and resources.

Planning considers all threats and hazards. The planning process must take into account a wide range of possible threats and hazards that may impact the school. Comprehensive school emergency management planning considers all threats and hazards throughout the planning process, addressing safety needs before, during, and after an incident.

Planning provides for the access and functional needs of the whole school community. The “whole school community” includes children, individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, those from religiously, racially, and ethnically diverse backgrounds, and people with limited English proficiency.

Planning considers all settings and all times. School EOPs must account for incidents that may occur during and outside the school day as well as on and off campus (e.g., sporting events, field trips).

Creating and revising a model emergency operations plan is done by following a collaborative process. This guide provides a process, plan format, and content guidance that are flexible enough for use by all school emergency planning teams. If a planning team also uses templates, it must first evaluate their usefulness to ensure the tools do not undermine the collaborative initiative and collectively shared plan. There are some jurisdictions that provide templates to schools, and these will reflect state and local mandates, as applicable.

THE PLANNING PROCESS


There are many ways to develop a school EOP. The planning process discussed in this section is flexible and can be adapted to accommodate a school's unique characteristics and situation.

Effective school emergency management planning and development of a school EOP are not done in isolation. It is critical that schools work with their district staff and community partners—local emergency management staff, first responders, and public and mental health officials—during the planning process, as an effective school EOP is supported at the district level and integrated with district, community, regional, and state plans. This collaboration makes more resources available and helps to ensure the seamless integration of all responders.

Schools can use the process outlined below to develop a plan, do a comprehensive review of their entire plan, or conduct periodic and incremental reviews of the plan's components. While this guide is designed for schools, districts may use this planning process as well.

Figure 1 depicts the six steps in the planning process.³ At each step, schools should consider the impact of their decisions on ongoing activities such as training and exercises as well as on equipment and resources.

Figure 1: Steps in the Planning Process



Step 1: Form a Collaborative Planning Team

Lessons learned from experience indicate that operational planning is best performed by a team. Case studies reinforce this concept by pointing out that the common thread found in successful operations is that participating organizations have understood and accepted their roles. Close

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, Version 2.0*. Washington, DC: Author, November 2010. Available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.

collaboration between schools and community partners ensures the coordination of efforts and the integration of emergency management plans.

Identify Core Planning Team: The core planning team should include representatives from a wide range of school personnel, including, but not limited to, administrators, educators, school psychologists, nurses, facilities managers, transportation managers, food personnel, and family services representatives. It should also include student and parent representatives, and individuals and organizations that serve and represent the interests of students, staff, and parents with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs, as well as racial minorities and religious organizations, so that specific concerns are included in the early stages of planning. In addition, the core planning team should include community partners such as first responders, local emergency management staff, and others who have roles and responsibilities in school emergency management before, during, and after an incident. This includes local law enforcement officers, emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, school resource officers, fire officials, public and mental health practitioners, and local emergency managers. Their expertise will inform the development, implementation, and refinement of the school EOP.

The planning team should be small enough to permit close collaboration with first responders and other community partners, yet large enough to be representative of the school, its families, and its community. It should also be large enough as to not place an undue burden on any single person.

Connecting the Planning Team to District, Local or Regional, State, Tribal, and Federal Emergency Planning

Schools undertake emergency operations planning within the context of district, local or regional, state, tribal, and federal agency emergency planning. School districts serve as the liaison between the school and these broader agencies. In order to promote coordination between these entities, the planning team is strongly encouraged to include a district representative. The local school district's emergency planning policies, procedures, and training activities will inform and enhance the school's planning to a significant degree.

In addition, from the onset, the planning team should be aware of any local or state requirements that may apply to the school EOP.

Form a Common Framework: A shared approach facilitates mutual understanding, coordination, and execution of the emergency management strategies as well as works from a common command structure. All team members need to take time to learn each other's vocabulary, command structure, and culture in order to facilitate effective planning.

Define and Assign Roles and Responsibilities: Each person involved in the development and refinement of the plan should know her or his roles and responsibilities in the planning process.

Determine a Regular Schedule of Meetings: School emergency management planning is an ongoing effort that is reinforced through regularly scheduled planning meetings. Establishing a

flexible but regular schedule of meeting times will facilitate greater collaboration, coordination, and communication among team members and will help solidify crucial relationships.

Step 1 Outcome

After completing Step 1, the school has formed a planning team with representatives from all necessary stakeholders. The planning team has taken initial steps to form a common framework, define and assign roles and responsibilities in the planning process, and set a schedule of planning meetings.



Step 2: Understand the Situation

In Step 2, the planning team identifies possible threats and hazards, and assesses the risk and vulnerabilities posed by those threats and hazards.

Effective school planning depends on a consistent analysis and comparison of the threats and hazards a particular school faces. This is typically performed through a threat and hazard identification and risk assessment process that collects information about threats and hazards, and assigns values to risk for the purposes of deciding which threats or hazards the plan should prioritize and subsequently address.

Identify Threats and Hazards

The planning team first needs to understand the threats and hazards faced by the school and the surrounding community.

The planning team can draw upon a wealth of existing information to identify the range of threats and hazards that may be faced by the school. First, the planning team members should share their own knowledge of threats and hazards the school and surrounding community have faced in the past or may face in the future. The planning team should then reach out to local, state, and federal agencies for data about historical threats and hazards faced by the surrounding community. Local and county agencies that have a knowledge of threats and hazards include, but are not limited to, emergency management offices, fire and police departments, as well as local organizations and community groups (e.g., local chapter of the American Red Cross, Community Emergency Response Team), utilities, and other businesses that can provide helpful information.

Assess the Risk Posed by the Identified Threats and Hazards

Once an initial set of threats and hazards have been identified through the process described in the previous section, the planning team should select suitable assessment tools to evaluate the risk posed by the identified threats and hazards.⁴ Evaluating risk entails understanding the probability that the specific threat or hazard will occur; the effects it will likely have, including

⁴ For more information on the threat and hazard identification and risk assessment process, please see FEMA's *Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide (CPG 201)* at <http://www.fema.gov/plan>.

the severity of the impact; the time the school will have to warn students and staff about the threat or hazard; and how long it may last. The local and county emergency management staff should be able to provide information on some of the risks posed by threats and hazards common to the school and surrounding community. This enables the planning team to focus its assessment efforts on threats and hazards unique to the school community, as well as on the particular vulnerabilities of the building and its occupants.

“Vulnerabilities” refers to the characteristics of the school (e.g., structure, equipment, information technology (IT) or electrical systems, grounds, surrounding area) that could make it more susceptible to the identified threats and hazards. Assessing risk and vulnerability enables the planning team to focus its efforts on prioritized threats and hazards.

There are numerous assessments that the planning team may use, including site assessments, culture and climate assessments, school behavioral threat assessments, and capacity assessments. These assessments will help the planning team not only assess risk but also identify resources and issues that the plan may need to address. Through the assessment process, the planning team may also identify additional threats and hazards.

The most successful assessments are conducted by a broad array of individuals, including support staff and first responders. Students and parents, including students and parents with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs, should be included to the maximum extent appropriate. The assessment also has to be strategic: If the school is in an isolated region of a county and the response times for law enforcement officers or fire officials and EMS practitioners are lengthy, that may alter the calculus of the assessment. If response time is lengthy, other security measures may need to be enacted to compensate for lengthy response times.

Assessments will be used not only to develop the initial plan but also to inform updates and revisions to the plan on an ongoing basis. The following table provides more information about some of the most essential assessments the planning team should undertake.⁵

⁵ For more information on assessments and schools, see the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance (TA) Center’s *A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments* at http://rem.ed.gov/display.aspx?page=publications_General.

Table 1: Assessment

Type of Assessment	Description	Purpose and Results
Site Assessment	A site assessment examines the safety, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of the school's buildings and grounds. This assessment includes, but is not limited to, a review of building access and egress control measures, visibility around the exterior of the building, structural integrity of the building, compliance with applicable architectural standards for individuals with disabilities and others with functional and access needs, and emergency vehicle access.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increased understanding of the potential impact of threats and hazards on the school buildings and grounds.• Increased understanding of risk and vulnerabilities of the school buildings and grounds when developing the plan.• Knowledge of which facilities are physically accessible to students, staff, parents, volunteer workers, and emergency response personnel with disabilities and can be used in compliance with the law.
Culture and Climate Assessment	In schools with positive climates, students are more likely to feel connected to adults and their peers. This fosters a nurturing environment where students are more likely to succeed, feel safe, and report threats. A school culture and climate assessment evaluates student and staff connectedness to the school and problem behaviors. For example, this assessment may reveal a high number of bullying incidents, indicating a need to implement an anti-bullying program. If a student survey is used to assess culture and climate, student privacy must be protected. A range of school personnel can assist in the assessment of culture and school climate, including school counselors and mental health staff.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Knowledge of students' and staff's perceptions of their safety.• Knowledge of problem behaviors that need to be addressed to improve school climate.

Type of Assessment	Description	Purpose and Results
School Threat Assessment	A school threat assessment analyzes communication and behaviors to determine whether or not a student, staff, or other person may pose a threat. These assessments must be based on fact, must comply with applicable privacy, civil rights, and other applicable laws, and are often conducted by multidisciplinary threat assessment teams. While a planning team may include the creation of a threat assessment team in its plan, the assessment team is a separate entity from the planning team and meets on its own regular schedule.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Students, staff, or other persons that may pose a threat are identified before a threat develops into an incident and are referred for services, if appropriate.
Capacity Assessment	The planning team needs to know what resources will be at their disposal. A capacity assessment examines the capabilities of students and staff as well as the services and material resources of community partners. This assessment is used to identify people in the building with applicable skills (e.g., first aid certification, search and rescue training, counseling and mental health expertise, ability to assist individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs). Equipment and supplies should also be inventoried. The inventory should include an evaluation of equipment and supplies uniquely for individuals with disabilities, such as evacuation chairs, the availability of sign language interpreters and technology used for effective communication, accessible transportation, and consumable medical supplies and durable medical equipment that may be necessary during a shelter-in-place or evacuation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An increased understanding of the resources available. Information about staff capabilities will help planners assign roles and responsibilities in the plan.

After conducting these assessments, the planning team should consolidate all of the information it has obtained into a format that is usable for comparing the risks posed by the identified threats and hazards. This information will then be used to assess and compare the threats and hazards and their likely consequences. This is referred to as a “risk and vulnerability assessment.” One effective method for organizing information is to create a table with a range of information about each possible threat and hazard, including any new threats or hazards identified through the assessment process. The table should include:

- ❖ Probability or frequency of occurrence (i.e., how often a threat or hazard may occur);
- ❖ Magnitude (i.e., the extent of expected damage);
- ❖ Time available to warn staff, students, and visitors;
- ❖ Duration (i.e., for how long the hazard or threat will be occurring); and
- ❖ Follow-on and cascading effects of threat or hazard.

While some of the information collected will directly feed into this table, other information, for example details on school climate challenges, will have to be organized differently. The most important outcome is that information is clearly presented so that it can be easily used to inform the plan’s development.

Prioritize Threats and Hazards

Next, the planning team should use the information it has organized to compare and prioritize risks posed by threats and hazards. This will allow the team to decide which threats or hazards it will directly address in the plan. The team must consider multiple factors when developing an indicator of risk to the institution. One option is a mathematical approach, which assigns index numbers (e.g., a 1-to-4, 1-to-5, or 1-to-10 scale) for different categories of information used in the ranking scheme. Using this approach, the planning team will categorize threats and hazards as posing a relatively high, medium, or low risk. The following table, “Table 2: Sample Risk Assessment Worksheet” (separate from Table 1, above) provides a sample risk assessment worksheet for comparing and prioritizing threats and hazards.

Table 2: Sample Risk Assessment Worksheet

Hazard	Probability	Magnitude	Warning	Duration	Risk Priority
Fire	4. Highly likely 3. Likely 2. Possible 1. Unlikely	4. Catastrophic 3. Critical 2. Limited 1. Negligible	4. Minimal 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 12–24 hrs. 1. 24+ hrs.	4. 12+ hrs. 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 3–6 hrs. 1. < 3 Hours	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> Low
Hazmat spill outside the school	4. Highly likely 3. Likely 2. Possible 1. Unlikely	4. Catastrophic 3. Critical 2. Limited 1. Negligible	4. Minimal 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 12–4 hrs. 1. 24+ hrs.	4. 12+ hrs. 3. 6–12 hrs. 2. 3–6 hrs. 1. < 3 hrs.	<input type="checkbox"/> High <input type="checkbox"/> Medium <input type="checkbox"/> Low

Step 2 Outcome

After completing Step 2, the planning team has a prioritized (high, medium, or low risk) list of threats and hazards based on the results of the risk assessment.



Step 3: Determine Goals and Objectives

In Step 3, the planning team decides which of the threats and hazards identified in Step 2 will be addressed in the school EOP. The planning team may decide to address only those threats and hazards that rank “high” in risk priority, or they may decide to also address some of the threats and hazards that rank “medium.” This is a critical decision point in the planning process that is left up to the planning team. It is recommended that the team address more than just the “high” risk priority threats and hazards.

Once the planning team has decided which threats and hazards will be addressed in the school EOP, it develops *goals* and *objectives* for each.

Develop Goals and Objectives

Goals are broad, general statements that indicate the desired outcome in response to the threat or hazard identified by planners in the previous step. They are what personnel and other resources are supposed to achieve. They also help identify when major activities are complete and what defines a successful outcome.

The planning team should develop at least *three goals* for addressing each threat or hazard (though the planning team may want to identify more). Those three goals should indicate the

desired outcome for (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the threat or hazard. For a fire, for instance, three possible goals include

- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 1 (before): Prevent a fire from occurring on school grounds.
- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 2 (during): Protect all persons from injury and property from damage by the fire.
- ❖ Hazard Goal Example 3 (after): Provide necessary medical attention to those in need.

Objectives are specific, measurable actions that are necessary to achieve the goals. Often, planners will need to identify multiple objectives in support of a single goal.

Using the goal in Example 1 of preventing a fire on or near school grounds, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 1.1: Provide fire prevention training to all students and staff who use combustible materials or equipment.
- ❖ Objective 1.2: Store combustible materials in fireproof containers or rooms.

Using the goal in Example 2 of protecting all persons from injury by the fire, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 2.1: Evacuate all persons from the building immediately.
- ❖ Objective 2.2: Account for all persons.

Using the goal in Example 3 of providing necessary medical attention to those in need, possible objectives include

- ❖ Objective 3.1: Immediately notify fire department officials and EMS personnel of any fire on schools grounds via 911.
- ❖ Objective 3.2: Immediately begin to provide first aid.

After the team has finished compiling the objectives for the prioritized threats and hazards, it will find that certain critical “*functions*” or activities apply to more than one threat or hazard. Examples of these cross-cutting functions include evacuating, providing medical care, and accounting for all students, staff, and guests.

After identifying these functions, the planning team should develop three goals for each function. As with the goals already identified for threats and hazards, the three goals should indicate the desired outcome for (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the function has been executed. These commonly occurring functions will be contained in a “*Functional Annex*” within the school EOP. More details on these functions are included in the Plan Content section of this guide, including issues to consider as you develop goals and objectives for these functions.

For an evacuation function, three possible goals are

- ❖ Function Goal Example 1 (before): Ensure all students and staff know their evacuation route.
- ❖ Function Goal Example 2 (during): Evacuate the school immediately.
- ❖ Function Goal Example 3 (after): Confirm that all individuals have left the building.

Once the goals for a function are identified, possible supporting objectives are identified. For the evacuation goals above, objectives could include

- ❖ Objective 1.1 (before): Assess, identify, and communicate the location of rally points to be used during an evacuation.
- ❖ Objective 2.1 (during): Evacuate all students, staff, and guests from the school using assigned routes.
- ❖ Objective 3.1 (after): Safely sweep the building.

Step 3 Outcome

After completing Step 3, the planning team has at least three goals (i.e., before, during, and after) for each threat or hazard and function, as well as objectives for each goal.



Step 4: Plan Development (Identifying Courses of Action)

In Step 4, the planning team develops courses of action for accomplishing each of the objectives identified in Step 3 (for threats, hazards, and functions). Courses of action address the what, who, when, where, why, and how for each threat, hazard, and function. The planning team should examine each course of action to determine whether it is feasible and whether the stakeholders necessary to implement it find it acceptable. For additional issues to consider as you develop courses of action for functions, please see the Plan Content section.

Identify Courses of Action

Courses of action include criteria for determining how and when each response will be implemented under a variety of circumstances. Subsequently, the planning team develops response protocols and procedures to support these efforts.

Possible courses of action are typically developed using the following steps:

1. **Depict the scenario.** Create a potential scenario based on the threats and hazards identified and prioritized in Step 2.

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2. **Determine the amount of time available to respond.** This will vary based on the type of threat or hazard and the particular scenario. For example, in the case of a hurricane, the school might have days or hours to respond before the storm makes landfall, while the school may have to respond in minutes to an *active shooter*.
 3. **Identify decision points.** Decision points indicate the place in time, as threats or hazards unfold, when leaders anticipate making decisions about a course of action. Walking through each scenario in detail will help identify the relevant decision points for each one, such as whether or not to evacuate, shelter in place, or lockdown.
 4. **Develop courses of action.** Planners develop courses of action to achieve their goals and objectives by answering the following questions:
 - What is the action?
 - Who is responsible for the action?
 - When does the action take place?
 - How long does the action take and how much time is actually available?
 - What has to happen before?
 - What happens after?
 - What resources are needed to perform the action?
 - How will this action affect specific populations, such as individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs who may require medication, wayfinding, evacuation assistance, or personal assistance services, or who may experience severe anxiety during traumatic events?

PLANS MUST COMPLY WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Plans must comply with the *Americans with Disabilities Act*, among other prohibitions on disability discrimination, across the spectrum of emergency management services, programs, and activities, including preparation, testing, notification and alerts, evacuation, transportation, sheltering, emergency medical care and services, transitioning back, recovery, and repairing and rebuilding. Plans should include students, staff, and parents with disabilities. Among other things, school emergency plans must address the provision of appropriate auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities (e.g., interpreters, captioning, and accessible information technology); ensure individuals with disabilities are not separated from service animals and assistive devices, and can receive disability-related assistance throughout emergencies (e.g., assistance with activities of daily living, administration of medications); and comply with the law's architectural and other requirements. (Information and technical assistance about the *Americans with Disabilities Act* (ADA) is available at <http://www.ada.gov>.)

PLANS MUST ADDRESS LANGUAGE ACCESS

Effective communication with individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP), including students and parents, is an essential component of emergency planning and response. Plans must comply with applicable legal requirements on language access, including *Title VI* of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* (available at <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titlevi.php>) and the *Title VI* regulation of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* (available at <http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/fedagencies.php>).

Select Courses of Action

After developing courses of action, planners compare the costs and benefits of each proposed course of action against the goals and objectives. Based on this comparison, planners select the preferred course or courses of action to move forward in the planning process. Plans often include multiple courses of action for a given scenario to reflect the different ways it could unfold.

After selecting courses of action, the planning team identifies resources necessary to accomplish each course of action without regard to resource availability. Once the planning team identifies all of the requirements, it begins matching available resources to requirements. This step provides planners an opportunity to identify resource gaps or shortfalls that must be taken into account.

Step 4 Outcome

After completing Step 4, the planning team will have identified goals, objectives, and courses of action for before, during, and after threats and hazards, as well as functions.

Goals, objectives, and courses of action for threats and hazards will go into the “Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes” section of the school EOP.

Goals, objectives, and courses of action for functions will be contained in the “Functional Annexes” section of the school EOP.



Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval

In Step 5, the planning team develops a draft of the school EOP using the courses of action developed in Step 4. In addition, the team reviews the plan, obtains official approval, and shares the plan with community partners such as first responders, local emergency management officials, staff, and stakeholders.

Format the Plan

An effective school EOP is presented in a way that makes it easy for users to find the information they need and that is compatible with local and state plans. This may include using

plain language and providing pictures and/or visual cues for key action steps. This guide presents a traditional format that can be tailored to meet individual school needs. This format has three major sections: the Basic Plan, Functional Annexes, and Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes.

The *Basic Plan* section of the school EOP provides an overview of the school's approach to emergency operations. Although the Basic Plan section guides the development of the more operationally oriented annexes, its primary audiences consist of the school, local emergency officials, and the community (as appropriate). The elements listed in this section should meet the needs of these audiences while providing a solid foundation for the development of supporting annexes.

The *Functional Annexes* section details the goals, objectives, and courses of action of functions (e.g., evacuation, communications, recovery) that apply across multiple threats or hazards. Functional annexes set forth how the school manages a function before, during, and after an emergency.

The *Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes* section specifies the goals, objectives, and courses of action that a school will follow to address a particular type of threat or hazard (e.g., hurricane, *active shooter*). Threat- and hazard-specific annexes, like functional annexes, set forth how the school manages a function before, during, and after an emergency.

The following functional format can be used for the Functional Annexes as well as for the Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes sections. Using the format below and the work the planning team did in Step 4, each function, threat, and hazard will have at least three goals, with one or more objectives for each goal and a course of action for each of the objectives.

- ❖ Title (the function, threat, or hazard)
- ❖ Goal(s)
- ❖ Objective(s)
- ❖ Courses of Action (Describe the courses of action you developed in Step 4 in the sequence in which they will occur.)

Figure 2 below outlines the different components of each of these three sections. This guide details the contents of these three sections under Plan Content.⁶

⁶ The term *annex* is used throughout this guide to refer to functional, hazard- or threat-specific, or other supplements to the basic plan. Some plans may use the term *appendix* in the same fashion (e.g., hazard-specific appendix).

Figure 2: Traditional EOP Format

School EOP Format

Basic Plan

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Introductory Material | 2.4. Planning Assumptions |
| 1.1. Promulgation Document and Signatures | 3. Concept of Operations |
| 1.2. Approval and Implementation | 4. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities |
| 1.3. Record and Changes | 5. Direction, Control, and Coordination |
| 1.4. Record of Distribution | 6. Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination |
| 1.5. Table of Contents | 7. Training and Exercises |
| 2. Purpose, Scope, Situation Overview, and Assumptions | 8. Administration, Finance, and Logistics |
| 2.1. Purpose | 9. Plan Development and Maintenance |
| 2.2. Scope | 10. Authorities and References |
| 2.3. Situation Overview | |

Functional Annexes

NOTE: This is not a complete list, but it is recommended that all EOPs include at least the following functional annexes:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Communications | 6. Reunification |
| 2. Evacuation | 7. Continuity of Operations (COOP) |
| 3. Shelter-in-Place | 8. Security |
| 4. Lockdown | 9. Recovery |
| 5. Accounting for All Persons | 10. Health and Medical |

Threat- or Hazard-Specific Annexes

NOTE: This is not a complete list. Each school's annexes will vary based on its hazard analysis.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Hurricane or Severe Storm | 5. Mass Casualty Incident |
| 2. Earthquake | 6. <i>Active Shooter</i> |
| 3. Tornado | 7. Pandemic or Disease Outbreak |
| 4. Hazardous Materials Incident | |

Write the Plan

As the planning team works through the draft, the members add necessary tables, charts, and other supporting graphics. The planning team circulates a draft to obtain the comments of stakeholders that have responsibilities for implementing the plan. Successful plans are written according to the following simple rules.

1. Summarize important information with checklists and visual aids, such as maps and flowcharts.
2. Write clearly, using plain language, avoiding jargon, minimizing the use of abbreviations, and using short sentences and the active voice. Qualifiers and vague wording only add to confusion.
3. Use a logical, consistent structure that makes it easy for readers to grasp the rationale for the sequence of the information and to scan for the information they need.

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4. Provide enough detail to convey an easily understood plan that is actionable. For example, classroom teachers may have a one-page document that covers what they will need to know and do during an emergency, or create flip-charts, posters, or signs giving simple directions. Organize the contents in a way that helps users quickly identify solutions and options. Plans should provide guidance for carrying out common courses of action, through the functional and threat- and hazard-specific annexes, while also staying out of the weeds.
 5. Develop accessible tools and documents. Use appropriate auxiliary aids and services necessary for effective communication, such as accessible websites, digital text that can be converted to audio or Braille, text equivalents for images, and captioning of any audio and audio description of any video content.

Review the Plan

Planners should check the written plan for compliance with applicable laws and for its usefulness in practice. Commonly used criteria can help determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the plan. The following measures can help determine if a plan is of high quality:

- ❖ A plan is *adequate* if the plan identifies and addresses critical courses of action effectively; the plan can accomplish the assigned function; and the plan's assumptions are valid and reasonable.
- ❖ A plan is *feasible* if the school can accomplish the assigned function and critical tasks by using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan.
- ❖ A plan is *acceptable* if it meets the requirements driven by a threat or hazard, meets cost and time limitations, and is consistent with the law.
- ❖ A plan is *complete* if it
 - Incorporates all courses of action to be accomplished for all selected threats and hazards and identified functions;
 - Integrates the needs of the whole school community;
 - Provides a complete picture of what should happen, when, and at whose direction;
 - Estimates time for achieving objectives, with safety remaining as the utmost priority;
 - Identifies success criteria and a desired end state; and
 - Conforms with the planning principles outlined in this guide.
- ❖ The plan must *comply* with applicable state and local requirements because these provide a baseline that facilitates both planning and execution.

Additionally, when reviewing the plan, the planning team does not have to provide all of the resources needed to execute a course of action or meet a requirement established during the

planning effort. However, the plan should explain where or how the district and school will obtain the resources to support those requirements.

Approve and Share the Plan

After finalizing the plan, the planning team should present it to the appropriate leadership and obtain official approval of the plan. The team should then share the plan with its community partners who have a responsibility in the plan (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) and additional stakeholders that have a role in the plan, including relevant district, local, regional, and/or state agencies with which the plan will be coordinated. The plan should also be shared with other organizations that may use the school building(s).

Schools should be careful to protect the plan from those who are not authorized to have it and should consider how they will secure documents shared electronically. Law enforcement agencies and first responders have a secured, Web-accessible site available to house copies of plans, building schematics, phone contact sheets, and other important details that round out planning. Schools must comply with state and local open records laws in storing and protecting the plan.

The team should maintain a record of the people and organizations that receive a copy of the plan.

Step 5 Outcome

After completing Step 5, the planning team will have a final school EOP.



Step 6: Plan Implementation and Maintenance

Train Stakeholders on the Plan and Their Roles

Everyone involved in the plan needs to know her or his roles and responsibilities before, during, and after an emergency. Key training components include:

Hold a meeting. At least once a year, hold a meeting to educate all parties on the plan. Go through the plan to familiarize these stakeholders with it.

Visit evacuation sites. Show involved parties not only where evacuation sites are located but also where specific areas, such as reunification areas, media areas, and triage areas will be located.

Give involved parties appropriate and relevant literature on the plan, policies, and procedures. It may also be helpful to provide all parties with quick reference guides that remind them of key courses of action.

Post key information throughout the building. It is important that students and staff are familiar with and have easy access to information such as evacuation routes and shelter-in-place procedures and locations. Ensure that information concerning evacuation routes and shelter-in-

place procedures and locations is effectively communicated to students, staff, and parents with disabilities as well as others with access and functional needs, such as by distributing the materials by e-mail in an accessible format.

Familiarize students and staff with the plan and community partners. Bringing community partners (e.g., law enforcement officers, fire officials, and EMS personnel) that have a role into the school to talk about the plan will make students and staff feel more comfortable working with these partners.

Train staff on the skills necessary to fulfill their roles. Staff will be assigned specific roles in the plan and positions supporting the Incident Command System (ICS) that will require special skills, such as first aid, threat assessment, and provision of personal assistance services for students with disabilities, and others with access and functional needs. Also, substitute teachers must be trained on the plan and their roles in the plan.

Exercise the Plan

The more a plan is practiced and stakeholders are trained on the plan, the more effectively they will be able to act before, during, and after an emergency to lessen the impact on life and property. Exercises provide opportunities to practice with community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management personnel), as well as to identify gaps and weaknesses in the plan. The exercises below require increasing amounts of planning, time, and resources. Ideally, schools will create an exercise program, building from a tabletop exercise up to a more advanced exercise, like a functional exercise:

- ❖ **Tabletop exercises:** Tabletop exercises are small-group discussions that walk through a scenario and the courses of action a school will need to take before, during, and after an emergency to lessen the impact on the school community. This activity helps assess the plan and resources, and facilitates an understanding of emergency management and planning concepts.
- ❖ **Drills:** During drills, school personnel and community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) use the actual school grounds and buildings to practice responding to a scenario.
- ❖ **Functional exercises:** Functional exercises are similar to drills but involve multiple partners; some may be conducted district-wide. Participants react to realistic simulated events (e.g., a bomb threat, or an intruder with a gun in a classroom), and implement the plan and procedures using the ICS.
- ❖ **Full-scale exercises:** These exercises are the most time-consuming activity in the exercise continuum and are multiagency, multijurisdictional efforts in which all resources are deployed. This type of exercise tests collaboration among the agencies and participants, public information systems, communications systems, and equipment. An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is established by either law enforcement or fire services, and the ICS is activated.

Before making a decision about how many and which types of exercises to implement, a school should consider the costs and benefits of each, as well as any state or local requirements. For

example, while a tabletop exercise may be less costly and less time-consuming to run, a full-scale exercise provides a more realistic context for the simulated response to an emergency situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to improve the plans. If students are involved, the school should also consider the age of the student population when selecting the appropriate exercise. Schools should also consider whether to include parents and should take into account the cultural diversity of their populations when designing exercises and training.

It is up to the planning team to decide how often exercises should be conducted. While frequent exercise is important, it is imperative that exercises are of high quality.

To effectively execute an exercise

- ❖ Include community partners such as first responders (law enforcement officers, EMS practitioners, and fire department personnel) and local emergency management staff;
- ❖ Communicate information in advance to avoid confusion and concern;
- ❖ Exercise under different and non-ideal conditions (e.g., times of day, weather conditions, points in the academic calendar, absence of key personnel, and various school events);
- ❖ Be consistent with common emergency management terminology;
- ❖ Debrief and develop an after-action report that evaluates results, identifies gaps or shortfalls, and documents lessons learned; and
- ❖ Discuss how the school EOP and procedures will be modified, if needed, and specify who has the responsibility for modifying the plan.

For additional information on conducting exercises, please see the *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Guide* at https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP10.aspx.

Review, Revise, and Maintain the Plan

This step closes the loop in the planning process. It focuses on adding the information gained from exercising the plan to the research collected in Step 2, starting the planning cycle over again. Remember, planning is a continuous process even after the plan is published. Plans should evolve as the school and planning team learn lessons, obtain new information and insights, and update priorities.

Reviews should be a recurring activity. Planning teams should establish a process for reviewing and revising the plan. Many schools review their plans on an annual basis. In no case should any part of a plan go for more than two years without being reviewed and revised.

Some schools have found it useful to review and revise portions instead of reviewing the entire plan at once. Schools may consider reviewing a portion each month or at natural breaks in the academic calendar. Certain events will also provide new information that will be used to inform the plan. Schools should consider reviewing and updating their plans or sections of their plans after

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- ❖ Actual emergencies;
 - ❖ Changes have been made in policy, personnel, organizational structures, processes, facilities, or equipment;
 - ❖ Formal updates of planning guidance or standards have been finalized;
 - ❖ Formal exercises have taken place;
 - ❖ Changes in the school and surrounding community have occurred;
 - ❖ Threats or hazards change or new ones emerge; or
 - ❖ Ongoing assessments generate new information.

The planning team should ensure that all community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency management staff) have the most current version of the school EOP.

PLAN CONTENT

Step 5 of the planning process in this guide introduced a format with three sections for schools to follow in developing a school EOP. This section provides greater detail about what each of the three sections should include and some key considerations in developing the content.

The Basic Plan

The Basic Plan section of the school EOP provides an overview of the school's approach to operations before, during, and after an emergency. This section addresses the overarching activities the school undertakes regardless of the function, threat, or hazard. The content in this section provides a solid foundation for the school's operations. The information in this section should not duplicate information contained in other parts of the plan. Almost all of the information contained in the basic plan should be able to come from the planning team. If the planning team finds that it has to go outside its members for a significant amount of information, it may be an indication that the planning team membership needs to be expanded.

Introductory Material

Introductory material can enhance accountability with community partners, including first responders, local emergency managers, and public and mental health officials, and make a school EOP easier to use. Typical introductory material includes:

- ❖ **Cover Page.** The cover page includes the title of the plan, a date, and the school(s) covered by the plan.
- ❖ **Promulgation Documentor Signature Page.** This document or page contains a signed statement formally recognizing and adopting the school EOP. It gives both the authority and the responsibility to school officials to perform their tasks before, during, or after an incident, and therefore should be signed by the school administrator or another authorizing official.

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- ❖ **Approval and Implementation Page.** The approval and implementation page introduces the plan, outlines its applicability, and indicates that it supersedes all previous plans. It includes a delegation of authority for specific modifications that can be made to the plan and by whom they can be made without the school administrator's signature. It also includes a date and should be signed by the authorized school administrator.
 - ❖ **Record of Changes.** Each update or change to the plan should be tracked. The record of changes, usually in table format, contains, at a minimum, a change number, the date of the change, the name of the person who made the change, and a summary of the change.
 - ❖ **Record of Distribution.** The record of distribution, usually in table format, indicates the title and the name of the person receiving the plan, the agency to which the recipient belongs (either the school office or, if from outside the school, the name of the appropriate government agency or private-sector entity), the date of delivery, and the number of copies delivered. Other relevant information could be considered. The record of distribution can be used to prove that individuals and organizations with specified roles have acknowledged their receipt, review, and/or acceptance of the plan. Copies of the plan can be made available to the public and media without sensitive information, in accordance with public records laws.
 - ❖ **Table of Contents.** The table of contents is a logically ordered, clearly identified layout of the major sections and subsections of the plan that will make finding information within the plan easier.

Purpose and Situation Overview

The Purpose and Situation Overview section includes the following components:

- ❖ **Purpose.** The purpose sets the foundation for the rest of the school EOP. The basic plan's purpose is a general statement of what the school EOP is meant to do. The statement should be supported by a brief synopsis of the basic plan and annexes.
- ❖ **Situation Overview.** The situation section explains why a school EOP is necessary. The situation section covers a general discussion of
 - The threats and hazards that pose a risk to the school and would result in a need to use this plan; and
 - Dependencies on parties outside the school for critical resources.

Concept of Operations

The Concept of Operations section explains in broad terms the school administrator's intent with regard to an operation.

This section is designed to give an overall picture of how the school will protect the students, staff, and visitors, and should

- ❖ Identify those with authority to activate the plan (e.g., school administrators, department heads);
- ❖ Describe the process by which the school coordinates with all appropriate agencies, boards, or divisions within the jurisdiction;
- ❖ Describe how plans take into account the architectural, programmatic, and communication rights of individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs;
- ❖ Identify other response and support agency plans that directly support the implementation of this plan (e.g., city or county EOP, school EOPs from schools co-located on the campus);
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken before an emergency is to prevent, protect from, and mitigate the impact on life or property;
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken during an emergency is to respond to the emergency and minimize its impact on life or property; and
- ❖ Explain that the primary purpose of actions taken after an emergency is to recover from its impact on life or property.

Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

This section provides an overview of the broad roles and responsibilities of school staff, families, guardians, and community partners (e.g., first responders, local emergency managers, public and mental health personnel), and of organizational functions *during* all emergencies. It

- ❖ Describes the broad roles and responsibilities of individuals that apply *during*⁷ all emergencies.
 - Individuals that the planning team may wish to include in this section of the plan are principals and other school administrative leaders, teachers, support personnel (e.g., instructional aides, counselors, social workers, psychologists, nurses, maintenance staff, school resource officers [SROs], cafeteria workers, bus drivers), and parents and guardians.
 - The planning team may also wish to include community-based organizations represented in the EOP.

⁷ If the planning team considers the information critical to the successful implementation of the plan, it may identify roles and responsibilities of one or more of these individuals before and after an emergency in addition to during an emergency.

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- The following is an example of the type of information that would be included in the plan to describe the broad roles and responsibilities of teachers during all emergencies.
 - Teachers will be responsible for the supervision of students and shall remain with students until directed otherwise. Teachers' responsibilities include:
 - ✓ directing students to inside or outside assembly areas according to instructions provided by the Incident Commander or designee;
 - ✓ accounting for students when class relocates to an outside or inside assembly area or evacuates to another location;
 - ✓ reporting missing students to the Incident Commander or designee;
 - ✓ obtaining first-aid services for injured students; and if trained and certified in first aid, rendering first aid, if necessary.
 - ❖ Describes informal and formal agreements in place for the quick activation and sharing of resources during an emergency (e.g., evacuation locations to a nearby business' parking lot). Agreements may be between the school and response groups (e.g., fire department, police department), neighboring schools, organizations, and businesses.

Direction, Control, and Coordination

This section describes the framework for all direction, control, and coordination activities. It should explain

- ❖ The ICS structure as used by the school;
- ❖ The relationship between the school EOP and the district, or the broader community's emergency management system; and
- ❖ Who has control of the equipment, resources, and supplies needed to support the school EOP.

Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination

This section addresses the role of information in the successful implementation of the activities that occur before, during, and after an emergency.

- ❖ Identify the type of information that will be helpful in the successful implementation of the activities that occur before, during, and after an emergency, such as
 - Before and during: weather reports, law enforcement alerts, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration radio alerts, crime reports.
 - After: mental health agencies' websites and hotlines, and emergency management and relief agencies websites and hotlines assisting in all aspects of recovery.

-
- ❖ For each of the identified types of information, provide answers to the following questions:
 - What is the source of the information?
 - Who analyzes and uses the information?
 - How is the information collected and shared?
 - What is the format for providing the information to those who will use it?
 - When should the information be collected and shared?

Training and Exercises

This section describes the critical training and exercise activities the school will use in support of the plan. This includes the core training objectives and frequency to ensure that staff, students, faculty, parents, and community representatives understand roles, responsibilities, and expectations. This section also establishes the expected frequency of exercises to be conducted by the school. Content may be influenced based on similar requirements at the district and/or local jurisdiction level(s). Exercises may range from basic fire and shelter-in-place drills to full-scale communitywide drills that realistically portray a crisis and show the role the school plays in school district and municipal planning.

Administration, Finance, and Logistics

This section covers general support requirements and the availability of services and support for all types of emergencies, as well as general policies for managing resources. It should identify and reference policies and procedures that exist outside the plan. This section should

- ❖ Identify administrative controls (e.g., budget and acquisition policies and procedures) and requirements that will be used to provide resource and expenditure accountability;
- ❖ Briefly describe how the school will maintain accurate logs of key activities;
- ❖ Briefly describe how vital records (e.g., student records) will be preserved (details may be contained in a Continuity of Operations [COOP] functional annex); and
- ❖ Identify general policies for keeping financial records, tracking resource needs, tracking the source and use of resources, acquiring ownership of resources, and compensating the owners of private property used by the school.

Plan Development and Maintenance

This section discusses the overall approach to planning and the assignment of plan development and maintenance responsibilities. This section

- ❖ Describes the planning process, participants in that process, and how development and revision of different sections of the school EOP (basic plan and annexes) are coordinated before an emergency;

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- ❖ Assigns responsibility for the overall planning and coordination to a specific position or person; and
 - ❖ Provides for a regular cycle of training, evaluating, reviewing, and updating of the school EOP.

Authorities and References

This section provides the legal basis for emergency operations and activities, and includes

- ❖ Lists of laws, statutes, ordinances, executive orders, regulations, and formal agreements relevant to emergencies; and
- ❖ Provisions for the succession of decision-making authority and operational control to ensure that critical emergency functions can be performed in the absence of the school administrator.

Functional Annexes Content

Functional annexes focus on critical operational functions and the courses of action developed to carry them out. This section of the guide describes functional annexes that schools should address in developing a comprehensive, high-quality school EOP. As the planning team assesses the school's needs, it may need to prepare additional or different annexes. Also included in this section are issues the planning team should consider as it develops goals, objectives, and courses of action for these functions. While these are some of the most important issues, they are not meant to constitute an exhaustive list.

While these functions should be described separately, it is important to remember that many functions will occur consecutively. For example, a shelter-in-place during an emergency may be implemented but, if the building is damaged, the school may then initiate an evacuation.

Often, multiple functions will also be performed concurrently. For example, during an evacuation, once students are safely out of the building, the accounting for students, staff, and guests function will begin. The evacuation function, however, will still be in effect as staff or first responders work to locate and evacuate any persons not accounted for.

While functions build upon one another and overlap, it is not necessary to repeat a course of action in one functional annex if it appears in a second functional annex. For example, though an evacuation may lead to reunification, it is not necessary to list a course of action for reunification within the Evacuation Annex.

Evacuation Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action that schools will execute to evacuate school buildings and grounds.

The planning team should consider the following when developing their goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to safely move students and visitors to designated assembly areas from classrooms, outside areas, cafeterias, and other school locations.

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- ❖ How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
 - ❖ How to evacuate students who are not with a teacher or staff member.
 - ❖ How to evacuate individuals with disabilities (along with service animals and assistive devices, e.g., wheelchairs) and others with access and functional needs, including language, transportation, and medical needs.

Lockdown Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action schools will execute to secure school buildings and grounds during incidents that pose an immediate threat of violence in or around the school. The primary objective of a lockdown is to quickly ensure all school staff, students, and visitors are secured in the rooms away from immediate danger.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to lock all exterior doors, and when it may or may not be safe to do so.
- ❖ How particular classroom and building characteristics (i.e., windows, doors) impact possible lockdown courses of action.
- ❖ What to do when a threat materializes inside the school.
- ❖ When to use the different variations of a lockdown (e.g., when outside activities are curtailed, doors are locked, and visitors are closely monitored, but all other school activities continue as normal).

Shelter-in-Place Annex

A Shelter-in-Place annex focuses on courses of action when students and staff are required to remain indoors, perhaps for an extended period of time, because it is safer inside the building or a room than outside. Depending on the threat or hazard, students and staff may be required to move to rooms that can be sealed (such as in the event of a chemical or biological hazard) or without windows, or to a weather shelter (such as in the event of a tornado).

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ What supplies will be needed to seal the room and to provide for the needs of students and staff (e.g., water).
- ❖ How a shelter-in-place can affect individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs, such as students who require the regular administration of medication, durable medical equipment, and personal assistant services.
- ❖ How to move students when the primary route is unusable.
- ❖ How to locate and move students who are not with a teacher or staff member.

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- ❖ Consider the need for and integration of “safe rooms” for protection against extreme wind hazards (such as a tornado or hurricane) in order to provide immediate life-safety protection when evacuation is not an option.

Accounting for All Persons Annex

This annex focuses on developing courses of action for accounting for the whereabouts and well-being of students, staff, and visitors, and identifying those who may be missing.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How staff will determine who is in attendance at the assembly area.
- ❖ What to do when a student, staff member, or guest cannot be located.
- ❖ How staff will report to the assembly supervisor.
- ❖ How and when students will be dismissed or released.

Communications and Warning Annex

The Communications and Warning annex includes communication and coordination during emergencies and disasters (both internal communication and communication with external stakeholders), as well as the communication of emergency protocols before an emergency and communication after an emergency.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How the school’s communications system integrates into the local disaster and response law enforcement communication networks (e.g., fire department and law enforcement staff).
- ❖ How to ensure relevant staff members can operate communications equipment.
- ❖ How the school will communicate with students, families, and the broader community before, during, and after an emergency.
- ❖ How to account for technology barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How to effectively address language access barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How the school will handle the media (e.g., district or school Public Information Officer [PIO]).
- ❖ How impacts on students will be communicated to the community, including the impact on activities related to the school but not necessarily at the school or during regular school hours (i.e., church use of school property and athletic events).

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- ❖ How the school will ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs (e.g., coordinating with first responders and local emergency managers to provide sign language interpreters for use during press conferences, publishing only accessible documents, ensuring information on websites is accessible).

Family Reunification Annex

The Family Reunification annex details how students will be reunited with their families or guardians.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How to inform families and guardians about the reunification process in advance, and how to clearly describe their roles and responsibilities in reunification.
- ❖ How to verify that an adult is authorized to take custody of a student.
- ❖ How to facilitate communication between the parent check-in and the student assembly and reunion areas.
- ❖ How to ensure students do not leave on their own.
- ❖ How to protect the privacy of students and parents from the media.
- ❖ How to reduce confusion during the reunification process.
- ❖ How frequently families will be updated.
- ❖ How to account for technology barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.
- ❖ How to effectively address language access barriers faced by students, staff, parents, and guardians.

Telling Family Members That Their Loved One Is Missing, Injured, or Killed

When reunification is not possible because a child is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their loved one is missing or has been injured or killed. Law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications, but all parties must understand their roles and responsibilities. This will ensure that parents and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate manner.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. Having trained personnel on hand or immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Counselors should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The school EOP should include pre-identified points of contact (e.g., counselors, police officers) to work with and support family members. These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while children are still missing but also before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long-term.

The school EOP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help in regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. Often, a family that has lost a child may have other children or another child in the school. It is critical that these families and loved ones are supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving child(ren).

The school EOP also should explicitly address how impacted families and children will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from families and students while the emergency is ongoing, and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.

Continuity of Operations (COOP) Annex

This annex describes how a school and district will help ensure that essential functions continue during an emergency and its immediate aftermath. Essential functions include business services (payroll and purchasing), communication (internal and external), computer and systems support, facilities maintenance, safety and security, and continuity of teaching and learning.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How the COOP annex will be designed so that it can be activated at any time and sustained for up to 30 days.

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- ❖ How the COOP annex will set priorities for re-establishing essential functions, such as restoration of school operations, and maintaining the safety and well-being of students and the learning environment.
 - ❖ How the COOP annex will ensure students receive applicable related services in the event of a prolonged closure.

Recovery Annex

This annex describes how schools will recover from an emergency. The four most fundamental kinds of recovery are academic recovery, physical recovery, fiscal recovery, and psychological and emotional recovery.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ Academic recovery
 - When the school should be closed and reopened, and who has the authority to do so.
 - What temporary space(s) the school may use if school buildings cannot be immediately reopened.
 - How to provide alternate educational programming in the event that students cannot physically reconvene.
- ❖ Physical recovery
 - How to document school assets, including physically accessible facilities, in case of damage.
 - Which personnel have expert knowledge of the schools' assets, and how and where they will access records to verify current assets after disaster strikes.
 - How the school will work with utility and insurance companies before an emergency to support a quicker recovery.
- ❖ Fiscal recovery
 - How district leadership will be included (e.g., superintendent, chief business officer, personnel director, and risk manager).
 - How staff will receive timely and factual information regarding returning to work.
 - What sources the school may access for emergency relief funding.
- ❖ Psychological and emotional recovery
 - Who will serve as the team leader.

-
- Where counseling and psychological first aid will be provided.
 - How teachers will create a calm and supportive environment for the students, share basic information about the incident, provide psychological first aid (if trained), and identify students and staff who may need immediate crisis counseling.
 - Who will provide trained counselors.
 - How to address the immediate, short-, and long-term counseling needs of students, staff, and families.
 - How to handle commemorations, memorial activities, or permanent markers and/or memorial structures (if any will be allowed). This includes concerns such as when a commemoration site will be closed, what will be done with notes and tributes, and how students will be informed in advance.
 - How memorial activities will strike a balance among honoring the loss, resuming school and class routines and schedules, and maintaining hope for the future.
 - How the Public Health, Medical and Mental Health annex will inform the actions and plans of the Recovery annex.

Public Health, Medical, and Mental Health Annex

This annex describes the courses of action that the school will implement to address emergency medical (e.g., first aid), public health, and mental health counseling issues. Schools should coordinate these efforts with the appropriate emergency medical services, public health, mental health, law enforcement, fire department, and emergency management representatives. Mental health needs after an emergency will be addressed in the Recovery annex.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ What the role of staff members is in providing first aid during an emergency.
- ❖ Where emergency medical supplies (e.g., first aid kits, AEDs) will be located and who is responsible for purchasing and maintaining those materials.
- ❖ Which staff have relevant training or experience, such as in first aid or CPR.
- ❖ How the school will secure a sufficient number of counselors in the event of an emergency.
- ❖ How the school will promptly share and report information about outbreaks or epidemics or other unusual medical situations to the local health department.
- ❖ How the school will support the needs of students identified by the threat assessment team.

Security Annex

This annex focuses on the courses of action that schools will implement on a routine, ongoing basis to secure the school from criminal threats originating from both inside and outside the school. This includes efforts done in conjunction with law enforcement personnel.

The planning team should consider the following when developing its goals, objectives, and courses of action:

- ❖ How agreements with law enforcement agencies address the daily role of law enforcement officers in and around school.
- ❖ How to make sure the building is physically secure (including implementation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design [CPTED]).

CPTED Principles

Natural surveillance – arranging physical features to maximize visibility

Natural access control – guiding people with signage, well-marked entrances and exits, and landscaping while limiting access to certain areas by using real or symbolic barriers

Territoriality reinforcement – clearly delineating space, expressing pride and ownership, and creating a welcoming environment

Management and maintenance – ensuring building services function properly and safely, and the exterior is properly maintained and organized with landscaping and plantings maintained and trimmed

The American Clearinghouse on Educational Facilities, available at <http://www.acefacilities.org>, provides additional information describing how CPTED can be applied in the school environment.

- ❖ How to get students to and from school safely (including traffic control and pedestrian safety).
- ❖ How to keep prohibited items out of school.
- ❖ How to respond to threats identified by the behavioral threat assessment team.
- ❖ How information will be shared with law enforcement officers or other responders (keeping in mind any requirements or limitations of applicable privacy laws, including the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 [FERPA]*, the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [HIPAA]*, and civil rights and other laws. More information on *FERPA* and *HIPAA* can be found in “A Closer Look, Information Sharing”).

Threat- and Hazard-Specific Annexes

The Threat- and Hazard-specific annexes describe the courses of action unique to particular threats and hazards. Courses of action already outlined in a Functional annex need not be

repeated in a Hazard-Specific annex. Schools will develop these based on the prioritized list of hazards determined in the assessment process. As planning teams develop courses of action for threats and hazards, they should consider the federal, state, and local regulations or mandates that often apply to specific hazards.

If there is a Functional annex that applies to one of the threat or hazard annexes, the latter will include it by reference. For example, if a “during” course of action for a fire hazard involves evacuation, and there is an evacuation annex, the Fire annex would indicate “see Evacuation annex” in the “during” course of action section rather than repeat the evacuation courses of action in the Fire annex.

Table 3: Threat and Hazard Types and Examples

Threat and Hazard Type	Examples
Natural Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Earthquakes • Tornadoes • Lightning • Severe wind • Hurricanes • Floods • Wildfires • Extreme temperatures • Landslides or mudslides • Tsunamis • Volcanic eruptions • Winter precipitation
Technological Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explosions or accidental release of toxins from industrial plants • Accidental release of hazardous materials from within the school, such as gas leaks or laboratory spills • Hazardous materials releases from major highways or railroads • Radiological releases from nuclear power stations • Dam failure • Power failure • Water failure
Biological Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infectious diseases, such as pandemic influenza, extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, <i>Staphylococcus aureus</i>, and meningitis • Contaminated food outbreaks, including <i>Salmonella</i>, botulism, and <i>E. coli</i> • Toxic materials present in school laboratories
Adversarial, Incidental, and Human-caused Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire • <i>Active shooters</i> • Criminal threats or actions • Gang violence • Bomb threats • Domestic violence and abuse • Cyber attacks • Suicide

A CLOSER LOOK

This section of the guide provides users with information on four key topics to enhance the implementation of their Emergency Operations Plans (EOP). These topics are described in the following chapters:

- ❖ “Information Sharing” provides an overview of the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act*, the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act*, and the implications that these federal statutes may have for information-sharing in the emergency planning process.
- ❖ “Psychological First Aid for Schools” (PFA-S) describes this type of aid and how schools can use it to help students, staff, and families during and immediately after a traumatic incident.
- ❖ “School Climate and Emergencies” describes how a positive school climate provides students with ready access to emotional and behavioral supports that can affect the capacity of students and staff to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies.
- ❖ “*Active Shooter Situations*” describes unique challenges involved in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a school-based shooting.

1. Information Sharing

This section of “A Closer Look” provides an overview of the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)* and the implications that this and other federal statutes have for information-sharing in the emergency planning process. This section also provides a brief overview of the more limited circumstances when the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)* may apply to impact information-sharing in the school setting.

While it is critical that schools comply with these laws, there is often confusion about their applicability, which results in schools sharing less than allowed with law enforcement officers or the appropriate authorities even when there is appropriate cause for sharing information. If schools understand when and how these laws apply, they can both ensure public safety and protect student privacy.

While this section of the guide focuses on *FERPA*, and to a lesser extent *HIPAA*, there may be federal and state civil rights and other laws that place restrictions on when and with whom schools may share information. At the federal level, for instance, public elementary and secondary schools are subject to federal civil rights laws, including laws that prohibit discrimination based on disability (the *Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]*), and *Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973*; race, color, and national origin (*Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*); sex (*Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*); and religion (*Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*). For example, *Section 504 and Title II of the ADA*⁸ prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability, and generally would prohibit unnecessary disclosures of disability status or information related to that disability, to third parties.⁹ Disclosures may be necessary when the student presents a significant, articulable threat to others.¹⁰

Schools are strongly urged to take the time to review these laws, as well as others that apply in their jurisdictions, when working with their community partners to ensure that all parties have a strong understanding of applicable laws when deciding whether to disclose information. In particular, it is critical to train school employees, including contractors, on applicable laws to ensure that schools, school officials, or employees do not release information inappropriately or make decisions about students or release of records based upon myths, fears, or stereotypes related to race, color, national origin, sex, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity.¹¹

⁸ *Title II of the ADA* prohibits discrimination based on disability by public entities, including public schools.

⁹ See 34 CFR § 104.4; 28 CFR § 35.130; “Dear Colleague Letter” and “Frequently Asked Questions on Report Cards and Transcripts for Students with Disabilities Attending Public Elementary and Secondary Schools,” October 2008. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20081017.pdf>.

¹⁰ See 28 CFR 35.139.

¹¹ For more information about applicable civil rights statutes, please visit www.justice.gov/crt, www.ed.gov/ocr or www.ada.gov. Information about appropriate training and management for school resource officers and law enforcement officials in schools may be found at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)

In this section:

- What Is *FERPA*?
- What Are “Education Records?”
- Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records?
- Balancing Safety and Privacy
 - The Health and Safety Emergency Exception to the Consent Requirement
 - The Law Enforcement Unit Record Exception to the Definition of Education Records
 - Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings
 - Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations
- Incorporating *FERPA* Into Your Emergency Planning Process
 - What Information Is *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?
 - What Information Is Not *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?
- Frequently Asked Questions Pertaining to *FERPA*
- *FERPA* Guidance and Resources

What Is *FERPA*?

FERPA is a federal law that protects the privacy of student *education records*. The law applies to all educational agencies and institutions that receive funds under any U.S. Department of Education program (termed “schools” below). *FERPA* gives parents certain rights with respect to their children's education records. These rights transfer to the student when he or she reaches the age of 18 or attends a school beyond the high school level. Students to whom the rights have transferred are “eligible students.” The Family Policy Compliance Office at the U.S. Department of Education administers *FERPA*.

FERPA protects the rights of parents or eligible students to

- ❖ Inspect and review education records;
- ❖ Seek to amend education records; and
- ❖ Consent to the disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) from education records, except as specified by law.

For a thorough review of *FERPA*, in addition to what is provided in this document, please see the implementing regulations for *FERPA*, found in Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 99, and the resources and guidance documents listed at the end of this section.

What Are “Education Records?”

Different types of records and information may be protected by *FERPA* if determined to be “education records.” Education records are protected by *FERPA* and are broadly defined as records that are directly related to a student and maintained by an educational agency or institution, or by a party acting for the agency or institution.

The non-exhaustive chart below shows several examples of what types of records generally *are* and *are not* considered to be education records.

Education Records	Not Education Records
Transcripts	Records that are kept in the sole possession of the maker and used only as personal memory aids
Disciplinary records	Law enforcement unit records
Standardized test results	Grades on peer-graded papers before they are collected and recorded by a teacher
Health (including mental health) and family history records	Records created or received by a school after an individual is no longer in attendance and that are not directly related to the individual's attendance at the school
Records on services provided to students under the <i>Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)</i>	Employee records that relate exclusively to an individual in that individual's capacity as an employee
Records on services and accommodations provided to students under <i>Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973</i> and <i>Title II of the ADA</i> ¹²	Information obtained through a school official's personal knowledge or observation and not from the student's education records

See the discussion under “Balancing Safety and Privacy” below for more detail on law enforcement units under *FERPA*, what constitutes a law enforcement unit record, and how these records may be used.

Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records?

“School officials with a legitimate educational interest” may access *FERPA*-protected education records. Schools determine the criteria for who is considered a school official with a legitimate

¹² Schools should also consider carefully whether information they are requiring for student enrollment in services, including special education services, will tend to identify a student as a person with a disability and determine to what extent laws other than *FERPA* should be considered before release of that information without consent. In addition, release of details about some disabilities or accommodations that permit the student to be identified could constitute discrimination on the basis of disability pursuant to the *ADA* or the *Rehabilitation Act* or other civil rights statutes.

educational interest under *FERPA* regulations, and it generally includes teachers, counselors, school administrators, and other school staff.

The term “school official with a legitimate educational interest” may also include contractors, consultants, volunteers, and other parties if those individuals

- ❖ Perform an institutional service or function for which the agency or institution would otherwise use employees;
- ❖ Are under the direct control of the agency or institution with respect to the use and maintenance of education records; and
- ❖ Are subject to the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.33(a), which specifies that individuals who receive information from education records may use the information only for the purposes for which the disclosure was made and which generally prohibits the redisclosure of PII from education records to any other party without the prior consent of the parent or eligible student. There are, however, exceptions to this prohibition.

In addition, schools must annually notify parents and eligible students of their rights under *FERPA*, and must include in this notification the criteria for who constitutes a school official and what constitutes a legitimate educational interest. The U.S. Department of Education provides model notification statements on its website at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/FERPA/lea-officials.html>.¹³

This means that if a school wishes to consider non-employee members of its threat assessment team (TAT), its contracted counseling, nursing, service, or security staff, its school resource officers (SROs), and other non-employees as “school officials” who may have access to education records, the school must ensure that these individuals meet the criteria in the bullets above and the criteria in the school’s annual notification of *FERPA* rights. Schools are encouraged to train all school officials who may have access to education records, including contractors, on *FERPA* as well as other applicable laws.

Balancing Safety and Privacy

School officials must balance safety interests and student privacy interests. *FERPA* contains exceptions to the general consent requirement, including the “health or safety emergency exception,” and exceptions to the definition of education records, including “law enforcement unit records,” which provide school officials with tools to support this goal.

The Health or Safety Emergency Exception to the Consent Requirement

FERPA generally requires written consent before disclosing PII from a student’s education records to individuals other than his or her parents. However, the *FERPA* regulations permit school officials to disclose PII from education records without consent to appropriate parties only when there is an actual, impending, or imminent emergency, such as an articulable and

¹³ See 34 CFR § 99.7(a)(3)(iii) for further information. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/reg/ferpa/index.html>.

significant threat. Information may be disclosed only to protect the health or safety of students or other individuals. In applying the health and safety exception, note that:

- ❖ Schools have discretion to determine what constitutes a health or safety emergency.
- ❖ “Appropriate parties” typically include law enforcement officials, first responders, public health officials, trained medical personnel, and parents. This *FERPA* exception is temporally limited to the period of the emergency and does not allow for a blanket release of PII. It does not allow disclosures to address emergencies that *might* occur, such as would be the case in emergency preparedness activities.
- ❖ The information that may be disclosed is limited to only PII from an education record that is needed based on the type of emergency.
- ❖ Disclosures based on this exception must be documented in the student’s education records to memorialize the
 - Emergency that formed the basis for the disclosure; and
 - Parties with whom the school shared the PII.

The U.S. Department of Education would not find a school in violation of *FERPA* for disclosing *FERPA*-protected information under the health or safety exception as long as the school had a rational basis, based on the information available at the time, for making its determination that there was an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of the student or other individuals.

For more information on the health or safety exception, see: “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” June 2011, available at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/emergency-guidance.pdf> and 34 CFR §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36.

The Law Enforcement Unit Record Exemption to the Definition of Education Records

FERPA defines a “law enforcement unit” as any individual, office, department, division, or other component of an educational agency or institution, such as a unit of commissioned police officers or non-commissioned security guards, that is officially authorized or designated by that agency or institution to

- (i) Enforce any local, state, or federal law, or refer to appropriate authorities a matter for enforcement of any local, state, or federal law against any individual or organization other than the agency or institution itself; or
- (ii) Maintain the physical security and safety of the agency or institution.

Significantly, to be considered a “law enforcement unit” under this definition, an individual or component must be officially authorized or designated to carry out the functions listed above by the school. Schools may designate a traditional law enforcement entity (such as school security staff, school resource officers [SROs], school safety officers, school police, or other school

security personnel) as a law enforcement unit, or opt to designate another non-law enforcement school official to serve as their law enforcement unit, such as a vice principal or another school official.

FERPA does not prevent schools from disclosing information from records maintained by law enforcement that were created for law enforcement purposes by the law enforcement unit to anyone, subject to state law, including outside law enforcement authorities, without the consent of the parent or eligible student during an emergency or otherwise.

Law enforcement unit records, which are not subject to the *FERPA* consent requirements, are defined as records that are

- ❖ Created by a law enforcement unit;
- ❖ Created for a law enforcement purpose; and
- ❖ Maintained by the law enforcement unit.

Law enforcement unit records *do not* include

- ❖ Records created by a law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose that are maintained by a component of the school other than the law enforcement unit, such as a principal or guidance counselor;
- ❖ Health records or PII collected about or related to the disability of a student, including information about providing an accommodation; and
- ❖ Records created and maintained by a law enforcement unit exclusively for a non-law enforcement purpose, such as a school disciplinary action or proceeding.

In designating a law enforcement unit and using law enforcement unit records, note that

- ❖ To be given access to PII from a student's education records, law enforcement unit officials who are employed by the school must meet the criteria set forth in the school's *FERPA* notification for school officials with a legitimate educational interest. While law enforcement unit officials are not required to be school officials under *FERPA*, many schools have found that it is useful for them to be school officials so that they may access education records that may be necessary to ensure school safety. For instance, if a student has been suspended for a period of time (a fact that would be recorded in the student's education records), the law enforcement unit could need to know this in case the student attempts to enter the building when not permitted to do so.
- ❖ A school's law enforcement unit officials must protect the privacy of education records they receive and may disclose them only in compliance with *FERPA*. For that reason, we recommend that law enforcement unit records be maintained separately from education records.

For more information on law enforcement unit records and *FERPA*, refer to the following sources:

- ❖ “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” June 2011
<http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/pdf/emergency-guidance.pdf>
- ❖ The discussion in the preamble to the final rule in the Federal Register published Dec. 9, 2008, starting on page 74836
<http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2008-4/120908a.pdf>
- ❖ Family Policy Compliance Office website
<http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/index.html>
- ❖ The regulatory definition of “Law Enforcement Unit” under *FERPA* in 34 CFR § 99.8(a) available at <http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=ae535d41f8bb03bedfef79634883360f&n=34y1.1.1.1.33&r=PART&ty=HTML#34:1.1.1.1.33.1.132.8>

Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings

School administrators and their partner organizations must understand *FERPA* and its implications because misinterpretations of the law and subsequent delays in information-sharing can hinder first responders’ efforts to provide necessary assistance in a health or safety emergency.

Sharing Personal Observation or Knowledge

Misinterpreting *FERPA* can lead school administrators to miss opportunities to share crucial information that could prevent an emergency situation. For instance, some schools incorrectly believe that information obtained from a school official’s personal observations or knowledge is protected by *FERPA*. In fact, personal observation or knowledge is generally not considered to be part of the student’s education records (see “What Are ‘Education Records’” above) and therefore may be disclosed. For example, if a teacher overhears a student making threatening remarks to other students, the teacher is not prohibited from sharing that information with appropriate authorities, including the parents of the students who were threatened.

However, if a school official learns of information about a student through his or her official role in creating or maintaining an education record, then that information would be covered by *FERPA*. For instance, if a principal suspends a student, the principal would not be permitted to non-consensually disclose that information (unless the disclosure met one of the exceptions in *FERPA* to consent) because he or she gained personal knowledge of that information in making that disciplinary determination.

Releasing Directory Information

In some circumstances, schools may be able to disclose “directory information” to prevent an emergency situation. Directory information means information contained in a student’s education record that would not generally be considered harmful or an invasion of privacy if disclosed. Some examples of directory information include a student’s name, address, telephone number, or e-mail address. Schools must follow certain requirements in publicly designating “directory information,” and they may not disclose directory information from a student’s

education record if the parent or eligible student has opted out of allowing that disclosure. For example, assuming that the parents' cell phone numbers have been properly designated as "directory information," what if the parents have not opted out of the disclosure of such "directory information," and a flood displaced families from their homes and these children are brought to a shelter? The school may disclose those parents' cell phone numbers to an emergency management agency that is trying to locate the parents.

Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations

FERPA has implications in a variety of different situations, and new questions arise as schools become more creative and innovative in developing their campus safety plans. In many cases, however, it is helpful to review the *FERPA* basics to help you clearly think through each scenario. The following are some scenarios that may arise.

❖ Infectious Disease

Under the health or safety emergency exception, school officials may, without consent, disclose PII from education records to appropriate parties in connection with an emergency. In the case of an influenza outbreak, for instance, if school officials determine that an emergency exists, they may share immunization records with parties such as state and local public health officials whose knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of students or others in the school community. Under this exception, schools may share information only during the limited period of time connected with the emergency. A blanket release of information is not allowed. You must instead determine what information to disclose on a case-by-case basis depending on the particular threat.

❖ Threat Assessment Teams

Some educational agencies and institutions may need assistance in determining whether a health or safety emergency exists for purposes of complying with *FERPA*. Federal agencies encourage schools to implement a threat assessment program, including the establishment of a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that utilizes the expertise of representatives from mental health service providers, persons familiar with emergency procedures, and law enforcement agencies in the community.

The threat assessment team must comply with applicable civil rights and other federal and state laws. Under a properly implemented threat assessment program, schools can respond to student behavior that raises safety concerns that are not based on assumptions, stereotypes, or myths about people with disabilities (including mental health-related disabilities) or people of a particular race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sex.

If a threat assessment team member meets the definition of a school official (as a party to whom the school has outsourced administrative functions or services) with a legitimate educational interest under *FERPA*, (see "Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Education Records" above), then he or she would be able to access students' education records in which he or she has legitimate educational interests. A threat assessment team member who is appropriately designated as a school official, however, may not disclose PII from

education records to anyone without consent or unless one of the exceptions to consent under *FERPA*, such as the health or safety emergency exception, applies.

❖ **Security Videos**

Schools are increasingly using security cameras as a tool to monitor and improve student safety. Images of students captured on security videotapes that are created and maintained by the school's law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose are not considered education records under *FERPA*. Accordingly, these videotapes may be shared with parents of students whose images are on the video and with outside law enforcement authorities, as appropriate.

Incorporating *FERPA* Into Your Emergency Planning Process

Below are critical questions and concepts that schools should discuss with their community partners while in the process of developing or revising an emergency management plan. While building partnerships is critical, in gathering information to support these partnerships, schools must also take steps to consider student privacy and civil rights and other laws as well as their mission of safety. Be sure to refer to the sections elsewhere in this guidance to review any concepts with which you are unfamiliar.

What Information Is *FERPA*-Protected, and When May the School Share It?

Education records are protected by *FERPA*, and schools may generally only PII from those records only with written consent from a parent or eligible student, unless a *FERPA* exception to consent applies. (See “What Are ‘Education Records’” above.) The following are examples of such exceptions.

Example: At the start of flu season, your local public health agency requests the names of those students showing influenza-like symptoms, as well as their parents’ contact information. You know that you may not disclose PII from a student’s education records without consent if there is not a health or safety emergency or another exception to consent under *FERPA* that applies. So, to facilitate this sharing of information, you opt to develop a consent form that identifies students’ names and parent contact information as specific PII from student education records. And you would like to share the form with the local public health agency, as well as the purpose of the disclosure. The form gives parents and eligible students the option to allow or to not allow this sharing of information. After collecting the signed and dated consent forms, for the students for whom you received consent you begin to share with the local health agency the names of students who are showing influenza-like symptoms and their parents’ contact information. Your purpose of this sharing of PII is to help so the health agency is able to conduct real-time surveillance to prevent the spread of the illness. (See “What Is *FERPA*” above.)

Example: Your school’s threat assessment team includes representatives from your community partners, and you have properly designated them as “school officials with a legitimate educational interest.” (See “Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Records” above.) The local law enforcement representative on your team does not share with his police chief or other law enforcement official the PII that he obtains from a student’s

education records in his capacity as a threat assessment team member while working to identify possible threats because he knows that this is not permitted. Several months after the threat assessment team initially convened to review a collection of behaviors and communications concerning a particular student and determined that there was not sufficient information demonstrating that the student posed a threat, the team learns that the student has now communicated his intent to harm the school principal. At this juncture, the law enforcement representative (and other members of the threat assessment team) shares pertinent PII from education records with appropriate parties so they can take steps, such as consulting with a police agency, to protect the health or safety of the principal (in this case). (See also the discussion of threat assessment teams under “Additional Situations With *FERPA* Considerations” above.)

Example: At the beginning of the school year, your school notified parents and eligible students that you had designated students’ names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses as “directory information,” explaining to them that you would disclose this information upon request to anyone contacting the school. In your notice, you explained how and by when they could opt out. When a reporter contacts your institution requesting the directory information about a student who is under 18, you check to see whether the student’s parents opted out of the disclosure of directory information. Because the student’s parents did not opt out of the school’s directory information policy, you provide that directory information to the reporter. (See “Common *FERPA* Misunderstandings” above.)

Example: A student has a severe allergic reaction to peanuts during lunch. The school nurse administers epinephrine and then calls an ambulance in accordance with applicable federal and state laws. When the emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrive, the nurse discloses PII from the student’s education record to the EMTs without obtaining parental consent under the health or safety emergency exception. (See “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.)

What Information Is Not *FERPA*-Protected and When May the School Share It?

Records that are created and maintained by a school’s law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose are not protected by *FERPA*, and there are no *FERPA* restrictions on the sharing of information in law enforcement unit records. (See “What Are ‘Education Records’” and “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.)

Example: Your school contracts with the law enforcement agency in your county to bring in an SRO and you properly designate the officer as a “school official with a legitimate educational interest.” (See “Who May Access *FERPA*-Protected Records?” above.) You also properly designate the SRO as your school’s law enforcement unit. (See “Balancing Safety and Privacy” above.) The SRO knows that she may not redisclose to her home agency PII that she obtains from a student’s education records while serving in her SRO capacity, unless there is a health or safety emergency or another *FERPA* exception to consent that would apply. However, she shares her law enforcement unit records about a student who was arrested for smoking marijuana on campus with other law enforcement officials because she knows that law enforcement unit records are not protected by *FERPA*.

Are Processes and Protocols, Including Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), in Place for Information Sharing and Record Keeping That Comply With *FERPA*?

It is important for schools to consider entering into MOUs with law enforcement and their other community partners to formalize roles, responsibilities, and protocols. MOUs can be tailored to the needs of the individual schools in the jurisdiction. Any policies regarding information sharing between the school and the law enforcement agency, however, must comply with applicable federal, state, and local laws, including *FERPA*. While information-sharing MOUs should be developed regarding what information can be shared between departments and what information is protected, no provision in an MOU can override a school's obligations under *FERPA*.

Frequently Asked Questions Pertaining to *FERPA*

Q: To what entities does *FERPA* apply?

A: *FERPA* applies to educational agencies and institutions that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Department of Education. This includes virtually all public schools and school districts, and most private and public postsecondary institutions, including medical and other professional schools.

Private and religious schools at the elementary and secondary school levels generally do not receive funds from the U.S. Department of Education and, therefore, are not subject to *FERPA*.

Q: Does an interagency agreement with partners such as the state or local health department enable a school to non-consensually disclose education records?

A: No. Interagency agreements do not supersede the consent requirements under *FERPA*. Although an interagency agreement would be a helpful tool for planning purposes, schools must comply with *FERPA*'s requirements regarding the disclosure of PII from students' education records.

Q: Under the health or safety emergency exception, may a school non-consensually disclose PII from a student's education records to the media?

A: No, you generally may not disclose *FERPA*-protected information to the media. While the media play a role in alerting the community of a health epidemic or a violent incident outbreak, they generally do not have a role in protecting the health or safety of individual students or others at the school.

Q: When would the health or safety exception apply?

A: Under *FERPA*, an emergency means a situation in which there is an articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of students or other individuals. This determination must be made by the school.

Q: Do I need to tell parents and eligible students or otherwise document when I have disclosed PII from their education records without consent under a health or safety emergency?

A: Within a reasonable period of time after a disclosure is made under the health or safety exception, a school must record in the student's education records the articulable and significant threat that formed the basis for the disclosure, and the parties to whom the information was disclosed. Parents and eligible students have a right to inspect and review the record of disclosure, but do not need to be proactively informed that records have been disclosed.

Q: Can members of our threat assessment team have access to student education records?

A: School officials with legitimate educational interests may have access to a student's education records. Members of a threat assessment team who are not school employees may be designated as such if they are under the direct control of the school with respect to the maintenance and use of PII from education records; are subject to the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.33(a) governing the use and redisclosure of PII from education records; and otherwise meet the school's criteria for being school officials with legitimate educational interests.

Members of a threat assessment team who are considered school officials with a legitimate educational interest generally cannot non-consensually redisclose PII from a student's education records to which he or she was privy as part of the team. However, if a threat assessment team determines that a health or safety emergency exists, members may non-consensually redisclose PII from a student's education records on behalf of the school to appropriate officials under the health or safety emergency exception.

For example, a representative from the city police who serves on a school's threat assessment team generally could not redisclose, without consent, PII from a student's education records to the city police during the initial discussions about a particular student. However, once the threat assessment team determines that a health or safety emergency exists, as defined under *FERPA*, the representative may redisclose, without consent, PII from a student's education records on behalf of the school to appropriate officials. (See the discussion under "Additional Situations with *FERPA* Considerations" above.)

Q: How does *FERPA* interact with the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)*?

A: The U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services jointly developed guidance on the application of *FERPA* and *HIPAA*. This guidance explains that records that are protected by *FERPA* are exempt from the *HIPAA* Privacy Rule. Accordingly, school officials must follow the requirements of *FERPA* with regard to the disclosure of records protected by *FERPA*. Please see the guidance at <http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf> for more information, as well as the *HIPAA* guidance in this "A Closer Look" section.

Q: Who should I contact for more information related to *FERPA*?

A: The U.S. Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office is available to respond to any questions about *FERPA*. For quick responses to routine questions, please e-mail the Department of Education at FERPA@ed.gov. For more in-depth technical assistance or a more formal response, you may call the Family Policy Compliance Office at 202-260-3887 or write to them at

Family Policy Compliance Office
U.S. Department of Education
400 Maryland Ave. SW
Washington, DC 20202-8520

Q: What are some of the other federal and state laws relating to emergency management planning that are relevant to access to and sharing of information about students?

A: As noted in the introduction to this “A Closer Look” section, schools may also be subject to federal and state civil rights laws that protect the disclosure of information about students. Schools and their community partners should review guidance from the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice on any applicable civil rights or other statutes governing privacy and information sharing and discuss their implications for emergency management and related planning processes. At a minimum, in determining what constitutes an “emergency,” schools and their partners must base their decisions on actual risks and not on assumptions, stereotypes, fears, or myths about people with disabilities (including mental health-related disabilities) or people of a particular race, color, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or sex.^{14, 15}

***FERPA* Guidance and Resources**

The Family Policy Compliance Office (FPCO) at the U.S. Department of Education administers *FERPA*. FPCO has developed, and continues to develop, extensive guidance pertaining to the implementation of *FERPA* and emergency situations. For more detailed information or additional guidance, please see the documents below and the FPCO website at www.ed.gov/fpc.

¹⁴ See Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 35.139.

¹⁵ In enacting the *Americans with Disabilities Act*, Congress relied on *School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline*, 480 U.S. 273, (1987) to “acknowledge[] that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” As explained in the preamble to the Justice Department’s 1991 *ADA* regulation, codification of the *Arline* standard was deemed essential if the *ADA* is to achieve its goal of protecting disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to legitimate concerns, such as the need to avoid exposing others to significant health and safety risks. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, sec. 36.208. This rationale applies with equal force to making determinations based on stereotypes about other characteristics protected by *Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964*.

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)

In this section:

- What Is *HIPAA*?
- How Does *HIPAA* Apply in Schools?
- *HIPAA* Guidance and Resources

What Is *HIPAA*?

The *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)* and its implementing regulations, commonly known as the *HIPAA* Privacy Rule and the *HIPAA* Security Rule, protect the privacy and security of individually identifiable health information, called protected health information or PHI, held by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and most health care providers, collectively known as covered entities, and their business associates (entities that have access to individuals' health information to perform work on behalf of a covered entity).

The Privacy Rule, or *Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information*, establishes national standards to protect the privacy of individuals' identifiable health information. In doing so, the Privacy Rule sets forth the circumstances under which covered entities and their business associates may use or disclose an individual's health information, requires safeguards to protect the information, and gives individuals rights, including rights to examine and obtain a copy of their health records and to request corrections.

A major goal of the Privacy Rule is to ensure that individuals' health information is properly protected while allowing the flow of health information needed to provide and promote high quality health care and to protect the public's health and well-being. Given that the health care marketplace is diverse, the Privacy Rule is designed to be flexible and comprehensive to cover the variety of uses and disclosures that need to be addressed.

The *Security Rule*, or *Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information*, establishes a national set of security standards for protecting health information that is held or transferred in electronic form. The Security Rule sets out the technical, administrative, and physical safeguards that covered entities and business associates must put in place to secure individuals' electronic health information. The Security Rule is designed to be flexible and scalable, and technology neutral, so a covered entity or business associate can implement policies, procedures, and technologies that are appropriate for the entity's particular size, organizational structure, and risks to consumers' electronic health information.

The HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has responsibility for administering and enforcing the Privacy and Security Rules.

How Does *HIPAA* Apply in Schools?

Generally, *HIPAA* does not apply to student health information maintained by a school. While schools and school districts may maintain student health records, these records are in most cases not protected by *HIPAA*. Rather, student health information maintained at a school would be considered education records protected by the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)*.

HIPAA may apply however to patient records at a university hospital, which may include records on students and non-students, or to the health records of non-students at a university health clinic.

During the emergency planning process, if you believe health information to which access may be needed is covered by *HIPAA*, you should consult the guidance and resources below for further information about how *HIPAA* applies.

***HIPAA* Guidance and Resources**

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has developed, and continues to develop, extensive guidance pertaining to the implementation of *HIPAA* Privacy Rule and emergency situations. The OCR website has guidance about the intersection between *HIPAA* and *FERPA* and the release of PHI for common emergency preparedness issues and public health purposes, such as terrorism preparedness and outbreak investigations. For more detailed information or additional guidance, please see the HHS OCR website at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/index.html> and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/U.S. Department of Education *HIPAA/FERPA* guide at <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/hipaaferpajointguide.pdf>

2. Psychological First Aid for Schools (PFA-S)

Psychological First Aid for Schools (PFA-S) is an evidence-informed intervention model to assist students, staff, and families in the immediate aftermath of an emergency and can be used by any trained staff member or community partner. Trauma-related distress can have a long-term impact. PFA-S uses brief interventions to produce positive results that last. PFA-S is designed to reduce the initial distress caused by emergencies, allows for the expression of difficult feelings and assists students in developing coping strategies and constructive actions to deal with fear and anxiety. A growing body of research shows that there are brief, effective interventions that have a long-lasting positive influence on trauma-related distress.

PFA-S is intended for students, school personnel, and families who have been exposed to a disaster or other emergency. Whether an emergency occurs on school grounds or in the community at large, schools serve as a central location for professionals to assist children, families, school personnel, and school partners.

PFA-S is most effective immediately following or even during an incident. In some circumstances, assuming the safety of students and staff has been ensured, PFA-S can be initiated while an incident is still occurring, such as in shelter-in-place or lockdown situations.

Students and staff may experience a broad range of reactions (e.g., physical, cognitive, psychological, behavioral, spiritual) to an emergency. Some of these reactions can cause distress

that interferes with adaptive coping. Support from informed, compassionate, and caring professionals can help students and staff members recover from these reactions. PFA-S has the potential to decrease the likelihood of mental health problems or long-term difficulties by identifying individuals who may need additional services and linking them to such services as needed.¹⁶

PFA-S assists students, staff, and families by

- ❖ Establishing a positive connection in a non-intrusive, compassionate manner;
- ❖ Enhancing immediate and ongoing safety and providing physical and emotional comfort;
- ❖ Calming and orienting those who are emotionally overwhelmed or distraught;
- ❖ Helping to identify their immediate needs and concerns and offering practical assistance and information to help address these needs and concerns;
- ❖ Empowering individuals to take an active role in their recovery by acknowledging their coping efforts and strengths, and supporting adaptive coping; and,
- ❖ When appropriate, linking those in need to other relevant school or community resources such as school counseling services, peer support programs, afterschool activities, tutoring, primary care physicians, local recovery systems, mental health services, employee assistance programs, public-sector services, and other relief organizations.

Training School Staff

Because PFA-S is not psychotherapy, an extended “treatment,” or a stand-alone mental health intervention, any trained staff member, regardless of whether he or she has had formal mental health training, can deliver aspects of PFA-S and can contribute to the school recovery by functioning within the PFA framework. Schools can find training resources, including the PFA-S Field Operations Guide, at <http://www.nctsn.org/content/psychological-first-aid-schoolspfa>. Similarly, trained members of community emergency response agencies and mental health professionals may provide PFA-S. During and after an emergency, teachers and other staff are a critical link in promoting resilience, in recognizing the signs of traumatic stress, and in helping students and their families regain a sense of normalcy.

3. School Climate and Emergencies

“School climate” describes a range of campus conditions, including safety, relationships and engagement, and the environment, that may influence student learning and well-being. Positive school climates that promote student learning and well-being often feature

- ❖ Safe environments free of violence, bullying, harassment, and substance use;

¹⁶ Melissa Brymer, Matt Taylor, Pia Escudero, Anne Jacobs, Mindy Kronenberg, Robert Macy, Lou Ann Mock, Linda Payne, Robert Pynoos, and Juliet Vogel, *Psychological First Aid For Schools: Field Operations Guide, 2nd Edition*. Los Angeles: National Child Traumatic Stress Network, 2012.

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- ❖ Appropriate facilities and physical surroundings;
 - ❖ Supportive academic settings;
 - ❖ Clear and fair disciplinary policies;
 - ❖ Respectful, trusting, and caring relationships throughout the school community; and
 - ❖ Available social, emotional, and behavioral supports.

Positive school climates are inclusive of and responsive to students of all backgrounds, regardless of race, color, national origin, language, disability, religion, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity.

Research shows that creating positive school climates can help districts, schools, and teachers meet key goals, including: boosting student achievement and closing achievement gaps; increasing high school graduation rates; decreasing teacher turnover and increasing teacher satisfaction; and turning around low-performing schools. Positive school climates also enhance safety in the school and community by increasing communication between students, families, and faculty. At the same time, schools reduce various forms of harm to students that can stem from negative school climates, including violence, bullying, and even suicide.

A positive school climate that provides students with ready access to emotional and behavioral supports can affect the capacity of students and staff to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies.

Prevention

A positive school climate can help to prevent emergencies because it can reduce the incidence of behaviors that can contribute to crisis (e.g., violence, bullying, harassment, substance abuse). Further, schools with positive school climates engage students in developing strong relationships with staff and peers, increasing the likelihood that students will quickly report potential threats to trusted adults within the school.

Response

Schools with positive school climates teach students the social and emotional competencies that enable them to develop persistence, tolerance of frustration, and ability to manage their emotions during an emergency. The teachers, counselors, school resources officers, and other staff who create positive school climates train regularly on child and adolescent development, and on how to respond appropriately to a variety of student behaviors so they are able to de-escalate aggressive behavior before it becomes a threat to school safety.

Recovery

A positive school climate can help in the recovery from an emergency because it represents a commitment, even prior to an emergency, to providing emotional and mental health services and supports to all members of the community. Schools with such a climate create an environment that recognizes the importance of social and emotional health, and so support the recovery of all members of the school community and promote an understanding that individual needs will vary in a post-emergency situation.

The following steps when implemented as part of a single, comprehensive, and integrated strategy for improving student health and safety will help schools promote a positive school climate.

Conduct a Comprehensive Needs Assessment

School communities are complex systems that include multiple stakeholders and interconnecting environmental factors that influence student health and safety. As such, comprehensive needs assessments of school climate including school engagement, school safety, and the school environment as elements to be evaluated can provide schools with the data support needed to pursue comprehensive approaches to improving school climate. A comprehensive picture of school health and safety can be created by utilizing needs assessments that include student perceptions and, where appropriate, parent and staff perceptions, to help schools identify key issues in need of attention. By monitoring indicators such as the frequency and severity of student risk behaviors, and perceptions of their safety, schools may identify threats to school safety and then use this information to implement the appropriate intervention or program to improve school safety. These data can be most effective when they are used regularly for decision-making and are disaggregated by different groups to determine how they experience the school environment. If a student survey is used to assess culture and climate, student privacy must be protected, including in accordance with the *Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment*, 20 U.S.C. 1232, if applicable.

A number of these surveys are in the compendium of school climate measures on the National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments' website at <http://safesupportiveschools.ed.gov/index.php?id=133>.

The center also houses archived webinars that provide information on how to use these surveys and the data that they collect. Visit at <http://safesupportiveschools.ed.gov/index.php?id=65>.

Use Multi-Tiered Interventions and Supports

School climate can be enhanced by a data-driven, multi-tiered framework that provides a continuum of behavioral supports and interventions to improve student behavior and achievement. A three-tiered framework would comprise the following:

1. Schoolwide or universal interventions and supports focus both on developing expected behaviors and social-emotional competence, and on preventing problem behavior.
2. A second tier of interventions targets groups of students who are at elevated levels of risk or exhibiting problem behavior (such as bullying). These groups of students can be identified more easily, and their needs or behavior can be addressed more effectively when a schoolwide foundation is in place.
3. A third tier of interventions targets individual students, including traumatized youths, who are at even more elevated levels of academic and social-emotional behavioral need and risk.

While interventions for students who are at elevated levels of risk address their needs and problem behaviors, they should also build the skills that support thriving in life and resiliency in crisis. Using an evidence-based, multi-tiered behavioral framework has been found to improve

school climate by reducing problem behaviors like bullying, drug abuse, and poor attendance, while making students feel safer and improving academic performance. Implementation of a schoolwide framework provides a structure for schools in which to customize and organize the varied practices and programs they need to provide to their students based on data on student needs and local resources. Further, such a framework may help schools to better identify students struggling with trauma post-event, and select appropriate interventions to help them to recover. For more information about a multi-tiered behavioral framework, visit the Technical Assistance Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports available at <http://www.pbis.org>.

Promote Social and Emotional Competencies

Social and emotional learning is important to enable individuals to learn to understand and manage their emotions and relationships, and to make good decisions. Social-emotional learning can help individuals stop and think before they react, control their response to stress, develop supportive and caring relationships, persist through challenge, seek help, and pay attention to theirs and others' needs and feelings. These and other social and emotional competencies can help individuals prepare for and respond to emergencies. Students are more likely to develop such competencies when they have good relationships with adults, and when the adults model these competencies.

For more information about teaching social and emotional competencies, visit <http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov>. For additional information on how social and emotional learning may be integrated into a multi-tiered framework, visit <http://www.pbis.org>.

4. Active Shooter Situations

Police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services technicians (first responders) who come to a school because of a 911 call involving gunfire face a daunting task. Though the objective remains the same – protect students and staff – the threat of an “*active shooter*” incident is different than responding to a natural disaster or many other emergencies.

Emergency calls can involve actual or future threats of physical violence. This violence might be directed not only in or at the school building, students, staff, and campus but also at nearby buildings on or off school grounds.

“*Active shooter situations*” are defined¹⁷ as those where an individual is “actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.”¹⁸ Unfortunately, schools face *active shooter situations* as well.

The better first responders and school personnel are able to discern these threats and react swiftly, the more lives can be saved. This is particularly true in an *active shooter situation* at a school where law enforcement responds to a 911 call of shots fired. Many young and innocent lives are at risk in such a concentrated space. This is why it is critical that schools work with first

¹⁷ Other gun-related incidents that may occur in a school environment are not defined as *active shooter* incidents because they do not meet this definition. Instead, they may involve a single shot fired, accidental discharge of a weapon, or incidents that are not ongoing.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Active Shooter, How to Respond*. Washington, DC: Author, October 2008. Available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf.

responders, emergency management staff, and all community partners to identify, prepare, prevent, and effectively respond to an *active shooter situation* in a coordinated fashion.

Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Because of this, individuals must be prepared to deal with an *active shooter situation* before law enforcement officers arrive on the scene.

Preparing for an Active Shooter Situation

Planning

As with any threat or hazard that is included in a school's EOP, the planning team will establish goals, objectives, and courses of action for an annex. These plans will be impacted by the assessments conducted at the outset of the planning process and updated as ongoing assessments occur. As courses of action are developed, the planning team should consider a number of issues, including, but not limited to

- ❖ How to evacuate or lock down students, staff, and visitors, including those who are not with staff or in a classroom (e.g., in the hall, bathroom, break room). Personnel involved in such planning should pay attention to disability-related accessibility concerns when advising on shelter sites and evacuation routes.
- ❖ How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
- ❖ How to select effective shelter-in-place locations (optimal locations have thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal interior windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices and duress alarms).
- ❖ How the school community will be notified that there is an *active shooter* on school grounds. This could be done through the use of familiar terms, sounds, lights, and electronic communications such as text messages. Include in the courses of action how to communicate with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as visual signals or alarms to advise deaf students, staff, and parents about what is occurring. School wide "reverse 911-style" text messages sent to predetermined group distribution lists can be very helpful in this regard. Posting this protocol near locations where an all-school announcement can be broadcast (e.g., by the microphone used for the public announcement system) may save lives by preventing students and staff from stepping into harm's way.
- ❖ How students and staff will know when the building is safe.

The planning team may want to include functions in the *Active Shooter* annex that are also addressed in other functional annexes. For example, evacuation will be different during an *active shooter situation* than it would be for a fire.

Additional considerations are included in the "Responding to an *Active Shooter*" and "After an *Active Shooter Incident*" sections below.

Sharing Information With First Responders

The planning process is not complete until the school EOP is shared with first responders. The planning process must include preparing and making available to first responders an up-to-date and well-documented site assessment as well as any other information that would assist them. These materials should include building schematics and photos of both the inside and the outside, and include information about door and window locations, and locks and access controls. Emergency responders should also have advance information on where students, staff, and others with disabilities as well as those with access and functional needs are likely to be sheltering or escaping, generally in physically accessible locations, along accessible routes, or in specific classrooms. Building strong partnerships with law enforcement officers, fire officials, and EMS technician includes ensuring they also know the location of available public address systems, two-way communications systems, security cameras, and alarm controls. Equally important is information on access to utility controls, medical supplies, and fire extinguishers.

Providing the detailed information listed above to first responders allows them to rapidly move through a school during an emergency, to ensure areas are safe, and to tend people in need. It is critically important to share this information with law enforcement and other first responders before an emergency occurs. Law enforcement agencies have secure websites where this information is stored for many schools, businesses, public venues, and other locations. All of these can be provided to first responders and viewed in drills, exercises, and walk-throughs.

Technology and tools with the same information (e.g., a portable USB drive that is compatible with computers used by first responders) should be maintained at the front of the school, in a lock box, or other secured location from which school officials can immediately provide it to responding officials or first responders can directly access it. The location of these materials at the school should be known by and accessible to a number of individuals to ensure ready access in an emergency. Every building should have more than one individual charged with meeting first responders to provide them with the school site assessment, the school EOP and any other details about school safety and the facility.¹⁹ All parties should know who these key contacts are.

Exercises

Most schools practice evacuation drills for fires and protective measures for tornadoes, but far fewer schools practice for *active shooter situations*. To be prepared for an *active shooter* incident, schools should train their staff, students, and families, as appropriate, in what to expect and how to react. If students are involved, to select the appropriate exercise the school should consider the ages of the students. In a study of 84 *active shooter* events that occurred between 2000 and 2010, 34 percent involved schools.²⁰

Good planning includes conducting drills which must include first responders and school resource officers (where applicable). Exercises with these valuable partners are one of the most effective and efficient ways to ensure that everyone knows not only his or her roles, but also the

¹⁹ See also, <http://www.ready.gov>.

²⁰ J. Pete Blair with M. Hunter Martaindale, *United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications*. San Marcos, Texas: Texas State University, 2013. Available at <http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Blair-UnitedStatesActiveShooterEventsfrom2000to2010Report-Final.pdf>.

roles of others at the scene. These exercises should include walks through school buildings to allow law enforcement to provide input on shelter sites as well as familiarize first responders with the location.

Each person carries a threefold responsibility.

- First: Learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation and ways to prevent an incident.
- Second: Learn the best steps for survival when faced with an *active shooter situation*.
- Third: Be prepared to work with law enforcement during the response.

Preventing an *Active Shooter Situation*

Warning Signs

No profile exists for an *active shooter*; however, research indicates there may be signs or indicators. Schools should learn the signs of a potentially volatile situation that may develop into an *active shooter situation* and proactively seek ways to prevent an incident with internal resources, or additional external assistance.

In 2002, the Safe School Initiative (SSI) was completed by the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service, examining 41 K–12 student attackers involving 37 incidents in the United States from 1973 through May 2000.²¹ These research results, though focused on targeted school violence and not on *active shooter situations*, remain highly useful as a guide for law enforcement officials, educators, and mental health practitioners.

The study identified 10 key findings for the development of strategies to address targeted school violence:

- ❖ There is no accurate or useful profile of students who have engaged in targeted school violence.
- ❖ Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts.
- ❖ Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or the plan to attack.
- ❖ Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

²¹ Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, William Pollack, Randy Borum, William Modzeleski, and Marisa Reddy, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf>.

-
- ❖ Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.
 - ❖ Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant loss or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
 - ❖ Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
 - ❖ Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
 - ❖ In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
 - ❖ Despite prompt law enforcement officer responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.²²

By highlighting common pre-attack behaviors displayed by past offenders, federal researchers have sought to enhance the detection and prevention of tragic attacks of violence, including active shooting incidents. Several agencies within the federal government continue to explore incidents of targeted violence in the effort to identify these potential “warning signs.” In 2002, the FBI published a monograph on workplace violence, including problematic behaviors of concern that may telegraph violent ideations and plans.²³ In 2007, the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education, and the FBI collaborated to produce the report *Campus Attacks, Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Learning*, which examined lethal or attempted lethal attacks at U.S. universities and colleges from 1900 to 2008. The report was published in 2010, and featured several key observations related to pre-attack behaviors, including the following:

- ❖ In only 13 percent of the cases did subjects make verbal and/or written threats to cause harm to the target. These threats were both veiled and direct, and were conveyed to the target or to a third party about the target.
- ❖ In 19 percent of the cases, stalking or harassing behavior was reported prior to the attack. These behaviors occurred within the context of a current or former romantic relationship, or in academic and other non-romantic settings. They took on various forms, including written communications (conventional and electronic), telephonic contact, and harassment of the target and/or the target’s friends and/or family. Subjects also followed, visited, or damaged property belonging to target(s) or their families prior to the attack.
- ❖ In only 10 percent of the cases did the subject engage in physically aggressive acts toward the targets. These behaviors took the form of physical assaults, menacing actions with weapons, or repeated physical violence to intimate partners.

²² Bryan Vossekuil, Robert Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, and William Modzeleski, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004. Available at <http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf>.

²³ U.S. Department of Justice FBI Academy, *Workplace Violence: Issues in Response*. Quantico, Va.: Author, 2002. Available at <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/workplace-violence>.

-
- ❖ Concerning behaviors were observed by friends, family, associates, professors, or law enforcement officers in 31 percent of the cases. These behaviors included, but were not limited to paranoid ideas, delusional statements, changes in personality or performance, disciplinary problems on campus, depressed mood, suicidal ideation, non-specific threats of violence, increased isolation, “odd” or “bizarre” behavior, and interest in or acquisition of weapons.

Specialized units in the federal government (such as the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit) continue to support behaviorally based operational assessments of persons of concern in a variety of settings (e.g., schools, workplaces, places of worship) who appear to be on a trajectory toward a violent act. A review of current research, threat assessment literature, and active shooting incidents, combined with the extensive case experience of the Behavioral Analysis Unit, suggest that there are observable pre-attack behaviors which, if recognized, could lead to the disruption of a planned attack.²⁴ While checklists of various warning signs are often of limited use in isolation, there are some behavioral indicators that should prompt further exploration and attention from law enforcement officers and/or school safety stakeholders. These behaviors often include

- ❖ Development of a personal grievance;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent acquisitions of multiple weapons;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent escalation in target practice and weapons training;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and recent interest in explosives;
- ❖ Contextually inappropriate and intense interest or fascination with previous shootings or mass attacks; and
- ❖ Experience of a significant real or perceived personal loss in the weeks and/or months leading up to the attack, such as a death, breakup, divorce or loss of a job.
- ❖ Few offenders had previous arrests for violent crimes.

²⁴ See Frederick Calhoun and Stephen Weston, *Contemporary Threat Management: A Practical Guide for Identifying, Assessing, and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent* (San Diego, CA: Specialized Training Services, 2003); Gene Deisinger, Marisa Randazzo, Daniel O’Neill, and Jenna Savage, *The Handbook for Campus Threat Assessment and Management Teams* (Stoneham, MA: Applied Risk Management, 2008); Robert Fein, Bryan Vossekuil, and Gwen Holden, *Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, 1995); John Monahan, Henry Steadman, Eric Silver, Paul Appelbaum, Pamela Robbins, Edward Mulvey, Loren Roth, Thomas Grisso, and Steven Banks, *Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001); Bryan Vossekuil, Robert Fein, Marisa Reddy, Randy Borum, and William Modzeleski, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service, 2004).

Threat Assessment Teams

As described in the previous section, research shows that perpetrators of targeted acts of violence engage in both covert and overt behaviors preceding their attacks. They consider, plan, prepare, share, and, in some cases, move on to action.²⁵ One of the most useful tools a school can develop to identify, evaluate, and address these troubling signs is of a multidisciplinary school threat assessment team (TAT). A TAT with diverse representation often will operate more efficiently and effectively. TAT members should include school principals, counselors, employees, medical and mental health professionals, law enforcement personnel and school resource officers, where applicable.

The TAT serves as a central convening body, so that warning signs observed by multiple people are not considered isolated incidents that slip through the cracks, when they actually may represent escalating behavior that is a serious concern. School districts should keep in mind, however, the importance of relying on factual information (including observed behavior) and avoid unfair labeling or stereotyping of students, to remain in compliance with civil rights and other applicable federal and state laws.

For the purposes of consistency and efficiency, a school TAT should be developed and implemented in coordination with school district policy and practice. In addition, staff already working to identify student needs can be a critical source of information about troubling student behavior for a TAT.

The TAT reviews troubling or threatening behavior of current or former students, parents, school employees or other persons brought to its attention. The TAT contemplates a holistic assessment and management strategy that considers the many aspects of the person's life—academic, residential, work, and social. More than focusing on warning signs or threats alone, the TAT assessment involves a unique overall analysis of changing and relevant behaviors. The TAT takes into consideration, as appropriate, information about classroom behaviors, various kinds of communications, not-yet substantiated information, any threats made, security concerns, parenting issues, or relationship problems that might involve a troubled individual. The TAT may also identify any potential victims with whom the individual may interact. Once the TAT identifies an individual that may pose a threat, the team will identify a course of action for addressing the situation. The appropriate course of action—whether law enforcement intervention, counseling, or other actions—will depend on the specifics of the situation.

Although not as common as in the K–12 environment, TATs are increasingly common in university settings, pushed to the forefront of concern following the 2007 shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Va., where 32 individuals were killed. In some cases, state funding mandates that colleges and universities create threat assessment teams.²⁶

²⁵ See <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/february-2010/threat-assessment-teams>.

²⁶ See *Recommended Practices for Virginia Colleges Threat Assessments at* http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/resources/tat_info/VArecommended_practices.pdf.

Even in a K–12 setting, where a designated TAT may not have been established, area law enforcement officials can help assess reported threats or troubling behavior, and reach out to available federal resources. The FBI’s behavioral experts in its National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes (NCAVC) at Quantico, Va., are available on a 24/7 basis to join in any threat assessment analysis and develop threat mitigation strategies for persons of concern. The law enforcement member of the school TAT should contact the local FBI office for this behavioral analysis assistance.

Each FBI field office has a NCAVC representative available to work with school TATs and coordinate access to the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU), home to the NCAVC. They focus not on how to respond tactically to an *active shooter situation* but rather on how to prevent one. Early intervention can prevent a situation from escalating by identifying, assessing, and managing the threat. The TAT should consult with its district and develop a process to seek these additional resources.

Generally, *active shooter situations* are not motivated by other criminal-related concerns, such as monetary gain or gang affiliation. Often, situations may be prevented by identifying, assessing, and managing potential threats. Recognizing these pre-attack warning signs and indicators might help disrupt a potentially tragic event.

Responding to an Active Shooter Situation

School EOPs should include courses of action that will describe how students and staff can most effectively respond to an *active shooter situation* to minimize the loss of life, and teach and train on these practices, as deemed appropriate by the school.

Law enforcement officers may not be present when a shooting begins. The first law enforcement officers on the scene may arrive after the shooting has ended. Making sure staff know how to respond and instruct their students can help prevent and reduce the loss of life.

No single response fits all *active shooter situations*; however, making sure each individual knows his or her options for response and can react decisively will save valuable time. Depicting scenarios and considering response options in advance will assist individuals and groups in quickly selecting their best course of action.

Understandably, this is a sensitive topic. There is no single answer for what to do, but a survival mindset can increase the odds of surviving. As appropriate for your community, it may be valuable to schedule a time for an open conversation regarding this topic. Though some parents or personnel may find the conversation uncomfortable, they may also find it reassuring to know that, as a whole, their school is thinking about how best to deal with this situation.

During an *active shooter situation*, the natural human reaction, even if you are highly trained, is to be startled, feel fear and anxiety, and even experience initial disbelief and denial. You can expect to hear noise from alarms, gunfire and explosions, and people shouting and screaming. Training provides the means to regain your composure, recall at least some of what you have learned, and commit to action. There are three basic options: run, hide, or fight. You can run away from the shooter, seek a secure place where you can hide and/or deny the shooter access, or incapacitate the shooter to survive and protect others from harm.

As the situation develops, it is possible that students and staff will need to use more than one option. During an *active shooter situation*, staff will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully informed decision about which option is best. While they should follow the plan and any instructions given during an incident, often they will have to rely on their own judgment to decide which option will best protect lives.²⁷

Respond Immediately

It is not uncommon for people confronted with a threat to first deny the possible danger rather than respond. An investigation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2005) into the collapse of the World Trade Center towers on 9/11 found that people close to the floors impacted waited longer to start evacuating than those on unaffected floors.²⁸ Similarly, during the Virginia Tech shooting, individuals on campus responded to the shooting with varying degrees of urgency.²⁹ These studies highlight this delayed response or denial. For example, some people report hearing firecrackers when in fact they heard gunfire.

Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately, including fulfilling their responsibilities for individuals in their charge. For example, train staff to recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and necessary action (e.g., “Gun! Get out!”) to those in their charge. In addition, those closest to the public address or other communications system, or otherwise able to alert others, should communicate the danger and necessary action. Repetition in training and preparedness shortens the time it takes to orient, observe, and act.

Upon recognizing the danger, as soon as it is safe to do so, staff or others must alert responders by contacting 911 with as clear and accurate information as possible.

Run

If it is safe to do so for yourself and those in your care, the first course of action that should be taken is to run out of the building and far away until you are in a safe location.

²⁷ As part of its preparedness mission, *Ready Houston* produces “Run, Hide, Fight” videos, handouts, and trainings to promote preparedness among residents of the Houston region. These materials are not specific to a school setting but may still be helpful. These videos are not recommended for viewing by minors. All of these items are available free of charge, and many are available at <http://www.readyhouston.tx.gov/videos.html>.

²⁸ Occupants of both towers delayed initiating their evacuation after World Trade Center 1 was hit. In World Trade Center 1, the median time to initiate evacuation was 3 minutes for occupants from the ground floor to floor 76, and 5 minutes for occupants near the impact region (floors 77 to 91). See National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005. *Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster Occupant Behavior, Egress, and Emergency Communications*. Available at <http://www.mingerfoundation.org/downloads/mobility/nist%20world%20trade%20center.pdf>.

²⁹ *Report of the Virginia Tech Review Team*, available at <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf> and <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/tempContent/techPanelReport-docs/12%20CHAPTER%20VIII%20MASS%20MURDER%20AT%20NORRIS%20HALL.pdf>.

Students and staff should be trained to

- ❖ Leave personal belongings behind;
- ❖ Visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible routes for students and staff with disabilities as well as persons with access and functional needs;
- ❖ Avoid escalators and elevators;
- ❖ Take others with them, but not to stay behind because others will not go;
- ❖ Call 911 when safe to do so; and
- ❖ Let a responsible adult know where they are.

Hide

If running is not a safe option, hide in as safe a place as possible.

Students and staff should be trained to hide in a location where the walls might be thicker and have fewer windows. In addition:

- ❖ Lock the doors;
- ❖ Barricade the doors with heavy furniture;
- ❖ Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows;
- ❖ Turn off lights;
- ❖ Silence all electronic devices;
- ❖ Remain silent;
- ❖ Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of the view from the hallway (allowing for an ambush of the shooter and for possible escape if the shooter enters the room);
- ❖ Use strategies to silently communicate with first responders if possible, for example, in rooms with exterior windows make signs to silently signal law enforcement officers and emergency responders to indicate the status of the room's occupants; and
- ❖ Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law enforcement officers.

Fight

If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, as a last resort when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, and chairs. In a study of 41 *active shooter* events that ended before law enforcement officers arrived, the potential

victims stopped the attacker themselves in 16 instances. In 13 of those cases they physically subdued the attacker.³⁰

While talking to staff about confronting a shooter may be daunting and upsetting for some, they should know that they may be able to successfully take action to save lives. To be clear, confronting an *active shooter* should never be a requirement in any school employee's job description; how each staff member chooses to respond if directly confronted by an *active shooter* is up to him or her. Further, the possibility of an *active shooter* situation is not justification for the presence of firearms on campus in the hands of any personnel other than law enforcement officers.

Interacting With First Responders

Staff should be trained to understand and expect that a law enforcement officer's first priority must be to locate and stop the person(s) believed to be the shooter(s); all other actions are secondary. One comprehensive study determined that more than half of mass-shooting incidents—57 percent—still were under way when the first officer arrived; in 75 percent of those instances that solo officer had to confront the perpetrator to end the threat. In those cases, the officer was shot one-third of the time.³¹

Students and staff should be trained to cooperate and not to interfere with first responders. When law enforcement officer(s) arrives, students and staff must display empty hands with open palms. Law enforcement may instruct everyone to place their hands on their heads, or they may search individuals.

After an Active Shooter Incident³²

Once the scene is secured, first responders will work with school officials and victims on a variety of matters. This will include transporting the injured, interviewing witnesses, and initiating the investigation.

The school EOP should identify trained personnel who will provide assistance to victims and their families. This should include establishing an incident response team (including local first responders and other community partners) that is trained to appropriately assess and triage an *active shooter situation* (as well as other emergencies), and provide emergency intervention services and victim assistance beginning immediately after the incident and throughout the recovery efforts. This team will integrate with state and federal resources when an emergency occurs.

Within an ongoing and/or evolving emergency, where the *immediate reunification* of loved ones is not possible, providing family members with timely, accurate, and relevant information is paramount. Having family members wait for long periods of time for information about their

³⁰ J. Pete Blair with M. Hunter Martaindale, *United States Active Shooter Events from 2000 to 2010: Training and Equipment Implications*. San Marcos, Texas: Texas State University, 2013. Available at <http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Blair-UnitedStatesActiveShooterEventsfrom2000to2010Report-Final.pdf>.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Also see the "Functional Annexes Content" and "Recovery Annex" sections of this guide.

loved ones not only adds to their stress and frustration but can also escalate the emotions of the entire group. When families are reunited, it is critical that there be child release processes in place to ensure that no child is released to an unauthorized person, even if that person is well-meaning.

Essential steps to help establish trust and provide family members with a sense of control are

- ❖ Identifying a safe location separate from distractions and/or media and the general public, but close enough to allow family members to feel connected in proximity to their children and their loved ones;
- ❖ Scheduling periodic updates even if no additional information is available;
- ❖ Being prepared to speak with family members about what to expect when reunified with their child and their loved ones; and
- ❖ Ensuring effective communication with those who have language barriers or need other accommodations, such as sign language interpreters for deaf family members.

When reunification is not possible because a child is missing, injured, or killed, how and when this information is provided to families is critical. Before an emergency, the planning team must determine how, when, and by whom loved ones will be informed if their child or loved one is missing or has been injured or killed. Law enforcement typically takes the lead on death notifications, but all parties must understand their roles and responsibilities. This will ensure that parents and loved ones receive accurate and timely information in a compassionate way.

While law enforcement and medical examiner procedures must be followed, families should receive accurate information as soon as possible. Having trained personnel on hand or immediately available to talk to loved ones about death and injury can ensure the notification is provided to family members with clarity and compassion. Counselors should be on hand to immediately assist family members.

The school EOP should include pre-identified points of contact (e.g., counselors, police officers) to work with and support family members. These points of contact should be connected to families as early in the process as possible, including while children are still missing but before any victims have been positively identified. After an incident, it is critical to confirm that each family is getting the support it needs, including over the long-term.

The school EOP should consider printed and age-appropriate resources to help families recognize and seek help with regard to a variety of reactions that they or their loved ones can experience during and after an emergency. Often, a family that has lost a child may have another child or other children in the school. It is critical that these families and loved ones be supported as they both grieve their loss and support their surviving child(ren).


The school EOP also should explicitly address how impacted families and children will be supported if they prefer not to engage with the media. This includes strategies for keeping the media separate from families and students while the emergency is ongoing and support for families that may experience unwanted media attention at their homes.



Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education



Action Guide for Emergency Management At Institutions of Higher Education



U.S. Department of Education
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
2010

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U.S. Department of Education

Arne Duncan
Secretary

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools

Kevin Jennings
Assistant Deputy Secretary

William Modzeleski
Associate Assistant Deputy Secretary


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
This guide is available on the Department's Web site at
<http://www.ed.gov/emergencyplan>.

On request, this publication is available in alternate formats, such as Braille, large print, or computer diskette. For more information, please contact the Department's Alternate Format Center at 202-260-0852 or 202-260-0818.



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
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
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


ABBREVIATIONS

BCP	Business Continuity Plan
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
DAT	Damage Assessment Team
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
<i>FERPA</i>	<i>Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act</i>
<i>HIPAA</i>	<i>Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act</i>
IACLEA	International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators
ICS	Incident Command System
IHEs	Institutions of Higher Education
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCEF	National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities
NIC	National Integration Center
NIMS	National Incident Management System
PIO	Public Information Officer



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Expert Panel Participants*

John Beach

Director, Physical Plant Operations

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Stephen E. Brock

Associate Professor

California State University, Sacramento

Department of Special Education,

Rehabilitation, School Psychology, and Deaf Studies

Tod A. Burnett

Vice Chancellor

California Community Colleges

Kay Goss

Director, Emergency Management and Crisis Communications

Systems Research and Applications Corporation

Steven J. Healy

Director of Public Safety & Chief of Police

Princeton University

Thomasine Johnson

Director, Department of Public Safety

The Catholic University of America

Linda Langford

Associate Center Director

U.S. Department of Education's Higher

Education Center for Alcohol and Other Drug

Abuse and Violence Prevention

Lauri Rush

Director

Mental Health Center at Gallaudet University

Dolores A. Stafford

Chief of Police

The George Washington University

Terri Ae. Stewart

Director for Public Safety

Trinity University

Vicky M. Stormo

Retired Chief of Police

University of Washington Police Department

Gregory A. Thomas

Former Deputy Director of Planning and Response

National Center for Disaster Preparedness

Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health

Katrin A. Wesner

Director, Abrons Student Health Center

University of North Carolina Wilmington

Eugene L. Zdziarski, II

Former Assistant Vice President & Dean of Students

University of Florida


External Reviewers

Meloyde Batten-Mickens

Executive Director, Facilities/Department of Public Safety

Gallaudet University

*On Nov. 27, 2007, the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools convened the Expert Panel on Emergency Management in Higher Education in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the panel was to discuss current resources and tools in the field of emergency management for colleges and universities, and other materials that may be needed. This action guide is one of the key products developed in response to information gathered during this meeting.



Kay Goss
Director, Emergency Management and Crisis
Communications
Systems Research and Applications Corporation
(SRA International)

Steven J. Charvat
Director
UW Emergency Management
A Division of the Facilities Services Department
University of Washington

Steven J. Healy
Director of Public Safety & Chief of Police
Princeton University

Eugene L. Zdziarski, II
Former Assistant Vice President & Dean of
Students
University of Florida


Institutional Resources

LaRue Williams
Director
Brian Lauffer
Instructional Designer
VMC/Homeland Security Programs
West Virginia University

Sally Logue Post
Associate Director
Office of Communications and Marketing
Texas Tech University

Yvette M. Jones
Chief Operating Officer and Senior Vice
President for External Affairs
Tulane University

Terrance G. Alexander
Executive Director
Occupational Safety & Environmental Health
University of Michigan




INTRODUCTION

THE NEED FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

There are over 4,000 two-and four-year public and private institutions of higher education (IHEs) in the United States totaling over 15 million students and several million staff, faculty, and visitors (U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics*, 2006). Each of these institutions has a commitment to ensure the safety and general welfare of those on their campuses and to provide appropriate policies, procedures, and strategies to maintain a safe campus. Because of recent violent crimes, natural disasters, and other emergencies or crises, colleges and universities are convening committees and task forces to reexamine or conduct a comprehensive review of policies, procedures, and systems related to campus safety and security. As with many critical areas on the agendas of administrators, campus safety requires building support and conducting a thorough and systematic process to produce a quality plan to prepare for and manage emergencies on campus.

Distinct Characteristics of Emergency Planning at Institutions of Higher Education

IHEs have many challenges in practicing emergency management that are related to the distinctive structure and environment of higher education. College and university campuses often cover large geographic areas, and sometimes even resemble small towns with the full extent of services in their vicinity (i.e., medical centers, sports complexes, residential centers, businesses). The campus population changes from day to day, semester to semester, and year to year. Many IHEs operate complex enterprises in addition to their academic programs. Hospitals, research and development facilities, performing arts venues, athletic complexes, agriculture centers, residential complexes, food services, and transportation systems all present a unique set of circumstances that must be considered when designing emergency management plans. These structural and environmental characteristics pose challenges for access control, monitoring movements, defining boundaries for facilities and grounds, standardizing procedures and decision-making processes, and prioritizing resource allocations.




IHE governance is also highly varied, complex, and often widely dispersed. Decentralized organizational structures and academic departments may be located in different buildings and have differing decision-making methods. The nature of higher education institutions, with faculty involvement in the governance process, is much different than the hierarchical structure of corporate entities or governmental agencies. Decision-making in such an environment can be slow, and hinder campus response to a crisis. The need for clear lines of authority and decision-making are all the more important at IHEs. Responsibility for developing, testing, and implementing an emergency management plan should be shared and communicated across all departments and functions.

Most IHEs have open access and often are geographically integrated in the surrounding community. Autonomy is encouraged and fostered for both students and faculty; at any one time, students, faculty, and staff are dispersed around the campus in classrooms, common areas, cafeterias, offices, dormitories, and numerous other facilities.

The population served by IHEs is distinct, as well. Most students are over 18 years of age—the age of majority in most states—and therefore are considered adults capable of making decisions on their own. This can present challenges and opportunities. It creates the need for a different set of roles and responsibilities for students during an emergency event (especially compared to the K–12 population of mostly minors).

Another characteristic of IHEs is that they do not operate under 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. typical business-hour schedules. A college campus is alive and engaged with activity almost around the clock. From the opening of food service operations and recreation facilities in the early morning to evening activities and late night studying in the library, the campus is constantly in motion. Unlike secondary education, most college campuses include residential facilities in which students live throughout the year. Even when classes are not in session these facilities are home to many out-of-state, international, and married students. These additional factors impact how an IHE plans, responds to, and recovers from a campus emergency.



Purpose and Uses of This Action Guide

This *Action Guide for Emergency Management at Higher Education Institutions* has been developed to give higher education institutions a useful resource in the field of emergency management. It is intended for community colleges, four-year colleges and universities, graduate schools, and research institutions associated with higher education entities, both public and private. This action guide may be used in a variety of ways:


- ▶ As a starting point in researching the topic of emergency management for those needing an overview of the subject;
- ▶ As a resource for an initiative to develop and implement an emergency management plan at a higher education institution; or
- ▶ As a reference and resource for colleges and universities looking to evaluate their emergency management programs to identify potential areas needing enhancement.

Many other resources are referenced in this document that can and should be used in conjunction with the contents of this guide. Specifically, the *Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities* published by the U.S. Department of Education (revised January 2007) and *Building a Disaster-Resistant University* published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, (August 2003) offer companion resources to help in an emergency management initiative. This action guide is not meant to prescribe exactly how emergency management should be practiced; rather, each higher education institution should decide for itself the best way to prepare to meet its own unique set of needs.

Key Principles in Emergency Management


Nine key principles serve as the foundation for the content of this action guide.

- **Effective emergency management begins with senior leadership on campus.** The IHE president, chancellor, or provost must initiate and support emergency management efforts to ensure engagement from the entire campus community. This “champion” administrator will have decision-making power and the authority to devote resources to implementing the initiative and subsequently put into action the emergency management plan. Since budgetary realities may force campus administrators to make decisions within select fiscal parameters, it



is important to have high-level support to provide both political and financial backing to the effort.

- **An IHE emergency management initiative requires partnerships and collaboration.** Every department responsible for creating a safe environment and enhancing campus functions must be involved in planning efforts. IHEs should identify and engage internal and external partners, and ensure that all planning tasks are performed within a collaborative and integrated approach. This means involving a variety of departments and functions across the campus and reaching out to community partners in the public, nonprofit, and private sectors. Partnerships with such community groups as law enforcement, fire safety, homeland security, emergency medical services, health and mental health organizations, media, and volunteer groups are integral to developing and implementing a comprehensive emergency management plan.
- **An IHE emergency management plan must adopt an “all-hazards” approach to account for the full range of hazards that threaten or may threaten the campus.** All-hazards planning is a more efficient and effective way to prepare for emergencies. Rather than managing planning initiatives for a multitude of threat scenarios, all-hazard planning develops capacities and capabilities that are critical to prepare for a full spectrum of emergencies or disasters, including natural hazards and severe weather, biological hazards, and violence and terrorism. As defined by FEMA, all-hazard planning “encourages emergency managers to address all of the hazards that threaten their jurisdiction in a single emergency operations plan, instead of relying on stand-alone plans” (FEMA’s *State and Local Guide SLG 101: Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning*; September 1996). An all-hazards plan should be flexible and specific to the campus and its needs.
- **An IHE emergency management plan should use the four phases of emergency management to effectively prepare and respond to emergencies.** Emergency plans at higher education institutions should use the four phases of emergency management as the framework for planning and implementation. Part of the founding principles of comprehensive emergency management when FEMA was created in 1979 is the four phases of emergency management: Prevention-Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. FEMA prescribes “to treat each action as one phase of a comprehensive process, with each phase building on the accomplishments of the preceding one. The overall goal is to minimize the impact caused by an emergency in the jurisdiction” (FEMA’s *State and Local Guide SLG 101: Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning*; September 1996).
- **The IHE emergency management plan must be based on a comprehensive design, while also providing for staff, students, faculty, and visitors with special needs.** Every aspect of an emergency plan also should incorporate provisions for vulnerable populations, those of which can have a wide range of needs, including: language barriers, disabilities, or other special conditions. Thus,





any procedures, products, and protocols created to prevent, prepare, respond, and recover from an emergency also must accommodate people with various levels of cognitive ability, knowledge, physical capabilities and life experience.

- **Campuses should engage in a comprehensive planning process that addresses the particular circumstances and environment of their institution.** A high-quality emergency management plan does not simply duplicate another institution's specific model. Rather, the plan must be based on the unique aspects of the campus, such as the academic programs offered, size, geographic location of the campus, number and type of buildings, such as athletic venues and research labs, availability of campus and community resources, and student demographics.
- **An IHE should conduct trainings based on the institution's prevention and preparedness efforts, prioritized threats, and issues highlighted from assessments.** Routine, multi-hazard training should be conducted with faculty, staff, and other support personnel, focusing on the protocols and procedures in the emergency management plan. Training should be conducted in conjunction with community partners, as well as integrated with responders' expertise, to ensure consistent learning.
- **Higher education institutions should conduct tabletop exercises prior to fully adopting and implementing the emergency management plan.** These exercises should cover a range of scenarios that may occur on the campus, and should be conducted with a variety of partners and stakeholders from the campus and the community. It is important for emergency planners also to evaluate and document lessons learned from the exercise(s) in an after-action review and an after-action report, and to modify the main emergency plan, as needed.
- **After adoption, disseminate information about the plan to students, staff, faculty, community partners, and families.** Dissemination efforts should include the conveyance of certain plan components to specific audiences, such as relaying shelter-in-place procedures to faculty members, or relaying campus evacuation information to the transportation department. General plans and procedures can be posted around campus or displayed on a Web site. Students, staff, faculty, and all of the varied campus support personnel should familiarize themselves with the plan and its components so they are prepared to respond in an emergency.

These key principles of emergency management are reflected throughout the four steps recommended in this action guide for developing and implementing a plan.

Before discussing in-depth each of the four steps in developing and implementing or updating a plan, it is important to cover an organizational framework relevant to the success of any emergency management planning effort: the four phases of emergency management that FEMA created and that is recognized in all relevant sectors.





THE FRAMEWORK: THE FOUR PHASES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

A comprehensive emergency management plan is based on the framework of the four phases of emergency management: prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. All phases are highly *interconnected*; that is, each phase influences the other three phases. The cycle as a whole is an ongoing process, just as the plan is a dynamic document that requires continuous updating.


Prevention-Mitigation

The first phase in the emergency management cycle is Prevention-Mitigation.

Prevention is the action colleges and universities take to decrease the likelihood that an event or crisis will occur.

Mitigation is the action colleges and universities take to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage related to an event or crisis, particularly those that cannot be prevented.

The hazards the institution is seeking to prevent, diminish, or mitigate will be defined specifically through a process of hazards identification and risk assessment (see U.S. Department of Education's *A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools* available at: <http://rems.ed.gov>). In the assessment, the campus representatives and community partners identify virtually all the hazards that could cause risks and subsequently a crisis. Prevention-Mitigation of hazards is not a new concept for IHEs because each campus historically has been involved in creating safe learning environments. However, in the context of comprehensive emergency management, prevention and mitigation efforts become more structured, formalized, and purposeful. Key steps in Prevention-Mitigation include:



- **Reviewing existing campus and community data.** The first step in the Prevention-Mitigation phase is to obtain such data as: previous community vulnerability assessments (i.e., vulnerability assessments conducted in the past by the institution or surrounding community), facility assessments (i.e., vulnerability assessments conducted on a particular structure or operation), recent community and campus specific crime data (e.g., *Clery* data¹), and weather- or natural hazard-related data, such as flood, tornado, hurricane, or earthquake probabilities.
- **Assessing facilities and grounds.** An assessment of facilities and grounds involves the selection and use of a tool to assess campus vulnerabilities (see *A Guide to Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools*, U.S. Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, 2008), as well as the application of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) assessments. Improving surveillance capabilities and access controls may mitigate some emergencies. In considering natural disasters that are common in the geographic locality of the campus, structural modifications and enhancements will help minimize damage.
- **Assessing culture and climate.** Prevention of violence, accidents, and harm in colleges and universities is enhanced by nurturing a healthy campus community. The challenge is to foster healthy societal relationships among students and to support the goal of students to feel connected to the institution and the surrounding community. In addition to supporting the learning environment, healthy relationships and connectedness are key hazard-prevention factors in that they make it less likely for violence to occur. High rates of alcohol or other drug use, for example, can bring a host of problems to a campus environment, including the increased likelihood of violence, accidents, or even poisoning or overdose. An assessment of the culture and climate at the institution is often a major aspect of an initiative for making improvements in this area and preventing such incidents from occurring.


Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a tool to assess campus grounds and structures. The three principles of the CPTED program are:

- *Natural surveillance* – the ability to easily see what is occurring in a particular setting;
- *Natural access control* – the ability to restrict who enters or exits an environment; and
- *Territoriality maintenance* – the ability to demonstrate ownership of and respect for property.

More information on CPTED is available at the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities at: <http://www.edfacilities.org/rl/cpted.cfm>.

¹ The *Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act*, codified as part of the *Higher Education Act of 1965*, is a federal law that requires colleges and universities to disclose certain timely and annual information about campus crime and security policies. All public and private institutions of postsecondary education participating in federal student aid programs are subject to it. (More information available at: http://www.securityoncampus.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=271&Itemid=60.)



Preparedness


The **Preparedness** phase designs strategies, processes, and protocols to prepare the college or university for potential emergencies. Preparedness activities may include:

- Establishing an incident command system (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) for organizing personnel and services to respond in the event of an emergency.
- Developing all-hazard policies, procedures, and protocols with input from such key community partners as law enforcement, medical services, public health, fire services, and mental health.
- Collaborating with community partners to establish mutual aid agreements that will establish formal interdisciplinary, intergovernmental, and interagency relationships among all the community partners and campus departments.
- Negotiating contracts that will provide the campus with resources (e.g., food, transportation, medical services, and volunteers) needed during an emergency.
- Assigning personnel to manage each ICS function and defining lines of succession in emergency plan as to who is in charge when key leaders are not available.

National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) offers a set of concepts, principles, procedures, processes, terminology, and standards that agencies of all different types can utilize in emergency management. The Incident Command System (ICS) is a key component of NIMS and consists of five functional areas: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. The incident commander's staff includes public information officer (PIO), safety officer, liaison officer, and campus liaison. It is important that campus administrators understand how campus personnel will perform under the ICS with local partners and agencies when responding to and managing an emergency.

The National Integration Center (NIC) Incident Management Systems Integration Division (<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims>) contains interagency tools for establishing partnerships and for adopting NIMS within a jurisdiction or organization. At the FEMA Emergency Management Institute Web site (<http://training.fema.gov>), online courses on NIMS are available, including NIMS: An Introduction (IS-700), National Response Framework (IS-800.B), Introduction to the Incident Command System (IS-100), and ICS for Single Resource and Initial Action Incidents (IS-200).



- Developing a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) and Business Continuity Plan (BCP) for all campus operations functions. The COOP plan ensures that the campus has the capability to continue essential functions (e.g., transportation, housing, food service). The BCP identifies systems needed to conduct all administrative functions (e.g., payroll, and communication) so that operations can be continued after the emergency (see Table 1).
- Developing plans to unify students, staff, and faculty with their families.
- Defining protocols and procedures for each type of response strategy, e.g., shelter-in-place, lockdown (if and where appropriate), or evacuation.
- Establishing an emergency notification system using multiple modes of communication to alert persons on campus that an emergency is approaching or occurred.
- Working with the media in the community and campus public relations office to develop a campus emergency communication plan that may include drafting template messages for communicating with the media, students, faculty, staff, community, and families prior to, during, and after an emergency. The campus public information officer (PIO) often coordinates these tasks.
- Coordinating campus emergency management plans with those of state and local agencies to avoid unnecessary duplication.
- Outlining schedules and plans for marketing emergency procedures and training staff, faculty, and students about the emergency plan procedures.
- Working with campus and community mental health professionals to establish a behavioral threat assessment process that involves mental health professionals for evaluating persons who are at-risk of causing harm to themselves or others.

Example of Business Continuity Planning: The University of Michigan

In 2006 the University of Michigan charged all campus deans, directors, and department heads to prepare a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) identifying critical functions, assigning key staff, and preparing contingency plans to keep essential functions operating during emergency operations. All campus units developed plans using a comprehensive guideline available at: <http://www.oseh.umich.edu/buscont/index.html>.

While the guideline focuses primarily on pandemic disease, it is adaptable to all hazards. In addition to a mock scenario to help analyze the impacts of a pandemic on university operations, the guideline provides checklists and templates to assist departments and units in developing specific continuity plans applicable to each unit's mission. Using this information, the units developed specific strategies for recovering business operations and undertook extensive preparation to execute those strategies.





Table 1. Illustrative Key Responsibilities During an Emergency by Organization Entity and Position Within Entity

Entity	Position Within Entity	Responsibilities
Local	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Enforcement • Fire Department • Emergency Medical Services • Emergency Preparedness Office • Public Works Office • Public Information Officer • City or County Attorney 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct criminal investigations (sometimes, together with campus law enforcement) • Ensure that the perimeter is controlled • Provide personnel, equipment and other resources, and specialized personnel or equipment • Coordinate emergency communications • Coordinate with campus PIO
State and Regional Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Guard • Civil Support Team • HazMat Personnel • State Emergency Management Agencies • State Patrol • Public Health 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide personnel, equipment, supplies, and specialized resources • Conduct field assessments • Determine Declaration of Emergency • Seek federal assistance
Federal Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) • Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) • Center for Disease Control (CDC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lead criminal investigations • Provide federal recovery assistance • Provide specialized resources
Campus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campus Executive Leadership • Campus Public Safety Officers • Emergency Management Team • Campus Public Information Officer (PIO) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide leadership on campus during an emergency • Institute the campus emergency management plan • Coordinate and support with partners • Serve as incident commander to establish the incident command system (sometimes, until partners arrive to take over ICS)

Source: Adapted from Homeland Security Planning for Campus Executives workshop, developed by VMC/West Virginia University for DHS/ FEMA under the agency's Training and Education Integration (TEI) Secretariat, available at <http://vmc.wvu.edu/projects.htm>.



- Ensuring that a process is in place for complying with the *Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)* and the *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)* for revealing information about a student or staff member. For additional information on *FERPA* and *HIPAA* restrictions on communication relating to campus safety see *NACUA NOTES on FERPA and Campus Safety* (Vol. 5, No. 4, August 2007) available at: <http://www.nacua.org/documents/ferpa2.pdf>.


Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety

The U.S. Department of Education offers a brochure *Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act for Colleges and Universities*. It provides guidance pertaining to *FERPA*, disciplinary records, the *Clery Act*, law enforcement units, disclosure to parents, and other information that will help campus officials make decisions quickly when confronted with issues about privacy and safety. The brochure can be found at: <http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpcu/brochures/postsec.pdf>.

Response

Response is taking action to effectively contain and resolve an emergency. Responses to emergencies are enhanced by thorough and effective collaboration and planning during the Prevention-Mitigation and Preparedness phases. During the response phase, campus officials activate the emergency management plan. Responses to emergencies vary greatly depending upon the severity, magnitude, duration, and intensity of the event. This is the phase of emergency management covered most intensely by the press and media, as well. Effective response requires informed decision-making and identification of clear lines of decision authority. Selected Response activities include:

- Activating the Incident Command System;
- Dialoguing with first responders and other community partners (as articulated in memorandums of understanding [MOUs] or other formal agreements) to make informed decisions and deploy resources; and
- Establishing an Emergency Operation Center (EOC).



Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

The EOC serves as a centralized management center for emergency operations. Here, decisions are made by emergency managers based upon information provided by the incident commander and other personnel. The EOC should be located in an area not likely to be involved in an incident (e.g., security department, emergency manager's office, or training center). An alternate EOC should be designated in the event that the primary location is not usable due to emergency consequences. Ideally, the EOC is a dedicated area equipped with communications equipment, reference materials, activity logs, and all the tools necessary to respond quickly and appropriately to an emergency, including:


- Communications equipment;
- A copy of the emergency management plan and EOC procedures;
- Blueprints, maps, and status boards;
- A list of EOC personnel and descriptions of their duties;
- Technical information and data for advising responders;
- Building security system information;
- Information and data management capabilities;
- Telephone directories;
- Backup power, communications, and lighting; and
- Emergency supplies.

Source: *FEMA Emergency Management Guide for Business & Industry*, available at: <http://www.fema.gov/business/guide/toc.shtm>).

- Activating communication plans using multiple modalities (e.g., e-mail, text message, phone).
- Determining and executing the appropriate response strategy.
- Accounting for students, faculty, and staff.
- Conducting an after-action report as a tool for modifying and improving the emergency management plan.

Example of Proactive Response: Texas Tech University


In the year following the tragedy at Virginia Tech, then university president of Texas Tech University (TTU) Jon Whitmore sent students and families a letter. He assured this community that TTU had a plan to respond to a variety of emergencies, and that the safety and security of the campus community was a high priority concern. He discussed recent updates to the TTU campus emergency notification system, which utilizes outdoor sirens, broadcast e-mails, text messaging, and phone calls as well as Web site postings. He invited everyone to view TTU's emergency response Web site to obtain additional information and urged faculty, staff, and students to sign up for emergency information alerts. Because emergency management is an ongoing process at TTU, he was able to reassure students and their families that the university was making a concerted effort to ensure safety and security.



Recovery

The Recovery phase establishes procedures, resources, and policies to assist an institution and its members' return to functioning after an emergency. Recovery is an ongoing process. The type and breadth of recovery activities will vary based on the nature and scope of the emergency. However, the goal of the recovery phase is to restore the learning environment. Planning for Recovery begins in the Preparedness phase, and requires support from campus leaders to ensure that decisions contribute to implementation and resolution of all four components of recovery. All decisions should be made in conjunction with local and perhaps state officials and partners. Recovery includes:

- **Physical and Structural Recovery.** Depending on the scope of the emergency, a key step to recovery can be the creation of a Damage Assessment Team (DAT). This team would likely consist of campus personnel (e.g., safety and security, facility management, risk management, budget office, transportation, food services, technology services, etc.) and community partners. This assessment will evaluate physical and structural damage, assess the availability of housing, transportation, and food services, and determine the degree to which equipment (e.g., computers, lab equipment) is functional. The major goal of the assessment is to determine the extent of the effects of the incident on campus and community physical assets and newly created vulnerabilities. Data from the assessment results will facilitate decision-making about repairs and timelines to resume learning activities.
- **Business Recovery.** IHEs can restore administrative and business function by activating the COOP and BCP plans. The plans also should identify who has the responsibility to cancel or postpone classes or to use alternative locations. Additionally, there should be a succession plan in place for each function identified in the plans, as well as strategies for accepting donations for goods and services following the emergency.
- **Restoration of the Academic-learning Environment.** Restoring the learning environment may involve housing students and conducting classes in off-site locations, implementing online learning, and implementing temporary procedures about assignments, grading, attendance, and tuition and housing payments. Campus administrators must make swift decisions about changes to class schedules and academic calendars and graduation requirements. Moreover, it is important to communicate the decisions and next steps to the media, faculty, staff, students, and families in an expedient fashion. Establishing such communication venues as a Web site or call center to manage inquiries will facilitate the communication process.




- **Psychological and Emotional Recovery.** It is critical to identify the mental health resources in collaboration with partners to promote psychological and emotional recovery. Through this collaboration students, faculty, and staff will have the opportunity to receive short- and long-term mental health services on and off campus, or obtain referrals for more long-term counseling. As part of the preparedness plan, campus mental health personnel may want to establish a prescreening and approval process for mental health personnel who could help during and after an emergency. In addition to providing mental health services for students, it is important to offer such services to workers who may be cleaning and restoring the physical and structural facilities; faculty; and staff involved in the recovery effort; as well as public safety, medical, and mental health professionals.

Hurricane Katrina and Tulane University: Recovery Set in Motion

On Aug. 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused massive destruction in New Orleans and a broad expanse of the Gulf Coast region. Tulane University, located in the heart of New Orleans, suffered major property damage and losses—estimated at more than \$600 million. University functions were brought to a standstill. Following Hurricane Katrina, Tulane University had to contend with the aftermath of the disaster, an inaccessible city, few functioning technologies, and no operational communication mechanisms. Moreover, the university had to close its doors for the fall semester and spend weeks attempting to locate faculty, staff, and students who had evacuated around the country. The university responded by establishing a Web site, call center, and remote offices to provide regular and accurate updates to the entire campus community. The university president and his staff identified several elements that needed immediate attention, including student housing and food services, parking and transportation, administrative and classroom space, media relations, and financial solvency. He set up a series of task forces with representatives from each department and asked them to develop solutions to the major issues. The university also established a policy that students would receive credit for the semester's courses taken at other universities with a passing grade. An online registration system for employees helped regain lost contact information, alleviating disruption to the payroll system. University staff read blogs to monitor the discussions circulating, including the issues of concern to families, students, and staff, in order to alleviate concerns and facilitate the return of campus community members.

The devastation of Katrina forced the university to undertake a major reorganization, which resulted in the layoff of hundreds of faculty and staff members, elimination of several undergraduate majors, removal of men's and women's sports programs, and significant changes to its school of medicine and other graduate programs. The university swiftly developed a renewal plan, approved by the Board of Tulane on Dec. 8, 2005. For Tulane University, the challenges of emergency management became a way of life and a constant struggle. However, from their experiences in this tragedy, they “gathered once again and are now called to be the architects of and witnesses to the renewal of a great American university and a great American city” (*Tulane University—A Plan for Renewal*, December 2005, available at: <http://renewal.tulane.edu/renewalplan.pdf>).



This section introduced the four phases of emergency management. These four phases provide an organizing framework for the development of an emergency management plan.

The remaining sections of this action guide cover the four recommended steps for developing and implementing a plan:

Step 1: Get Organized

Step 2: Identify Hazards and Conduct a Risk Assessment

Step 3: Develop or Update the Emergency Management Plan

Step 4: Adopt and Implement the Emergency Management Plan


This four-step process can be used in either developing a new plan or updating an existing plan.

Four-step Process for Emergency Management and Implementation

This action guide offers a four-step process² for developing and implementing an emergency management plan at higher education institutions. For each step, the guide identifies a set of tasks that must be covered in order to thoroughly address that step.

Step 1: Get Organized

- Build support by getting institutional commitment and leadership for emergency management work.
- Identify, access, and use available resources, from both inside and outside the institution.
- Formulate a project organizational structure [that consists of an advisory committee, a planning team, a project manager, or other structural components.
- Develop a project work plan that has tasks and milestones.



Step 2: Identify Hazards, Vulnerabilities, and Threats by Conducting a Risk Assessment

- Identify a vulnerability assessment tool, which assists an institution in the ongoing process of identifying and prioritizing risks.
- Identify and profile potential hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities.
- Assess vulnerabilities to potential hazards and the institution's capabilities in responding to an event.
- Assess potential consequences and impacts of various emergency events.
- Identify actions that can be taken to prevent, mitigate, or prepare for hazards and potential hazards.


Step 3: Develop or Update the Emergency Management Plan

- Ensure that the plan incorporates the nine key principles in emergency management that contribute to a successful plan.
- Incorporate the results of work done in step 2, including identification of hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities through a risk assessment.
- Address planning elements associated with each of the four phases of emergency management: Prevention and Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.

Step 4: Adopt and Implement the Emergency Management Plan


- Subject the draft plan to a thorough review and approval process.
- Communicate and distribute the plan in various forms (e.g., via the campus Web site, on posters in classrooms, in pull-out guides for specific audiences and responders) to a full range of involved parties.
- Test and practice the plan in training sessions, drills, and exercises.
- Implement action items related to prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.

² The planning process outlined in this guide closely parallels the process advocated by the FEMA for both institutions of higher education and communities as a whole. FEMA's label for this process is *mitigation planning*, drawing from the title of the *Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000*. While the FEMA process focuses heavily on natural disasters, it is fully portable in applying to an all-hazards approach.



- Monitor and update the plan on an ongoing and regular basis, with assistance from after-action reports that are compiled following exercises and corrective action reports that are compiled following actual emergencies, and using lessons learned from both.

In the process of planning and implementation, success is achieved by working carefully through each step in the process. An investment of time and energy in the plan development stage (step 3 in the four-step process) will pay dividends at the implementation stage and to an actual emergency when actions become intuitive based on ongoing training and regular exercising. Consider each of these steps and their corollary tasks in more detail.



STEP 1: GET ORGANIZED


The first step in emergency management planning is to get organized. Tasks to be accomplished in getting organized are:

- Build support and get institutional commitment and leadership for the project.
- Identify, access, and use available resources, both inside and outside the institution.
- Formulate a project organizational structure with an advisory committee, a planning team, a project manager, or other structural components.
- Develop a project work plan with tasking and milestones.

These preparatory tasks are all essential to the success of the planning project.

Build Support, Commitment, and Leadership

Launching an emergency management initiative emerges from a decision to develop a plan or update an existing plan. Implementing and sustaining an emergency management planning initiative requires a considerable investment of institutional time, energy, and resources. It is important to obtain a firm commitment from numerous stakeholders to engage in a substantive planning effort. Thus, the institution's president or provost must assume strong leadership and assign someone to lead the effort who has decision-making power and the authority to use campus resources to manage the planning initiative. It is helpful to issue an administrative directive or resolution that defines the broad objectives of the initiative and describes the general approach to achieve the activities. The objectives should incorporate the guiding principles for emergency management and should rely on the four phases of emergency management.




Identify, Access, and Use Available Resources

When beginning the emergency management planning process it is important to identify what assets and resources are available both on campus and in the community. This task is challenging because there are so many groups and individuals to consider. Ideally, a college or university should have an office of senior management, or at a minimum, a staff position, dedicated to emergency management as a primary function. If so, this office or staff position would play a lead role in the planning. Institutions vary greatly with regard to the presence of departments and functions with a direct responsibility for emergency management; for example, many institutions have their own police and fire operations, and others do not. A first order of business is to identify those departments that must play a significant role in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from an emergency.

On the campus, a major challenge is to achieve a cohesive and integrated planning initiative. The process is an opportunity to create linkage and constructive communication across a large number of potential participants. In doing so, the objective is to generate buy-in, participation, and enthusiasm for the initiative. Table 2 provides a list of on-campus resources and their potential contributions. Determining the extent of resources, knowledge, and expertise that each department brings to the initiative will be helpful throughout the process.

Table 2. IHE Emergency Management Planning: Selected Departments and Illustrative Contributions



College or University Department*	Illustrative Department Contributions
Academic Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures to communicate with and account for teaching faculty in an emergency situation. • Develop plans to identify alternate facilities where institution activities can be conducted in the event of the destruction, disablement, or denial or lack of access to existing facilities • Identify and prioritize critical support services and systems • Identify and ensure recovery of critical assets
Business Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop the processes and procedures for tracking employees' time and issuing paychecks during disaster operations • Develop procedures for procuring emergency resources for responding to and recovering from emergencies • Develop the process for documenting the financial cost of emergency response and recovery operations • Develop a Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
Central Administration or Designee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide resources and leadership support to drive the initiative • Develop procedures for declaring an emergency • Identify alternate administrative facilities • Develop procedures for increasing public information efforts • Develop and coordinate procedures for recruiting volunteers and additional staff • Develop procedures to coordinate and approve volunteers and manage donations during an emergency • Develop a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)
Counseling and Mental Health Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify and train appropriate staff to provide developmentally and culturally appropriate mental health services • Train mental health staff on specific interventions • Provide basic training on available resources and common reactions to trauma for all staff (including administrators) • Train teachers and other staff on early warning signs of potentially dangerous individuals • Assemble and train crisis recovery teams • Identify both internal and external partners (consider local mental health agencies who may be able to assist, and develop a structure for support) and develop partnership agreements • Develop template letters (that can be tailored) for alerting students, parents, families, staff, and the community to emergencies
Emergency Medical Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop and coordinate procedures for mobilizing resources needed for significant, longer-term emergencies • Identify sources for mutual aid agreements and assistance
Environmental Health and Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate in vulnerability and hazard assessments • Review and update office standard operating procedures to align with the campus emergency management plan • Develop procedures for pre-positioning resources and equipment • Review and update processes and procedures for state and federal disaster declaration requests • Develop, review, and update state and federally required environmental emergency response plans, including management procedures for the plans • Coordinate with public safety operations (see next entry) to develop process and procedures for increasing public information • Provide warning system information

* Across varying types of institutions of higher education these departments are key to university functioning.




Table 2. (Cont'd)

Facilities and Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate in vulnerability and hazard assessments • Provide floor plans with room layout, electrical sources, and entrance and exit points for all campus buildings • Develop procedures for pre-positioning resources and equipment • Identify sources for mutual aid agreements and assistance
Food Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identify possible threats and mitigation strategies relating to food safety • Develop procedures for providing food to students, staff, faculty, and community partners during a major emergency • Develop mutual aid agreements for obtaining, preparing, and distributing food
Health Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures to determine if there are adequate supplies and equipment to triage for an emergency and to support community health partners • Develop procedures for mobilizing personnel on campus and at external sites • Develop procedures for developing mutual aid agreements • Develop pandemic flu and infectious disease plans • Develop system for disease surveillance and tracking • Coordinate with local and state public health partners
Human Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop plans to maintain the continuity of payroll, together with the business office (see above), during an emergency • Develop plans to maintain employee benefit services during an emergency • Develop plans to hire or replace staff with temporary employees, if needed • Develop plans to serve as the liaison, or organizer, or both, of volunteer assistance in the event of an emergency • Prepare to execute components of the COOP relating to staffing, including assessing faculty and staff availability, appropriation of personnel, and assisting employees with work-recovery needs (e.g., psychological help, time off for personal needs).
Information Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures and systems for checking critical information and alert systems to disseminate emergency information via Web site, cell phone, e-mail, and other mechanisms. • Identify IT resources needed to facilitate the emergency operations of all campus departments • Identify need for and sources of emergency communication devices (e.g., ham radios, cell phones) • Develop plans to continue academic programs that significantly use technology for teaching purposes
Legal Counsel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide legal counsel on campus liability to key decision makers • Coordinate investigations completed by community partners • Review messages drafted by PIO • Ensure that all campus and community actions are documented with a rationale for the action
Public Information Office (PIO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for coordinating with all departments to provide unified and factual messages to students, staff, faculty, families, and the media using multiple modalities • Develop pre-agreements with the media concerning debriefings and media holding areas during an emergency • Designate a campus spokesperson





Table 2. (Cont'd)

Public Safety Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for reviewing and updating emergency management plan • Develop procedures for facilities and equipment, including testing systems • Develop procedures for mobilizing department of public safety personnel and pre-positioning resources and equipment • Develop a process for managing incidents at the field level using the Incident Command System • Develop a process for communicating with and directing the central dispatch center, including the activation of the Emergency Contact List • Develop procedures to warn threatened elements of the population • Ensure that hazardous material procedures are consistent with the state and local environmental safety hazardous materials plans
Residential Life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures to coordinate the need for on-campus housing, temporary shelters, and temporary off-campus housing locations • Develop procedures for mobilizing residential life personnel and pre-positioning resources • Develop an on-call staffing system to ensure staff are available at all times • Develop procedures for identifying resident students in need of emergency evacuation assistance • Develop procedures for the evacuation and temporary shelter accommodations for resident students • Develop procedures for checking residential facilities and equipment
Student Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for checking student affairs facilities and equipment, including those relating to on-campus recreation, student organizations, on-campus employment, community service, and volunteerism • Develop procedures for addressing the needs of students living in Greek housing or off-campus facilities • Develop procedures for pre-positioning resources to maintain functioning of such campus elements as career services and student government • Develop mutual aid agreements and pre-negotiate services for goods and services in the event of an emergency • Ensure that all items under the <i>Americans with Disabilities Act</i> are considered throughout the planning and implementation of the emergency management plan • Ensure that the plan is accessible to students whose primary language is not English • Develop parent or family notification procedures
Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop procedures for mobilizing campus wide transportation for an emergency and for maintaining control of traffic from private vehicles • Develop evacuation procedures from various campus locales


Source: Adapted from the *University of Maryland Emergency Operations Plan* (2006) available at: http://www.umd.edu/emergencypreparedness/umeop/pdfs/sop_dev.pdf [last accessed on Sept. 30, 2008] and the *University of Florida Emergency Management Plan* (2005), available at: <http://www.ehs.ufl.edu/disasterplan/UFEMP.pdf> [last accessed on Sept. 30, 2008.]



Collaboration with community partners should support all planning efforts as well as ensure coordinated response and recovery plans. Outside the college or university system, the planning effort also should involve other community collaborators, such as organizations in government, the nonprofit sector, and the private sector in the community. Consider involving the following:

- Local emergency management offices and planning committees;
- First responders in law enforcement, fire protection, and emergency medical services;
- 911 communications centers;
- Ambulance services;
- City and county government planning agencies, including regional planning agencies;
- City, county, and state government public works departments;
- Special districts with responsibilities for infrastructure, transportation, or flood control;
- Public health agencies;
- Mental health agencies;
- Hospitals;
- State government offices with responsibilities related to emergency management (especially the state office of emergency management and the state hazards mitigation officer);
- FEMA, specifically the regional office;
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), regional office;
- Nonprofit organizations related to emergency and human services, such as the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and United Way; and
- Media organizations.

The objective in contacting these groups is to generate interest in planning, enlist support and participation, and determine how each stakeholder might best become involved. The magnitude and intensity of the involvement of these organizations will depend on their expertise, time, and resources. In some cases, it will be sufficient for the stakeholder to simply be aware of the planning and know that a new or updated emergency management plan is forthcoming from the IHE. Additionally, these stakeholders will be key participants in all exercises.




Formulate a Project Organizational Structure

Once the campus and community resources are identified, a structure for implementing the planning initiative is needed. This structure will be different from campus to campus, depending on size, location, and campus facilities (e.g., research facilities), and buildings and events (e.g., athletic, performing arts) organized by the institution. It may be appropriate to form an advisory committee or task force with a representative drawn from the campus as well as each of the community partners to formulate this structure. Another option is to form a core planning team with members having expertise in emergency management and such related disciplines as public safety, risk management, and public communications. Core members should consistently participate in any planning efforts to minimize information inconsistencies and provide for fluid decision-making.

While some individuals will be active participants, other stakeholders' participation in the effort may take the form of submitting information and providing feedback. For example, the core planning team may include the head of each department. The department head and his or her designated staff would collaborate to develop an all-hazards department operations plan that will help with accountability and unity of command. Components of the all-hazards plan should include:

- Data about threat and hazard assessments, department statistics, relevant campus data, and any relevant regulations or guidelines that apply to the department functions.
- A mission statement that outlines the broad objectives and general approach to preparing for, responding to, and recovering from emergencies and hazards.
- Mechanisms to trigger readiness activities and illustrative readiness activities, response activities, extended response activities, and recovery activities.
- An emergency team leader and alternative team leaders who will coordinate the resources and functions of each department during an emergency. Each person must provide contact information, such as campus, cell, and home phone numbers.
- An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) representative who will be at the EOC and serve as a liaison between the departments and the EOC.
- The primary location where emergency operations will be coordinated and an alternative location for backup.




- Procedures that the departments will use to contact personnel and ask them to report to the campus or an alternative location.
- Designation of groups of employees to perform specific functions. Each group should be assigned a group leader and members (two to seven people) and designate a location on campus or alternative location if the campus is not accessible where employees in this group will meet. This component also should include assignment configuration that will list shifts and periods of days on and off.
- Resources, materials, and equipment needed to perform each task before, during, and after the emergency. The plan also should include multiple locations on campus for the materials. The primary location may be the place where similar routine tasks are performed or where materials and equipment are routinely stored.
- Summary of available resources not available on campus, which may necessitate developing mutual aid agreements, memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or pre-emergency contracts for equipment, materials, or services.
- Summary of timelines and milestones for ensuring that all components are fully in place according to a schedule.

For some responsibilities and data collection efforts, there may be a decision to collaborate across departments. For example, it may be more efficient and cost-effective to predetermine whether to have each department conduct hazard and risk assessments or make this a campuswide activity. Regardless of the option selected, one entity should analyze all the data and develop one hazard matrix for the entire campus.

Develop a Work Plan

To formulate a work plan, it is first necessary to consider *scope* and *approach*. A first task might be to gather existing information related to emergency management at the institution, such as:

- Previous risk assessments and campus climate assessments as they pertain to potential hazards and vulnerabilities;
- Incident data, culture and climate data, and community hazard profiles;
- Any existing emergency management plans for the campus; and
- Previous media coverage (such as newspaper articles) of campus emergencies.





It always helps to know what has gone on before and what is currently in place pertaining to emergency management. It is important to identify what is working well and where there are major gaps in existing plans or procedures.

All assessment and planning efforts should be aligned with federal, state, and local requirements and guidelines (see U.S. Department of Education's *A Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools* available at: <https://rem.ed.gov>). Campus emergency management teams should obtain key information from resource agencies, such as documentation on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) from the Department of Homeland Security. Information on how to access local agencies can be obtained from FEMA. Leaders also should understand any relevant regulations or guidelines that apply, such as policies related to safety and security for the college or university system. Local emergency planning committees or emergency management agencies can be a good source of information about regulations and requirements promulgated in the local community.

The work plan should identify specific timelines and milestones. Leaders should set a target date for completing a first draft of the plan. The schedule should consider, as well, what needs to happen for the plan to be officially adopted and should allow time for stakeholder review, discussion, and approval processes. If a core planning team is in place, the team should be actively involved in planning—the team as a group may construct a work plan that designates specific tasks, when they will be accomplished, and who has the lead responsibility for getting each task done.

Completing the tasks necessary to get organized requires considerable effort. A concerted effort will help launch the planning work successfully, including a transition to the next major step in the process—identifying hazards and conducting a risk assessment.






STEP 2: IDENTIFY HAZARDS, VULNERABILITIES, AND THREATS BY CONDUCTING A RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

After getting organized, the next step in developing an emergency management plan is to identify potential hazards and conduct a risk assessment. It is important to take an all-hazards approach, considering a full range of risks and threats to the college or university. The hazards identification and risk assessment will prioritize among possible hazards so that a focus can be placed on the top priority hazards, while still addressing lower priority hazards. The assessment should be comprehensive with regard to settings, encompassing the campus, the surrounding neighborhoods, and the greater community.

This step of the process typically involves five distinct tasks:

- ▶ Identify a Vulnerability Assessment tool.
- ▶ Identify and profile potential hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities.
- ▶ Assess vulnerabilities to potential hazards and the institution's capabilities in responding to an event.
- ▶ Assess potential consequences/impacts of various emergency events.
- ▶ Identify actions that can be taken to prevent, mitigate or prepare for hazards and potential hazards.



FEMA Publications on Mitigation Planning

In August 2003, FEMA published *Building a Disaster-Resistant University*, a 42-page technical assistance document with eight worksheets in an appendix. This document contains detailed information on FEMA's mitigation planning methods, including details on estimating losses from a disaster (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003). The contents of *Building a Disaster-Resistant University* are based on a series of FEMA publications on mitigation planning at the state and local levels. There are four publications in this series (publication numbers 386-1 through 4):


- 386-1: *Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation Planning*
- 386-2: *Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses*
- 386-3: *Developing the Mitigation Plan: Identifying Mitigation Actions and Implementation Strategies*
- 386-4: *Bringing the Plan to Life: Implementing the Hazard Mitigation Plan*

Although the guides are written for communities, many of the steps and procedures represented in these documents are relevant to IHEs and their planning efforts. All of these publications can be found at the FEMA Web site, www.fema.gov. Click on "Forms and Publications" and search for the documents by publication number.

Identify a Vulnerability Assessment Tool

Vulnerability assessment is the ongoing process through which colleges and universities identify potential risks and areas of weakness that could have adverse consequences for institutions and their systems. Vulnerability assessments are an important and vital part of emergency management planning for examining risks, needs, and threats. A vulnerability assessment focuses on an institution's susceptibility to specific threats or hazards and how those weaknesses or threats might be mitigated through emergency management. Vulnerability assessments should be used to inform the prevention-mitigation phases of emergency management and help institutions decide which areas should be priorities of focus.

Initial emergency management planning can be a daunting task for many reasons, not the least of which is learning the numerous terms associated with various phases of the planning. Many other terms are used in relation to assessment, such as needs assessment, threat assessment, risk analysis, safety and security audit, hazard assessment, and facility assessment. Each one of these terms can have its own meaning depending on the context in which it is used. Some of these types of assessments, such as safety and security audits and facilities assessments, focus only on specific aspects or areas of vulnerability. Some examples of the interchangeable terminology follow.




- A *needs assessment*, often used interchangeably with *vulnerability assessment*, commonly refers to an assessment done to identify gaps or areas needing improvement and to determine unmet needs, but not necessarily all vulnerabilities or potential threats.
- A *hazards assessment* focuses on general hazards and determining which hazards an institution might be prone to. A *threat assessment* also focuses on hazards that could potentially threaten the institution, but the term has generally been used in assessing students or outsiders who may post a violent threat to other students within the campus.
- A *risk analysis* usually focuses on the calculation of specific risk levels to determine how vulnerable institutions would be to specific threats or what specific consequences institutions could face in the event of emergency-related crises. Generally a risk analysis is conducted after specific hazards are identified.

The U.S. Department of Education's *Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools* (2008) encompasses all of these areas of assessment and uses vulnerability assessment as an inclusive term. It also provides several sample assessment tools for use by institutions in an assessment process. Additional resources can be found at the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) Campus Preparedness Resource Center (available at: <http://www.iaclea.org/visitors/wmdcpt/cprc/aboutcprc.cfm>)

Identify and Profile Hazards, Threats, and Vulnerabilities

There are many different categories of hazards that could potentially affect higher education institutions. Vulnerability assessments should take into consideration all hazards and threats that could potentially affect the institution instead of limiting assessments to only specific categories of hazards and threats. A hazards assessment and risk analysis often are conducted by a team of participants with expertise in various aspects of the assessment process. First, the team engages in a hazards assessment to identify and prioritize hazards.



Hazards can be described in several categories:

Natural Hazards, Including Severe Weather

Natural hazards refer to what are commonly called natural disasters as well as various types of severe weather. Examples of these types of hazards are:


- Earthquakes;
- Tornadoes;
- Lightening;
- Severe wind;
- Hurricanes;
- Floods;
- Wildfires;
- Extreme temperatures (hot or cold);
- Landslides and mudslides;
- Tsunamis;
- Volcanic eruptions; and
- Winter precipitation (ice or snow).

Biological Hazards

Biological hazards that could affect colleges and universities include:

- **Infectious diseases**, such as pandemic influenza, XDR (extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis), *Staphylococcus aureus* (“Staph”), and meningitis;
- **Contaminated food outbreaks**, including salmonella, botulism, and *E. coli*; and
- **Toxic materials present in campus laboratories**, such as chemical, radioactive, or other potentially harmful substances.

Additionally, DHS advises that colleges and universities consider how such existing biological or medical conditions of students as allergies, diabetes, or asthma could affect students in the event of an emergency. For example, because of the stress caused by a crisis, students with asthma may have greater difficulty breathing and may need access to medications or inhalers during a shelter-in-place situation.



Similarly, diabetic students may need access to insulin or snacks during a shelter-in-place scenario. Meeting the special needs of more vulnerable students and staff is a key component in any emergency management plan.

Violence

Threats of violence at colleges and universities involve:

- Weapons on campus and school shootings;
- Fights;
- Criminal or gang violence; and
- Bomb threats.


Such factors as crime rates in the area, known gang activity, and drug use in the community and on campus may contribute to the potential for acts of violence on campus.

In situations where a student or faculty may pose a threat to the institution, as manifested through actions, or words, colleges and universities should have available a specific process for early intervention, usually called a *threat assessment*. Threat assessments are used in response to the identification of a person who is at risk of causing harm to self or others. The purpose of the threat assessment is to prevent acts of violence by responding to early warning signs and taking appropriate measures.

Climate and Culture

The climate and culture of the institution can contribute to or even cause hazards. Issues of climate and culture both in the institution and in the community that could influence hazards include:

- Drug usage and trafficking;
- Crimes, both minor and serious;
- Sexual misconduct;
- Suicide;
- Hostile environments (i.e., an environment where individuals or groups of individuals feel unsafe or threatened, such as in instances of racial or religious discrimination);



- Students, personnel, or intruders that may pose a danger to others; and
- Political protests or demonstrations.

Hazards Present in the Community

There are many possible threats associated with the physical community surrounding a campus. Examples are:

- If the campus is located near an industrial plant, this poses a potential hazard to the campus in the event of an explosion or accidental release of toxins.
- If the campus is near an airport or major highway, there is a risk of a plane crash on campus grounds or a nearby vehicle crash that releases hazardous material.
- If railways run through or near campus, accidents involving cargo transportation may pose risks of fire, explosion, or hazardous material release.
- If the campus is near waterways with a major dam, dam failure could pose a risk.
- Nearby prisons could pose a threat if convicts were to escape.

Hazards Related to the Physical Campus Environment


Many hazards or risks associated with hazards within the physical campus environment have potentially serious impacts, including structural-, maintenance-, and grounds-related issues. Examples of such hazards include:

- Building fires;
- Power outages; and
- Structural failures.

These are discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Hazards Created by Terrorism and Military Conflict

Such events as Sept. 11, 2001, have prompted new concern regarding the potential for terrorist threats. Incidents associated with terrorism and subsequent military conflict could occur on campuses. According to FEMA (2006), terrorism-related threats include the following:



- Explosions;
- Bioterrorism or biological warfare threats;
- Chemical threats;
- Nuclear blasts;
- Radiological threats that could be dispersed through a bomb or radiological dispersion device (RDD), or “dirty bomb.”

Certain locale also may be a target for terrorism:

- Military installations;
- Nearby dams;
- Campus facilities conducting animal research;
- Nuclear reactors on campuses; and
- Nearby sites of mass transportation, such as airports, railroads, ports, rail transits, major highways, and bus stations.


Bioterrorism threats include proliferation of hazardous bacteria, viruses, and related toxins that could be released into the air. Chemical threats could be in the form of toxic vapors, aerosols, liquids, or solids. Nuclear events would similarly involve some sort of bomb or explosion; however, the use of an RDD would be far more likely. In the event of terrorist threats such as these, colleges and universities may need to evaluate how prepared they would be to evacuate or shelter-in-place based on the type and proximity of the threat, and the campus location and structure itself.

Mapping of Area Targeted for Emergency Management

As hazards relevant to the institution are identified, the emergency management team would benefit greatly from the creation of a map supporting emergency management purposes. The base map created ideally would be GIS-based, offering multiple layers of spatial information features and the ability to associate attribute information with those spatial features. Mapping layers might include:

- All buildings and facilities on campus;
- The location of key resources related to emergency management, such as police, fire, and emergency medical services;
- The location of hazardous materials;
- Boundaries related to specific hazards such as floodplain topography and earthquake fault zones; and
- Campus infrastructure showing roads, water lines, power lines, and telecommunications systems.

The scope of the mapping system may extend beyond campus boundaries to include the surrounding community, hazards present in the community, and infrastructure in the community critical to the emergency management program of the college or university.



Hazard Identification: First Steps

A first order of business for the assessment team is to consider the list of potential hazards and begin to identify those that pose the greatest risk to the college or university. In the case of natural disasters, it may be fairly easy to determine those that are of greatest concern. Other hazard categories, however, may take some research and analysis to uncover.

It is likely that the community in which the college or university is located has conducted a hazards assessment that could be helpful to this effort. Talk to emergency management or public safety agencies in the community to find out what has been done in identifying potential hazards. A community-based hazards assessment likely will have considered many of the same hazards that a college or university is concerned with, including natural disasters, community facilities and plants, hazardous materials from industrial and chemical accidents, and susceptibility to terrorism.

After identifying a list of hazards, it is helpful to develop *hazard profiles*. For each type of hazard, answer the related profile questions:

- Frequency of occurrence – How often is it likely to occur?
- Magnitude and potential intensity – How bad could it get?
- Location – Where is it likely to strike?
- Probable geographical extent – How large of an area will be affected?
- Duration – How long could it last?
- Seasonal pattern – What time of year is it more likely to occur?
- Speed of onset – How fast will it occur?
- Availability of warnings – Does a warning system exist and how much warning time will there be?

After completing hazard profiles, a prioritization analysis can be created using a risk matrix. A risk matrix is used to rate probability and severity on a scale of low, medium, or high. Obviously, hazards with high probability and high severity are at the top of the priorities list, and those with low probability and low severity are at the bottom. The hard part may be prioritizing hazards that get medium ratings or those that are high probability-low severity or low probability-high severity. Once an institution has determined which hazards are at the top of the list as well as those that fall in descending order following those at the top, it can prioritize planning, training, and drill efforts to focus on the hazards most likely to occur and most likely to cause significant repercussions to the campus.




Figure 1. Example of an Emergency Management Risk Matrix


PROBABILITY	HIGH			Hurricane Tornado
	MED		Flood	Violence
	LOW			Hazmat Spill
		LOW	MED	HIGH
		SEVERITY		

Source: Akers, J. & Lassiter, B. *Prevention-Mitigation*. (April 2008). Presentation at the U.S. Department of Education Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools' *Emergency Management for Schools* Training, New Orleans.

Assess Vulnerabilities and Response Capabilities

The next task for the team is an assessment of vulnerabilities and response capabilities. This entails determining the characteristics of the campus setting that contribute to susceptibility to hazards and the ability of the institution to respond to an event. As discussed previously (see p. 30), a vulnerability assessment identifies areas of weakness that could result in undesirable consequences for the campus or community. For colleges and universities, these areas of weakness could include particular aspects of an institution's structure, procedures, equipment, systems, grounds, and surroundings. As noted earlier, many campuses have open access to buildings and grounds, which increases vulnerability. Some vulnerabilities can be identified through an inspection of buildings and grounds:

- **Structural hazards** refer to actual structural issues within the building, such as weak roofs or trusses, building susceptibility to high winds or floods, unreinforced masonry, and unsecured or unsafe windows.
- **Maintenance-related hazards** could include unstable bookshelves, exposed wiring, wet floors, unsafe practices in science labs or with chemical elements, exposure to asbestos, unsecured appliances and vending machines, malfunction of heating and ventilation systems, blocked exits, and general fire hazards.
- **Grounds hazards** include such issues as unsafe landscaping, poorly maintained outdoor equipment, exposed electrical wires or gas lines, exposed nails, or unsecured storage structures.



A vulnerability assessment also is supported by applying the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED):

- Natural surveillance – ability to see what is occurring in a particular setting;
- Natural access control – ability to restrict who enters or exits an environment; and
- Territorial maintenance – ability to demonstrate ownership of and respect for property.

The assessment should identify instances where these features could be improved.

Another key component of vulnerability assessment is perhaps the most challenging—assessing campus culture and climate. Colleges and universities should foster a culture of respect and create an environment that lessens the chance of a violent incident. To do this, institutions pursue a number of strategies, such as creating connections between faculty and students and encouraging an environment of openness and disclosure. There are a number of assessment tools available to colleges and universities to evaluate their culture and climate. These tools can help point to areas that need attention. Obviously, improving culture and climate is an ongoing and long-term endeavor.

Leadership in an Emergency Situation


The incident command system, as described earlier (see p. 9), is a standardized, on-scene, all-hazard management structure that allows its users—higher education institutions and first responders—to operate together to meet the demands of emergency situations without encountering barriers in functioning due to jurisdictional boundaries. As FEMA explains in their ICS-100 course, Introduction to the Incident Command System, the basic organization of the incident command system entails several key elements relating to the organization of command.

For one, having a **unified command** establishes a single command structure for all respective agencies to work under (e.g., fire, police, SWAT). It includes common response objectives and strategies and the ability for agency incident commanders to work together in joint decision-making.

Transfer of command also ensures the emergency is handled effectively by always placing control of the situation in the hands of the best-equipped entity. Transfer of command occurs in the following circumstances:

- When a more qualified entity assumes command;
- When the incident changes so as to legally require a change in command;
- When personnel change shifts during a prolonged incident; or
- When the incident response is concluded and control is returned to the home agency (here, the higher education institution).


An emergency plan for higher education institutions will entail an incident command system made up of campus personnel, including a designated incident commander. When first responders arrive on campus to respond to an emergency, the higher education incident commander will typically transfer command to the first responders' incident commander, who will operate response efforts from a unified command structure.




If an emergency were to occur, how prepared would the institution be to respond? A major purpose for conducting an assessment and developing an emergency management plan is to improve preparedness and response capability. Ask key questions that pertain to the Preparedness and Response phases of emergency management:

- How well defined are campus policies and procedures for responding to emergencies?
- How well established are relationships with first responders and other community partners?
- Would it be clear who is in charge when responding to an emergency and how leadership responsibility will be handled as the emergency evolves (see Figure 2.)?

Figure 2. NIMS Organizational Chart, Modified for a College Campus



Source: Chart courtesy of Gallaudet University, adapted from Director Harry Aziz's presentation at ACAP's Crisis Management – Protecting our Students Workshop, Oct. 30, 2007, Baltimore, Md.



Example of NIMS Training: California Systemwide Community Colleges

In 2007, the California College Systems Office began offering systemwide training for all California community college districts and colleges on NIMS and the state Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) as a result of funding from the Governor's Office of Homeland Security. Initial training opportunities were held for two types of college personnel: chief executive officers, and emergency and safety personnel. The CEOs received training from the University of West Virginia's VMC/Homeland Security Programs and a SEMS executive course that fulfills one of the requirements for CEO training under NIMS and SEMS, while the emergency and safety personnel received training on college risk assessment planning. Trainings also included time to network with other community college personnel. Chancellor Mark Drummond encouraged all district and college CEOs and emergency and safety personnel to attend a training to ensure their colleges and communities are prepared in the area of emergency management. More information on this effort is available at: <http://emergency.cccco.edu>.


- Is there a defined procedure for communicating with students and others on the campus to alert them of the emergency? Are multiple modes of communication available, including cell phone broadcasts, Web site postings, notification through media outlets, and campus warning alarm systems?
- Are radio systems of campus police or security personnel interoperable with local law enforcement first responders?
- Are there plans in place for communicating with the media?

Thinking through these questions will help determine where the most work in developing an emergency management plan needs to be done.

Assess Potential Consequences and Impacts of Emergency Events

The assessment of consequences measures the range of loss or damage that would occur from the impact of an incident. For colleges and universities, this should include the disruption of the social and physical learning environment—whether short or long term—as well as subsequent psychological impact on the college community. Estimating the potential for death and injury is a critical aspect of consequences assessment. Another key component is estimation of financial losses, such as liability for death or injury, repairs to buildings and grounds, and loss of revenue due to disruption of operations.

To accurately estimate potential losses from an emergency event, it is necessary to take inventory of assets at the institution. For buildings, the inventory should include square footage, construction materials, contents and equipment inside of buildings, uses of the building, and occupancy levels at different points in time during the year. The inventory should address infrastructure as well—utilities, communications systems, and transportation systems. An assets inventory is critical when estimating potential losses from specific events, such as a flood, earthquake, or fire.



The estimation of losses from an emergency event is conventionally organized in broad categories of life, property, and function. For IHEs, losses may be estimated in terms of harm to persons (often measured in numbers of injuries or deaths), financial costs related to buildings and equipment, lost revenues, and other conventional measures. Other measures of loss are particular to the college and university setting—e.g., loss of instructional time, research data, and unique historical artifacts or other valuable assets present on campus.


Identifying Prevention, Mitigation, and Preparation Action Items

From the tasks performed by the assessment team, a list of action items should be compiled. These action items could include the following:

- Install access controls for selected buildings and campus areas;
- Make structural improvements to buildings;
- Conduct maintenance projects, such as securing bookshelves and display cases to walls and securing lab equipment;
- Make improvements in landscaping, such as removing objects that might impair visibility through windows to the outside;
- Install systems for communicating with students and others on campus to notify them of an emergency;
- Enhance radio systems to ensure interoperability with local law enforcement;
- Improve security technology, such as security cameras, access control, and alarm systems; and
- Update structural design as applied to new construction or the retrofitting of existing structures.


National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities

Each type of campus facility has unique safety and security needs. The National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities (NCEF) has created assessment questions and checklists for virtually every type of facility or area on a campus. The Web site also offers articles on prevention and mitigation actions that are appropriate for indoors and outside on campus grounds. The NCEF assessment tools and articles can be found at www.ncef.org.



These action items will eventually be incorporated into the emergency management plan document. The items identified should be subjected to a costs-benefit analysis. Some items can be accomplished at little cost. Others may be very costly, requiring the identification of funding sources and an analysis of budgetary impact. A prioritization of items on the list can be established using criteria of cost, benefits accrued from risk reduction, and estimated frequency of occurrence for the hazard involved.

This section discussed the second step in a four-step process for developing and implementing an emergency management plan at the IHE level. In identifying hazards and conducting a risk assessment, an IHE positions itself to write a plan based on relevant facts and systematic analysis. A thorough effort in identifying hazards and conducting risk assessment makes the job of writing a plan considerably easier and leads to a higher-quality product.



STEP 3: DEVELOPING OR UPDATING AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

The third step in developing and implementing an emergency management plan is to draft—or review and update—the emergency management plan. Using campus and community data and resources and the departmental plans, an all-hazard, campus-based emergency management plan can be developed, modified, or updated. Much of the work done during assessment (see step 2) will carry over and serve as the basis for the plan.

It is important to remember that the campus and relevant partners should collaborate to develop the comprehensive plan. In addition, certain campus entities may require separate plans of their own, such as an athletic stadium or university hospital. These plans should be stand-alone with respect to that specific entity, but also should be rolled into the campuswide emergency plan.


The tasks to be accomplished in this step are:

- ▶ Ensure that the plan incorporates the key principles that will contribute to successful emergency management operations.
- ▶ Consider the results of work done in step 2, including identification of hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities indicated by conducting a risk assessment.
- ▶ Act on planning elements emerging from each of the four phases of emergency management: Prevention-Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.

Incorporate Key Principles

Every plan should incorporate several general components. The plan should:

- Establish points of responsibility consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (see <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims> for more information on NIMS).



- Demonstrate meaningful collaboration with community partners.
- Reflect an all-hazards approach to emergency management.
- Address elements within the boundaries of the four phases of emergency management framework.
- Document approval of the plan by the appropriate authorities.
- Show alignment with federal, state, and local emergency management plans and guidelines.
- Specify accommodation for people with disabilities or other special needs.
- Provide a timeline for maintaining and updating the plan.

National Incident Management System and Higher Education Institutions


Are colleges and universities required to implement NIMS? Any colleges or universities that receive federal preparedness funds are required to adopt NIMS. In addition, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 requires all federal agencies to adopt NIMS, and requires state and local jurisdictions to adopt NIMS to receive federal preparedness funding. While colleges and universities do not qualify as first responders, it is similarly recommended that these institutions work with the community on emergency preparedness activities. This includes the collaboration of college and university emergency preparedness personnel with the community's emergency response personnel and the use of NIMS and ICS.

See National Incident Management System at the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia at: <http://www.usg.edu/publicsafety/resources/index.phtml?res=5>.

Consider Hazards, Threats, and Vulnerabilities Identification From Risk Assessment

When developing the plan, the results of step 2—identification of hazards and risk assessment—should be considered. Step 2 results could include:

- Results on research as to past occurrences of hazards at the college or university, covering all hazard types.
- Profiling and prioritization of hazards resulting from an assessment of frequency and severity of potential hazards.
- Summary information on vulnerabilities of the institution to potential hazards as identified in a facilities and grounds assessment, surveys of campus culture and climate, or other sources; also, conclusions on the ability of the institution to respond to various hazards.
- Information on the potential consequences of hazards likely to occur, including estimates of loss.



These findings should inform all components of an institution's emergency management plan, shaping the strategies, procedures, and practices implemented in each of a plan's four phases of emergency management.

Address the Four Phases of Emergency Management


Next, the plan should include a section on elements related to each of the four phases of emergency management, as earlier described. Building on the risk assessment, the plan should describe the decisions, activities, and programs that pertain to **Prevention-Mitigation** of emergencies, addressing such questions as:

- What actions have been taken and will be taken to prevent campus violence?
- What actions have been taken and will be taken to mitigate the impacts of an unavoidable natural disaster?
- Who is responsible and involved in crisis prevention and mitigation at the college or university? How are community partners involved in this?
- What training and practice has been conducted or will be conducted to support prevention and mitigation activities?

To address **Preparedness**, the plan should adopt and endorse the incident command system and acknowledge how ICS will be applied during a crisis. To the extent this can be done ahead of time, specific roles and responsibilities should be assigned to individuals or position types in the institutional system. If possible, the plan should describe how coordination with community partners will take place and what roles community partners will play in different types of emergencies. If MOUs have been developed in this regard, these MOUs can be incorporated into the plan document.

Example of Coordinated Response: Stanford University Emergency Event Classification System

The Stanford University Campus Emergency Plan calls for triaging an emergency in a three-level classification system. Level 1 is a minor incident that is quickly resolved with internal resources or limited help. Level 2 is a more significant emergency that impacts critical infrastructure, a building, or multiple buildings and that may potentially affect life safety or mission-critical functions. For level 2, the emergency plan is activated, and an operational subset of a larger emergency management team, the Situation Triage and Assessment Team (STAT), determines the magnitude of the emergency and coordinates its resolution or, if the emergency continues to develop, activates level 3 response. Level 3 is a disaster that involves the entire campus and surrounding community. At Level 3, the emergency plan is activated, and the entire emergency management organization across the campus mobilizes.




Other factors to consider in **Preparedness**:

- Articulate policies, protocols, and guidelines in the plan that directly prepare the college or university for an emergency. Examples include guidelines for when evacuation or a shelter-in-place response should be invoked, what emergency supplies need to be available, where building floor plans are to be maintained and made available, and how transportation-related issues will be handled. If contracts have been negotiated to provide supplies or transportation in an emergency, these should be identified in the plan.
- Incorporate a communications plan—one that covers communications with the campus community, the surrounding community, the media, parents and families of students, and other stakeholders.
- Outline the training and practice to be conducted. This should include a full range of training and drills, from simple orientation to full-scale simulation drills. Training and practice requirements vary greatly by role and position within the college or university. It takes some work, but it is important to think through and specify a training plan for each type of position.

If a thorough job has been done in addressing **Preparedness** in the plan, the job of addressing the Response phase will be relatively straightforward. In the **Response** section, the plan could:


- Articulate specifically *how* mobilization and activation of the plans and protocols—those that pertain to the incident command system and communications, for example—will take place.
- Articulate distinct criteria for activating an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in response to a crisis of moderate or severe intensity. Activation of the EOC is often accompanied by designation of a particular individual or position as incident commander.
- Specify how documentation of the event will occur and who is responsible for doing this. This documentation is necessary for after-event debriefing session. The debriefing is also important for reviewing with the involved emergency responders both what went right and what went wrong.


In the plan, all the components of the **Recovery** phase should be addressed—physical and structural recovery, business and administrative continuity, resumption of academic learning, and emotional and mental recovery of those involved. The plan might discuss:



- Conducting a physical and structural damage assessment and making decisions about building closures. The plan should articulate guidelines for decisions for both closures and reopenings.
- Documenting procedures for how physical and structural repairs are to be initiated.
- Drafting a continuity of operations plan (COOP) that describes how to handle payroll and other key aspects of doing business in the college or university.
- Designing guidelines for how resumption of learning activities will be accomplished. Will there need to be alternative sites for parts of or the institution's entire learning program? Flexibility and innovation may be the keys here.
- Recognizing that the emotional and mental health of students, faculty, staff, or other involved parties is a paramount concern. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a serious health concern. The early stages of Recovery are the best opportunity to mitigate the impacts of this. Resources for mental health counseling at the institution and in the surrounding community should be identified ahead of time.
- Anticipating certain practical matters that could become logistical issues, for example, procedures for receiving donations and procedures for screening volunteers to help with recovery efforts.

Drafting an emergency management plan is step 3 in the four-step process. Completing a draft of the plan is a major milestone in planning, but there is more work to be done. In step 4, the plan enters the phase of implementation, monitoring, and updating.





STEP 4: ADOPTING AND IMPLEMENTING AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

Once an emergency management plan has been drafted, attention can shift to getting the plan adopted and implemented. Plans need to be dynamic and adaptable, not documents that sit on a shelf and are never used or consulted. How does implementation happen? The tasks in this final step of the process are:


- ▶ Subject the draft plan to a thorough review and approval process.
- ▶ Communicate and distribute the plan in various forms to a full range of involved parties.
- ▶ Test and practice the plan in training sessions, drills, and exercises.
- ▶ Implement the action items outlined related to prevention, mitigation, and preparedness.
- ▶ Monitor and update the plan on an ongoing and regular basis, with assistance from after-action reports following exercises and corrective action reports following actual emergencies, and using lessons learned.

Review and Adopt the Plan

Early in the planning process, provision should have been made for review and approval of the plan document. Review and approval processes are an opportunity to communicate the contents of the plan to planning committee team members and community partners, improve upon it by incorporating review feedback, and build support for the plan with governing boards and senior administrative officials.

The campus emergency management committee, advisory board, or task force should review all documentation in collaboration with community partners. This review serves multiple purposes:

- Ensure that campus plans are aligned with and integrated into local, state, and federal law enforcement and emergency management guidelines and policies;



- Identify and resolve any inconsistencies or overlaps among departmental actions;
- Ensure that all responsibilities and procedures are consistent with NIMS and ICS functions; and
- Ensure that the campus is not subject to any legal liability.


After this review, the emergency management plan should be finalized, modified, or updated on a regular basis.

Of course, approval processes vary depending upon the structure and policies of the institution. Whatever is required, the plan should receive a formal approval and become an official policy document for the institution.

The adoption of the plan also can reflect the endorsement of several stakeholders. In addition to the approval of a chancellor or president and a governing board, endorsements can be sought from the business and administrative departments of the institution, from local emergency management agencies, local public safety agencies, and local political jurisdictions. This is also an opportunity to include student groups, for example, by obtaining an endorsement from the student government body.

Communicate and Distribute the Plan

The emergency management plan must be disseminated, communicated, and marketed to a variety of involved parties and stakeholders, including faculty, staff, students, parents, community partners, and the media. Each distinct stakeholder will receive a different part of the emergency plan—only the component most relevant to their respective roles in emergencies. For example, food service workers should receive information about food safety and infectious diseases. For maintenance and custodial staff, the emphasis may be on floor plans about campus buildings and the importance of regularly updating the floor plans and having the plans accessible in various formats (e.g., paper, electronic copies). All entities should know that a complete plan exists, but that for security reasons, the details of the master plan are not publicized. Few stakeholders will receive the complete plan.



Developing a marketing and dissemination plan of the various components will involve collaboration among campus administration, department heads, the public information officer, student affairs, community partners, and the media. Each stakeholder may require a different type of marketing strategy and a variety of communication modalities.


It is likely the full plan will be a large document organized in a notebook or posted on a secure campus Web site. For students and families, the campus Web site is the most effective communication mechanism. Faculty and staff may want to access publicly viewable parts of the plan via an Intranet Web site. Summary components tailored to stakeholders' interests and perspectives also can be presented in laminated one-page documents able to be posted and readily accessible for periodic review. Quick reference guides, or "pocket guides," may be an important format for communicating the essential components of the plan and making its contents more accessible during an emergency event.

Partnerships with the media should be strategic and ongoing. Developing a media communication plan with various media outlets will result in a collaborative effort to disseminate timely and accurate information to the public. The media can be sent press releases about the emergency plan and any exercises that the campus may conduct. Asking media outlets to be active participants in exercises will emphasize the importance of a strong working relationship between the campus and media.

Test and Practice the Plan

Higher education institutions have come to expect the unexpected. The more the plan is practiced and people are trained on the plan, the better the campus responds to emergencies in a comprehensive and effective manner. The ability to do this comes from practice. Exercises are an effective way to identify gaps and weaknesses in the plan and to train students, staff, faculty, and campus administrators in the emergency management procedures. All practicing and training must be done in conjunction with relevant community partners and should focus on the key procedures and strategies outlined in the plan. There are five types of exercises; each requires different levels of planning, time, people involved, and resources:

- **Orientation meetings** will increase awareness among all stakeholders about why and how the plan was developed and provide an overview of the plan's contents. These meetings should include campus administration, department heads, the public information officer, student affairs, community partners, first responders, and the media.




- **Tabletop exercises** are discussions about a scenario and how the campus or a department will prepare for, respond to, or recover from an emergency. Participants, from faculty and staff to department heads, campus administrators, and emergency planners, discuss potential challenges, and identify solutions.
- **Drills** involve one or only a few community partners (e.g., law enforcement, fire) and relevant campus staff that use the actual campus grounds and buildings to drill on how to respond to a scenario.
- **Functional exercises** are similar to drills but will likely involve multiple partners and campus staff. Participants react to realistic simulated events (e.g., a bomb in a residence hall and an intruder with a gun in a classroom). Participants implement the plan and procedures using the Incident Command System (ICS) protocol.
- **Full-scale exercises** are the most time-consuming activity in the exercise continuum and are a multiagency, multi-jurisdiction effort in which all resources are deployed. This type of exercise tests collaboration among the agencies and participants, public information systems, communications systems, and equipment. An EOC is established, and the ICS is activated.

What Is a Tabletop Exercise?

Tabletop exercises analyze an emergency event in an informal, stress-free environment. They provide participants with an emergency scenario to analyze and increase their awareness of the roles and responsibilities of individuals who need to respond, stabilize, terminate, and help others recover from emergencies. They are designed to prompt a constructive discussion about existing emergency response plans as participants identify, investigate, and resolve issues. (“Emergency Exercises: An Effective Way to Validate School Safety Plans,” *ERCM Express Newsletter*, Vol.2, Issue 3, 2006)

For example, a tabletop exercise might bring together campus emergency planners and local first responders to discuss planning and response efforts to any number of emergencies that might occur on campus, including an active shooter or a pandemic outbreak. Together, the institution and their partners review preventive abilities, preparedness for such a situation, and capacities for responding and recovering from the emergency to determine areas for improvement and possible revisions to the institution's emergency plan.


Before making a decision about which type of exercise to facilitate, a higher education institution should consider varying factors, including the amount of time and resources and collaborative support required to execute the activity balanced against the outcome of the experience. For example, while a tabletop exercise may be cheaper and less time-consuming to run, a full-scale exercise provides a more realistic context for the simulated response to an emergency situation, thus providing more constructive feedback to implement into plans.



To successfully execute any type of exercise, consider the following:

- Involve students, faculty, and staff in the exercise to provide a different perspective about the plan.
- Communicate information in advance to avoid panic and concern.
- Develop and practice a wide range of scenarios, based on the risk, threat, and hazard assessments of the campus.
 - Identify or try to identify the most likely event(s) the campus might encounter by consulting risk assessment data.
 - Include a variety of response procedures.
 - Practice and train under different conditions (e.g., time of day, weather, points in the academic calendar, and various campus events).
- Be consistent with common emergency management terminology, such as ICS.
- Debrief after each exercise and develop an after-action report. The report should evaluate and document results, identify lessons learned, and discuss how the emergency management plan and procedures will be modified, if needed. Designation of responsibility for modifying the plan should be specified.

It is important to remember that the emergency management plan is a dynamic document and should be practiced, modified, and updated on a yearly basis. The emergency management plan should include timelines for updating and should describe how campus staff will ensure that the plan aligns with current best practices for emergency management on campuses.



Emergency Management Plans of Institutions of Higher Education: Site-specific Documents


As mentioned earlier, there is no template or model emergency management plan that will suit every higher education institution. A strong emergency plan addresses the four phases of emergency management, defines key issues and vulnerabilities, capitalizes on institutional and community resources, and describes the roles and responsibilities of designated school officials as they integrate with community agencies. Plans should be developed based upon site-specific issues and validated through a number of collaborative exercises: site assessments, needs assessments (see page 31), inventories, meetings, and emergency exercises, including drills and tabletops.

The broad array of personnel and providers; the range of available resources; the scope and type of facilities, equipment, and structures; and the vast diversity in geographical, cultural, and social climates of an institution invariably will make plans very different from one locale to the next. As such, the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools advocates that IHEs engage in a thorough and inclusive emergency plan development process, as opposed to adapting or tailoring a preexisting plan from another institution. Only an institution that has undergone all of the aforementioned steps can know what is necessary to include in their individualized emergency plan. In addition, a plan is not only unique but also private to an institution. That is, a security interest exists in keeping aspects of an emergency management plans protected from public access.

Lest sharing of existing or sample plans be construed as prescriptive, no links or excerpts from sample or existing higher education institution emergency management plans are provided within this section of the document. However, valuable lessons from the field of emergency management relating to IHEs are eminently appropriate for distribution. In spring of 2008, the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, in partnership with Health and Human Services' Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), launched the Emergency Management for Higher Education grant program to support emergency preparedness planning for higher education institutions. In the future, important lessons learned from the subsidized efforts of these institutions will likely be shared with the field to supplement this guide and elucidate recommendations and key practices.

Implement Emergency Management Plan Action Items

As the emergency management plan was developed, a number of action items were identified, many related to prevention, mitigation, and preparedness. The risk assessment process identified areas of weakness with respect to vulnerabilities and response capabilities, coupled with specific action items for improvement in these areas. In the implementation phase, these action items are addressed one-by-one. Some may require approval and scheduling through capital improvement programs, maintenance programs, or other established systems. Some items will require the identification of funding sources and inclusion in budgets for the organization. For all items, points of responsibility and a specific schedule for implementation should be identified.




In many college and university systems, emergency management does not have a distinct or separate program budget. Institutions may want to establish a separate budget for emergency management as a means of emphasizing its support of emergency management objectives and facilitating the achievement of those objectives. A separate budget is one way to clarify what resources are needed for the emergency management program and sustain a level of commitment to the program over time.

Another type of action item in emergency management is the implementation of programs related to prevention and mitigation of hazards. For example, the institution may determine that it needs to conduct a campus culture and climate assessment (see page 33) and follow up with programs aimed at reducing the risk of violence on campus. The institution may not have a thorough threat assessment process in place in which case the development of such a process becomes a clear action item.

Monitor and Update the Plan

There are several ways to keep an emergency management plan fresh and subject to continuous improvement. Every time a training session or drill is conducted, there is an opportunity to identify weaknesses in the plan—things that need to be changed or added. Every time there is an actual emergency, be it minor or major, there is an opportunity to improve the plan based upon an after-action debriefing. After-action reports that follow exercises and corrective action reports that follow actual emergencies can provide important insights for plan improvements based on lessons learned. Over time, it is possible to identify more effective ways to prevent and mitigate emergencies, better ways to prepare for and respond to emergencies, and better ways to recover from them. Certainly, problems that surface in responding to an emergency will lead directly to ways to improve preparation. All of these improvements should be reflected in updates to the emergency management plan.

Suggestions for improvement can come from many sources. Emergency first responders in the local community are a great resource in this regard. As conditions in the community change, the plan may need to adapt. As the profession of emergency management evolves, new ideas and practices will come to light that can lead to plan updates. Suggestions for improvement also can come from faculty, staff, and others who are involved in training sessions and drills. Emergency management is everyone's concern.




After-action Reporting: Part of the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program

FEMA's Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) provides standardized policy, methodology, and terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. HSEEP recommends four performance requirements:

1. Conducting an annual training and exercise plan workshop and developing and maintaining a Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan.
2. Planning and conducting exercises in accordance with the guidelines set forth in HSEEP, vols. I–III.
3. Developing and submitting a properly formatted After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP). The format for the AAR/IP is found in HSEEP, vol. III.
4. Tracking and implementing corrective actions identified in the AAR/IP.

After-action report templates, along with other information on conducting and evaluating drills and exercises, are available online at FEMA's HSEEP Web site at: https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx.


As a general rule, the emergency management plan should undergo a relatively thorough review on an annual basis. It may be necessary to update the risk assessment work in the original plan and incorporate new information or changing conditions. As with all planning and implementation initiatives, there is a danger that enthusiasm will wane as time passes. An annual review and update process is a way to combat this problem and renew enthusiasm for a vigorous emergency management program. Another tactic for sustaining interest is to publicize the successes and accomplishments of the program to campus and community members, such as the completion of building structural improvements or the launching of an improved communications and notification system on campus.



CONCLUSION

This action guide has offered many suggestions for developing and implementing an emergency management plan for institutions of higher education. The plan should address all four phases of emergency management—Prevention-Mitigation, Preparation, Response, and Recovery. It should take an all-hazards approach, which means not only should it consider a full range of potential hazards, but it should recognize as well that there are commonalities across hazard types in practicing emergency management throughout the four phases. Leadership support within the institution is critical to the success of an emergency management planning effort. As noted, colleges and universities present unique characteristics relevant to emergency management. For these reasons, emergency management planning at each institution must be individualized and take into account the circumstances and characteristics at each specific campus. Also, as noted, a collaborative approach building partnerships both inside and outside the institutional system is a key success factor in emergency management planning.


Colleges and universities are places of learning. It is only appropriate that a spirit of learning and information sharing should be reflected in the emergency management planning process. Recent events are keen reminders of the need to be ready in the event that immediate activation of a comprehensive campuswide emergency plan with procedures for coordinating responses and recovery activities, regardless of the emergency, is warranted. All institutions of higher education undoubtedly see their obligations in this critical endeavor, and it is hoped that this guide provides helpful information towards improving and strengthening the broader field of emergency management for higher education.



FEMA's Emergency Management Higher Education Project Principles to Guide Emergency Management Plan Development


1. Comprehensive—emergency managers consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders, and all impacts relevant to disasters.
2. Progressive—emergency managers anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities.
3. Risk-driven—emergency managers use sound risk management principles (hazard identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources.
4. Integrated—emergency managers ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all elements of a community.
5. Collaborative—emergency managers create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.
6. Coordinated—emergency managers synchronize the activities of all relevant stakeholders to achieve a common purpose.
7. Flexible—emergency managers use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster challenges.
8. Professional—emergency managers value a science and knowledge-based approach based on education, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship, and continuous improvement.

More information on these principles and the Higher Education Project is available at FEMA's Emergency Management Institute at: <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/emprinciples.asp>.



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
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